Discussion of the Viet-Nam Situation

By

Dr. Reeves
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Dr. Reeves:

There now seems to be a complete understanding upon the part of Wesley Fishel, John Dorsey, and Jack Ryan regarding the organisational set-up of the Michigan State University project in terms of Ralph's letter to Wesley Fishel dated July 26, 1957. A memo that was given me from Fishel to Scigliano seems to me to be in accord with this understanding. John discussed with me the reorganisational set-up labeled Tentative Organization of Michigan State University Group dated August 15, 1957. At the time that he discussed this with me, he had not yet had an opportunity to discuss it with Wesley Fishel. I raised questions with John concerning the advisability of having four sections, one of them labeled research section, in the division of public administration. John thought that there would be advantages in retaining these sections from the standpoint of making it easier for him to delegate to members of a small administrative group certain administrative functions which he might otherwise need to retain in his own office. I raised the question with him as to the means that he expected to use to secure cooperation among members of these groups which are now designated as sections. He
replied that he thought it was very important that the members of the different sections worked together on both long-range and short-range projects. He stated that he had given some consideration to an entirely different organization within the public administration division. An organization that would be flexible and continuously changing and that would be centered around projects both long-range and short-range rather than \( \text{as now organized} \). He added that he had discarded this idea for the immediate future because he felt that he was not sufficiently well acquainted with the problems now facing the division to justify making a major change of this kind. That he still intended to keep this idea in mind with the possibility that at some future date, it might be advisable to abolish the sections and organize the group entirely on the basis of projects. We agreed that this might be desirable at some future date, but also that it might be somewhat demoralizing to the staff to do so now, that many of the same goals may be reached under \( \text{a new organization} \) sections that could be attained through a complete reorganization around projects. If \( \text{in cutting across section lines and have staff members} \) from different sections work on the same project, we both concluded that it would probably be both unnecessary and unwise to abolish the sections at this time, first because John needs more time to become acquainted with the nature
of the problems that he will face; second, because more time is needed to
find out the extent to which Wesley finds it possible to delegate important
administrative functions to John; and third, because Glen will probably be
in Saigon early next year and could discuss this matter in person with John
before any change is made. Time will be needed to
determine the final authority that is to be exercised by John in this position.

I raised the question with John regarding the increase in the number of American
advisers in this field. He said that he did not yet know whether the present
number is larger than will be advisable during the next year or two, but that
he has already reached the conclusion that there should be no additions to the
staff in terms of number. He may reach the conclusion that the present number
is larger than should be retained after this year.

Ross:

We were met at the airport by Wes Fishel, Jerry Hickey, Stoutenburg,
Mr. Hendrey, and Scigliano which I remember of the American group and two or
three Viet-Namese. One person had been apparently particularly assigned to
facilitate our entry into Saigon took care of all matters with the customs
officials. I was told later somewhat apologetically that they had more
people at the airport to meet us, but since our plane was late, they decided
they had better call off part of the welcoming crew and send them back to
work. I was a little bit bowled over by the fact that before we had got
settled in the care going into town we were presented with our schedules for
our entire trip. I had the feeling that we were not going to be able to get as
much out of some parts of the trip as we might have otherwise gotten if we had
had a less tight schedule.

Wesley was surprised when he learned that we were going to be there three
nights and four days leaving late in the afternoon or early evening of the
fourth day. Wes was somewhat apologetic over what he termed as very crowded
schedule. He said that they had examined plane schedules and found that if we
were to leave on Wednesday the only plane that would get us back to Karachi was
one that left shortly after two o'clock in the afternoon.

Reeves:

We had cabled in advance that we were to be there Monday, Tuesday,
and Wednesday, but had failed to let him know our change in plans to stay through
Thursday. That change was made after our first cable was sent, because we found
that it was not possible to get satisfactory plane service back to Karachi unless
we stayed through Thursday.
House:

I might add that this necessitated a rescheduling of our trip and later on in the day, we were given a new schedule which took care of the additional day that we were going to be there. It was pointed out to me that they had made arrangements for me to make a visit to the P.M.S. group or groups. This means the mountain groups or primitive groups about which Wes had exhibited some concern and earlier when he was at Michigan State he had initiated some talks about these groups and the problems they posed in a conference with John Ussen last spring. At that time, there was a feeling that some kind of basic research should be done on these groups with a view to bringing them into the governmental set-up of the Viet-Namese or if you want to call it some kind of a tribal organization set-up. This project had been dropped so Wes told me before I left the states because the President, Mr. Diem was not ready to go ahead with the “tribal project”. I had known of course, before I went to Saigon that this was going to be one of the main things on the agenda to talk about, but did not know that I was going to have the opportunity of a visit to the areas concerned.

