Richard J. Evans, Field Rep/Nhatrang.

Inclosure.
Field Report No FS-177

The attached paper is a copy of a critique and government reorganization plan submitted to me by Mr Ngo-Khoa-Thanh, Assistant Chief of Province at Phan Thiet (Binh Thuan province). You will perhaps recall that I was quite impressed with Mr Ngo and his real concern about the welfare of his people. At the Field Staff Conference, Col. Landsdale asked that we keep our eye out for potentially good civil leaders. I feel strongly about Mr Ngo's ability. In fact, he would do a far better job as Chief of Province than the present incumbent.

I have had a rough translation made of the attached document for my own files. I submit the Vietnamese copy to you for a more detailed and accurate copy than we have had time to prepare.

Mr Ngo submitted a copy of this paper to Hue for comment and consideration. It has been so far ignored. It probably will continue to be as it steps on the toes of the Public Officials at Hue and the functionnaires as a class. While there is some ambiguity in Mr Ngo's paper, there is also a lot of truth. At any rate, it will let you know a bit of the honest opinion of some of the Middle class Vietnamese.
PROPOSITIONS RELATIVE TO THE REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENTAL MACHINERY

In the terms of the Geneva agreement the VM must be regrouped by the stipulated date. But in the occurrence, a great number of VM agents tergiversate on the area and secretly they operate in the midst of the population especially in the villages formerly under their control (these villages are generally in the vicinities of jungles where access is generally risky). In the theatre of operations, these VM do all they can to bring about a "peaceful" policy which is nevertheless efficacious owing to the echo presently left of their former influence.

The so called policy tends to:
- Ensure credulity in the people for these agents and safeguard the prestige of Ho Chi Minh as well as of the communist party in preparation for the popular suffrage.
- Sabotage of the organizations enterprised by the National Government.

In view to attain the above objective, the VM are now planning:
- To carry out propaganda in favor of the popular government regime reversing every step of our own. Their campaign seems to have certain results on account of the close contact they have with the mass, and because of their systematic device aducing concrete examples to generate dislike and stir conflict between the classes of people etc.
- To terrorize every nationalist tendency especially the village council factors. They do not only try to infiltrate into this organism with an aim to substitute our men in the management of the village work so as to direct it in the Marxist style, but also are they fomenting trouble from time to time for the council to become discreditable. This is a trick to accuse the National Government of inaptitude, as having no appreciation and support of the people.
- To urge the mass to claim for immediate use of those rights of democracy that the National Government is not yet in a position to provide.
- To group their elements into nests hiding at solitary spots for pillerage insinuating the charge of powerless administration for the Nationalist part. If our authorities take any measure against such of their deeds, they would report it to the CIC as an aggression.
- To incite our troops back to agricultural occupations motivating that troop maintenance in peace time is no longer reasonable.
- All the VM being left behind have received secret order to infiltrate into the population to perform such plots of a deceitful kind of politics. For remuneration to their elements the VM force the peasants to contribute in cash and the products of some unknown lands.
they set for rents.

The fact that no reorganizational steps have ever been taken so far by our government to face the situation has rendered the existence of our administrative machinery apparently useless.

In this phase of history the position of the government officials deserves critics. They might as a matter of fact, have good ability and qualifications but in the absence of energetical and determinate fundamentals they seem to get along in their own initiatives; the results of their action are at the mercy of chance whereon depends the people's interest as well as the fate of the country. In words, the government is apparently leaving the people in the hands of untrained experimenters and such is obviously to account for failure more than success.

The position of a government official nowadays is no longer of the feudal system but it ought to be the symbol of faithful public servants in whom the qualities of sacrifice, good concept and straight behavior are required. Furthermore, they must be able to observe democracy as distinct from dictature and to discern right and wrong, avoiding false subjectivities of pride and self-support. In sum, the model government servant must be enlightened in a spirit of reform to evolve from individuals unto masses and from masses unto the nation.

