A Threat to the Peace

North Viet-Nam’s Effort
To Conquer South Viet-Nam

PART II—The Appendices
A Threat to the Peace

North Viet-Nam's Effort
To Conquer South Viet-Nam

In Two Parts

PART II—The Appendices

PART I—A separate publication—
is the report which refers
to these appendices

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Direction of the Viet Cong by North Viet-Nam

(See Part I, section IV, pp. 14-18)

The Government and the Communist Party in North Viet-Nam provide support and encouragement to the illegal movement to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam. The Communist Party, called the Lao Dong (Workers) Party in North Viet-Nam, provides the ideological orientation of the so-called "liberation movement" in South Viet-Nam.

The following excerpts from Lao Dong Party declarations and from the articles and speeches of party and government officials in Hanoi demonstrate clearly the leading role played by North Viet-Nam in the Viet Cong campaign in the South:

1. From the resolution of the 3d National Congress of the Lao Dong (Workers) Party of Viet-Nam adopted at Hanoi on September 10, 1960:

   "1. The Third National Congress of the Party unanimously finds that over the past nine years and more, from the Second Congress to the third, under the leadership of the party, the Vietnamese revolution has won big victories. . . .
   "The people's democratic power, more and more consolidated, is a strong instrument for fulfilling the tasks of proletarian dictatorship and speeding up socialist transformation and socialist construction in the North; at the same time, it is a firm base for our whole people in their struggle for the strengthening of peace and the achievement of national reunification. Under the leadership of the party, the People's Army has vigorously developed its revolutionary character, scored new achievements in study and in work, and made steady progress in turning itself into a regular and modern army.
   "The national united front has been consolidated, the worker-peasant alliance strengthened. The Viet-Nam fatherland front and the political parties and mass organizations, members of the front, have made active contributions to the cause of socialist revolution in the North and the struggle for national reunification.
   "In the South, our compatriots' struggle against the American imperialists and their agents, the Ngo Dinh Diem clique, though facing many difficulties, is being firmly maintained and further expanded day by day. Our people throughout the country have united closely in their struggle and enjoy worldwide sympathy and support. The American imperialists and their henchmen are more and more isolated. . . .
   "Since the reestablishment of peace and the complete liberation of the North, the Vietnamese revolution has shifted over to a new stage. Under the leadership of the party, the North is advancing by firm steps toward socialism; it has strengthened its forces in all fields and become the bulwark of the nationwide revolution. Meanwhile, the U.S. imperialists and the Ngo Dinh Diem clique have set up a despotic and warlike administration in the South and turned it into a colony of a new type and a military base of the American imperialists. They are hampering and sabotaging the cause of national reunification of our people.
   "In the present stage, the Vietnamese revolution has two strategic tasks: first, to carry out the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam; second, to liberate South Viet-Nam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order to achieve national unity and complete independence and freedom throughout the country. These two strategic tasks are closely related to each other and spur each other forward.
   "To take the North toward socialism is a necessary and unavoidable task following the completion of the national people's democratic revolution. To take the North toward socialism and make it more and more powerful in every field will benefit the revolutionary movement for the liberation of the South, the development of the revolution throughout the country, and the preservation and consolidation of peace in Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the world. Therefore, to carry out the socialist revolution in the North, in the South we
must endeavor to rally all national and democratic forces, expand and consolidate the national unity bloc, isolate the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, and speed up the struggle to strengthen peace and reunify our fatherland. That is why the guiding principle of the socialist revolution in the North is: To build the North and take the South into due consideration.

"In the completion of the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country and the achievement of national reunification, our compatriots in the South have the task of directly overthrowing the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their agents. The revolutionary struggle of our compatriots in the South also aims at frustrating the attempt of the U.S.-Diem clique to rekindle war, and making an active contribution to the defense of peace in Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the world. That is why the struggle of our southern compatriots against the U.S.-Diem clique for the liberation of the South has a decisive and direct effect on the liberation of the South, the achievement of national reunification, and the completion of the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country.

"The two revolutionary tasks of the North and the South belong to two different strategies, each task being aimed at satisfying the definite requirement of each zone under the specific conditions of our divided country. But these two tasks have one common aim—to achieve peaceful national reunification and resolve one common contradiction of our whole country—the contradiction between our people and the imperialists and their henchmen.

"The common task of the Vietnamese revolution at present is: to strengthen the unity of all the people; to struggle resolutely to maintain peace, to accelerate the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam while at the same time stepping up the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam; to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy; to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, rich, and strong Viet-Nam; and to contribute practically to reinforcing the socialist camp and to maintaining peace in Southeast Asia and in the world. . . .

"The immediate task of the revolution in the South is to achieve the unity of the whole people, to fight resolutely against the aggressive and war-mongering U.S. imperialists, to overthrow the dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem ruling clique, lackeys of the democratic coalition government in South Viet-Nam, to win national independence and establish democratic freedoms, to improve the people's livelihood, to safeguard peace, to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy, and to make an active contribution to the defense of peace in Southeast Asia and the world.

"The revolution in the South is a protracted, hard, and complex process of struggle, combining many forms of struggle of great activity and flexibility, ranging from lower to higher, and taking as its basis the building, consolidation, and development of the revolutionary power of the masses. During this process we must pay special attention to the work of organizing and educating the people, first and foremost the workers, peasants and intellectuals, promoting to the highest degree the revolutionary fighting spirit of the various strata of our patriotic countrymen. We must unceasingly expose the criminal schemes and acts of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, doing our utmost to divide and isolate them.

"To insure the complete success of the revolutionary struggle in South Viet-Nam our people there must strive to establish a united bloc of workers, peasants, and soldiers and to bring into being a broad national united front directed against the U.S.-Diem clique and based on the worker-peasant alliance. This front must rally all the patriotic classes and sections of the people, the majority and minority nationalities, all patriotic parties and religious groupings, together with all individuals inclined to oppose the U.S.-Diem clique. The aims of its struggle are peace, national independence, democratic freedoms, improvement of the people's living conditions, and peaceful national reunification.

"The front must carry out its work in a very flexible manner in order to rally all forces that can be rallied, win over all forces that can be won over, neutralize all forces that should be neutralized, and draw the broad masses into the general struggle against the U.S.-Diem clique for the liberation of the South and the peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

"The revolutionary movement in the South plays a very important role in relation to the reunification of the country. Simultaneously with the effort to build the North and advance toward socialism our people must strive to maintain and
develop the revolutionary forces in the South and create favorable conditions for peaceful national reunification.

2. From the speech of Ho Chi Minh at the opening session of the Lao Dong Party’s 3rd Congress in Hanoi, September 5, 1960:

"In the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and private capitalist industry and commerce, we have won a victory of a decisive character. We have recorded many achievements on the agricultural and industrial production fronts, and in cultural and educational work, and have made improvements in the people’s living standards. The North is becoming more and more consolidated and transformed into a firm base for the struggle for national reunification. The big victories won over the past 9 years have testified to the correctness of our party’s line and the firmness of our party’s leadership. They are victories of Marxism-Leninism in a country which has suffered imperialist oppression and exploitation. Our party is worthy of the confidence of our people from north to south.

“Our party can be proud to be the heir to our people’s glorious traditions, and the guide of our people on the road to a bright future. . . .

“The victories of the Vietnamese revolution are due also to the wholehearted assistance of the fraternal socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union and China. We avail ourselves of this opportunity to express our warm feelings of gratitude toward the fraternal socialist countries headed by the great Soviet Union. We are also sincerely grateful to other fraternal parties, first of all, to the French Communist Party, for their active support to our people’s just struggle. We sincerely thank all colonial peoples and peace-loving people throughout the world, who have always given us their sympathy and support.

“The history of the 30-year-long struggle of our party has taught us this: the best guarantee of victory for the revolution is to steep ourselves in Marxism-Leninism; to remain loyal to the interests of the working class and the people; to preserve solidarity and unity of mind within the party and between all Communist parties and all countries of the big socialist family. . . .

“A prosperous and strong North is the firm base of the struggle for national reunification. This congress will shed new light on our people’s revolutionary path to peaceful national reunification. Our nation is one, our country is one. Our people will undoubtedly overcome all difficulties, achieve national reunification and bring the North and the South together again.'

“Dear comrades, the Vietnamese revolution is a part of the world forces of peace, democracy, and socialism. The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam is a member of the big socialist family headed by the great Soviet Union. It is our duty to defend the advance post of socialism in Southeast Asia, to endeavor to contribute to the strengthening of the forces of the socialist camp, and to safeguard peace in Southeast Asia and the world. . . ."

3. From an article by Ho Chi Minh in the Belgian Communist publication Red Flag, July 10, 1959:

“We are building socialism in Viet-Nam, but we are building it in only one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to direct and bring to a close the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution.”

4. From the speech of Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap to the Lao Dong Party’s 3rd Congress in Hanoi, September 12, 1960:

“The August general uprisings [against the French] are a model of successful uprisings in a colonial and semifeudal country and a model of a clever association between political and armed struggles and between the political forces of the masses and the revolutionary armed forces.

“The success of the August general uprisings proves that under the present world situation, the liberation struggle by the people of a colonial country—under fixed historic conditions—can be brought to a successful conclusion through the channel of uprisings. This is an experience having a creative character which has been daily proved by the rich realities of the people’s liberation movements over the past few years. . . .

“These successes and experiences give us this lesson: to be successful, the armed struggle and the building of armed forces must be guided by correct political lines and the armed struggle must serve the objectives of the political struggle. Indeed, during the whole process of its leadership over the armed struggle, our party kept a firm hold on the national democratic revolutionary line and cor-
rectly associated the anti-imperialist responsibility with the antifeudal responsibility, thus achieving brilliant successes. At the same time, we have fully understood that 'to build and consolidate our armed forces is one of the important conditions enabling our revolution to defeat any aggressive enemy, protect, and develop its achievements;' as stated in the political report.

"Under the lively conditions of our people's liberation struggle, our party has set forth a correct policy concerning the revolutionary armed struggle and on the building of the revolutionary armed forces: it is the policy of people's war and people's army. The major significance of this policy lies in the fact that our party has cleverly and creatively applied the general principles of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete realities of the revolutionary struggle in a former colonial and semi-feudal country like ours. This is the cause of all successes achieved by our party.

"After thoroughly surveying the international and domestic situation, the political report of the party Central Committee sets forth the revolutionary task to be carried out by our people in the present phase as follows: 'to strengthen the unity of all the people; to struggle resolutely to maintain peace; to accelerate the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam while at the same time stepping up the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam; to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy; to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, prosperous, and strong Viet-Nam. To guarantee the full execution of these tasks, we must make our party even stronger and must strengthen the leadership of the party. The present national congress of the party will define for the whole party and the whole people the line for carrying out the socialist revolution in the North, for the completion of the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country, for the struggle to achieve national reunification; at the same time it will decide upon the basic orientation for the building of the party and for the strengthening of party leadership to meet the new requirements of the revolution.

"The Second National Congress of our party was the congress of resistance for national salvation. The present national congress is the congress of construction of socialism in the North and of struggle for the achievement of national reunification. It will open up the road to new victories for the people throughout our country.

"The socialist revolution is carried out in the North while in the South we have to make every effort to achieve a broad national unity embracing all national and democratic forces, all forces opposed to the U.S. imperialists and Ngo Dinh Diem. In building and consolidating the North, we must on the one hand keep firmly to the line of socialist construction and, on the other, pay the greatest attention to the situation in the South, help create further conditions for the rallying of all patriotic forces opposed to the U.S.-Diem regime in the South into a broad national united front with the worker-peasant alliance as its basis, and insure the victory of the revolutionary struggle in the South. Our guiding principle in carrying out the socialist revolution in the North is: consolidate the North, and in so doing, take the South into due consideration.

"The North is the common revolutionary base of the whole country. Its constant strengthening not only heightens the confidence and stimulates the revolutionary enthusiasm of our patriotic

5. From an article by Vo Nguyen Giap in the Lao Dong Party journal Hoc Tap, January 1960 issue:

"The North has become a large rear echelon of our army. . . . The North is the revolutionary base for the whole country."

6. From the political report of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party delivered at the Party's 3d Congress in Hanoi by Le Duan, First Secretary of the Committee, on September 5, 1960:

"At present our party is facing momentous tasks: to promote socialist construction in the North and to consolidate the North into an ever more solid base for the struggle for national reunification; to strive to complete the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country, to liberate the South from the atrocious rule of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen; to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy; to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, prosperous, and strong Viet-Nam. To guarantee the full execution of these tasks, we must make our party even stronger and must strengthen the leadership of the party. The present national congress of the party will define for the whole party and the whole people the line for carrying out the socialist revolution in the North, for the completion of the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country, for the struggle to achieve national reunification; at the same time it will decide upon the basic orientation for the building of the party and for the strengthening of party leadership to meet the new requirements of the revolution.

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"The socialist revolution is carried out in the North while in the South we have to make every effort to achieve a broad national unity embracing all national and democratic forces, all forces opposed to the U.S. imperialists and Ngo Dinh Diem. In building and consolidating the North, we must on the one hand keep firmly to the line of socialist construction and, on the other, pay the greatest attention to the situation in the South, help create further conditions for the rallying of all patriotic forces opposed to the U.S.-Diem regime in the South into a broad national united front with the worker-peasant alliance as its basis, and insure the victory of the revolutionary struggle in the South. Our guiding principle in carrying out the socialist revolution in the North is: consolidate the North, and in so doing, take the South into due consideration.

"The North is the common revolutionary base of the whole country. Its constant strengthening not only heightens the confidence and stimulates the revolutionary enthusiasm of our patriotic
countrymen in the South but also helps the balance of forces between revolution and counter-revolution on a national scale to tip over to the side of revolution, creating favorable conditions for the powerful development and final victory of the revolution in the South. Besides, since the North is the common revolutionary base of the whole country, the socialist revolution in the North aims not only at building a new life for the northern people but also at laying the foundations of a new life full of freedom and happiness for our entire nation and at preparing effectively the future development of the revolution throughout the country.

"... the southern people's revolutionary struggle will be long, drawn out, and arduous. It is not a simple process but a complicated one, combining many varied forms of struggle—from elementary to advanced, legal and illegal—and based on the building, consolidation and development of the revolutionary force of the masses. In this process, we must constantly intensify our solidarity and the organization and education of the people of the South—especially the workers, peasants, and the intellectuals—and must uphold the revolutionary fighting spirit of all strata of patriotic compatriots. We must ceaselessly unmask the pernicious and cruel schemes of U.S. imperialism and its lackeys with a view to isolating them further, and winning over the forces that can be won over. On the basis of developing the great revolutionary force of the masses and uniting closely with the peace-loving peoples of the world, we must struggle tenaciously for the implementation of the Geneva agreements.