We were taken to Wes’s house to freshen up and have breakfast and there of course, we met Wes’s wife and two of the children and it was some discussion
over the breakfast table with Wes about changes in our schedule at cetera.

He told us at eleven o'clock he had arranged a meeting with the American
Ambassador Mr. Durrow and that we would have lunch with Wes, Mr. Stoutenburg,
Mr. Dorsey and Mr. Ryan. After breakfast, we went over to the office and
Dr. Reeves had some discussions with Wes, part of which I sat in on, but most
of the time, I was talking with other people that I had known back at Michigan
State, Jerry Hickey and so on. A rather amusing incident, just as we were leaving
Wes's house we were waiting on the steps for Dr. Reeves and as was my usual way
of behaving towards Dr. Reeves since we have been here, I had started calling
him Floyd and I just referred to him naturally as Floyd in conversations and
 kidded him about a number of things at the breakfast table. I noticed that Wes
appeared to be a little bit uneasy. When we got out on the steps and were waiting
for him Wes said, "Did I understand you to refer to Dr. Reeves as Floyd?" I said
well yes, I sort of adopted this ever since we left the states and other members
of the group call him Floyd and he was amazed at this said, "I don't think I
could ever bring myself to refer to him in any way except as Dr. Reeves; we kind
of look on him as a kind of God." Of course, I laughed at this a little bit and
more of this feeling came out later on. He tried very hard to get himself around
to the point of saying Floyd and even did this once to me, but never in his
presence. It was always Dr. Reeves.

After some talk in his office, we eventually got off to lunch with the people that I have already mentioned. This went on until around three or three-thirty in the afternoon. We had a very pleasant chat with people and then we went to the hotel. At five o'clock, Dr. Reeves had a conference with Mr. Stoutenburg. Part of this I attended and part I didn't. This had to do with some of the problems in administration there and personal problems relating to Stoutenburg's proposed thesis.

At eleven o'clock, we had our conference with Mr. Durrow the Ambassador, Dr. Reeves, Wes and myself. He is a very affable kind of person. Wes mentioned pretty early in the conversation that I was interested in cultural relations and being an anthropologist, particularly in the P.M.S. group. To Wes's surprise, I believe, the Ambassador apparently had had some talks with the President about just this problem and was rather eager to go into it. He himself had made at least one trip up into this general area, but had very little to say about it.

Apparently he was acquainted with some of the different groups. He knew where they were at cetera and said that just the other day the President brought up this problem and expressed his concern about it. He had outlined to the Ambassador something of his notions of a program for the P.M.S. groups. He said
that he was sure that the President was very much interested in this kind of project. The Ambassador also asked that when we had finished our tour of P.M.S. groups that we give him a few moments of our time to tell him what we had found on the trip and any ideas that we had on the subject. A tentative appointment was set-up for four-thirty on Thursday afternoon. Our plane was supposed to come back to Saigon for the mountain areas at three o'clock.

A subtle point that I want to somehow bring into this discussion is the fact that Wes had sort of apologized to us at breakfast for not having got ahead with this P.M.S. project and his feeling was that you couldn't press the President on this; you had to wait until the President became sufficiently interested. My feeling, from what he had to say about this was that the President up to this point had exhibited no interest in it so I was a little bit surprised in the conversation with the Ambassador to have it come out that he had had discussions already with the President. The President had manifested to him a great deal of interest in these mountaineer groups. My question was whether or not he was saving this kind of communication for the ambassador and other peoples and why if he was so interested in it hadn't he brought this up to Wes, because it was pretty obvious that Wes was not acquainted with what he was doing for the P.M.S. groups.
Reeves:

On our way to the office of the Ambassador, Wesley mentioned incidentally two points that he thought would be interesting to us. One was a description of a party that had been given by the Ambassador to all the American groups in Saigon. He stated that the invitations had termed this an informal garden party. He was asked by members of the Michigan State University group how they should dress. After considerable thought, he told them they should wear coats and neckties. When they arrived at the party, to their surprise no other American group was dressed that way. The Ambassador himself wore a sportshirt and members of other groups came without coats and without neckties and in sportshirts, or in a shirt without a necktie.

The second point mentioned on our auto ride to the embassy was with regard to the frequency with which Wes met with the President. When I was there on my first trip, he had stated that he took breakfast with the President usually twice each week and that Wolfe Ladejinski attended both of these breakfasts with Wes and had one additional breakfast with the President each week at which Wes was not present. Between my two trips this pattern had changed and both Wes and Wolfe together had three breakfasts with the President each week. I asked Wes what opportunity he had to discuss matters with the President when Wolfe
was not present and he said, "almost none". I asked him if he knew what

opportunity Wolfe had to discuss with the President when Wes was not present
and he stated that he did not know how much time they spent together when he
was not present.