In the preamble of an anti-communist campaign it is noteworthy to look first, over the potential and moral energy displayed in the echelons of our cadres so as to remedy imperfection and raise high the merits wherever necessary. In this respect, the selection of officials is undubiously an essential matter and to form them into valuable government servants is to a greater extent indispensable. Therefore, it appears that regional schools for formation and graduation of cadres be necessarily established in view to prepare officials capable of securing improvement for the popular existence.

The government officials may be considered as the instrumental factors in the economic and social reforms and therefore they must properly be chosen among the experienced elements and employed in accordance with their ability.

Beside the problem regarding officials we should not overlook the question of abroad studies. So far the government has not yet adopted any definite policy governing the vocational orientation of students and the implementation of emergencies in respect of the national reconstruction.

As outlined above, the concurrence of able cadres cannot sufficiently face the present situation if the administrative organizations are not reformed in a relative harmony.

On the one hand, the citizen should have a direct contact with the governmental organism so as to wipe out the mediation which generally leads work astray and defers expedition of affairs.
On the other hand, the government ought to look directly after the people so as to have a good understanding of their feelings and aspirations. This connection is to be maintained in politics as well as in the military, administrative and technical points of view.

A. - SIMPLIFICATION OF GOVERNMENTAL MACHINERY - ADMISSION OF POPULAR DELEGATES TO PARTICIPATE IN NATIONAL AFFAIRS.

The governmental machinery should necessarily be simplified particularly in the field of administration where too many hierarchic notches exist between the central and village bodies which are likely to keep the countrymen too far away and thus to retard work as much in private as in public undertakings. And consequently, the countrymen face a lot of troubles on the simple way of their life.

It is felt that the desire of the citizen is to see the administrative system organized in the manner to permit him an easy and rapid approach to its organism. To this end it is advisable that all superfluous mediators be abolished (for instance, special posts assuming no other offices than the reception and transmission of orders). And affairs would be fast expedited if the villages could make a direct contact with the provincial authorities or through the district’s and so on are the provinces in regard to the presidency or ministries. All the intermediate work heretofore in rule should be left to the discretion of the authorities in province, district or village.

The Two-Head or Three-Head administrative system must not be applied because it is likely to stir up complication in the hierarchies and make inadequate the power of the government delegate in prompt decisions. Indeed, the annals of our administration give us to observe that such a system only results in one-mone ruling while the others become dissatisfied to see their power outdone. To make up for the retrenchment in administrative notches it is recommendable to extend the inspection service in personnel as well as in power. The administrative inspectors should have full power to control and investigate whenever they desire but not to wait for orders from higher quarters as in the rule of the present system which is only pseudo inspection. They must also be conferred the right to propose, appreciate and promote as well as to blame. Their task consists of the study and proposition of projects liable to bring unification for ideas and action of the governmental organism.

THE PEOPLE OUGHT TO BE ENTITLED TO TAKE PART IN NATIONAL AFFAIRS

As the principles of democracy are based on the election made by the people, it appears that a so called regime is only valid when it is supported by the National Assembly.

The latter is comparable to a thermometer registering the temperatures in popular opinions to guide the government toward the adoption of policies suitable for the popular aspirations. The rights of vote and consultation enable the people to disclose their outlooks and to bring to light unfair abuses.
Therefore the formation of a National Assembly is preponderant. In the conception of a definite constitution the provisional assembly may proceed to a constitutional project for ample democracy. A copy of this project should be presented to all political sects and to the administrative organism in villages for discussion and advices.

Constitutional elements may include delegates of political sects, deputies of capitol, province, district and village and delegates of various syndicates.

B. - ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL DELEGATIONS IN VILLAGES

1. - Organization: The village is the basis of the administrative organism. In these peculiar circumstances the administrative machinery in village must be of a peculiar character. Because no special delegation of the government had ever existed in villages sometime previously, it is now necessary to assign governmental delegates for villages in view to follow closely and supervise the work carried out by the village councils. A number of VM agents have infiltrated into these councils for sabotage practices. Their secret propaganda and intimidation have affected the morale of the councilors insofar as many of them have to consult with VM each time they receive any circular or notice from the higher authorities and their action is generally directed by VM.

In the village sphere, the position of an administrative cadre is extremely important. His task is not only to look into the work of the village council but also to follow up every action in administration as in security in order to push it to the rate of general development. In case the numeral of available cadres is far to meet the requirements for villages it would be of convenience to coordinate the villages into groups. In each group is stationed an administrative cadre assuming the offices of a governmental delegate within the power assigned to him by the province or district authorities.

The effective cadres for administration must have beside a good training, accomplished a stage period in the country side. First of all they must have a lively spirit rather than the clumsiness of officials inclined to comfort and arrogance toward the countrymen. They should share with the villagemen the same life in sentiments and materials so as to understand them well.

In the field of administration in villages, political topics are the key part in the mission of an administrative cadre. He is the example of the nationalist principles and must behave in the way to grow belief in the morale of the people. The excellence of conduct would help overcoming the enemy sabotage and to prevent the attempt of VM to bring the population back on their way.

2. - Accommodations: Any facilities either material or financial attributable to villages would be appreciated.

However, it would be unfit to contemplate everlasting edifices because:
Such works would be obviously of a long standing.
- The financial possibilities do not cover all the needs of the villages
- The political situation is not seemingly to ensure such painstaking reconstructions from eventual destruction.

Suggestions are therefore made to an economical reconstruction. However cheap this work might, it could all the same cover for the time being the needs of the villages.

The protection of governmental personnel in villages requires a force in security and police and in this connection we can rely on the Police Force which is supposedly to be reformed into National Self-Defense Force after an appropriate training.

As far as the regular troops are concerned, it is advisable to have them temporarily assisting the regional security force and stationed at strategic points so as to ensure a ready intervention. But it seems that these troops would be soon reorganized into combatting units and subsequently could not be scattered in too many places. Therefore the station of the regional security force at important posts would become necessary to help the village small posts.

If the figures of village groups in a province are supposedly from 80 to 100 units, the numeral of specific requirement for regional self-defense force is evaluated at 1,500 to 2,000 men.

But before the assignment of these elements to village guard it is necessary to have them trained for a high spirit of duty (political training course for instance) a vocational aptitude either in the military or in other relativities such as social, sanitary, administrative etc. according to the plan of action they are called for.

Employing regional self-defense force to supplement or to back up regular troops is an erroneous idea. The former should properly be placed directly under the responsibilities of the Home Ministry in order to insure sufficient prestige for the administrative organism. A long stationing of regional self-defense force in villages is tentatively indispensable to secure for the troops a good understanding of sentiments and customs in different villages.

This way of organizing would save this force from being moved at any time by the government for incorporation into the regular force. Such a displacement would entail disturbance in the rank resulting in the interruption of the task and the loss of influence at the expenses of the overall development.

In view to raise the value of regional self-defense troops to a higher scale, an improved standard of retribution and allocations is recommended. It is further advisable that such troops be recruited among the class of young men having good education and clear ideas of nationalism.

The future of the administrative organism depends greatly on the selection and training of the regional self-defense troops.
Propositions:

- To place the regional self-defense force under the responsibilities of the Home-Ministry which is to assign it to the discretion of the provincial authorities.

- To select able veterans for the officering of troops.

- To create a position of "Political-Officer" for every echelon.

- To reserve a number of personnel for the purposes of: entertainments, sanitation, charity, education, information, police etc.

- To open training courses.

- To organize competitions for sports, race etc.

With the assistance of well trained police groups (constituted by regional self-defense troops or national self-defense troops) the government delegate in each village would be able to ensure security for the village authorities and population in their current activities such as popular education, sanitary works, propaganda campaigns and tracking of VM etc.