"In order to assure the complete victory of the revolutionary struggle in South Viet-Nam, the South Viet-Nam people, under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Party and the working class, should endeavor to build a worker-peasant-army coalition bloc, and set up a broad national united front against the U.S.-Diem clique on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance. This front must be able to unite all patriotic classes and strata, the delta and minority peoples, all patriotic parties and religions, and all those who have anti-U.S.-Diem tendencies. The aims of the struggle of the national united front against the U.S.-Diem clique in South Viet-Nam are peace, national independence, democratic freedoms, improvement of the people's livelihood, and peaceful reunification of the fatherland. The activities of the front must be extremely varied in order to unite all forces that can be united and win over all the forces that can be won over, neutralize the forces that must be neutralized, and draw the masses of the people into the common struggle against the U.S.-Diem clique.

"The revolutionary movement in South Viet-Nam has a very important position in the cause of national reunification. Parallel with the building and consolidation of North Viet-Nam, bringing it to socialism, our people should endeavor to maintain and develop the revolutionary forces in South Viet-Nam, thus creating favorable conditions for the peaceful reunification of the country...

7. From an article by Truong Chinh, a member of the Politburo of the Lao Dong Party, in the journal Hoc Tap for April 1961:

"Thus the resolutions of the Third National Party Congress have clearly set forth two strategic responsibilities of the Vietnamese revolution:

"1. 'To carry out the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam';

"2. 'To liberate South Viet-Nam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order to achieve national unity and complete independence and freedom throughout the country.'

"These two strategic responsibilities aim at satisfying the objective and concrete requirements of each zone while our country is temporarily partitioned. But they also aim at solving a problem: to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, rich, and strong Viet-Nam. Thus the Third National Party Congress set forth the general responsibilities of the present Vietnamese revolution:

"To strengthen the unity of all the people; to struggle resolutely to maintain peace; to accelerate the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam while at the same time stepping up the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam; to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy; to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, rich, and strong Viet-Nam; and to contribute practically to reinforcing the socialist camp and to maintaining peace in southeast Asia and in the world..."
"Inside the country, the responsibilities of the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam and those of the national people’s democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam are also closely related and interdependent. Indeed, the success of the socialist revolution and construction in North Viet-Nam will not only consolidate North Viet-Nam and bring a peaceful, free, and happy life to the northern people, but it will also strongly encourage southern compatriots to struggle against the U.S.-Diemists, to liberate South Viet-Nam, and to achieve national reunification. On the other hand, each success of the National People’s Democratic Revolution in South Viet-Nam has two effects: (1) to struggle against the U.S.-Diemists, restore to the southern people the right to earn their daily living, advance toward liberating South Viet-Nam from the imperialist and feudal yoke, and create favorable conditions for peacefully reuniting the country; and (2) to help protect revolutionary bases common to the entire country and to encourage the northern compatriots to do their best to build socialism.

"It is precisely because of this interdependence between the revolutionary responsibilities in the two zones that the congress has set forth this slogan for North Viet-Nam: ‘Build North Viet-Nam and pay attention to the South.’ One of the important points in the present propaganda, mobilization, and ideological education work in North Viet-Nam is to turn the hatred for the U.S.-Diemists into practical actions in order to step up the patriotic emulation movement and the building of socialism in North Viet-Nam.

"The Political report of the Central Committee to the congress said:

"The responsibilities of the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam are obviously the most decisive responsibilities in the development of the entire revolution in our country and in the national reunification work of our people.

"Why? First of all, because North Viet-Nam is the revolutionary base common to the entire country, and the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam not only seeks to build a peaceful, free, and happy life for the northern people but also lays the foundation for the building of a peaceful, free, and happy life for all the people throughout the country; and prepares practically for the future development of the entire country.

"After determining the role and responsibilities of the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam, the congress set forth the role and responsibilities of the National People’s Democratic Revolution in South Viet-Nam, which are: to overthrow the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys in order to liberate South Viet-Nam and fulfill the responsibilities of the National People’s Democratic Revolution throughout the country.

"From a passive state, our people in South Viet-Nam are advancing to take the initiative. They have exhaustively exploited the difficulties encountered by the Ngo Dinh Diem authorities, especially since the November 1960 coup d’état. Forms of struggle are multiplying daily; political struggles are being closely associated with military struggles.

"The deadly enemies of our people do not resign themselves to dying. As long as they live, they will resort to all plots and measures to oppress and terrorize the revolutionary forces in South Viet-Nam, hoping to destroy them and provoke North Viet-Nam. Their plots will be thwarted and they will be destroyed only by the vigorous struggle of our people in South Viet-Nam as well as in North Viet-Nam, and by the positive support of the peace- and justice-loving people the world over. We are very enthusiastic over the development of the revolutionary movement in South Viet-Nam. However, we must understand that the struggle against the U.S.-Diemists to liberate South Viet-Nam is still arduous and complicated.

"However, we are firmly convinced that the revolution in South Viet-Nam and the struggle to achieve peace national reunification will surely succeed because they are evolving under these favorable conditions: socialist North Viet-Nam is being rapidly consolidated and strengthened, is providing good support to the South Vietnamese revolution, and is serving as a strong basis for the struggle for national reunification; the peaceful and socialist forces the world over are stronger than the warlike imperialist forces; and the colonial system of imperialism is disintegrating rapidly and is advancing toward destruction."

"Unable to endure the oppressive, exploiting, and murderous policies of the enemy, southern compatriots have to rise and group themselves under the fighting banner of the Liberation Front to destroy the U.S.-Diemist regime and set up a National Democratic Coalition Government. Once established, this government will agree with
the DRV Government about achieving peaceful national reunification under one form or another, including the holding of free elections throughout the country. Thus, though South Viet-Nam will be liberated by nonpeaceful means, the Party policy of achieving peaceful national reunification is still correct. It is precisely because of the revolutionary struggle of southern compatriots to overthrow the U.S.-Diemists and to liberate Viet-Nam that there are favorable conditions to carry out the policy of achieving peaceful national reunification.

"The development of the revolutionary movement in South Viet-Nam is fully consistent with the following view of the Moscow Declaration of November 1960:

"The presence of the world socialist system and the weakening of imperialist position have opened for all the oppressed new possibilities to recover independence. The recovery of independence by colonial people through peaceful or nonpeaceful means depends on the concrete conditions of each country."
APPENDIX B
The Viet Cong Organization in North and South Viet-Nam
(See Part I, section V, pp. 18-22)

1. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE VIET CONG:

Lao Dong (Workers) Party,
i.e. Communist Party
Sec. Gen.: Ho Chi Minh
Hanoi

Central Committee of
the Lao Dong Party

Committee for Supervision
of the South
1. Le Duc Tho
2. Pham Hung

Interzone of South-
Central Viet-Nam

Committee for S-C
Interzone
Sec. Gen.: Tran Luong

Inter-province
Committees
I II III IV

Provincial
Committees

District
Committees

Town and Village
Cells

Specialized Agencies
Secretariat
Liaison
Propaganda & Training
Personnel
Subversive Activities in
the Army
Bases
Espionage
Military Affairs
Popular Fronts
Finance

Specialized Agencies
Secretariat
Liaison
Propaganda & Training
Personnel
Subversive Activities in
the Army
Bases
Espionage
Military Affairs
Popular Fronts
Finance
Democratic Party
Subversion among Chinese

Nambo (Southern)
Interzone

Committee for Nambo
Interzone
Sec. Gen.: Muoi Cuc

Inter-province
Committees
I II III IV

Provincial
Committees

District
Committees

Town and Village
Cells
APPENDIX B (Cont.)

2. TYPICAL INTER-PROVINCE ORGANIZATION OF THE VIET CONG

Committee for the South-Central Interzone

Inter-Province I
Sec. Gen.: Le Minh
Inter-Province Committee

Specialized Agencies
Liaison, Propaganda, Personnel, etc.

Quang Tri Province
Provincial Committee
Sec. Gen.: Truong Cong Kinh

Thua Thien Province
Provincial Committee
Sec. Gen.: Nguyen Hung

Quang Nam Province
Provincial Committee
Sec. Gen.: Nguyen Cuong

Town and Village Committees or Cells
APPENDIX B (Cont.)

3. ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL RESEARCH AGENCY OF THE VIET CONG

- Lao Dong Party
- DRV Armed Forces

**CENTRAL RESEARCH AGENCY**

- Hanoi
- Intelligence Section
- Coding Section
- Cadres Section
- Administration Section
- Espionage Section
- Communications Section
- Research Section
- Training Section

**Special Centers**

- Center for Liaison with foreign countries
  - Haiphong
  - Hongay
- Center for Laos-Cambodia
  - Vinh
- Base in Laos
- Base in Cambodia

- Center for Demarcation Zone
  - Vinh Linh

- Base for South-Central Interzone
- Base for Saigon
- Base for Nambo Interzone
APPENDIX B (Cont.)

4. ORGANIZATION OF A TYPICAL VC INTELLIGENCE CENTER

Central Research Agency

Center (#3) for Demarcation Zone
- Vinh Linh

Radio Section
Coding Section
Documents Section
Training & Liaison Section

Unit for infiltration by land
Unit for "illegal" action
Unit for infiltration by sea
APPENDIX B (Cont.)

5. SPECIAL TARGETS FOR PENETRATION BY VIET CONG INTELLIGENCE AGENTS

Viet Cong
Intelligence
Organization

- GVN administrative units
- Ministry of Interior
- Directorate General of Police and Security
- Directorate General of Information
- U. S. Information Service
- Religious Organizations
- Political Organizations

Political

- Ministry of Defense
- Headquarters of the Chief of Staff, GVN Armed Forces
- Military Security Agency
- Military Units
- Directorate General of the Civil Guard
- U. S. Military Assistance Advisory Group

Military

- Ministry of Economy
- Ministry of Finance
- Land Development Agency
- Agricultural Credit Agency
- Ministry of Public Works
- U. S. Operations Mission

Economic
APPENDIX C

The An Don Case

(See Part I, section VI, B, 1, pp. 25-26)

Map showing the route from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam taken by the Viet Cong agents in the An Don Case.
Viet Cong agents captured at An Don on June 5, 1961. (Left to right: Lam Dua, Nguyen Chuc, Huynh Tinh, Nguyen Dong, and Truong Van Hao.)

The junk that Nguyen Chuc and his comrades used to carry agents and messages between the Viet Cong base at Dong Hoi and landing sites in South Viet-Nam.
Page 1 of Nguyen Chuc's confession that he and his comrades in the An Don Case were agents for the Viet Cong operating from North Viet-Nam.

![Image: Nguyen Chuc's photograph]

Tên Nguyễn Chúc bị danh NGUYỄN HỮU quê là
HUYỆN THỊ TRANG - Bộ quận ĐÓN V.C., vụ bắt
tại An Bình (BT.040.790) ngày 5/6/1961
lúc 18 giờ 30.

I)- ĐỊNH LÝ LỊCH:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Họ và Tên</th>
<th>NGUYỄN CHÚC tên gọi NGUYỄN QUÝ.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mã Đơn</td>
<td>NGUYỄN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinh Mùa</td>
<td>1927 (34 tuổi).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinh Quan</td>
<td>THÀNH 1 xã DUY NGHIỆN, huyện DUY NUYỆN, TỈNH QUẢNG NAM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tên Cháu</td>
<td>NGUYỄN PHÚC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tên Mẹ</td>
<td>VÕ THỊ LÁNH.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chú Vô</td>
<td>TRANG - ĐÔ, trong quận ĐÓN V.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nước Tích</td>
<td>VIỆT-NAM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tỉnh Trắng gia đình:</td>
<td>100 vò 50 000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lý do bị bắt:</td>
<td>Tên phán tập kết với Độc V.C. bò tới với Mỹ Hàng Đông.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II)- CỬA TRÌNH NGHĨA ĐÔNG:

a)- Trùm giao tình chiến:

Mük 1945 - 1947: tham gia kỳ Đồn Cần Sắc Vô xã
Duy Nghĩa, huyện Duy Nuyệt, CANDOM
Translation of page 1 of Nguyen Chuc’s confession

Preliminary Statement

of

NGUYEN CHUC, alias Nghiep or Nguyen Thi, a lieutenant in the Viet Cong Army, who was arrested at An Don at 1830 hours on June 5, 1961

I. Personal History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nguyen Chuc alias Nguyen Thi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secret name</td>
<td>Nghiep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of birth</td>
<td>1927 (34 years old)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of birth</td>
<td>Hamlet 1, Duy Nghia township, Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father’s name</td>
<td>Nguyen Tung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother’s name</td>
<td>Vo Thi Lang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Lieutenant in the Viet Cong Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Viet-Nam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family status</td>
<td>Married, 2 children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for arrest</td>
<td>A regrouped person who was assigned to carry out activities in the South by the Viet Cong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of arrest</td>
<td>June 5, 1961, at 1830 hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. Chronology of activities

A. Before the ceasefire (1954)

1945-47: Was in the self-defense militia of Duy Nghia township, Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam Province
Excerpts from remainder of Nguyen Chuc’s confession

1947-49 : In charge of a transportation office in the South
1949-53 : In charge of transportation work in the Nam Dong area
1953-55 : At home ill

B. After the ceasefire

Regrouped to the North in January 1955. Taken to Thanh Hoa Province. Inducted into the 2d Battalion stationed at Thieu Hoa. Battalion was part of the 55th Regiment. Assumed duties of commander of Third Platoon of the 1st Company commanded by Nguyen Khuong.

From December 1955 to 1958, studied at the construction branch at Gia Lam and after graduating was assigned to work on camp construction.

In 1959 was assigned by the North Vietnamese High Command to carry documents into South Viet-Nam and was given training to prepare for the assignment.

III. His Story of Crossing the (17th) Parallel

I worked for the first time in South Viet-Nam in June 1959, and from then until May 1961 made 17 trips to the South.

There were five of us who worked in South Viet-Nam:

1. Nguyen Chuc alias Nguyen Thi (the subject)
2. Huynh Tinh alias Le Nghe
3. Truong Van Hao alias Ding Dai
4. Nguyen Dong alias Nguyen Tham
5. Lam Dua alias Le Lam

Traveled by boat No. T 02. The boat was built mainly by Nguyen Dong.

The false inspection cards we brought in in order to carry out activities in the South were distributed at Dong Hoi by [men named] Nguyen Vinh and Binh.

The trip by boat from Dong Hoi to Tourane took only 3 days.

On our trips across the parallel to work in South Viet-Nam, we usually docked at [one of] three places:

1. Lang Co
2. Trem (Tourane)
3. An Don (the An Chanh section of Tourane)

Whenever the boat docked at a port, I [Chuc] went ashore alone to establish contact; usually for half an hour. The other four men waited in the boat.

On each trip across the parallel into South Viet-Nam I brought documents in from the North and received documents from the South to take out.

The documents brought from North to South Viet-Nam were usually rolled up in an aluminum tube about 10 centimeters long and 2 centimeters in diameter.

IV. Contacts on Shore

(Chuc listed the names and addresses at which he made contacts in South Viet-Nam with Viet Cong agents from June 1959 to June 1961. He also admitted transporting at least two Viet Cong agents between North and South Viet-Nam.)
Huynh Tinh (tên gia là Huynh Tinh) cán bộ V.C viết tuyên về Nam hoạt động và bị bắt ngày 5/6/61 tại Đà Nẵng.