Either during my Monday morning conference with Wes or one of my later
conferences, I asked him how much opportunity he had had to visit the rural
communities of Viet-Nam. He stated that he had had either no opportunity or
practically no opportunity, I have forgotten which, to do that and gave as
the reason that his time was so completely occupied with activities that needed
to be dealt with in connection with the Presidency, the American Ambassador,
and the head of I.C.A., the problems connected with finding housing for new
staff members dealing with the internal problems of the American employees and the
Viet-Namese employed by the Americans that no time remained to visit outside
of Saigon. He was hopeful that with the relief he would get under the new set-up
it would be possible for him to make some visits to the rural areas.

Ross:

The next event was dinner at the home of Wes Fishel that evening. He had
told us at breakfast that he was going to have here a number of people who were
very much interested, he thought, in the Viet-Namese (mountaineers) problems or
would become interested in it as a result of further discussions. One of
the people he hoped to have was a man who had been doing a great deal of work
with the refugee groups. One of the first persons I met at dinner that night
was General Kim. I remembered that this was the man that Wes said would be
interested in these problems and had done work with refugee groups. It was a
little difficult easing him into this conversation about the Vietnamese groups
because of the presence of Scigliano. He had not been apprised of the fact that
we were going to spend a great deal of the evening talking about this problem.
He had just arrived in Saigon a few days before and there was a good bit to
talk about in terms of his trip over so on and so forth. Shortly after I had
met General Kim, Mr. Scigliano put in an appearance and a good bit of time was
taken up talking about his impressions of Saigon and his trip over and Scigliano
became a member of our little group throughout the evening and at some points
it was difficult to bring him into the total conversation about the Vietnamese-
mountaineer problems. At any rate, we finally formed a little discussion group
that was made up of General Kim, Mr. Hai, who is the private secretary to President
Diem, Mr. Gerald Dickey, who has done some preliminary research on the Vietnamese
peoples and later on Dr. Fouck. I am not quite sure what Mr. Fouck's position
is with the U.S.V. group. I don't know for sure if he is in the institute, I
think perhaps he is, but I know that his main job at least up to this point
had been working with the refugees mainly from Northern Viet-Nam, getting them
settled about the country. There were some other interesting things that came
out during this discussion. Mr. Hai kept assuring me of the great interest and
the feeling the president had for...
for these peoples and said that he was trying to do something about the problem. He said that in his own opinion that the main thing they needed with the mountain groups was education and when questioned a little bit further on education his notion of it seemed to be that these people would be educated into the ways of the Viet-Namese. As it kept putting it over and over how to become a responsible citizen. He was concerned about their agricultural practices. This was a system of what they call Ray Agriculture. A kind of slash and burn agriculture, but these people according to Hickey at any rate do cut down certain sections of the forest, 

and pile the trees up later burning these and using these as fields for some two, three, to five years moving away when the soil is no longer fertile, but he also says that his research shows that these people do not completely abandon these fields. That is they have some feeling of ownership or some ties to these fields and do come back to them eventually, so that he says the Viet-Namese groups are not nomadic in the sense that anthropologists think of them as being nomadic, which is a term that seemed to bother the Viet-Namese. They kept referring to them as wandering groups of people and Hai's feeling and later when Kim discussed this was that this was "a bad thing" that they should settle down to some kind of secondary life and again to take up their full responsibilities as Viet-Namese citizens. When we talked with General Kim about this I thought
that he had some genuine feeling for these people, that is he felt that they should not be uprooted from their lands and said that in the instances where he had been concerned with land tenure and land use et cetera, that they had always been able to make some peaceful settlement with the natives on this score. His own work that he referred to had to do with one particular group the Khage. This seems to be one of the larger primitive groups in the country. I was a little bit displeased with the way Hickey handled some of the conversation, that is it seems to me he tended to bait both General Kim and Mr. Hai on a couple of questions about where he need not have. His question turned around traditional values, land use and land tenure. Without pushing on the subject, both Kim and Hai expressed themselves a point of view you could not go in and uproot these people and push them off their land, but that some kind of peaceful settlement could be made. But Hickey kept pushing the point of tradition. How can you do this to people who have a different kind of tradition, do you have a right to do this and to do that? I had a feeling that, well certainly General Kim at a couple of points bridled under this kind of needling and I thought pretty justly so, that surely this is a problem. What are you going to do with these people and are you going to uproot them from their lands and I think in the back of his mind that Kim was saying
that ultimately or that as a last resort in order to better the total
Viet-Namese society that sometimes you might have to run roughshod over
tradition. Now I will be perfectly frank about this, a lot of this [redacted]
[redacted] is what I read into what he said rather than what he said specifically,
and I thought that Hickey was taking a somewhat unfair advantage of him,
that you push him into a position that he has to defend that actually he
would not do this [redacted] except as a last resort. The program that had been
mentioned earlier that the President set into motion was not brought up as
such in this discussion except as Hickey related to this as something the President
was working on. We really didn't get any specific information about this
project and I will mention it again when we get into the discussion with
the President.