We would have presumably an efficient administrative machinery if to the above organizations are joined the services of population census and land reform administered in a temporary but adequate manner.

The vital point of the policy outlined is the perspective of a wide spread nationalist influence while expenditures are little in comparison to possibilities.

PLANNED MACHINERY FOR VILLAGE ADMINISTRATION

It has been exposed above that the presence of a government delegate in villages is very important in the present circumstances. This official will operate in the village under the protection of the regional self-defense force which should be all the time ready in the village. He will supervise the daily work of the village authorities and observe the opinions expressed among the villagemen. A part of the self-defense personnel especially trained for popular activities will assist the cadres carry out their work in respect of their task.

But such organizations are not yet sufficient to introduce positively the governmental influence into every recess of the country if a determinate program of action is not drawn up. In this connection let us examine the situation in the villages of Central Vietnam so that we might find an appropriate remedy.

Present situation in the village of CVN

It is noticed in the field of reform that CVN villages are far
behind SVN villages where land services and community budgets have already existed.

This inadequacy is probably due in the one case to the state of insecurity persisting in CVN villages and in the others, to the fact that the areas returning under the power of the national government in CVN are so immense and are so much covered by jungles and mountains that the villages are dissociated and communications are rendered hazardous. As the fire has supposedly just ceased, the villages have freshly engaged in the way of reconstruction which is mostly on the ground of ruins left by the vicissitudes of warfare. This state of things deserves attention in every point of view.

a) Political conditions

A number of dangerous VM agents being left behind are operating in secret some time openly, to sabotage the work carried out by the national government in respect of reorganization and pacification. They are doing all they can to impede our way and to gain the people's favor.

This clandestine existence of VM is not generally reported to the administrators although the enemey mischief is not praiseworthy in the opinions of our men. The reason that keeps our men so quiet is that the competent authorities are too far away to assure them protection from the terror of VM which persists more or less in the thought/these helpless peasants.

So are the VM taking advantage of this state of hesitation to perform their maneuvers. Any village organism infiltrated by VM is fast polluted. Insomuch as the governmental influence is rapidly eclipsed in this village. Beside these clandestine activities the VM are carrying on some other sorts of agency like armed groups hiding in the jungles, syndicates of cultivators, educational classes, liaison bureaux for the reception and transmission of orders, entertainments etc.

b) Economic conditions

In the economic domain agriculture is the main activity of our deltaic populations while fishing is vocational to most of our people living on the coasts.

As far as CVN is concerned, many provinces in this part of the country have not yet established any land survey and evidently no specific service is yet in force. All the original documents relating to land repartition and properties have either been lost or made away by the VM and so are/the distribution and recognition of lands a very hard matter now to deal with. And the VM make the best of this situation to hold to the lands they had usurped from the countrymen in war time. In order to draw profits from these lands the VM either place them under the care of their agents or give them for rents to the villagemen. In this way the VM agents operating in the village can obtain a regular source of livings. Unless necessary steps are taken to bar this imposture, it is feared that the VM might go on in these conditions which are detrimental to the
prestige of the national government in respect of the popular election.

In such a deplorable state of things the government misses a good opportunity to prove to the proletarians the benefits of its land reform enterprise while the wealthy landlords are given the chance of a confuse situation to withhold the excess of their lands for speculative purposes. This excess should theoretically be shared to the needy peasants as provided in the plan of reform. Under such circumstances the prestige of our government is undoubtedly at stake.