I. PHÂN LÝ LỊCH:
Ho và tên
Ngày sinh
Nơi sinh
Con Gia
Và bà
Vợ
Con trai
Riêng
Xu hướng chính trị
Tôn giáo
Tình ồn chính trị
Em:

- Huynh Tinh, 38 tuổi,
- Day Nghĩa, Day Xuyên, Quảng Nam
- Huynh Lâm (c)
- Phan Thị Lân
- Nguyễn Thị Nhi, 34 tuổi, ở làng
- Huỳnh Thu, 5 tuổi, ở làng
- Bất jede bất việt
- Gia nhập Việt Minh năm 1952 ở Day Nghĩa, do tên Hinh cán bộ xa (tập kết) gởi thiều.

- Phát giác
- Không
- Huỳnh Thị Tinh, 37 tuổi, buôn bán, vợ Lê Văn (Trần) 2x, huyện Thăng Bình - Quảng Nam.
- Huỳnh Thị Bình, 36 tuổi, buôn bán, vợ tên Nguyễn Thị ở Day - Xuyên.
- Huỳnh Thị Kỳ, 22 tuổi, cô chung đi lính cho chính phủ VNCH ở bên Hội-An
- Huỳnh Thị Liên, 30 tuổi, làm ruộng, chồng tên là Trần Độc, thành-nhiên Cộng hòa ở Duy Nghĩa.
- Huỳnh Sự, 20 tuổi, nghỉ ở vào chính phủ VNCH.
Nguyen Dong served as a Viet Cong agent under Nguyen Chuc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. PHẦN LÝ-LỊCH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Họ tên</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISTER</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGUYỄN-ThÂM (tên thêt)</td>
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<td>Ngày và nơi sinh</td>
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<td>Nghề-nhiệp</td>
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<td>Địa chỉ hiện tại</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cha - Mẹ</td>
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<td>Anh em ruột</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cha Mẹ vợ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anh em vợ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tôn giáo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trình độ học lực</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xu hướng chính trị</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiền án</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CỬA TÉN LAM ĐỨC, TÊN GIÁC LE LAM (TRONG KIỂM-TRA)
Biết tại AN HỘI (BÍCH 040, 790 - NAM HIỆM - QUẢNG NAM) ngày 5/6/61 lúc 18 giờ 30.

I. PHÂN LÝ LỊCH

Tên, họ: LAM ĐỨC, bi danh không có
tên ở trong thế kiếm-tra: LE LAM.

Lạng-viên Cộng-sản: 10 tuổi đang, vào Đảng CS năm 1952 do
cụ giảng thiền của:
- Tên LE VĂN ĐỊNH, ủy viên Thường vụ Khu Đông - HỘI AN - QUẢNG NAM.
- Tên TRƯỜNG UYỂN, Phương-trưởng ở Khu Đông - HỘI AN - QUẢNG NAM.

Sinh năm: 1929 (32 tuổi) tại Khu Đông, HỘI AN - QUẢNG NAM.
Tên cha: LAM BIỂN (chết năm 1953)
Nghề-nghĩa người cha: làm cá tại CỦA ĐI - HỘI AN (Q. NAM)
Tên mẹ: PHẠM THỊ ĐƯA (sống)
Tuổi: 50
Nghề-nghĩa người mẹ: Di mồ tôm, cua, ở Khu Đông - HỘI AN - QUẢNG NAM.

Diệu chí cha, mẹ: Làng NHẤT Khu Đông - HỘI AN - QUẢNG NAM.
Nghề-nghĩa đất sống: Đánh cá tại CỦA ĐÔNG HỘI - HỘI-viên
"Người-Trưởng NHẤT LỘI".

Học lực: Lớp Tiểu (bắt đọc, bắt viết)
Giai cấp: Hạn-nhãng (tuy nhiên gia đình được VC cấp 3 sào 3
ruộng ở làng NHẤT, Khu Đông, HỘI AN năm 1947.

Tên-gia : thọ tơ-tiện.
Tình trạng gia đình: Có vợ, 1 con (1 chết)
Tên vợ: PHẠM THỊ NƯƠI, 32 tuổi (năm 1929)
Nghề-nghĩa người vợ: Đi mồ cua, bò, tôm (tuy nhiên nhà có
1 sào 5 ruộng do VC cấp vào năm 1952).

Tên người con thứ 1: Không có(vì vừa lốt lòngra đã chết)-

................./...
Tên TRƯỜNG VAN HẢO tức NGUYỄN ĐẢI dùng ghe vụt tuyên vào miền Nam hoạt động cho V.C, bị bắt giữ tại Bến An-Dọn (Nha-Trang) hồi tháng 6 tháng 5-5-1961.

---

I. PHẦN LÝ LỊCH.

Họ tên: TRƯỜNG VAN HẢO (tên thật)
- NGUYỄN ĐẢI (tên theo kim tự tháp)
- ĐẲNG ĐẢI (tên theo kim tự tháp)


Nhũ hiệu: Dánh cá

Di chỉ hiện tại: Độc lập sống Nhật-Lệ, thị xã Quảng Bình (Bắc vi-tuyên 17).

Cha mẹ: TRƯƠNG VAN ĐÔ (chết) và LỆ THỊ TÂN, 70 tuổi, buôn bán ở làng Hà-Khê (Đăk-Nông).

Vợ con vợ lớn: NGUYỄN THỊ DƯNG 27 tuổi, buôn bán, hồi năm 1955 y vẫn 3 vợ chồng tại làng Hà-Khê (Đăk-Nông) có một con nuôi, lúc tội rất lớn nhỏ không rõ đặt tên là gì và THỊ DƯNG có lẽ đã đi lấy chồng khác riêng.

Vợ nhỏ: TRƯƠNG THỊ KỊNH 25 tuổi, làm có, ở thôn Đặng-Thánh, thuộc khu phố Thành-Lý thị xã Quảng Bình (Bắc vi-tuyên 17) đã có hai con nhưng đã chết rõ, hiện nay đang có thằng.

Anh em ruột: Có người anh em là TRƯƠNG VAN THỊM, 44 tuổi, làm có, ở làng Hà-Khê (Đăk-Nông).
The Calu Case
(See Part I, section VI, C, 1, p. 28)

Map showing infiltration route from the North, including the Calu way station.
The cover of Calu mealbook No. 1
A sample page from Calc textbook No. 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column 1</th>
<th>Column 2</th>
<th>Column 3</th>
<th>Column 4</th>
<th>Column 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value 1</td>
<td>Value 2</td>
<td>Value 3</td>
<td>Value 4</td>
<td>Value 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Value 17</td>
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<td>Value 19</td>
<td>Value 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value 21</td>
<td>Value 22</td>
<td>Value 23</td>
<td>Value 24</td>
<td>Value 25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table continues with more rows and columns as shown in the image.
The two mealbooks, pages of which are reproduced in this appendix, were captured during a raid by Republic of Viet-Nam armed forces on a Viet Cong infiltration station at Calu in Quang Tri Province on March 29, 1961. Calu was station No. 8 along a secret trail that had at least 25 such way stations where Viet Cong infiltrators from North Viet-Nam were fed and rested as they moved into the South.

Notebook No. 1 is a monthly record (October 1960–March 1961) of food items received and consumed at the Calu station. Separate entries were made for rice and for other foods (meat, vegetables, et cetera). The date of each transaction is recorded together with the quantity of rice or other food, the price paid, the person from whom received, and other data.

Notebook No. 2 is a record of food served at the Calu station by individuals or units. The front part of the notebook lists men by name, apparently the members of a Viet Cong unit based at or near Calu. The size of the unit varied from 28 to 35 over the 6-month period.

The back pages of notebook No. 2 provide a record of "guests" served at the Calu station from October to March, sometimes with the number of men involved, sometimes with merely the name of the leader and the notation that a group accompanied him.

With the average daily per capita consumption of rice known, as well as the amount of rice delivered to each passing group, it is possible to estimate with fair accuracy the number of Viet Cong who moved through the Calu station during the October-to-March period. On this basis it is believed that approximately 1,840 VC personnel moved south along the Calu trail during those 6 months.
The Tra Bong Case

(See Part I, section VI, C, 2, pp. 28-29)

A number of Viet Cong soldiers were killed in a fight with forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam at Tra Bong, Quang Ngai Province, in October 1960. Some of them (see below) had pictures of themselves wearing the uniform of the North Viet-Nam Army.
The Dakrotah Case
(See Part I, section VI, C, 3, p. 29)

Route of Y Lon and fellow Viet Cong from North Viet-Nam to Dakrotah, where he was captured on October 23, 1960.
Picture of Y Lon (left) and three other highland tribesmen who were members of a Viet Cong unit and were captured at Dakrotah on October 23, 1960.
BẢN KHAi CUỘC

Của tên Y Lon, dãy-viên thuộc Trung-dãy 3
Dãy-dãy 3 / Tiểu-doàn 20 V.C. bị Tiểu-doàn
2/41 bắt ngày 23/10/60 tại Dakkotah (YB-965796)

I. PHÂN CẢM CUỘC VÀ LÝ LỊCH:
- Tên : Y Lon
- Tuổi : 20 (không nhớ năm sinh. Chỉ nhớ 14 tuổi
thì tập kết).
- Quê quán : Toumorong (QUANG NGÃI)
- Trình độ văn hóa : lớp 5 V.C. (tương đương cấp lực của ta).
- Cha mẹ : Chết từ hồi còn nhỏ
- Thân quán : Không còn ai
- Gia đình : 1 vợ, không con
- Tên vợ : MCI
- Tuổi : 18
- Quê quán : Dak Dru Dok
- Cha mẹ vợ : O. A-XUNG và bà Y-DAM (không biết tuổi)
- Nghề-nghề nghiệp : Làm rầy ở Dak-Dru
- Thân-nhân vợ : không có

II. LỘI KHAi TRONG ĐỆM THẤM VĂN BÀU TIỂN TẠI SAIGON (25/10).
Tôi thuộc Tiểu-dãy 2, Trung-dãy 3, Dãy-dãy 3, Tiểu-
doàn 20 V.C., Quân sỹ lll người. Tôi bị bắt khi có nhiệm vụ
đi đàng từ Dak-Dru xuống Dak Rotah cho đồn-vị tôi tiếp viên
cho l đồn-vị khác ở Dak-Rotah.
Năm 1954, tôi 14 tuổi, làm bồi cho 1 tên Đại-úy Pháp.
Sờ tôi bịt Đại-úy BELLO vò tôi có theo người 03 đem gà và
gạo cho Đại-úy này luôn, lúc ý ở tại DakTo. Tên này qua LÃO,
tôi ở lại bị V.C. dna chết đối nên theo V.C. tập kết.
Excerpts from Y Lon’s interrogation record

STATEMENT

of

Y Lon, member of the 3d Platoon, 3d Company, 20th VC Battalion, who was captured by Battalion 2/41 on October 23, 1960, at Dakrotah

I. Identification and personal history

Name: Y Lon
Age: About 20 (does not remember year of birth but was about 14 when regrouped to North in 1954)
Native village: Toumorong (Quang Ngai)
Parents: Died when he was young
Relatives: None
Family status: Wife, no children
Wife’s name: Moi
Wife’s age: 18
Native village: Dak Dru Dok
Wife’s parents: A Xung and Y Dam (ages unknown)
Occupation: Farmers at Dak Dru
Wife’s relatives: None

II. Chronology of activities

Served with the French Army at Toumorong. In 1954 . . . went to Binh Dinh on the train and arrived at Qui Nhon. After resting for 4 days and 4 nights at Qui Nhon I was regrouped to the North on a Polish ship. On the ship there were about 6,000 or 7,000 mountain tribesmen who were attached to the 120th Regiment. The regiment was commanded by Y Bloc, a Hre tribesman, and at the present time is stationed at Nghe An. At present it is called Su-doan 120 and is still commanded by Y Bloc. The ship docked at Sam Son and, after a stopover of 5 days there, went to Ha Long. I went to Gia Lam for cultural study at the “nationalities” school.

On May 1, 1959, the Viet Cong began to train me to educate my compatriots and on May 29 I left Gia Lam and went by car to Vinh Linh. . . . I arrived at Vinh Linh on June 1, 1959. After 2 days of rest at Vinh Linh, my group (which included 30 men) went out during the day on foot in order to cross the Ben Hai River. . . .

Immediately after we crossed the parallel, our group arrived at a contact point where there were four or five men who . . . showed us the way. After that, I do not know what places we passed through nor do I remember the date because we moved through the jungle. When we were near the Quang Nam border I remember that we stood on a mountain peak and looked at the ocean. I remember that we crossed Route 9 but I am not sure at what spot.

After leaving Quang Nam . . . we arrived at Mang Hon around August 1959 and reached Chieng 8 days later.
At Chieng, I went out with a group of Viet Cong cadre to propagandize among the tribal compatriots. About November 1959 we urged other tribal youths in the Chieng area to volunteer for military drill. A platoon of youths from Chieng was organized under the command of Vietnamese cadre. . . . They had military drill and they cleared land. . . .

[Y Lon gave details of his unit's attack on Dak Dru and of his capture together with three other Viet Cong the following day while carrying out a reconnaissance mission near Dakrotah.]

At the present time, in the remote areas of the southern plateau region, especially in the area of the Laos-Viet-Nam border, the Viet Cong have organized militia and self-defense units to guard the villages. They have forced the people to dig spiked ditches and have armed them with knives, machetes, and sticks, and some have bows with poison arrows.

Each time the Republic of Viet-Nam Army approaches a village, the self-defense militia guarding the village runs and reports to the Viet Cong troops and they use secret signals to inform the village people.

Ordinarily all our units are stationed in remote mountain areas far from the villages. Only the command cadres can enter the villages to contact the administrative units.

Usually we are given two types of training, military and political. Our program is organized as follows: in the morning from 5 to 11 o'clock we study physical training, politics, and the policies proposed for the national struggle; in the afternoon, we have military studies, especially on close combat fighting, bayonet attack, and post attacks.

Every day after we finish training, we indulge in sessions of stocktaking and criticism. But before these sessions the command cadre have met and reported to each other.

There is usually a shortage of food. Each day we receive two tins of rice which is supplied by the local people. We became more and more indifferent because they would never give us permission to visit our families. Parents did not know where their children were and were never allowed to see their children. The Viet Cong always said that "individuals do not count and must sacrifice themselves for the people and the Fatherland." . . .
The Le Hoa Case

(See Part I, section VI, C, 4, pp. 29-30)

Map showing the route Le Hoa and his group followed from their departure at Vinh in July 1961 to Le Hoa's surrender in Binh Dinh Province in South Viet-Nam on October 12, 1961.
KIN

(--) AN KHAI CUNG
tên LE HOA, Hấp-sĩ V.C., bị bắt tại
(BÌNH ĐỊNH) ngày 12.10.1961.