Hickey

In my discussion with John Dorsey he stated that when [redacted] completed
his present period of service in Saigon he did not expect to renew his
appointment. In fact, [redacted] that he had determined not to do so, that his present
plan was to replace him with someone from the field of public administration.
I raised the question with John as to whether it might be advisable if the
right kind of an anthropologist or sociologist could be secured to make the
replacement from either of those fields or from social psychology rather than
from public administration and asked him whether he had given thought to the
possible contribution that an outstanding person from the social science field outside of public administration might make to the entire enterprise not merely through direct research that he might conduct, but primarily through assisting the other staff members in by themselves the right questions with reference to the research aspects of the programs of the entire project.

John thought that it would be very difficult to find that kind of a person from the social science field, but if they could find the right person, such a replacement might be advisable rather than to appoint a man from the field of public administration to replace the present anthropologist.

Ross: One further comment I wanted to make on this meeting with Kim and Mr. Hai was that it was brought out in the discussion with Hickey that in all of these groups the Rhade, the Koho, et cetera there was a different way of life in each group, that there was a different way of viewing land tenure, land use and also different methods of agriculture in all these groups and there was a feeling for this kind of thing that was expressed by both Kim and Hai that is in dealing with the total P.M.S. problem, if you want to call it a problem you would have to deal with them individually. You would have to take into account that the Rhade’s do things one way and the Koho’s do things another and that they were not proposing a one-shot method of land tenure and land use and purchase of land
for all these groups, but agreed that this would have to be worked out in terms of the value systems of each group that they were working with and I thought that this showed much more insight into this problem than I had been lead to expect from previous conversations with Hickey and with Wes.

We were on our second day in Saigon, and December 13th was scheduled for a meeting with Gerald Hickey at nine-thirty. Floyd and I had breakfast and near the end of this Hickey joined us in the dining room and Floyd was with us for about the first thirty minutes of the discussion and then he left to have his other discussion with Wes in his hotel room.

Most of the time with Hickey was taken up in his recounting of some of the findings of his research on the Vietnamese groups, a copy of which we had in our possession before we went to Saigon, which both Reaves and I had read as well as Wilbur Brookover and we had had some discussion on this preliminary report of his before we went to Saigon and I was simply drawing him out on certain aspects of this. As it turned out in his recounting of the research he ran into a number of problems in connection with this. One the difficulty of communication with the chief adviser, that is Wes. Hickey said he had never really been able to get any time to talk with Wes about the research he had done nor had he had time to talk with him about a proposed
type of research or program in these areas. I think that we get a subjective view on this a great deal of this was Hickey's own fault; he simply should have pushed for interviews, however, when I mentioned our talk with the ambassador the night before and what he had to say about the President's interest in the Vietnamese groups, Hickey said, well there you are.

And there again I think actually that Wes himself is not interested in this thing at all and never has been interested in this research in the P.M.S. areas and hasn't done anything about it. The feeling was that he could have been very affective with the president at the breakfast sessions he had with him if he had simply approached his problem. Now Hickey's feeling was that probably that Wes had never even mentioned this to the President, now this I don't know whether he had or had not. Then in addition to this he mentioned obstacles in the way of research the kinds of approval that had to be sought and obtained from the M.S.U. and their connections with the group. He brought out the attitude of the Usom group concerning research that was to be done by the M.S.U. people pointed out the difficulties of doing research without having the head of the advisory group really himself interested in doing things to promote it and facilitate it. He also brought out the problem of doing research in which Viet-Namese themselves would be involved.
He said that the relationship between the Viet-Namese and the P.M.S. peoples was rather a strained thing and the minute that you bought into the picture Viet-Namese people that the mountaineers would tend to climb up and would not give interviews that they did not feel comfortable around them and when I asked why did they have to be brought into the picture, he said this was part of the set-up with Usom's that this was part of the way of getting into the mountain areas themselves, that the present government feels that one Viet-Namese should participate in the research and that Americans should not go into these areas unless accompanied by Viet-Namese. Part of this, as it turned out seems to be a problem of security, that some of the people that went with Hickey on his trips into the villages were thought of as security personnel and I questioned him on this point and he said well yes, but perhaps there was some need for this that foreigners and this would include Viet-Namese, foreigners in the P.M.S. area had been from time to time roughly handled that there had also been some incidents with what he thought of as communists or at least spearheaded by communists from around the border and such a person is not as safe as he might be in these areas alone. This may in part account for the governments insisting that people doing research in these areas be accompanied by Viet-Namese. Further in talking with Hickey and I didn't bring up this point at this minute type of research that he is doing.
but let him talk on about it and it was pretty much as I had surmised from
the document that he had gotten together and knowing something of Hickey's
anthropological background, that Hickey is interested in research per se.