And here are the bad needs of the cultivators:

- Tilling stocks (a big lot of their old stocks have been killed by war operations)

- Renovation of dike-dams (these are practically out of use for lack of maintenance and so are the crops entirely at the mercy of rainfalls)

- Assistance to land owners for the resumption of their agrarian works (these unfortunate people encounter a lot of troubles in procuring money by their own means. They have now to borrow money from rich citymen who charge so heavy interests as 50% for paddy and 100% for cash loan)

- Fertilizers for their lands (the peasant life is presently very hard, primarily the lack of fertilizers gives their lands a bad yielding and secondly their debts come generally to maturity at the crop period which compels them to sell their crops at cheap prices and consequently a shortage in incomes).

Now let us consider the fisherman existence:

Most of these people have no means to procure themselves gears and barges. They depend mostly on certain owners charging very high rent for their equipments and this is the reason why the poor fishermen are generally so full of debts that they have frequently to sell their catch at cheap prices to the creditors.

In sum, our poor fishermen are existing in the same conditions as our poor cultivators do.

c) Social conditions

The national government has recovered its power on many immense areas but has not yet accomplished any reorganizational work to suit this development of power. The slowness of its action might chiefly have its source in the lack of a program of action parallel to the speedy change of events. Such an imperfection may be interpreted as the defect arising from the strict observation of superfluous and too formal routines on the part of the governmental machinery. And this is the reason why many villages have been rallied for 4 long months already and no sign of governmental influence is ever expressed in
these villages: the village councils do not work according to the instructions given them by the administrative authorities, no teachers are seemingly to arrive for the resumption of popular education in replacement of the VM closed down schools, no medical assistance is yet available to the village patients etc. These items are the main subject of social action for which the peasants must not be kept waiting too long. In the agricultural point of view nothing is yet launched in contest with the VM organizations.

The national government contemplates a reform which sound very nice but in implementation the project still lies in procrastination; and the poor countrymen are eagerly looking forward to the realization of the promised improvement. They are all holding to the belief that the nationalist promises are not empty ones like the queer fancy of VM rulers.

In fact, if the national government makes efforts to meet the aspirations of the countrymen in due speed and efficiency it would undubiously secure high appreciations and a firm support of the people. It is in the country field that a reform of the peasant existence is the real arm to be tried for final victory in the communist and nationalist battle (the whole population of Vietnam is represented in the countryside by 9/10). It may be also presumed that the fate of democracy itself is not lying beyond the power of these marshy fields.

d) Financial conditions

The finance potential of the villages have been depleted by the vicissitudes of the country drama and furthermore have these villages extremely suffered from the VM device of resistance in "clear land and empty house" that the strained resources of the villages are not at the level to stand the numerous expensive items created by new circumstances. A coordination of budgets is therefore proposed for village groups in order to provide a relative credit for the common needs.

Such a coordination would in the occurrence, increase work for the village councils and would require the presence of a number of personnel. Therefore compensatory allocations for services rendered are to be taken into consideration.

Moreover, it is noteworthy to stress on the fact that incomes obtainable from the lands under the VM maneuvers are sufficiently important to feed the village budgets and deserve the government's attention. We find it necessary that a service for the control of lands be immediately established in villages.

Subsidiary credits are also indispensable for other needs of the villages but it is advisable that the government adopt a system of allocation based on the efforts displayed by the villages interested (for instance, if a certain village wants a good school building, the population of this village must at first, endeavor to raise for the purpose half of the cost and afterwards the government would complete the balance). The advantage of the system here proposed is largely comprehensible.
The salaries allowed presently to the village officials are not so reasonably scheduled, most of the echelons are enrolled for a pay relatively too high for village financial position while the standard of living in villages is rather low. In this case it would be impossible to make any reserve for provincial nor village budgets.

B. - PROPOSITIONS

The question asked is an early solution to the needs presently felt in the villages in order to push them ahead in this conjunction of events. This solution must discard all superfluous steps and all expensive undertakings. Readiness, adequacy and little cost are the principal devices to be applied. Any huge planning should properly be reserved for the second phase.

a) Political measures

Vigilance must be assumed to stop VM plots. For the sake of security the population census ought to be made. The system of records used so far in the villages is not sufficient. A rough chart of the village structure must be drawn up such as to show every recess, entrance, exit, passage, cottage, hamlet, thatched or tile roofs etc. Every village house must have a serial number and at the same time a register must be made to mark down every family home. Another register is to be used for nominal registration and to record detailed information about every village inhabitant. This would help the village authorities in the ready detection of suspects and dangerous elements as well as to caution the VM about their subversive intrigue.