I.- PHÂN LÝ LỊCH :

- Họ và tên : LE HOA (tự BA)
- Ngày và nơi sinh : 1931 tại xã Đức Lân, quận Mộ Đức
  tỉnh QUANG NGÃI.
- Tên cha mẹ : LE TỤ (c), LE THỊ CỮU (dã tài gia)
- Tên em : LE THỊ TU Lạy chồng ở xã Đức Tan,
  Mộ-Đức, QUANG NGÃI.
- Tên vợ : LƯ Thi TÂO, đợ 25 tuổi, ở tại làng.
- Trình độ học vấn : biết đọc biết viết quốc-ngữ
- Tên giáo : Thơ cùng ông bà.
- Xu hướng chính trị : Không dằng phải.

II.- QUẢ TRÌNH HOẠT-ĐỘNG :

- Từ bé đến đầu năm 1949 : duong sự sống với gia đình
  làm nghề đánh cá và đi dòi lua trên vùng thủy Ba-Tô
  - Củi 1949, vào dân quân xã, có nhiệm vụ canh gác
    miền biên (không thoát lý)
INTERROGATION REPORT

of

Le Hoa, corporal of the Viet Cong, captured at Binh Dinh Province on October 12, 1961

I. Personal history

Name: Le Hoa alias Ba
Date and place of birth: 1931, village of Duc Lan, district of Mo Duc, province of Quang Ngai
Name of parents: Le Tu (deceased) and Le Thi Cuu (remarried)
Sister: Le Thi Tu, married to a man in Duc Tan, Mo Duc, Quang Ngai
Wife: Lu Thi Tao, about 25, same village
Education: Can read and write
Religion: Ancestor worship
Political affiliation: None

II. Past activities

- Until 1949, lived with family, fishing and trading fish for rice in the midlands area of Ba To.
  - End of 1949, joined village defense corps with the mission of watching the seashore (did not have to leave his family).
  - July 1954, was recruited as a soldier of the district guard of Mo Duc, then stationed at Duc Thanh (district of Mo Duc). Effective strength of the district guard was about 90 men, under the command of district guard chief Ha Yen and his deputy, Hanh.
  - October 1954, moved with district guard to Qui Nhon, then boarded a Polish ship to be regrouped to the North.
  - Landed in Sam Son (Thanh Hoa Province). Had 2 days of rest then moved with the district guard to the village of Nam Thanh, district of Nam Dan, province of Nghe An. The entire group was assigned to building dams, fighting droughts, fighting floods, and so forth.
- June 1956, the district guard of Mo Duc was disbanded. The group integrated into Regiment No. 803, Division 324, then stationed at Anh Son, Nghe An Province. Le Hoa was assigned to Company 3, Battalion 1, as a private.
  (Period June 1956 to June 1961 was occupied by military training, drill, et cetera.)
- June 1961, Le Hoa was ordered to report to the headquarters of Regiment 803 at Anh Son, together with the following: Thuong, a sergeant; and Corporals Hoa, Thoai, Giap, Yem, Duoc, Cong, and Doan. At the headquarters, a Major Thu, commanding Regiment 803, gave the group a welcoming party. He then told them they had been selected for training. Two days later, they were transferred to Vinh, where they were billeted at the camp of Regiment 271.

The next day, the Viet Cong brought another group of about 50 men to the camp. (The men belonged to various units formerly from Interzone 5 in South Viet-Nam, including natives of the South or Northerners who formerly participated in the “advance toward the South,” all of them regrouped.) They had a political training course for 15 days. The lecturers were a Lieutenant Son, a native of Binh Dinh Province, and Lieutenant Luan, from Phu Yen. Both belonged to the Political Section of the Command Staff of Military
Zone No. 4. The theme of the course was “The Situation in the South” and the duties of cadres who had been regrouped and would return to the South to reinforce the Front for Liberation of the South.

- At the beginning of July 1961, the training sessions ended. Each trainee was promoted one rank except Le Hoa. (No reason given.)

All the trainees were grouped into units. Unit No. 1, to which Le Hoa was assigned, was to be sent to Binh Dinh and was still composed of the persons listed above. Thuong was promoted to 2d Lieutenant, commanding the unit, and the 7 others were promoted to 1st Sergeants. Only Le Hoa remained a corporal.

One day before departure, a Lt. Col. Khue from the Command Staff of Zone No. 4 came and visited the trainees. They had a farewell party. Next day, the trainees each received one khaki uniform, one set of black cloth underwear, one hat, one woolen coat, one hammock, one haversack, a water bottle, cooking pan, 2 kilograms of salt, and some medicine. No money or weapons were distributed at this time.

III. The trip to the South

Vinh-Ben Hai River

- On July 16, 1961, at about 7 o’clock the entire unit boarded a truck belonging to Regiment No. 271 at Vinh and traveled along Highway No. 1 to Ha Tinh. The other unit (50 men) were to be sent away too, but Le Hoa did not know where or when.

From Ha Tinh the truck followed Highway No. 3 to the district of Huong Khe, then crossed the river by ferry, and reached a military post on the border between the provinces of Ha Tinh and Quang Binh at about 4 p.m. There the unit rested all night.

- On July 17, 1961, heavy rain forced the unit to remain at the military post.

- On July 18, 1961, the unit left the post. They followed the main road for 2 or 3 kilometers, then took a track called the “Unity Route,” a partly dirt trail, partially covered by vegetation which the unit had to clear as it went along. At 4 p.m. the unit halted, cooked a meal, and hung hammocks for a night’s rest.

- July 19, 1961, at 6 a.m. unit departed under the guidance of a tribesman. They halted at 2 p.m. at which time a new guide came with some rice for the group. The unit spent the night there and also the following day and night.

Ben Hai-Hara

- On the night of July 21, 1961, at 7 p.m. the unit departed. It crossed the Ben Hai River (into South Viet-Nam) at 2 a.m. At 4 a.m. it crossed a wide road, then came to a relay station at 5 a.m. The group rested there all of July 22.

- July 23, 24, and 25, the unit continued marching south. After 3 days of marching, the unit crossed a high mountain and saw the sea. Le Hoa believes this was in the province of Thua Thien.

- Five or 6 days later, on August 2, 1961, the unit reached Quang Nam Province.

- Sixteen days later, August 18, 1961, the unit had crossed the territory of Quang Nam and were near Tra Bong. The trip through Quang Nam had been very tiring because of the hills.

- August 20, 1961, the unit crossed a road.

- August 23, the unit had crossed the territory of Quang Ngai Province and came to the mountain passes of Binh De and Tam Quan.

- Seven days later, on August 30, 1961, the unit reached the area of Ha Ra (10 kilometers from An Khe). Two days before, the unit had crossed a large river on a suspended bamboo bridge.

Here, the tribesman who had served as a guide led the unit to Dong, a native of Quang Nam with the rank of platoon commander. Dong told the unit that from then on he would be in charge of the group. He instructed them to rest before receiving orders for action.
In the camp Le Hoa met 21 young men from Binh Dinh who had left their families and joined the Viet Cong. The young men were responsible for transporting rice to the base. Le Hoa remembered that once two of the young men had brought nine rifles and three submachineguns to the camp.

IV. Circumstances of Le Hoa’s capture

After arriving at Ha Ra, Le Hoa and his group were able to rest a few days. Then they began to take part in production. After 1 day of work Le Hoa became ill and rested for 2 days.

During this sick leave he heard the young men who had left their families discussing escape from the Viet Cong who had taken them from their homes. They discussed some young men who had already returned to their homes. From that moment Le Hoa said he decided to escape and surrender. He had been told that if he followed the direction of the sunrise he would arrive at the lowlands.

About midnight (October 8), Le Hoa left the camp carrying with him a MAT 49 submachinegun. He walked all that night and the following day. He arrived at a highland village. He begged for food and then went on until 9 p.m. Then he stopped and rested in a cave. The next morning, he continued walking.

On October 12, at 9 a.m., he met a young boy with a buffalo. He asked where he was and was told he was not far from Cat Hiep village. The boy showed him the way to National Road No. 1 and Le Hoa continued his trip. Meanwhile, the young boy had reported to the Self-Defense Corps unit in the village.

After walking for a while, Le Hoa met a man carrying potatoes and asked him the way. Suddenly, two Self-Defense Corps soldiers with a rifle came up on a bicycle and captured him. Le Hoa offered no resistance and obeyed his captors’ orders. One man tied him and they took him to their post about 3 kilometers away. At the post, Le Hoa was well treated by the village officials who gave him something to eat. Then he was sent to Phu Cat, about 5 or 6 kilometers from the Self-Defense Corps post. He arrived at about 2 p.m. on October 12, 1961, and then was transferred to Qui Nhon.
The Diary of Nguyen Dinh Kieu

(See Part I, section VI, C, 5, pp. 30-31)

Map showing the route followed by Viet Cong Captain Nguyen Dinh Kieu and his men from North Viet-Nam through Laos into South Viet-Nam.
Photo of the cover of the diary of Viet Cong Captain Nguyen Dinh Kieu found in his possession at Dakakoi on September 26, 1961.

Nhật ký của tên Nguyễn Đình Kieu bị ta giết ngày 26.9.61 ở Dakakoi.
A chart of the Viet Cong company commanded by Captain Nguyen Dinh Kieu, which was contained in his diary.
May 30, 1961

Under the heading *Boh too* (probably the abbreviation for "Command Staff Organization"), Captain Kieu assembled notes and ideas on the current situation and on what had to be done, apparently in preparation for the move to the South. ("We still have enough time to get ready . . . .")

1—Alertness is necessary ("We should not relax in political matters . . . .").
2—Better combat disposition is needed ("more mobility . . . .").
3—Party activities must be stepped up during operations.
   ("Before departure, GH [probably a political cadre] must come and discuss the situation, the difficulties we are going to face, our objectives, etc. . . .").
4—Command staff must realize our problems ("There will be long marches, no transportation, little food . . . .").
5—Indoctrination (propaganda for the population and international affairs).
   ("Our allies have great admiration for us. But precisely at this moment we must not show any vanity which could lead our allies to think that the Vietnamese do not have any modesty.")
   "See to it that our troops use only our own dry food supply and do not touch the property of the population. Beware of relationships with women . . . . Political cadres must reaffirm this before departure . . . .")
6—Protect secrecy ("Never leave used packages of cigarettes at camp sites . . . .").
7—"Think of the problem of unity between the army and the population, between the political
cadres and the army.")
8—"We must organize a system for relations with families.")
9—Administrative problems ("Avoid carrying too bulky items.").

May 31 (in pencil) "The sandals and shoes distributed are a little tight."
June 16–17. "rest at Thanh Lang?"

June 18. "departure for Fong Khai . . . ."

July 8. "There is no rice at the places where there should be. Then how can we continue, and it is already the 8th of July . . . ."

July 9. "We sleep at Thanh Cau (or Can)."

July 10. "We sleep at Cape (or Cabe). At night we depart from Cape for Tusa . . . ."

"At 4 a.m. we arrive at the foot of the mountain. Why is it that the South is located in the skies? We keep going but when shall we reach the blue clouds and when shall we reach our beloved South?"

July 11. "We have been on the road for almost a month now. The mountain slopes are cruel . . . ."

July 12. "Rest at Tusa. The road from Cape to Tusa, where we arrived only at 1630 today, has been the most difficult and the longest."

July 18. "We have departed [several illegible words] for the border. We have been on the road for 5 days."

"We pass an area with enemy posts. There are three of them where we cross National Highway 14. Let's watch out for enemy patrols from Highway 14 to Da Kley. Enemy planes are flying all day long. But we are relatively safe . . . ."

"Our relay stations are distant from one another. Some of them can be reached only after 7 p.m. and sometimes much later than that. These stations have more security. They are built near the mountains and have living quarters . . . ."
"Effectives were 37 at departure. Now the following are missing: Hrim, Dich, Mom, Du.
"Preparations, equipment, weapons, everything is in good shape."

(Notes on the qualifications of members of the company.)
(Notes on meeting of Party committee covering pages 96–99.)

(A note to his wife, Thu Huong.)
"After fighting here, on our glorious fatherland, I am writing to you and to our child. I have already written to you on the way. Thu Huong, I have not received any letters from you for 4 months. The working conditions are difficult . . . ."

(Duty situation—
"Prepare a safe base from which we can start operations to harass the enemy . . . ."

". . . Exploit then the situation in the plains (Binh Son, Son Tinh, Quang Ngai, Mo Due)."
"Winter-Spring 1961–62 operations: Start with small operations. Gather all military power in Safe Base No. 1 (CKI), then launch simultaneous attacks"

(all over the mountain area. After this, leave the mountain area to local forces and go as far as possible toward the midlands. . . . Ds operate on Highway No. 5. Konbrai, Mangden, Konklung: attack enemy rescue groups, paralyze their transport, reduce their manpower. . . ."

(Pages 105–16 contain notes on military matters, evaluations of personnel, new recruits, etc.)

(brief evaluation at Party meeting of battle of Konbrai):
"Good secrecy was observed. No man left to visit his family. No sign of low morale. We have not yet proceeded to the counting of our casualties. The spirit of the army is high with this first victory. . . ."

Diary concludes with an entry on September 15 which discusses plans for operations at Kon Mong and includes a hand-drawn map of the area north of Konbrai. Capt. Kieu was killed on Sept. 26, 1961, at Dakakoi and the diary was picked up on that date.
The Calu Case (2)

(See Part I, section VI, D, 1, pp. 32-33)

In the attack of March 29, 1961, against the Calu station of a Viet Cong infiltration trail (see Part I, section VI, C, 1, p. 28 and Part II, appendix D), armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam captured the notebook of a VC officer, probably the commander of the Calu post. In his notebook, the officer had listed weapons brought in to the station for distribution to VC forces in Quang Tri, in Zone 5, and in other areas.

Below is a photograph of the cover of the notebook.
A sample page from the VC cadre's notebook from Calu.
Another page from the Calu cadre's notebook. Note the name and address, in Russian, of a Vietnamese living in Moscow.
APPENDIX J

The Ly Son Case

(See Part 1, section VI, D, 2, pp. 33-36)

On January 31, 1960, a junk from North Viet-Nam with six men aboard landed at the island of Ly Son off the Quang Ngai coast. They claimed to be fleeing from Communist rule in the North. In April, a high-ranking agent of the Viet Cong was captured in South Viet-Nam and exposed the real purpose of the voyage of the six men: to bring supplies from the North to a Viet Cong unit in the South. Confronted by the testimony of the agent, all six of the captured men confessed that they had been on a VC supply mission. They provided extensive details of their voyage and of the special infiltration unit in North Viet-Nam to which they were attached.

Below is a picture of Nguyen Bat (third from the left), leader of the group, and his five VC companions.
Below is a map showing the planned and actual voyages of Nguyen Bat and five other Viet Cong agents captured in the Ly Son Case.