This is as I will put it research as opposed to action. I will come back to
this action part of it later on because I think this is one of the important
aspects of future work in the area of P.N.S. and maybe for the total
project, but at any rate, this is the kind of anthropologist that Hickey has
been trained to be, very much interested in social organisation and kinship
systems. Now he had—done—told me about being successful in gathering
sufficient data on a group of particular people for his doctoral disserta-
tion when he gets back to the University of Chicago and this brings up a point
which we might very well look into when we are sending people into foreign
areas, but I do not hold that we always have to send people who have their doctorate out of the way. But, if it is going to
be a research person you will have to be careful to evaluate this person and
the kind of research that he is going to do in the light of what he himself
wants to do for a dissertation and what his specific committee wants him to do.

Now I think the fact that he is working under Fred Egan at Chicago has had a
great deal to do with the kind of research that Hickey has done in the field
and one thing of course that he has accomplished, and this incidentally should be of some value to the M.S.U. group, is the data he has gathered for his dissertation. I had the unhappy feeling that a good deal of this gathering of data had been for the specific purpose of Gerald Hickey's own dissertation without seeing this in relationship to the total problems in Viet-Nam and how this could further M.S.U.'s project there. In other words I think they are not looking at this the bit of research that Hickey's done and maybe it has been gathered in such a way that it can't be looked at this way that this is not seen as part of a total problem. In other words, he is not looking at the total metrics in which he finds this one tribe that he has done research on.

After the session with Hickey I went back down to the general office buildings for a tour of the building with Mr. Stoutenburg. In a sense this was interesting to see all the offices and the various apartments above the offices themselves, but in another sense, I thought this was a waste of time that I might very well be spending my time talking with Wes, or talking with Hickey or Stoutenburg about the problems in Saigon that I might be able own to relate to our own project in Pakistan or to add to my total knowledge of the Saigon project. Now surely this added something to my knowledge
of the Saigon project to see the amount of time they had lavished on this
building setting up apartments for people and so on and so forth and I don't
want to seem too critical of this, but I had to strain a little to see why I
should do this instead of something else. The main thing of interest to me
in this somewhat lengthy tour, and I might say that once you have seen one
apartment they are all the same. They all have bathrooms and dining rooms the
same thing is true of the offices. Each suite of offices has its own bathroom
and this is pointed to with a great deal of pride, but other than that I
couldn't see much excuse for seeing all of these. I did however get a chance
to meet some people that I had talked with at M.S.U. before they came out, a
couple of groups and was pleased to hear some of their comments about Saigon.

and I was particularly pleased with comments of a couple of people who were
in Halese #1 whom I had talked to before they came out on the cultural
differences and so on and maybe they simply remember what we had to say there
and # were just parroting some of these words, but at any rate they
# brought up a number of things that related to this and it seemed
to me that they were beginning to grasp the situation here in terms of cultural
differences and similarities. After # the tour of the building was over
we went to the home of John Dorsey, that is Floyd and I for lunch with just John
and his wife. This was a very pleasant affair and I did some more breaking
down the notions that Floyd was a God and could be approached only with a
straight face. We had a little battle of wits across the table and a good
bit of joking et cetera during lunch and this is fairly lengthy affair as it
went on, actually until somewhat after four o'clock discussing various
problems with John after lunch, a discussion in which his wife participated.

