REPORT: "Fonction Publique" and The Presidency

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Mr. Tho, the Director of Personnel, was more helpful than Mr. Tho. He sees his job primarily as dealing with Ministries and not with individuals, even though his organization is mainly designed to deal with individual cases. For example, he controls inter-Ministry transfers (but not intra-Ministry transfers) and does this by means of documents and not people. He knows which Ministries have authorized vacancies and will only permit transfers to them.
His organization also controls the leaves of all government employees. The Ministries send him reports of the leaves they have granted, though his organization still maintains "control." With repeated questioning he admitted that the Ministries had made very few mistakes on granting leaves, in recent months. He was nevertheless afraid that without his "control" the Ministries, especially the new ones who have no "skilled" personnel people, would make mistakes which would then become dangerous precedents.

In spite of the rather narrow, legalistic attitude regarding leaves, there are some worthwhile central personnel activities this organization can and does take on as a result of the kind of information on individual cases that flows through it. For example, they have begun to detect that government policies with respect to the reemployment of discharged soldiers are not clear. Mr. Thoi is now writing a memorandum on this matter to the Minister of the Interior. Mr. Thoi would like to see some government-wide policy regarding these reemployment problems.

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Mr. Thoi does not always limit himself but sometimes has used some imagination, for example, in redesigning his own organization to operate more efficiently than is set down in the pertinent Arrêté. For example, according to the Arrêté he was supposed to have one bureau within a service operate for
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Their big job now is the preparation and distribution of new regulations regarding the composition and pay of the 60-odd "cadres" of employees. These regulations for some cadres have been completed, but there are about 40 more cadres to go. Part of this problem of reordering cadres came about because of the centralizing of several disparate personnel systems formerly existing in Tonkin, Cochin China, Annam, and the PMS.

Once a new cadre has been formed, it becomes necessary to transfer sometimes thousands of persons from outdated cadres to the new one. This mass of clerical work should probably technically be done by the Director of Personnel, Mr. Thi. But Mr. Truong feels that this vast, delicate job can only be handled by his organization, if it is to be done "right." (This kind of action sets up a series of questions. For example, how does Mr. Truong get personnel for all this extra work? To what extent does this clerical load distract his
From addressing personnel, this information is necessary for keeping the Personal Information Act (PIA) compliant with respect to the relevant regulations. However, the procedure involves ensuring that all information is gathered and recorded effectively, which may require additional steps and resources.

It is important to note that personal information must be collected and processed for a specific purpose, and that the purpose must be clearly defined and documented. This is crucial for maintaining data integrity and ensuring that the information is used only for the intended purpose.

In addition, it is essential to safeguard the personal information collected, as required by law. This includes implementing appropriate security measures to protect the information from unauthorized access, use, or disclosure.

Furthermore, the organization is responsible for ensuring that the personal information collected is accurate and complete. This means that the data must be verified and updated regularly to ensure its accuracy. Additionally, the organization must provide individuals with the option to access and correct their personal information, as required by law.

In summary, the organization must take proactive steps to ensure that the personal information collected is handled appropriately, processed for the intended purpose, and safeguarded effectively. This requires a comprehensive approach, including proper documentation, security measures, and individual rights.

**Note:** The text appears to be incomplete or contains errors. The content may need to be reviewed and corrected for accurate representation.
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[Omitted text]

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from doing its main policy-setting job? What are the relations between Mr. Thoi and Mr. Truong? Etc.)

Mr. Truong admitted that there was some decentralization of the "regulation" of these cadres. Some cadres belong entirely or almost so to some one technical Ministry, e.g., Agriculture or Public Works. These Ministries then handle their own cadre "regulation" problems.

In addition to the clerical load that probably ought to be done by Mr. Thoi's office, there was another example of seeming overlapping in function between Mr. Truong's and Mr. Thoi's offices. Mr. Truong's office seemed also to handle some types of individual personnel problems. For example, Mr. Truong's office was now charged with making individual arrangements with highly qualified, technically trained Vietnamese abroad to get them to come home. In some cases they were offering 50,000 and more piastres a year. But there are no general regulations. Salaries seem to depend on individual bargaining factors. Another type of individual case Mr. Truong's organization deals with is settling salary arrangements for civil servants being sent abroad to study. (Note: I suspect Mr. Truong's rather than Mr. Thoi's office handles these individual cases because these are all salary matters; this distinction was never made in the interviews.)

Somehow, too, Mr. Truong sees his organization as a kind of watchdog over all the Ministries. The Ministers are all seen as unscrupulous empire builders. Mr. Truong's directorate somehow helps to keep the internal organizations of the various Ministries fairly uniform, especially with respect to numbers of personnel. This directorate somehow has power to keep Ministries from adding personnel. (Note: Here is a function closely related to budgeting.)
A large part of the time of the service of disputed cases seems to go into researching out the facts. Many cases are settled out of court, once the facts have been dug up. This disputed cases operation did not appear to assume large proportions. Mr. Truong himself evidently is able to handle much of this work even though he is not trained in law.

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### Table I.

**Numbers of Persons in Various Sections of Fonctiones Publics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIRECTOR GENERAL LEVEL</th>
<th>DIRECTOR LEVEL</th>
<th>CHIEF OF SERVICE LEVEL</th>
<th>CHIEF OF BUREAU LEVEL</th>
<th>WORK LEVEL</th>
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<tr>
<td>LEGISLATION</td>
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<td>18+ 3 S</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONTENTIEUX</td>
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<td>12+ 3 S (disputed cases)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAIL: 12+ 1 S</td>
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<td>PERSONNEL AND</td>
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<td>ACCOUNTING</td>
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<tr>
<td>10+ 1 S</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONFIDENTIAL MAIL AND</td>
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<td>FILING: 6+1 S</td>
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<td>MESSENGERS, JANITORS,</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHAUFFEURS, ETC. 15</td>
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<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL</td>
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<tr>
<td>53+7 S</td>
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<td>SERVICE</td>
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<td>35+3 S</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERVICE FOR CONTRACTUAL AND DAY-BY-DAY PERSONNEL</td>
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<td>BUREAU 1: 14+ 1 S</td>
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<td>BUREAU 2: 21+ 1 S</td>
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<td>BUREAU 1: 5+ 1 S</td>
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<td>BUREAU 2: 5+ 1 S</td>
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ORGANIZATION OF THE FONCTIONES PUBLIQUES

MINISTER OF INTERIOR

DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE FONCTIONES PUBLIQUES
MR. NHÔ

DIRECTOR GENERAL ADJOINT

DIRECTOR OF LEGISLATION AND DISPUTED CASES
MR. TRUONG

CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICE
(2 BUREAUS)

CHIEF OF SERVICE OF DISPUTED CASES
(2 BUREAUS)

CHIEF OF CENTRAL SERVICE
MR. THÔ

1. Mail BUREAU
(2 BUREAUS)

2. PERSONNEL AND ACCOUNTING AND MATERIAL
(for the Fonctiones publiques organisation only)

3. CONFIDENTIAL MAIL AND FILING

DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL
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