Key

- Planned voyage of Nguyen Bat and his crew to South Vietnam
- Actual voyage

Dong Hoi
(departure: Jan. 27, 1960)

Ly Son Island
(Capture: Jan. 31, 1960)
Below is a photocopy of page 1 of Nguyen Bat's confession.
A translation of page 1 of Nguyen Bat's confession follows:

**PERSONAL HISTORY**

of

NGUYEN-BAT alias Duong—From the mouth of the Gianh River (North Viet-Nam), he used a boat to cross the border into the South to supply foodstuffs, military supplies, equipment and arms to the Viet Cong cadre in the South.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Departure</th>
<th>Jan. 27, 1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrive at Ly Son</td>
<td>Jan. 31, 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrive Thua Thien</td>
<td>Mar. 12, 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrive Saigon</td>
<td>Apr. 14, 1960</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Name of person crossing border : Nguyen-Bat (name on birth certificate) alias DUONG (name on forged identification card given him by the Viet Cong at the beginning of December, 1959)

1/a Pseudonym : Nghia (assigned on joining Communist Party)

2. Place of birth : Thanh Chau village, also known as Duy Nghia, Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam Province

2/a Citizenship : Viet-Nam

3. Date of birth : 1927

3/a Occupation : First Lieutenant, assistant company commander in charge of Ocean Transportation unit in Doan 603 of the Viet Cong armed forces

3/ Religion : Ancestor worship

4. Address before crossing : Don-vi 603, subordinate to Doan 559 of the Rear Services Directorate, stationed south of the Gianh River, Quang Trach District, Quang Binh Province, North Viet-Nam

4/a Addresses prior to above : Aboard a Norwegian ship for regrouping to the North

October 7, 1954

October 23, 1954

When the Norwegian ship docked at Sam Son in Thanh Hoa, he stayed there on the Sam Son coast for 3 days and nights.

A summary of Nguyen Bat's confession follows:

From October 1954 to May 1955, Bat was stationed in Thanh Hoa Province. From May to July 1955, he served in the Coast Guard Bureau of the North Viet-Nam General Staff in Hanoi. From July to October, he received special training in coastal defense work. From October 1955 to March 1957 he was a member of Bach Dang naval unit patrolling the North Viet-Nam coast from Haiphong to Thai Binh. He then had 18 months of political training. He said he worked at the Haiphong fish cannery from September 1958 to July 1959. From the latter date until his capture he was a member of Doan 603, the special maritime infiltration unit of the Viet Cong.

Bat said his father, Nguyen Giap, was dead. His mother, Do Thi Chinh, was living in the village of Duy Nghia. He said he had 5 brothers and two sisters, all in the same village in Quang Nam. Bat is unmarried.

Bat joined the Viet Minh in 1948 in the war against the French. He was progressively: a soldier in a transportation company; deputy chief of a small boat unit; commander of a small boat
unit; deputy commander of a larger boat unit; a deputy company commander. In 1954 he was re-grouped to the North with his unit, the 812th regiment. Meantime, in 1951, he had become a member of the Communist Party.

In July 1959, when the North Viet-Nam authorities decided to establish Doan 603, the special unit for transporting agents and supplies to the Viet Cong in the South, Bat was picked as one of the original complement of 107 men. They went through a period of political training and the unit was activated in August.

Doan 603 was organized into two companies. One was responsible for administration, personnel, boat building, and other command and supply functions. The second company, of which Bat was commander, was responsible for carrying out assignments to the South by sea.

On October 20, 1959, five men were picked to carry out a supply mission to South Viet-Nam. They were: Nguyen Bat, Nguyen Xanh, Nguyen Nu, Huynh Lach, and Tran Muc. The following day they went to Vinh to get two fishing boats, each about 5 tons and built to look like fishing boats in the South. From late October to late November the men sailed one of the boats to become familiar with it and to practice chart reading, navigation, and boat handling. In late November and early December they were given leave to visit Hanoi before departing on their assignment.

On December 8 they met Nguyen Nua, who was to accompany them as a guide on their return trip. Nua was a “stay-behind” cadre of the Viet Cong who had remained in the South, in Quang Nam Province, until 1958.

Plans for the voyage:

They were to leave from the mouth of the Gianh River and to sail southeast, then south until they arrived at the planned landing site on the Quang Nam coast. They were to wait until after sunset before landing. They were to exchange flashlight signals with the shore party before landing. A waving red light would indicate that it was unsafe to land.

If captured with all their supplies and weapons, they were to admit they came from the North. But they were instructed to be vague about their landing site and where they came from. They were told to say only that the supplies came from the “Hanoi Office of Rear Services.”

If they had managed to dispose of all their supplies and weapons before capture, they were to tell the authorities they had come from Vinh in the North to seek freedom. If they disposed of their weapons but not the supplies, they were to tell the authorities that they were from the South and were to use their forged boat papers and identity cards.

The men were told they could scuttle their cargo if:

• they encountered severe weather that prevented them from reaching their destination.
• a patrol boat of the Republic of Viet-Nam approached within 3 miles.
• if they encountered a group of small boats that seemed to be police craft.

Should they meet a single small boat that tried to check on them, they were instructed to use their weapons to destroy it and its occupants.

They were advised to use forged papers only in contacts with village or district officials, not with provincial or national authorities who would be likely to recognize them as forgeries.

Nguyen Bat listed the following items in the cargo he and his companions brought to the South:

12 bolts of nylon cloth, 5 large rolls of white paper, 3 bolts of black cloth, 20 cases of medicine, 2 cases of rice seed, 2 rolls of electric wire, a case of electric light bulbs, a case of batteries, one electric motor, a mimeograph machine, a case of printer’s ink, 15 packages of documents, and 4 bundles of warm clothing (100 items).

Bat said each man aboard carried: 2 suits of black cotton, a long-sleeved jacket, 1,000 piasters (about $13.60) in Southern currency, one kilogram of dried fish, a pot for cooking rice, a package of assorted medicines, a bag of tobacco with lighter and alcohol, and 20 kilograms of rice.

Each man also was given: an identity card, a card proving service in the armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam, a voting card.

The boat also carried: 6 submachineguns (MAT 49), 24 clips of ammunition, 18 grenades, 6 knives. They were to be delivered in the South and used for self-defense if necessary on the voyage.

After delivering their cargo to the Viet Cong in Quang Nam, Bat and his crew were to destroy their boat and return to the North overland. Nua was to guide them on this journey over secret trails to the North.

Bat and his crew made three unsuccessful attempts to carry out their assignment. They left
the Gianh River on December 9, on December 14, and again on December 29. Each time, bad weather forced them to turn back. Finally, on January 27, 1960, they set off again determined to complete their task.

Once again they ran into heavy weather. The rudder was broken. In a short time the spare rudder also broke. They drifted southward unable to control their direction. On the morning of January 31, they sighted a light. At first they feared it might be a patrol boat. Then they decided it was Ly Son Island, off the Quang Ngai coast.

They had the choice of continuing to drift at sea or trying to move in toward the island. They chose the latter course for their supply of fresh water was almost gone. They decided, too, to abandon their cargo and weapons.

Bat’s statement concluded:

“I talked with the others about letting the boat move toward Ly Son Island because if we just let it drift we would die out in the middle of the ocean because the fresh water in the boat was almost gone. The boat did not have a rudder and we knew we had to go somewhere and hide.

“After everyone expressed his ideas, I had all the supplies and weapons thrown overboard. But the nylon cloth, even though it had a stone tied to it, continued to drift along the surface. The crew, after throwing the cases of medicine, rice seed, and the four packages of clothing over the side, had to fish them out again in order to open them up and let the water in. Otherwise they would have kept floating. The clothing had to be tossed over piece by piece.

“When we opened up the packages with the warm clothing, it was such a shame [to abandon them] that each of us took one [coat] and a piece of nylon cloth to wrap them in and protect them.

“Having thrown out the cargo and the weapons, we destroyed all the papers we had brought along with us. The 1,000 piasters for each person were given back to Nua and he wrapped them in a fat roll. At first Nua did not want to throw the money away but we decided it would give us away.

“Then we let the broken rudder go so the boat would drift in to Ly Son Island. We landed around 3 p.m. on January 31, 1960. All of us declared that we had crossed the 17th parallel to seek freedom.”

Sample pages from the interrogation records of the other members of Nguyen Bat’s crew are reproduced below. Their accounts, though given individually to Republic of Viet-Nam authorities, follow Bat’s confession even in minor details.
A page from the interrogation record of Nguyen Nua, who accompanied Nguyen Bat on a supply mission into South Viet-Nam for the Viet Cong.
1/ Tên người v/vt: Trần Mục
   1/a Mi danh: Vương (tên lúc nghĩa xướng CS)

2/ Ngôi sanh
   2/a Quốc-tịch: Việt-Nam

3/ Ngày sinh
   3/a Nghề nghiệp: 1927
      - Xóaogi-trường đa-kích
      - Tạp đoàn danh can xã Hải-Ninh,
        Huyện Tỉnh-Gia (Thanh-Hòa)

4/ Hành-chi trước ngày v/vt: Xã Thạnh-trạch, huyện Đô-Trạch,
   Tỉnh Quảng-Ninh (Đoàn trải 603),
      - Tạp két ra Hải năm 1954
      - 1955 - 1956, đi công-trường tập dương quốc
      - Số 1 tị Nhơn-Kinh vgod Nghê-An.
      - Tháng 2/1958, tạp đoàn danh can xã Hải-Ninh,
        huyện Tỉnh-Gia (Thanh-Hòa).

5/ Tên người cha
   5/a Mi danh: Trần Chuyến
   5/a Ngôi sanh: không
   5/c Ngày sinh: 72 tuổi
   5/d Hành-chi: Xã Lục-Thanh
   5/e Nghề-nghề: Loa ca 2 mất (không làm gì)

6/ Tên người mẹ
   6/a Ngôi sanh: Nguyễn-thị-Chuyến
   6/a Ngày sinh: 70 tuổi
   6/c Hành-chi: Xã Lục-Thanh

7/ Anh em
   7/1a Ngôi sanh: Trần Kỳ-Hệt
   7/1b Ngày sinh: Ngoại 40 tuổi
   7/1c Hành-chi: Xã Lục-Thanh
   7/1d Nghề-nghề: Đánh can

************/2
A page from the interrogation record of Nguyen Nu, a Viet Cong agent in the Ly Son Case.
A page from the interrogation record of Huynh Lach, a Viet Cong agent in the Ly Son Case.
A page from the interrogation record of Nguyen Xanh, a Viet Cong agent in the Ly Son Case.
Medical Equipment From North Viet-Nam and the Communist Bloc

(See Part I, section VI, D, 4, pp. 37-38)

Below are reproduced pictures of three Chinese medical charts printed in Peiping. The Vietnamese translations of anatomical terms are written in. The charts were captured by Republic of Viet-Nam forces in an attack on a Viet Cong medical post and military unit near Darlac in August 1961.
Below are reproduced pictures of Soviet, Chinese, and other Communist-bloc medicines, medical instruments, and other equipment captured by forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam in actions against the Viet Cong. Articles manufactured in the Communist bloc are not available in South Viet-Nam and must have been introduced from outside.
In an attack on a Viet Cong unit near Ban Me Thuot on October 3, 1961, Viet-Nam Government forces overran a VC medical aid station. The diary of the medical officer was captured (see the Mai Xuan Phong Case in Part I, pp. 41-42). Among the captured equipment were medical supplies, including vials of novocain, atropine, and other drugs manufactured in a state-owned pharmaceutical plant in North Viet-Nam. A picture of some of these vials is reproduced below.
1. North Vietnamese Forces in Laos

(See Part I, section VI, E, 1. p. 39)

During the fighting in Laos a number of officers and men of the Army of North Viet-Nam have surrendered or been captured. They have admitted they were ordered to go to Laos to fight alongside the Pathet Lao against the forces of the Royal Lao Government. One such prisoner was Private Second Class Ne Tong, pictured below. He identified himself as a member of Company 2, First Battalion, Regiment 120, of the Army of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

A summary of Ne Tong's statement to his captors follows:

On December 11, 1960, Regiment 120 of the Army of North Viet-Nam was ordered to move from its base at Phu Quy to the area of Nong Het in Laos. The unit moved by truck along Route #6 to Cua Rao. It then marched, via Route #7, to the Nong Het area.

On December 15 the unit took part in the attack on the Royal Lao Army outpost at Nong Het. Ne Tong was wounded in the right arm and was captured.

Another soldier of the Army of North Viet-Nam captured in Laos was Private Vi Van Sang, pictured below.

Sang was a member of Independent Battalion 925 of the Army of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. He said he was ordered on February 19, 1961, to go to Laos. He traveled with two sections of 42 men each from his battalion. They marched for 4 days to the Nong Het area in Laos. Then they were moved by truck convoy to the Plaine des Jarres. They were attached to Pathet Lao Battalion #6. Sang took the Lao name of
Lieutenant Nguyen Van Nham, a common practice among Vietnamese fighting in Laos.

From the Plaine des Jarres, Sang's unit marched to the Muong Kassy area. They took part in the attack on Muong Kassy on March 11. Eight days later the unit fought in the battle of Pha Tang. Sang was wounded by shrapnel in this engagement and was taken prisoner. He was hospitalized in Vientiane.

Sang said his detachment of 42 specialists in mortars and machineguns who were assigned to fight in Laos was commanded by Sublieutenant Pham Van Duong of the 925th Battalion.

Still another North Vietnamese who took part in the fighting in Laos was Sublieutenant Nguyen Van Nham from the Huong Khe District of Ha Tinh Province. He was a platoon commander in Company 1, 6th Battalion, of the 335th Division, Army of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

On December 25, 1960, Nham was ordered to go to Laos. He traveled from Moc Chau in the northwest to Hanoi. On December 26 he flew from Gia Lam airport to Vang Vieng in Laos. Nham was accompanied by nine specialists in the use of mortars.

He took part in actions at Phou Pha and Ban Hin Heup. On January 30, 1961, Nham was wounded and captured in a fight near Ban Hin Heup.
The Do Luc Diary

(See Part I, section VI, E, 2, p. 40)

After a fight at Daktrum on September 3, 1961, forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam found a diary in the uniform of a Viet Cong soldier who had been killed in the engagement. Together with the diary were several pictures. One (reproduced on right) shows two men and a young boy. The men are wearing the uniform of the Army of North Viet-Nam.

The Do Luc diary opens on a melancholy, pitiful note. On July 28, 1961, Do Luc wrote a brief note on the first page. Apparently the lonesome soldier pretended it was a message to him from his loved one, Nguyen Thi Minh Chau, in the North. It reads:

"We are in love and we have talked about that many times. Even though mountains and rivers will separate us, I shall wait until the revolution succeeds! My heart aches when I look toward the South, my darling! Is it not true that in the South there is still boiling oil, burning fire and many painful and mournful situations, my darling?"
Do Luc made his first entry in his homemade diary on May 4, 1961. On that date he wrote:

"Leaving temporarily the beloved North to return to my native South to liberate my compatriots from the yoke of misery imposed by My-Diem (U.S.-Diem). This has been my ideal for a long time."

An entry of the same date with the time 1:30 a.m. noted:

"Here is the Viet-Nam-Laos border. I will always remember the international love which is engraved deep in my heart."

This was apparently a reference to his earlier service in Laos, which he described later.

By the middle of June, Do Luc and his companions had passed through Laos and had entered South Viet-Nam. On June 17 he wrote:

"Having been away for several years from the territory of Interzone 5 'Quang Nam,' my heart is both happy and sad. What shall I do now to be a worthy son of Interzone 5?"