I was interested in some of the points that she raised that is the kinds of
things wives were doing in Saigon and how proud there were of the fact that
all these new families who had come out I think 30 or something like this all
had been housed right away in sort of an assembly line fashion that they were
met at the plane by a certain number of people and were given schedules that
this person got boiled water for them and that person got in food and so on and
so forth. Another point that she brought up was the intense jealousy of other
groups towards the M.S.U. people that is she was saying that the M.S.U. people
had done so much more to integrate themselves with the Viet-Namese society and
had been so well accepted by them that this has created jealousy from particularly
the U.S. groups and some other groups that were coming out, and she pointed
out that even the visits to the President by her husband, John, and by Wes and
Laurel Waddinsky and so on that these had raised problems with other people who were
in often similar positions, and pointed out that they had the advantage of a commissary so on and so forth which also caused some tension with other Americans in the area. As we left John at four o'clock I handed Floyd a letter that had come from Michigan State. We spent some time after we got back at the hotel discussing certain problems that were raised and then just had time to clean up to keep our appointment that Wes had made with President Dulles at six o'clock. When we arrived at the Independence Palace we waited for a couple of minutes I suppose. The American ambassador was just finishing up a conference with the President. Before I get into the conference with the President perhaps I should work out the schedule that had been arranged for us on the mountain trips so that I say after this will make more sense. We were scheduled to go by commercial airline to a place called Dalat and from there we were to go to Binh Thuan and from there to Blao, hoping to visit some of the mountaineer villages as well as the refugee areas. It was felt unfortunate by Hickey and Mr. Stoutenburg and eventually Wes when he got in on this that if it would not be possible to go further into the mountain area to visit the predominantly Rhade area because there were no commercial planes going to that area. Now I will get on with the accounting of the meeting with the President. Present at this meeting was Wes, John Dorsey, who was asked by
the President to interpret for us the President speaking in French throughout. Floyd Reeves and myself, Wes made the proper introductions and introduced Floyd of course as an advisor to the President of M.S.U. and I was introduced as an anthropologist who was particularly interested in inter-cultural relations and a little bit later on, he told the President of my interests in the P.M.S. peoples. This friendly kind of conversation centering around things back at M.S.U. and some mention of the President's visit there et cetera and then Wes told the President that I was going up to the P.M.S. groups to make a visit.

The President asked where we were going and when he was told we were going to Dalat, Djiring and Blao, said, 'why aren't you going to Banmatuot? which is in the heart of the Rhade area.' It was explained to the President that there was no plane going to that area and he questioned Wes as to whether he knew this was a fact, Wes assured him that this had all been checked and it would not be possible for us to go during the time that we were in Saigon. Whereupon the President said that he would see if he couldn't make some other arrangements. The results of the other arrangements was that the President would put at our disposal his own private plane and his pilot to make the trip to the area that we wanted to see. Then followed a rather lengthy discussion of our total conference with the President was slightly over an hour of our lengthy discussion of
the mountaineer groups. This took up the vast bulk of the conversation while we were there. I simply asked the President one or two questions to get him started talking about the mountaineer areas and my main question was what problem or problems did he see the P.M.S. groups closing to the government of Viet-Nam and total society? His answer was a very long one and was divided into three main points which I will state in that order. He said that the first problem and the main problem was an economic one. He sees the economic problem as one of raising the level of living of these mountaineer groups, and as part of the economic problem, he also sees the agricultural practices of the mountaineer groups as a threat to the natural resources of the country. That is, he explained it at some great length the agricultural practices for the mountaineer groups and said that it was feared that the mountaineers were making great inroads into the timber of the area through their slash and burn agricultural methods. Not only this, but there was a danger of burning out vast areas. I wasn't quite sure on this point whether he thought the forest fires themselves would get out of control and burn great forest areas or if he thought of this shifting agriculture itself ultimately burning out a good share of the mountain areas. He did mention however that all of the mountaineer groups were not practicing the same type of economic and explained
that this differed from the coastal areas to a sort of middle ground as he called it, the high plateaus and into the mountain areas themselves. The second problem that he raised was one of education. The feeling was that in order to raise the standard of living for the mountaineer groups this should be done through a method of education and that we should bring these people somewhat into the fold of Viet-Namese culture. The third point and very last one he raised and I had the feeling that maybe this was of more importance at this particular time than some of the other problems that he mentioned and that is the problem of security. The mountaineer groups, that many of these are located along the border **and** of **and** where the borders are not so well guarded as to keep out communist infiltration from these areas and that there is the problem of the effect that the communists infiltrating into these areas would have on the mountaineer groups.

He painted the mountaineer groups as very friendly, trusting, very childlike peoples who could be lured over to the communists and this was something that they had to guard against and one way of doing this of course, was through education, be raising their standard of living and to bring in Viet-Namese groups who were stable group who were for the present government. These were his three main points but he gave us some rather interesting ideas that he has concerning these groups
and one of these was that there is a direct kinship relationship between
the Viet-Namese and, so far as I could tell, all of these mountain groups.

Remembering the mountain groups vary and the time that they came into this
country, but the President did not mention this he simply said that we are
related to them, that they are our kinfolks that we come from the same spot.