In the event the villagers deliberately trespass on the rule of our government it is advisable to apply the system of joint responsibilities and vigilance (5 or ten families jointly responsible for the conduct of the group individuals).

All disorderly elements must be kept away, preferably confined in reeducation camps such as have been successfully applied in Egypt. Such a confinement is not a punishment but a way to train them for an industrial career and to give them proper education.

In order to avoid conflict in authority, the army and political bodies should have specific attributions of power and responsibility. In the sphere of the troops, the responsibility constantly resides in the performance of duties contributing to the welfare of the people (construction of roads, medicinal distribution, protection for the weak etc.). Our experiences have shown that the troops are in regard to the people as fish in regard to water and to displease the people is to create for ourselves a bad situation. This does not mean that the troops are inactive but on the contrary they must always be ready to defend firmly the governmental power against the enemy intrusion.

In view to prevent possible friction between the regular and the Self-Defense troops in operations it is recommendable that the latter be stationed in every village to take care of administrative vigilance.
and popular entertainments while the regular troops should be grouped into combatting units to be employed especially in operational plannings and campaigns.

To the same extent of solidarity it is noteworthy to give consideration to the class of men who were formerly compelled to work for the VM or are they nationally converted. If we help these men to procure for themselves some steady means of existence or to rally themselves to the nationalist front, it might be expected that they become our valuable auxiliaries. In so doing we may have a further advantage of calming the opinions of the leisured classes.

The institution of a land service in villages is the prime necessity for the control of the village economics. Prior to hostilities such a service had already existed under a rudimentary structure at CVN. It is now so much ravaged that a groovy renovation would require a lot of time and expenses while the emergency urges us to way back to the traditional methods which are practical and cheap before a better solution could be obtained. In this respect a special course initiating the practice of combined ancient and modern methods is suggested in order assure early determination of land properties and rights. The village cadres and councils must therefore proceed immediately to the re-establishment of the village land services in the same manner as for the population census outlined above. Such works are instrumental to the program of land reform the government contemplates.

This reform ought to be at any rate, accomplished at the earliest date. Another problem consisting of dams, irrigation and draining must also be solved in order to help cultivations. To save time and expenses it is advisable that the government organize agricultural cooperatives.

In regard to circulation it appears necessary to abolish the regulations being enforced by warfare or are they intentionally imposed by the French rulers themselves in view to separate our people. A free circulation would help our people assure regular supplies avoiding speculative practices and black markets and consequently a better standard of living might be secured. Therefore we find it necessary that the existing means of communication be renovated so as to facilitate intercourses between different parts of the country and eventually the development of the people's cultural.

**Agricultural Credit**

The poverty observed in the countrymen has been disclosed in the above chapters and here, suggestions are made to the institution of an agricultural credit for assistance to the needy cultivators.

The poor cultivators having visibly no material guarantee for the loan they want, the agricultural credit should be organized in such a way as to assure a solitary warrant from several cultivator families for the borrowing person and that credits should be allowable only to proletarians considered solvent by their producing ability.
It is noticed that needs and debt obligations usually make the poor cultivators sell their crops at very cheap prices early after harvesting and the rich merchants (mostly Chinese) make the best of this situation in speculative transactions. To bar such eventualities it would be much appreciable if the government organizes public granaries in villages so as to enable the cultivators deposit their crops and obtain cash advances until better negotiation is realized (either by themselves or through the credit service). In this way the poor cultivators would have better profits although they have to pay a certain amount for storage and interests on the loan they are to receive.