On August 6, Do Luc wrote as follows:

"A few lines to remind me of this remote place! Not enough rice; meals tasteless because there is not enough salt; clothing is not warm enough for this very high peak.

"Nevertheless, in his determined heart, the fighter for liberation of the South remains faithful to the Party, to the people of the South, and he remains faithful to his only love."
Beginning on August 14, 1961, Do Luc began a review of some of his experiences. He wrote:

"Memory!

"One afternoon which is turning into evening. I am sitting on the peak of a high mountain. This is a famous scenic place. This is the highest peak of the whole chain of mountains, and it is all covered with mist. All this scenery arouses nostalgia in my heart! I try to recall my life since I was a young boy.

"I answered the call of the Party when I was very young, and what did I do for the people of my village? I devoted myself to the people. I took part in propaganda and aroused the people to carry out the policy of the Party and the Government and helped organize village defense and fighting forces. On March 25, 1954, I began my fighting career and I contributed my part in fighting the French Expeditionary Force. With the army of Interzone 5, I saw the end of the war on July 20, 1954, and then on April 26, 1955, I left my native place and all the ties with my family and friends to go North as a victorious fighter.

Since that day, my spirit has matured together with that of the regular army. We have built up a beautiful and prosperous and strong North; the construction sites and factories spring up quickly everywhere under a bright sky and under the superior socialist regime. Close to me there was a unique source of consolation in my life. My life was beautiful, my happiness immeasurable. Enough to eat; warm clothing in my daily life; earning a living was fairly easy; often I enjoyed songs and dances which deal with the healthy life of all the people in the North and with the maturity of the Army."

In the following entry Do Luc wrote:

"Then, one morning, while my life was touched with a fresh, joyous and peaceful atmosphere, in harmony with the reconstruction program in the North, while my life was a normal one and I was happy with my only love . . .

"Suddenly, on December 15, 1960, . . .

"I answered the needs of the international solidarity of the Vietnamese-Laotian proletariat. I
had to leave my beloved fatherland and my sweet life and go to help our friends with a spirit of unselfishness, of class solidarity, of love for my fatherland, and the spirit of the international proletarian revolution, in order to annihilate the reactionary clique of Pumi Buon Um (Phoumi-Boun Oum) so that mankind and the two countries, Viet-Nam and Laos, could achieve prosperity and happiness.

"Thus, I succeeded in meeting the needs of a friendly country.

"Our friends' war has stopped and the guns are silent. On the call of the Party, I returned to my beloved fatherland! My life returned to normal. I enjoyed again the peaceful atmosphere and my happiness. I continued training daily for the defense of the territory of the North and for the continuation of the liberation of the South. But I was back with my only love. Hurrah! How happy and how sweet. But my life could not continue that way!

"For the third time my life turned to war again. For the liberation of our compatriots in the South, a situation of boiling oil and burning fire is necessary! A situation in which husband is separated from wife, father from son, brother from brother is necessary. I joined the ranks of the liberation army in answer to the call of the front for liberation of the South.

"Now my life is full of hardship—not enough rice to eat nor enough salt to give a taste to my tongue, not enough clothing to keep myself warm! But in my heart I keep loyal to the Party and to the people. I am proud and happy.

"I am writing down this story for my sons and my grandsons of the future to know of my life and activities during the revolution when the best medicine available was the root of the wild banana tree and the best bandage was the leaf of rau lui, when there was no salt to give a taste to our meals, when there was no such food as meat or fish like we enjoy in a time of peace and happiness such as I have known and left behind. But that day will not take long to return to my life."

On the back pages of his diary, Do Luc had listed a number of Vietnamese words with their equivalents in the language of one of the mountain tribes in the area where he was stationed.

(See page reproduced below.)
In the back pages of his diary, Do Luc also listed "10 disciplinary rules for military security" as follows:

"1. Do not disclose army secrets. Do not be curious about your own responsibilities and duties.
"2. Do not discuss the duties you must carry out.
"3. You must respect absolutely the regulations which protect documents during your activities. Do not carry with you those things that regulations prohibit you from carrying. If you are captured by the enemy, be determined not to give in."

(Ironically, this regulation on documents was violated by the diary in which he wrote down the rule!)

"Slogans:—absolute loyalty to the revolution —death is preferable to slavery
"5. Do not take the liberty of listening to enemy broadcasts or of reading their newspapers or documents. Do not spread false rumors.
"6. Do not have any relations with any organization with evil segments of the population which are harmful to the revolution.
"7. Do not take your family or relatives or friends to military camp sites.
"8. Keep order and security among the population as well as among yourselves.
"9. Do not cease to carry out self-criticism or being vigilant, and continue your training.
"10. Implement seriously these ten rules, mentally as well as in deeds."
The map below shows Do Luc's itinerary from 1954 to 1961.
The Vo Van Tan Case

(See Part I, section VI, E, 2, p. 41)

Vo Van Tan, whose picture appears below, was a private, first class, in the First Battalion of Regiment 664, Army of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (North Viet-Nam). In June 1961 he was assigned to a special unit, Independent Battalion #2, to go to South Viet-Nam. In August, after a battle, Tan decided to defect. He stole some rice and money and made his way to Saigon. On September 18 he was arrested by the police at the An Dong bus station during a routine check of identification papers.
BÀN KHÁU CUNG

VÕ VÂN TÂN tự VÕ HOÀ MI tự
VÕ - MAI - HÀ bị danh VÕ QUANG VINH,
Thượng-sĩ thuộc Tiểu-đ conversion.II Cần-Bộc
Việt- Cộng, được phải trao vào Nam hoạt
dong, bị bắt ngày 18/9/61 tại SAIGON.

I.- LY LỊCH

- Võ Văn Tân tự Võ Hoà Mi tự Võ Mai Hà, bị danh Võ Quang Minh.
- Sanh năm 1927 tại xã Hưng Lợi, huyện Giồng Riông, tỉnh Rach Gia (RÍEN GIANG).
- Con ông Võ Văn Quang (c) và Bà Nguyễn Thị Hàng (c).
- Thọ: lúc
- Độc thân
- Khai chưa tiến dần
- Anh chỉ em ruột: không có.

Nhân dạng:

II.- TRƯỞNG HỌP BI ĐEN

Thượng sỉ quân đội Việt- Cộng thuộc Tiểu đoàn 2 Dộc Lập (tiểu đoàn cần-bộc) được phải vào Nam tăng cường cho các đơn vị V.C., cho ngài và đánh các tiền cung của đơn vị trên vào Sài Gòn, bị bắt tại bên xe An Đồng (Saigon) ngày 18/9/61.

III.- TIN TỨC CHANG THỨC

- Trước năm 1945: đồn trâu cho người có ruột, sau theo ông giá vừa trâu rừng vừa học nghề thương.
- 1946: gia nhập Thanh-niên Tiến-Phong xã Hưng Lợi, huyện Châu Thành tỉnh Rach Gia.
- 1948: sau khi Thanh-niên tiến-phong giải tan, gia nhập đoàn Thanh Niên Chủ Quốc xã Hưng Lợi.
- 11-1952: do sự giúp đỡ của tên MINH, tiểu đội trưởng Du-kích xã quê Hưng Đông xã Hưng Lợi, y được kết nạp vào Tiểu đội trên và tham gia (cùng đơn vị chủ lực địa-đroken) công tác chiến viễn các đơn bộ để thế trong xã.

.... /2
A translation of page 1 of Vo Van Tan’s interrogation follows:

INTERROGATION REPORT for

Vo Van Tan, alias Vo Hoa Mi, alias Vo Mai Ha, secret name of Vo Quang Vinh, Private, First Class, Battalion 2, Viet Cong cadre, charged with returning to South Viet-Nam for active duty. Arrested in Saigon, September 18, 1961.

I. Biographical data

- Vo Van Tan, alias Vo Hoa Mi, alias Vo Mai Ha, secret name Vo Quang Vinh
- Born in 1927 in Hung Loi hamlet, Giong Rieng district, Rach Gia province (now Kien Giang)
- Father is Vo Van Quang; mother is Nguyen Thi Hang
- Carpenter
- Single
- Declared he has no police record
- No sisters or brothers

Measurements:
1.52 meters; medium build; complexion—clear brown; high cheekbones; deep-set eyes; long black eyebrows; large mouth; mole 2 mm. over right eyebrow near middle; left ear close to head.

II. Circumstances of arrest

Private, first class, in Viet Cong Independent Battalion 2 (cadre battalion). Was assigned to South Viet-Nam to increase the potential of Viet Cong units. He deserted, stole the money of the battalion, and escaped to Saigon. He was arrested at An Dong bus station in Saigon on September 18, 1961.

III. Specific information

- Before 1945: he kept buffaloes for his aunt. Later he worked in the rice fields with his father and at the same time was trained to be a carpenter.
- 1946: he joined the Youth Commandos of Hung Loi village, Chau Thanh district, Rach Gia province.
- 1948: after the Youth Commandos were disbanded, he joined the Youth for Liberation of the Country.

November 1952: He was sponsored by a man named Mien, who was head of a guerrilla platoon in Hung Dong hamlet, Hung Loi village, and was accepted as a member of this platoon which took part (together with other local platoons) in attacks on scattered outposts near the village.

A summary of the remainder of Vo Van Tan’s confession follows:

In October 1954 he boarded a French ship to go to the North. At O Cap he transferred to a Russian ship together with about 3,000 other Vietnamese. On October 5, 1954, they arrived at Sam Son in Thanh Hoa province in North Viet-Nam. He was assigned to the 338th Division.

In 1961, in preparation for their assignment to South Viet-Nam, Tan and some of his comrades were given a special course to familiarize them with the use of French and U.S. weapons. On June 20, 1961, they began their journey to the South, starting at Hoa Binh, then passing through Hanoi and Thanh to Vinh, where they rested. From Vinh they traveled southwest into Laos. Tan noted the passage of his unit, Independent Battalion No. 2, through “Cam Muon,” the Laotian province of Khammouane.

They entered South Viet-Nam through Quang Nam Province. Tan said they passed through Kontum and Darlac Provinces and operated in the area around the city of Ban Me Thuot.

On August 26, 1961, Tan said, his unit encountered troops of the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam and suffered heavy casualties. He said they were saved only by a Viet Cong unit that was nearby and came to their aid. Tan and the rest of the survivors managed to escape into the jungle. Tan told his interrogators that he deserted within 24 hours following this engagement.

He stole a bag of rice and 95,000 piasters (about $1,292) from his unit and left for Saigon. Traveling entirely at night, he reached his goal but was picked up almost immediately by South Vietnamese police.
The map below shows Vo Van Tan's travels.
The Mai Xuan Phong Diary
(See Part I, section VI, E, 2, pp. 41-42)

On October 3, 1961, in Darlac Province a unit of the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam overran a Viet Cong camp. The VC group had included a small medical detachment. The ARVN forces captured some medical supplies and a diary kept by the Viet Cong medical officer, a man named Mai Xuan Phong. The first dated entry in the diary is for April 20, 1961; the final one, for September 21, 1961. In the back pages of his notebook Phong wrote the words of a popular Vietnamese song.

The cover of the Mai Xuan Phong diary is pictured below.

Excerpts from the Mai Xuan Phong diary follow:

(page 4)

The most precious thing for a man is his life, because one has only one life. One must, then, live in such a way that one does not have to regret the wasted years and months, that one does not have to be ashamed of a pitiful past, that one is able to say before passing away: my whole life, my whole strength have been devoted to the most elevated and the most beautiful cause—the struggle for the liberation of mankind. . . .

(page 5)

. . . And one has to live in a hurry. A stupid accident, disease, or any tragic hazard may suddenly put an end to one's life. . . .
April 20, 1961

Departure for a new mission to which I have been assigned. There are so many happy memories which will encourage me to fulfill my duty . . . .

April 22, 1961

We left the beloved fatherland at exactly five minutes to 12. Here is a friendly country. We have to cross a very mountainous border region.

May 14, 1961

At 15 minutes before 9:00 we arrived at Highway No. 9 which has just been liberated. On the highway lie the remnants of four enemy GMC trucks and two armored cars which our forces have destroyed. We arrived at the post of Muong Phin (Muong Phine) which has just been liberated. We slept at Muong Phine and, next day, we cross Highway No. 9.

(unintelligible code sign “6-5 * +”)

We stop here and help build a road to allow trucks to bring in rice supplies. For two days, we have been short of food and had only glutinous rice. The sun is burning hot. We do not have enough drinking water . . . .

But our patriotism and our determination to liberate the native land will help us overcome all the difficulties and accomplish our duty.

June 1, 1961

At 15 minutes to 2:00 we arrived at the regrouping station located on the border between Laos and Viet-Nam, at the border of Quang Nam [Province]. I have been away from the beloved fatherland for one month and 20 days (Note: bad arithmetic, should be one month and 10 days!), and I have been away from my native South for 6 years.

(signature)

At exactly 3:00 p.m. on the 10th of June ’61 we arrived at the boundary of Contum (Kontum) province . . . .

(signature)

We entered Cambodia on July 10, 1961—across the border of Cambodia and Viet-Nam in the province of Gia Rai . . . .

We arrived at the operational base in Dac Lac (Darlac) province, in the southwest highlands, on August 7, 1961 . . . .

On August 9, I received orders to go on a mission and join an armed unit. This unit has just been organized. It does not have living quarters yet and is not yet fully equipped. The unit is composed of only two squads, all mountain tribesmen except for two Vietnamese who came from the North. As for me, in my capacity as medical assistant, I find that there are no conditions or means for me to operate. There is not sufficient medicine. Life in this base is really difficult . . . .
But I shall overcome all these difficulties in order to fulfill my duty in the revolution in the South.

After three months and nine days, after having crossed many a border—Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam—after having gone through all this hardship and danger, I think that I have accomplished at this point a part of my duty.

August 9, 1961

September 20, 1961

Today we begin our tour of armed propaganda. We shall attack the enemy and establish popular bases among the population of the land development centers in Dac Lac (Darlac) province, in the southwest highlands . . . .

(continued on page 14)

September 21, 1961

I received instructions to report to K (note: probably the Viet Cong operational headquarters in the Ban Me Thuot area) in order to be assigned a new mission . . . .

(continued on page 14)

September 21, 1961

At 5:30, our forces launched a massive attack on the land development center of Quang Nhieu, Ba Moi Thuoc (Ban Me Thuot), and we proceeded to armed propaganda. We gathered together about 400 people and propagandaed on the policy of the Front for Liberation of the South . . . .

We have secured good results. We have awakened these people after the dark years they lived under My-Diem. We seized many documents and much military equipment . . . .

The inside cover of the Mai Xuan Phong diary bears the seal of the Tong Cong Ty Bach Hoa (literally, General Company for a Hundred Things), a state-owned enterprise in North Vietnam.
The inside cover of the Mai Xuan Phong diary is reproduced below.
The map below shows Mai Xuan Phong's itinerary.
Communist Party Cadres in the South
(See Part 1, section VI, F, 1, pp. 43-44)

On October 26, 1961, troops of the Republic of Viet-Nam attacked and seized a Viet Cong camp. Many documents were seized. Included were the medical and Party records of a Party cadre named Huynh Van Cuong.