Therefore, we cannot look down our noses at this people because they are our
cousins and I believe John also said that he thought perhaps the President
was rather stretching his own point of view here, that he really
felt this kind of kinship with the mountaineer groups. I didn't know if this
was true or not true, but if he does hold this view of course this would
be a wonderful thing if he could get this view filtered down to people who are
going to work with the mountaineer groups, that there is not a vast difference
between them and the Viet-Namese and that whatever differences they are willing
to bridge. The President also said that he was starting a program of education,
particular agriculture education for the mountaineer groups. Now this I couldn't
find very much about. He pointed out that in the area about or around Dalet that
he had had two fertile valleys dammed up, had put this dam across these in an
attempt to introduce wet rice agriculture to these predominantly dry rice
mountaineers and pointed out that with a little bit of encouragement that the
mountaineers had really taken to this kind of agriculture very well and he
was pleased with this kind of a project. This was one thing he wanted me to
have a look at when I was up there. Unfortunately we couldn't and I will
explain why in a minute. There was one question that I put to the President
which he did not answer, but went on to something else. I don't know how to
interpret this. I had thought the conversation might get too long and too
wearing and I thought ought to cut this short and another to get some
additional information I said to him that I didn't want to weary him with
questions about the program that was being established for the mountaineer
group if I could get this information elsewhere because I was very much
interested in it and if possible to follow this up to see its
results et cetera and perhaps he could tell me where I could get this
information and I could contact the people that were working on the program.
After this he gave absolutely no answer, but went on to something else. Then
he did ask that when I got back from the trip to the mountain providences that
I give him a report on my findings and some kind of recommendations on it.

On Thursday morning, my last day in Saigon I spent the first two hours
in a discussion with Jack Ryan. As we completed our discussion John Dorsey
came in and John and I took an early luncheon together and spent about three
and one-half hours in discussing problems that had been opened up at one of our earlier discussions.

Ryan started the discussion by picking up at a point where John and I had closed the discussion at an earlier meeting. He said that he was quite certain that no one in the public administration division had really had very close contact with the rural people in Viet-Nam. That the closest contact had been with members of the police staff. That they had had very close contact of an unofficial type as well as an official type with people in the cities and with people in the remote rural areas and that it was his opinion that they had more first-hand information in that division about the problems of both rural life and of city life among the unofficial classes than any other group in any of the American agencies operating in Viet-Nam. At several points in our discussion Ryan was very critical of Wesley Fischel as an administrator. He said that he had not demonstrated ability to delegate to the extent that was important in a position of the kind that he held. He added that he thought his lack of ability to delegate had been more pronounced in all of the divisions that are now incorporated into the public administration division than in the police administration because Wesley knew more about the activities of the public administration division that being more nearly related to his field than he did about the activities of police administration
and that from some points of view he thought it was fortunate for police
administration that Wesley did not know any more about the operations of a
police force than knows because that has given them somewhat more freedom to
go ahead along the line that seemed to them to be advisable. Toward the
close of our discussion Ryan said that he did not want me to misunderstand
his criticisms of Wes. He did not know any man at Michigan State University
or anywhere else that he thought would be able to do a better job than Wes
can do in the present situation in view of his close contacts with the
President, the fact that the President seems to have confidence in him and
the fact that he has had the experience that he has had in Viet-Nam already.
He wouldn't trade Wes he said for anyone else he could think of.

Ryan said in the course of our discussion that he was very hopeful that
John Dorey would be delegated the duties and authority that was necessary to
carry on his part of the program without having detailed matters referred to
Wes. He added that in his opinion Wes should come in on the conferences
primarily at the level of the President, the ambassador and Barrell, the head
of I.C.A., and that if Sargent turns out to be a good man he can help Wes
in the process of delegation by passing telephone calls and memoranda to John
and to Ryan or Hoyt, when Hoyt returns, without bringing Wes into the discussion
of the problems until after tentative decisions have been made until memoranda have been drawn for Wes's signature and that most of the contacts with the ministers and with those in the I.O.A. below the level of Barrels contacts should be carried out in a great majority of cases directly and not through ______ I asked Ryan why he thought it was that Wes had had so much difficulty in delegation. He gave as one of the reasons that first Wes had had no experience or training in administration. Second, that Wes wanted so much to be identified with the President that he was very reluctant to let matters be dealt with at any level lower than his own office without being certain that the way in which they were dealt with would meet with the full approval of the President. He expressed the opinion, that I should say he expressed a doubt, that Wes really was doing much in the way of advising the President, but rather than advising him he was securing the ideas of the President and serving in a sense as a yes man to the President. He made the comment that this undoubtedly not a conscious procedure upon the part of Wes, but that he felt that if he could give his approval to the President on his ideas, it might put him in a preferred position over Barrels and in a preferred position over the ambassador.