Other needs of the cultivators reside actually in tilling stocks. But the problem of stocks and tools is not so hard to deal with so long as the agricultural credit and cooperative are available.

Fisheries

The people living on fishing are not concerned with agricultural organizations but fishing barges and gears are the items they want. These people have equally suffered from the operations of war and deserve the same considerations as the cultivators are to receive in regard to assistance.

c) Social measures

The program outlined for an economic reconstruction may be considered as the master piece of the social reform because it would afford the people an improved standard of living and work up for them a better existence.

The government has in prospect very sound programs for social action but in the country side the villagers do not expect more than the minimum for their urgent needs in school for children, nursery and first-aid station where the village patient could find consolation in an efficacious medicinal dose same as the needy peasant who would be relieved of his grief by a piece of clothes or a bowl of rice.

d) Financial measures

The financial situation in villages is not presently so bright. However, it would be improved if the population census and land control services were reorganized in time to enable budgetary operations. The creation of village budgets should be realized in the simplest way with the participation of the village representatives in organization as in the control of any operations.

e) Youth movements

In the fulfillment of their duties, the administrative personnel ought to discern among the people all opportunities of cooperation either with individuals or groups in view to initiate the young generation to the spirit of common interest based on the sentiment of sacrifice and devotion displayed.
In this respect, the youth class should be given extensive facilities for action and must be systematically guided. Any arrangements to this intention must not have a severe character like the fascist usage.

It is believed that formation of young pioneers and organization of sporting groups as well as composition of delighting hymns are the subjects not to be neglected. They seem trivial but practically they afford the villagemen a sound recreation in replacement of the kinds the VM had given them. The lack of relaxation after tedious hours of life might turn them back to the habits in the past and eventually does not help politics.

D. - ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTION IN VILLAGE

In the light of this organizational prospecture the countryside is evidently the axis of governmental action. And it is a rule that every part of the administrative machinery be controlled in the way to assure a regular work for the overall organization.

It is a matter of evidence that the province or district chiefs are responsible for the control in their sphere but practically these officials are often so much overwhelmed by various affairs that they cannot look thoroughly into details wherefore the assistance of special administrative inspectors is a matter of necessity.

The principle recommended to the inspecting works is that they be represented in any circumstances whatsoever, by detailed reports and proper comments. The administrative inspectors in the province echelon should be conferred appropriate power and benefits so that they might positively improve the position of the villages.

In this connection, the government or its regional delegates must have their programs of action drawn up in such a manner as to assure concrete results in definite time. These programs must be scheduled into stages at each of which specific main work must be accomplished. The whole program of action the government is to carry out must of course, be completed before the date of election stipulated in the Geneva agreement will expire.

It would be impossible to determine the popular opinions in regard to the nationalist motion if a test election is not made now in the villages under our control. And it appears to be the duty of the administrative body to investigate into the possibilities of this test and to proceed immediately to realization as can until a summary idea is obtained about the popular opinions.

Such a campaign must be carefully carried out in order to bar all eventual infiltration of VM. To this end, it is useful that the government have beside the normal organizations (administrative cadres, self-defense force, village councils, teaching staff, nurses, information agencies, security services etc.) some special administrative mobile teams whose mission is in apparence for administrative control but in fact is to prepare the ground for election.
It is estimated that each team should spend at least 2 weeks in each village to fulfill the task and as the election is supposedly to take place in 15 months from now, the number of teams required for the whole country are therefore proportional to the totality of villages concerned. In regard to the composition of such teams, it is preferable that they represent a mixture of political, administrative and technical elements aiming at a common objective which is to attract the whole mass.

In case the nationalist succeeds to prove its reliability, there is no doubt that the people will realize the way they must follow when they have to vote.

**CONCLUSION**

The question of victory in this battle between Nationalism and Communism asks for a support of the mass and the key to this problem is likely to lie in the early realization of the program of reform the government has before itself.