The medical record, reproduced below, showed that Cuong was suffering from a lung ailment. The record sheet is headed “Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.” It is from the “Military Medical Office, Medical Section 108.”
The "Announcement Certificate" below is a receipt for the certificate of introduction for Cuong from the Lao Dong Party (Communist Party). It is dated April 1961 and shows that he was a member of the Party since 1947. He apparently brought it from the North to present to his new Party unit, F 351, in the South.

(FRONT)

(Dang Lao Dong) Viet Nam
Ban To chuc

PHIEU BAO
Da tien anh gian gioi thieu S.H.D.

Kinh gioi: BAN TO CHUC F 351

Xin bao da tien anh gian gioi thieu sinh hoat Dang so 479
ngay 4/4/1951 cau lano
Dong chi Huynh Cuong vao Dang 4/4/1947
Chinh thec

Ngay theng nam
T/M Ban To chuc

(Back)

Chu y:

- Khi co quan gioi thieu sinh hoat Dang cho Dang vien phai viet kien phieu bao.
- Muc Kinh gioi Ban To chuc... thi noi gioi viet luan, tice la viet tron ly cho co quan Minh.
- Ngay vao Dang, quy chinh thec cong co quan gioi ghi vao luan.
- Co quan tien anh giai giai thieu sinh hoat Dang chi xem ly
- ngay vao Dang, quy chinh thec trong giai giai thieu sinh hoat Dang
- roi ghi o, ngay theng va ky ten dong dau.
Below is a photograph of a “Certificate of Introduction” from the Lao Dong Party in the name of Huynh Van Cuong. It lists his Party alias, Quoc Cang, and notes his entry into the Party on April 3, 1947. It is from his regular organization, chapter 11, section E 400, and lists his next assignment as “administrative headquarters for cadre.” It requests that Cuong be permitted by his new organization in the South, “F 351,” to carry out “special missions.”

(Front)
**Photograph of a “Certificate of Introduction”—Continued**

(BACK)
A.- CHƯƠNG TRÌNH :


Chúng ta lao động vất-vả, song vó tóc tuốt nặng nề tay làm không đủ hăm, xanh quan tâm ở không ly, cần yêu không thấu men. Ngoài ra hàng ngày bồn Chanh-Quyen thành-trại ép buộc bỏ-lợi chúng ta rót nặng nề, hào là gã cao thế nặng, hào là bất an, bất linh, hào là tay đầy chút, tre-tàn đa-màn, hào đến đơn hữu lạy, hào bất chung ta vào ("Khu-Trí-Dân", "Dính-Dân").


Cach-Nông thang 8 da thiết sự giai-quyet quyền lợi ruin bất chung ta, đem lái cho chúng ta dại-sối xứng danh cũa con người, đem lái cho chúng ta chánh lâm vụ, vò cho giai-tốc, xoa mùa, giảm phê di dân tâm trạng bất chung ta. Ở miền Bắc hiện nay toan bộ giai-cề địa-chủ đã bị đánh đo, Nông-dân Lào-Dòng chúng ta tro thành chủ ních ông ở tổn xoa, đối sống hằng ngày càng dậy ca-li-thiền không now...

Nhưng ở miền Nam ở bồn Dĩ-Quốc Kỳ và bồn Phong-Kiên Ngọc-Dinh-Dié mà nhân tính chia cắt đặt mở chung ta và trùng trùng xóa bỏ mỗi quyền lợi về chung ta để do xứng mỗi mỗi gián giữ. Lượng 234 cáo-cach ruoi wont giao tiếp của chúng ta, tùy theo quyền sở hữu riêng rẽ của chúng ta, đang từng bồn địa chung họa ac ba cấp đất, từng tò, xao cảp, Kỳ bo tiên ra biết con chung ta di linh vật lên mới Quan-Hơi Phat-Kít, lãnh sung đến của Kỳ, do Kỳ chỉ huy ngày đề dân, ap bo-li, kêu kêu chúng ta, gay ra không biết bao nhiêu tội ac. Trực tiếp mặt chung chỉ có hai con đường: hoặc translating chung chiết lây chung minh thê-tham dùng cung cứu của Kỳ-Đic, hoặc phải vùng lên giá-chiến của cut mà, cứu nữa, cứu nữa, cõ gián quyền sống, không thể khác nữa, chúng ta chơn con đường thú hai, con đường Cach-Nông.

---2---
Excerpts from the “Draft Program of Action and Rules of Procedure of the Association of Peasants for Liberation”:

(Page 1)—“Our peasants have an old and glorious tradition of resistance against the imperialists, French and Japanese, and against the feudalists and exploiters. Under the leadership of the working class and the leadership of the Party, which is in the vanguard of the revolution, which was the Communist Party of Indochina, and which is now the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam, since 1930 we have taken part in all the demonstrations against taxes, forced labor, taxes on the rice crop, and all other kinds of exploitation . . . .”

(Page 2)—“The Association of Peasants for Liberation, together with all the other classes and revolutionary forces belonging to the Popular Front for Liberation of South Viet-Nam, will contribute to strengthening the links of solidarity among the working classes under the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam . . . .”
BÁO CÁC TINH HÌNH TO CHÚC NONG HÔI
VA NGUỒN DAN HỌC TẬP CHƯƠNG TRÌNH
DỊU LẾ Ô XA

1.- VẾ 20 CHÚC NONG HÔI :

Việc năm tỉnh hình Không stagn van-dong Không ky, cho nên đăng
ngày tập-trung học-tập (30/12/60) chi có 5 uy-viên và đc CUV fú-trạch
Nông-hội la 6 người, con 1 ở Lıp-Winh tu chối không đánh-hán nhiem-va:
Mây da tim duoc nuoi that the, đa du 7 uy-viên, gom co: 1 Co-nong, va 5
Trùng-nông lop duoi.
Vi tỉnh-hình giai-cap o day da so la Trung-nông va da so dong-
chi va nong-ctot la Trung-nông, cho nen chu-a thuc-hien duoc da so Ban
van-dong xa la Ban-Co-nong.

2/- Ban Can-su Nong-hoi ap :

Đa thanh-lap xong 9 Ban Can-su ap co 1 ap Long-Chau chu-a
thanh-lap vi de fú-trạch Bình, Hai ap chu-va Can-van thi khong thanh
láp Ban Can-su ma co can-bo van-dong don-tuyen voi dong-chi fú-trạch-
Nông-hội trong cac Ban Can-su ap co dai-hieu Pu-su nhung chua cháp
(ly do nhu tren) tra nh-fan giai-cap o day co nhuic BN hon 0 cac Xa
Vi fan lon uy-viên xa fú-trạch 2 ap va co ban mat màng cho nen
den toi mai (30/1/61) noi hoc xong Ban Can-su ap .

Uy-viên Ban van-dong không kiêm trong Ban Can-su, ma chi hung -
dan giup-do Ban Can-su .

3/- To Nong-hoi ; (ke-koanh ).
Vi theo gian duoi buc chi con 2 ngay ma mat het 1 buoi
hop kiêm-diem tỉnh-hình va to-chuc Ban can-su, cho nen yeu-cau to-chuc
To Nong-hoi chi thuc-hien duoc o 1 so ap ho.i truc, con cac ap khác moic
uy-viên Ban van-dong va Ban Can-su chi co the va-dong duoc 1 vai hoi-
vien.

Uy-viên Ban van-dong va Ban Can-su không truc-tiep lam To-truong
To Nong-hoi. Uy-viên Ban van-dong va truc-tiep huong-dan Ban Can-su
va truc-tiep huong-dan 1 To Nong-hoi noi minh o de rut kinh-nhiem
chung .

4/- Thac-mac va to-chuc Nong-hoi :

Co to-chuc Nong-cot va TVHM va Nong-hoi không .

85
Excerpts from “Research Document on the Organization of Peasants Association”:

(Page 4)—“Our final victory will depend on our policy in rural areas. The Front’s policy should be in deep harmony with the laboring class and should be placed under the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam . . . .”

(Page 6)—“Under what leadership should the Peasants Association be placed?

“The Peasants Association accepts the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam because: imperialism and feudalism, concretely represented by the U.S.-Diem clique, are the peasants’ enemies and have always exploited and oppressed the peasants; on the other hand, the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam has always led the fight against imperialists and feudalists, and for the liberation of the people . . . .”
Below is a page from a letter from the commanding officer of Company 265 of the "Army of Liberation of the South" addressed to officers and men of the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam at Truc Giang in Kien Hoa Province, dated June 5, 1960.
Thân ái gửi anh em bính sĩ,

Chúng tôi gửi trên quan niệm dân-độc-độc này: nhạc da vang, giọng may thẩm và cơ trách nhiệm đôi với gia đình anh. Đồng thời chúng tôi của hiếu gia đình anh xúc thán tô giai cấp bị bốc lột vì hoạn cảnh hay ế ủ. Văn còn trống hàng ngàn giọt, chống hối đồng lớp ta gây nên cảnh tan tót khỏi mục thương tàn, quan gia đình anh cùng văn về trận gia đình do trước nỗi ái hèt.

Họa bình thông nhất được lập nên anh ông đích lâm để công nhất bên bắc tỉnh проч nước của cộng-dân đi với giai dân nay để có những mặt định cuộc chiến và chiến tranh, đồng thời gửi đến anh lời thắm hỏi sức khoẻ an lành.

Anh gì! Lập thương cho anh và nhiều vui phán đề phân phong của toàn dân để Đảng Lao-dép Việt Nam lãnh-đạo lên phái tiêu diệt đến quốc và chúng kiến để thực hiện nghĩa co ruộng, tạo điều kiện tốt cho kinh tế cho chiến đấu cho cuộc chiến. Nhưng để đạt được kết quả xong lực này, bộ đoàn phái kiến quan liêu lên lỏng Trần hóa bình thông nhất tổ quốc tranh cơ chế hợp lập dân-chủ để xây dựng mới nước Việt-Nam.

Hoa bình thông nhất được lập dân-chủ và giai nhân.

Xuất phát từ lập thương của nhiều vui và quyền lợi nhiều vui với cả nước và cả nước của dân tộc. Xe nài chỉ dụng lại nguyên vọng của dân do và chào thay với sự vui mừng ngày này là kẻ thù Việt-gian nhất định phải tiêu diệt.

Đều gì ai ai cũng nhận rằng: ĐảngALSE Việt-Nam đã từng anh dùng đất khách chúng lên làm cho các cường thợ dân Phap can thiệp ở gần 100 năm dưới sự lãnh đạo của Đảng Lao-Dép Việt Nam anh minh nhất tình hội nhất, song suốt nay là Đổ-Chái-Phổ đã đến cách mình thành công cuộc chiến quan trọng tháng 8 năm 1945 được toàn thị xã và toàn tỉnh Ninh Binh tiêu diệt một chấn mạnh nhất định bằng lòng một cách công minh, không còn gì để lại Việt-Nam. Nhân dân mới ta đầy niềm phong, hùng dũng, bền bỉ và đầy nay đã tỏi nguyện thương hiền được trong mê đất anh tổ rơ, lồng tay mình niềm thương với mọi

Mừng...
Excerpts from the letters of the commanding officer of Company 265:

1. (June 5, 1960)—“In the past, the Vietnamese Communists have led the Vietnamese people in the victorious fight against the French colonialists and the feudalistic Bao Dai clique. Now and in the future, the Vietnamese Communists are leading and will lead the Vietnamese people in the struggle against the American imperialists and the feudal Diem clique . . . .”

2. (April 22, 1960)—“The policy of the revolution and the responsibility of the entire population in the fight against colonialism and feudalism, under the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam, is to annihilate imperialism and feudalism, to give land to the tillers, and to lay the foundation for the building of socialism and communism . . . .”
Calls for More Aggressive Action

(See Part I, section VI, F, 3, p. 46)

Below is a page from "Instructions on the Creation of People's Self-Defense Units" seized by Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam authorities in Bien Hoa Province on February 8, 1961.

I/- Kim dinh ting hinh nhung xay dung doi Vo-Trang dua qua I2

A) va tong chuc chua ting gia kiet nap thanh fan thu co

B) va duy tung chua lay chinh tri lam chinh de co so cho

II/- De khoa lu quy duan trong chung ta can hinh ro:

A) de co trac tram cac mang ciet sam hai nay co
day do ting quyet dau tram giai cap gay sat va su doi khoang giai
cap sau ke thu-kiet di lien.

B) thay ro vai tro nong cot cho su

C) trong xay dung ly xuong vo tram tai

III/- Chuong ta can cap xay dung cong co cac doi vo

1) hoat dong tac chuan, diet ac ho truc long trao

2) cong tac quan chung cu tho la cong tac vat tram xay
dung ly ly xuong chinh tri trong thanh dan

3) cong tac tuy cap tuy tu

4) va quy dung ly xuong
Excerpts from "Instructions on the Creation of People's Self-Defense Units":

(On page 1)—Examining the past situation of the armed self-defense units, 12 (unit commander's code designation) was able to find some weak points which must be attended to and speedily corrected by Party members of all ranks . . .

(Same page)—Our present and future responsibility is to create armed self-defense units. The creation of armed self-defense units is based on the following four points:

1) take the offensive in order to eliminate the enemy and protect the movement.
2) our activity among the people is [through] the Front; propagandize in order to rally the people; organize basic revolutionary cells in order to build political forces among the people.
3) try to achieve self-sufficiency.
4) create a reserve force . . .
KHÔC PHỤC KHNUT ĐIỆM
PHỤ HUY PHỤ ĐIỆM

RA SỨC DÀY MẠNH HÙN NỮA CÔNG-TÁC ĐÔ-TỊ

Hồ tình-vụ và phương châm trước mắt chủ yếu của dùng-books ta là mở rộng công-tác thôn quê, đẩy mạnh công-tác pô-thị, giành lại những vùng cần-cứ khánh chiến cứ, mở rộng những khu an-toàn, thu hẹp phạm-vi hoạt-dộng và kiểm-soát của địch, làm thay đổi lực-lượng so sánh giữa ta và địch, làm cho địch chúng những bất động và toàn cuộc mà còn làm cho địch bị động cả và cục bộ nửa, tạo điều kiện để đến khóe nghĩa cuộc chiến quyền.


Theo phương hướng tiến lên khỏi nghĩa cuộc chiến-chánh-quyền thì đầu-tranh trong pô-thì cũng vẫn là đầu-tranh chiến-trị chủ yếu có kết hợp với đầu-tranh vỗ-trang đứng mức và kíp thể.

Trong pô-thì đầu-tranh đơn thuần và chiến-trị là không đúng, vì đơn thuần và chiến-trị thì không xây dựng, cũng cỏ, phát-trí thiên được cơ-số và không dựa phong-trào đầu-tranh chiến-trị của quân chúng lận ác. Nuơn soát ác-nghiệp yêu cầu mong muốn đó, căn thiết và trước hết phải có lý-lưỡng, phải có lý-lưỡng chiến-trị...
Excerpts from "Instructions Regarding Activities in Cities":

(Page 1)—The responsibility and main goals that our Party has in view are to
develop activities in the countryside, to increase activity in the cities, to reoccupy
our former resistance bases, to extend our security zones, to limit the field of action
and control of the enemy. . . .

ITEM 4

The Policy of Forcible Seizure of Power

(See Part I, section VI, F, 4, pp. 46-47)

In December 1960 in a raid on a Viet Cong headquarters in Dinh Tuong Province,
armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam seized many documents. Included was the
notebook of a VC commissioner. Excerpts from the notebook follow:

Subject: Preparation for the creation of a liberation front.

1.—How the international balance of power and the internal balance of power affect
the revolution in the South.

—the strategy of our revolution remains a popular and democratic one (unchanged).
Its basic purpose: overthrow of imperialism and feudalism and land for the tillers.

—the present policy of the revolution in the South is not the same as in 1956.

—on the basis of the balance of power between ourselves and our enemies inside the
country and outside, the Central Committee has outlined a new policy for the revolution
in the South . . . .

Our purposes: to incite the people to rise against the U.S.-Diem clique in order to
achieve the objective of the revolutionary liberation of the South. The enemy is now
implementing a dreadful policy to oppress the people (for example, decree No. 10/59,
agrovilles, etc.). The people should stand up and fight against them, using all means,
legal and illegal, political and military.

The fascist policy of the enemy has prompted the people to join the fight for self-
defense with arms.

Whether we should resort to the use of arms or not depends on the actual situation
at the moment. This should not occur too early or too late, and it is only up to the
Central Committee to determine when the time is appropriate and reach a decision.

The revolution in the South at the present time has two possibilities:

—general uprising to seize power.
—a long-term armed struggle.

But our final objective is a general uprising to seize power.

The Revolution in the South should go through two stages until the General
Uprising:

—the preparatory stage, to upset the balance of power.
—the stage of direct revolution.

When the balance of power has completely changed in our favor and when the
time is proper for a general uprising, military means will be the essential means and
arming the population and our forces will be our primary task.

When should the general uprising take place?

During the preparatory stage, in order to change the balance of power in our favor,
we must exert our influence on the people in rural areas and in cities and organize the
masses under the strict leadership of the Party.
Party Policy Toward the Front
(See Part I, section VI, P. 5, p. 47)

Below is a copy of the Thu-Bien "instructions" issued by the Lao Dong (Communist) Party organization in the Thu Dau Mot and Bien Hoa region. It is dated March 28, 1961, and was seized in the hideout of a Viet Cong official in Phuoc Thanh Province.

Below is a copy of the Thu-Bien "instructions" issued by the Lao Dong (Communist) Party organization in the Thu Dau Mot and Bien Hoa region. It is dated March 28, 1961, and was seized in the hideout of a Viet Cong official in Phuoc Thanh Province.
Excerpts from the Thu-Bien “Instructions”:

... The organization of committees of the Popular Front at all levels, starting with the villages, is very important because the people want to know the leaders of the Popular Front at all levels and, through them, the policy of the Front.

We urge you, comrades, to start immediately the organization of committees of the Popular Front in village bases [controlled by the VC], “rice and beans” villages [mixed control], and in “rice and beans” villages [where the VC is] weak but where we have managed to exert a certain control over a few hamlets and where we can gather about 100 people for demonstrations and where we have already organized peasants associations . . . .

The number of members of those [Party] committees working overtly as members of committees of the Popular Front varies according to the degree of control over each village, but in any case the minimum number of committee members operating overtly as such should be two. The other members, although they do not operate openly as committee members, should engage secretly in propaganda activities for the Popular Front, while waiting for the time when we have extended our control over the villages and all or the majority of committee members can operate openly as such.

To secure a broad base of representation within the Front, the number of Party members on committees of the Popular Front should not exceed two-fifths of the total membership . . . .
Deceptive Appeal for Broad Support of the "Liberation" Movement Is a Temporary Policy of the Communist Party

(See Part I, section VI, F, 6, p. 48)

Below is a photograph of instructions issued by the Viet Cong Regional Committee of the South to inter-province committees, seized in Tay Ninh on February 15, 1961.
Excerpts from the “Instructions” issued by the Viet Cong Committee for the South to inter-province committees:

The policy of the Front is that of building up the massive solidarity of all the people without distinctions of race, social class, religion, political party, or sex, without distinctions among intellectuals, bourgeoisie, rich peasants or poor peasants or proletariats. Even those who were against the Resistance or the Party will be admitted to the Front on the sole condition that they be for peace and reunification of the country. All efforts should be directed to attack the enemy number one of the Vietnamese people, the U.S. and Ngo Dinh Diem clique.

For this reason, the Front’s forces will comprise workers, peasants, bourgeoisie, students, intellectuals, prominent national figures who are for the progress of the country, and all organizations or individuals in South Viet-Nam who are for peace and reunification of the country.

Of these constituent elements, workers are the heralds of the revolutionary struggle. The coalition bloc of workers and peasants is the foundation stone of the Front for these two classes occupy the absolute majority in the Front. Furthermore, they have the spirit of sacrifice and endurance for the sake of the revolution.

But in the present situation, these two classes do not enjoy high prestige and are not capable of leading the revolution to decisive victory.

That reason prompts the Party to apply the policy of the Front and to set up the People’s Front for Liberation of South Viet-Nam to attract bourgeois intellectual circles which comprise young men and girls and students in the cities, middle and rich peasants in the countryside.

In reports read to the 3d Congress of the Party, Comrades Le Duan and Le Duc Tho observed that young men and girls, students, intellectuals, and the bourgeoisie in the cities, as well as rich and middle peasants in the country, are quickly converted to socialism but they are also very prompt to waver and to oppose the revolution, socialism and Marx-Leninism. They are inclined to self-interest, security and pleasure. In the present situation of South Viet-Nam, the Central Committee supports integration of these elements into the Front, not because the Party is betraying the policy of class struggle and of the revolution, not because the Party is going to entrust these classes with heavy responsibilities in the revolutionary liberation of South Viet-Nam, but only to utilize their abilities and their prestige in order to push forward the revolution and to give more prestige to the People’s Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam.

This line of conduct is only a temporary policy of the Party. When the revolution is crowned with success, this policy will be revised. Then the Party will act overtly to lead the revolution in South Viet-Nam.

The policy of the Front will help us to control the majority of the people and to isolate the enemy, which will be reduced to a handful of reactionaries in the Government and in the Army. Our final victory will be assured. . . .
Policy of Violence by the Viet Cong

(See Part I, section VI, F, 7, pp. 48-49)

In an attack on August 15, 1961, against a Viet Cong base in Long An Province, forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam seized a copy of instructions to the VC provincial committee from the Inter-Province Committee of the Central Region of the South (Nambo). A photocopy of a page from those instructions appears below.
Excerpts from the VC instructions from Long An follow:

(The first part of the document points out certain shortcomings in Viet Cong operations.)

Instructions:

1. I urges all 14 W (provincial cadre) to correct the above shortcomings and from now until National Day, September 2, 1961, to step up the following activities:

   1. Special caution against civil guard members who might surrender for infiltration purposes. Conduct thorough investigation of each particular case for no more than three months. After this period, if the case remains suspicious, immediately liquidate the suspect to avoid further trouble for the revolution.

   2. Step up extermination activities against traitors. All those refusing to have rice collected, to pay taxes or make money contributions to the Front can be considered as reactionaries and punished like other traitors.

   3. Step up activities [aimed at] encircling and paralyzing strategic roads, means of communication used for transporting rice, pigs and charcoal, such as canals and most particularly Inter-Provincial Road No. 4. These activities are aimed at ruining the economy of the enemy, at raising the cost of living in the city of Saigon, and thereby creating discontent.

   The accomplishments of the 14 W of Long An and Dinh Tuong during the month of June—sinking 5 junks (loaded with) charcoal, 8 junks with rice, confiscating 4 trucks of pigs—deserve our praise.

   4. Build up the revolutionary spirit of the cadre and Party members and most particularly of the liberation forces. Regularly study revolutionary documents so that cadre, Party members and combatants do not panic in the face of the enemy and have strong confidence in the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party and of the Front.
The Present Danger

(See Part I, section VII, pp. 49-51)

The first page of a copy of the “Military Plan of the Provincial Party Committee at Baria” is reproduced below.

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AN SAO "ĐẾ-ÁN QUAN-SỰ TỈNH ĐÀN BỘ BÀ-RIÀ"
(bắt được tại Hạt-Dịch "Phước-Tuy" ngày 12 - 5 - 1961)

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NHIỆM-VỤ CỦA LỰC-LƯỢNG VÔ-TRANG : - Để thực hiện được
đường lối hoạt động của Đảng hiện nay với tình hình mới :
Nâng cao hoạt động vô-trang lên ngang với đấu-tranh chính-trị
và đường lối hoạt động riêng cụ thể của mới vùng : vùng can-cú
hoạt động vô trang là chủ yếu, vùng nông thôn ngang với đấu trạnh
chính trị. Vùng ðồ-thị đấu trạnh chính trị là chủ yếu.

Thi hành đường lối của Đảng thích hợp với tình hình
ta nhiệm-vụ chung của các lực-lượng vô trang phải đẩy mạnh
hoạt động giỏi thế kễ kếp, vô trang TT và tác chiến tận công
dịch liên tục sâu rộng khắp khắp để phục vụ kịp yếu cầu của
cách mạng. Tích cực tiêu hao, tiêu diệt bình lức địch, bởi
dương. Xây dựng lực lượng ta.

Về hoạt-dộng cụ thể :
1/- Giữ thế kễ kếp, phối hợp chặt chẽ với lực-lượng
chính trị quyết tâm thi hành kế hoạch giỏi thế kễ kếp trong
phân đấu-tranh giỏi thế kễ kếp.

Nhưng chúng ta phải tiến mạnh với hình thức quyết liệt
quyết quyết có tập trung, có điểm, có diện. Các lực lượng của quân
phối hợp với 1 số xã có đủ kích và dân quân tự vệ, tự vệ bị
mất, quyết sacht trong 1 vùng nhứt đích với hình thức như khởi
nghiêm quân chúng trong vùng đói. Lực lượng tập trung của mỗi
quân phải phối hợp tiến hành cho được 1 điểm trong 1 xã hoặc
liên xã. Rạng 21/22 và 55 chuẩn bị 1 điểm có lực lượng của T
hợp trảng. Các đối xã tiến lên&t; đấu mạnh và chủ đi thế kễ kếp có xã nội, có đối, dân-kiểm phải tiến hành cho được 1 liên
ếp.

Các đối, phụ trách thi xã, thị trấn, dinh-dién phải có
diệt ác tác chiến tại Trung-Tâm để thị động chiến nhằm bóng Cộng
An và CĐV và Quân, bón xã còn đấu so. Ngơi rồi, có 1 cuộc vô-
trang TT và thường xuyên di xã xây dựng cố so.
A translation of page 1 of the Baria military plan follows:

The responsibilities and duties of armed groups:

In order to carry out the present policies of the Party to meet the new situation: increase armed activities to the level of political activities and the policies appropriate for each region—in base areas, armed intervention or activities are the mainstay; in rural areas armed activities should be at the same level as political activities; in towns and cities, political activities are the most important.

To carry out the policies of the Party appropriate to the new situation, the common task of armed units of the military forces is to press forward measures to overcome encircling pressures, propaganda under armed protection, and military attacks on the enemy in a continuous, spreading and well-coordinated manner to serve the needs of the revolution. Weaken and annihilate enemy military forces, then regroup for recovery. Build up our forces.

Concrete activities:

I. Overcome encircling pressure; coordinate closely with the political branch to carry out plans for this purpose.

However, we must move forward with determination, planning places for concentration, targets and areas of activities. Forces at the district level should coordinate with a number of villages having guerrilla and people's militia security forces. Wipe out the enemy in one area at a time under the guise of liberating the people in that particular area. Concentrated forces of a district should coordinate to establish a beachhead in a village or inter-village. 21/22 and 55 be prepared for a beachhead with support from the forces of T. Village forces under encircling pressure and having guerrilla groups must progress into inter-village formations.

Squads in charge of villages and agrovilles must carry out assassination missions right at the center to immobilize the enemy. Prime targets should be security forces and civil action district officials, hooligans and thugs. Besides, propaganda under armed protection must be carried out on a regular basis with a view to establishing bases.

Excerpts from the Baria military plan follow:

Organization qualities:

Quick, up-to-date, well planned. All personnel who meet standards and support the directives can be formed into guerrilla-militia. To be left out: hooligans, spies, police, sons and daughters of landlords and businessmen.

Duties:

- Identical for village guerrilla squads and people's militia.
- Deliver villages from pressure. Assassinate hooligans and oppressors. Disperse reactionary organizations carrying out propaganda to soldiers.
- Protect the people, protect production, maintain security and order in villages. Information and labor duties. Fight the enemy in order to take over weapons and establish bases.
- Oppose military service, labor assignments, concentration of people in agrovilles, and fight against corruption.

Equipment:

For village guerrillas, each squad must have at least two guns, and simple weapons for each member.

Secret militia:

Fight against pressure, suppress corrupt officials, carry out military logistics, sabotage, provide and disseminate information.

Fifth column:

Constant underground activities. Be on the alert to sabotage the enemy's military forces whenever necessary. In this case, instructions from above will be given.

Target level of the districts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Target Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/14</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/14</td>
<td>6,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/22</td>
<td>9,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>4,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/11</td>
<td>5,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attention: This does not include existing organizations . . . .

Training requirements:

The cells supervise the execution of all missions, maintain discipline, administer punishments and rewards. In all Party committees, military training must be given to members as well as to the Party secretary.
Political studies:
Cadre in village and district units:
  • Study the combined Party resolution of 1961.
  • Study the central resolution No. 15 and the military resolution.
  • Study the scope and objectives of the Front for Liberation of the South.

Village local guards:
  • Study of the regulations is a duty for local guards.
  • Study the bylaws of the Peasants Association and take part in organized political-military discussions in the villages.

New recruits:
  • Study the documents related to youth.
  • Study the objectives of our struggle.

All units:
  • Study the above documents. In addition, study the characteristics of the People's Army.
  • In daily activities, the units must instill in the minds of the soldiers, and urge them to carry out, the 36 commandments for the revolutionary fighter.
  • Carry out battle analysis after every engagement.
  • Propagate education in the units.

Military training:
Guerrillas:
  • Study guerrilla tactics. (Each region must analyze its tactical experience. Documents will be sent later.)
  • Practice individual combat, triangular formation, and close combat.

Secret local guards:
  • Study the employment of rifles, grenades and all other available weapons, practice close combat.

Cadre at district level and in centralized units:
  • Study the tactics of cell leaders, guerrilla principles and Mao's theses.
  • All units and cadres must practice individual combat, triangular formation (A fights B; C evaluates A's and B's performance against theory).
  • Military training must be carried on every day; new techniques will be initiated regularly once or twice a month.
  • Discuss and draw conclusions from field exercises and from documents exchanged between regions.
  • In addition, the village guerrilla units and those at district level must study the maintenance of available weapons.