This key represents the general aspirations of the countryside as have been explicit in the lines of this plan.
USOM

Saigon, Vietnam

Date: June 22, 1955

TO: Dr. Weidner, Chief Advisor, Michigan State University Project

FROM: M.H.B. Adler, Chief, Field Service

SUBJECT: Field Report No. FS - 248

INFORMATION COPY

The attached field report is transmitted to you for your information.

Please address any comments or inquiries you may have regarding the subject of this report to me.

This report has been distributed as follows:

Action copy: Mr. Cardinaux, Resettlement

Info copies: Mr. Lavergne, AB/RR

Dr. Poindexter, Health and Sanitation

Mr. Martini, Controller

Dr. Weidner, Chief Advisor, Michigan State University Project
Refugees in Bình Thuan Province

FIELD REPORT NO. FS - 248

June 14, 1965

Mr. H. B. Adler, Field Chief of Field Service, Saigon

Richard J. Evans, Field Representative, Nhattrang.

There are 15 Refugee resettlement camps in this Province, 10 regular refugees and 5 Rung camps. This report concerns the conditions affecting the regular refugees.

All of these camps can be considered to be in category B. All could very quickly be raised to A if reasonable refugee program activation could be made.

This province like most of them has a very ineffective refugee program. As a matter of fact, considering the number of refugees in this province the situation is serious. I strongly suspect irregularities in the Administration of the refugee program. People who have been here since December have not paid either lump sum payment or their housing allowance.

The Assistant Chief of Province Lau Ba Cham and the Chief of refugee service Nguyen Mau Thanh were much disturbed about the questionnaire and were very evasive about answering questions. This was particularly true where the questions involved expenditures of money.

As far as I can see little or nothing has been done for the refugees.

The refugee Chief says that Hue has not sent the money. He also says that all he is supposed to do is to give out money and keep records. Problems of health, fisheries, agriculture, education etc... are the responsibility of the Ministries in these fields. These Ministries disclaim any responsibility for refugees. They maintain that their problem is regular inhabitants. It is all a mess of confusion, procrastination, evasion of responsibility and lack of cooperation. This is evident all along the line national, regional and local.

This province is in a position of extreme vulnerability to dissention. 50% of the people are favorable to the Government of President Diem, 10% are avowed Viet Minh sympathizers and 40% are "on the fence". Refugees are becoming more and more discontented daily. Of the 17 618 refugees in identified camps only about 500 or 600 have received lump sum payments. Only part have received the 25 days subsidy of 12 piasters. When asked the reason for this delay the
Province authorities have a number of confusing excuses.

Mr Khanh A.M.A. Representative of the Area was with me on this trip he admits that a great deal of the trouble is in fact that Hue will not decentralize authority and that requests by all of the Provinces are delayed for months or ignored all together.

I would like to suggest the following plan of action as a mean of rectifying the problems of Refugee Resettlement in S.C.V.

1) Action to force Hue to either grant the Provinces authority to act or expedite their own operation of refugee relief.

2) Prevail on Ministries of the national government. Health, agriculture, public works etc... to inform their province offices to cooperate with provincial refugee chiefs.

3) Arrange some sort of control by Field Representative over distribution of Refugee Relief. I do not mean to give the responsibility to us but to give us authority to make end use checks. I strongly believe that only a small portion of Refugee Relief is reaching the refugees.

4) Secure a definite and clear discussion from the Refugee High Commission regarding the families of military men who are not wives and children. These people should receive refugee status but are not. Great hardship and injustice is being perpetrated by this condition.

5) Secure release of medical and sanitary supplies to the provinces by the regional medical service. The organization of medical services and the lack of distribution of supplies is creating not only a grave hardship on the people but building a strong dissatisfaction with American Aid Programs.

6) Inaugurate some kind of training and organization of provincial technical programs, that will result in some kind of action. At the present time very little construction work is being done.