I asked Ryan what his opinion was of the program of the I.O.A. outside of
the Michigan State University project and what his opinion was of Mr. Barrow.

He said without hesitation that he and Wes were in considerable disagreement
with reference to the qualifications of Mr. Barrows. He thought rather highly
of Mr. Barrows. He thought on the whole Barrows had done a good job. He was
not critical of Berreis on many of the points that Wes had criticised Berreis
somewhat openly among the division heads. Ryan summed up his impression of
Wes as starting out as a very poor administrator. As a man who during the
past year has made considerable improvements in administration and as a
person who is probably irreplaceable in the M.S.U. project, He felt that there
was a definite place for the M.S.U. project to continue for at least the next
two years. He thought that Wes character would need to be changed considerably
in the near future from what it has been in the past and that it would go
through a period of constant change. I asked him whether he saw the need
for that kind of a program beyond a two year period. He said that he was
unable to express a point of view on that because he did not know. He thought
that if the program could become less identified with the actions of the
government and more identified with techniques, advice, and program research
there was a probability that there would be a call for that kind of help for a
period longer than two years. He was quite certain in his own mind however,
that unless the program changed markedly both the program of police administration
and the program of public administration within the next two years there
would probably be no call for a program of this type from Michigan State University.
He also stated that he was convinced in his own mind that for the period of
two years it would be possible to bring about the changes needed so that
the program and particularly the program that he is actively directing
would be much more effective if operated by Michigan State University, than
if operated by any other agency in Viet-Nam.

I mentioned to Ryan as I read the literature there was a great deal of
discussion centering around the word democracy, but not a great deal of dis-
cussion centering around the words equality and freedom. I asked Ryan how
he would describe the difference between the attitude toward the President
and the attitude of the Russians toward Stalin. In both cases the word
democracy had been used. He stated that he thought there was some difference
in the way they looked upon the use of that term and that in Viet-Nam democracy
did not mean communism but the opposite of communism. I raised the question
of the development of personality cult of a government centered around a
person and I asked Ryan if there was anyone else that he knew of was being
given an opportunity to develop in a way such as he might take the President's
place if something should happen to the President. He said he thought exactly
the opposite was the case at the present time. The ministers were in constant
Then an attempt was made to do the thing by the President as a whole to promote through the Federal Reserve, and the political view was that the President could, in his own right, make the necessary arrangements and that the President could then appoint the Board. He does speak of it in discussion with his own, to the effect that they were, if we may more literally to be the fact of the President then they were at the other moment, each minister sitting to understand the authority of the President, and in the hope spoke very frankly about the distressed situation of the Board. John Dorsey said that one of the ministers was also a friend of the President, who was unwilling to release any authority to the ministers, but about other ministers in the cabinet and who also complained bitterly because of the ministers who took direct at the home and who complained bitterly.

I return now to a comment made in the discussion discussion with John Dorsey, which is all in the same hand.
the number of employees invited to that tea was about 250. It included
all the Americans, Vietnamese, and their wives. Following the tea which
did not end until sometime after seven o'clock in the evening, both Wes
and Mrs. Fishel asked me to estimate the number of people who had been
present at various times throughout the three hour period. I told them
that it was not possible for me to give a good estimate because during
a part of the time I was engaged in a lengthy conversation with Mr. Barrows
and was not paying much attention to the comings and goings of those present.
Both of them informed me that most of those who came early stayed until
at least seven o'clock. I said that I would guess that as many as 120
persons were present in the house and in the front yard. Wes doubted that
more than 100 had been present, but Mrs. Fishel estimated that as many
as 130 had been present. Both of them seemed to be greatly worried as to
what had happened to the others who had been invited. What was the matter
that more than half of all those invited had not shown up? They returned to
discuss this matter from time to time throughout the evening that they spent
together following the party.

During the tea, "cocktail party," I talked with a considerable member
of the staff members both Americans and Vietnamese. I was quite impressed
with the quality of both groups. It seemed to me that the selection of personnel among the Vietnamese had been on the whole excellent and I think the same is in general true with reference to the Americans who were there. I think of this group in terms of other American groups that I have been with in Pakistan and in my opinion there is no better group in Pakistan as far as ability of the individuals is concerned than the group who were at the party that afternoon.

Mr. Barrels came at about six o'clock. I was sitting on the porch and Wes brought him over saying that Mr. Barrels wanted to have a visit with me. Two other chairs near mine occupied, one by a Vietnamese member of the staff and the other by one of the newcomers from Michigan State University. Both of them got up and left their chairs and Barrels and I spent about one hour in uninterrupted conversation. During that time, he described to me all of the other projects now underway and contemplated by the I.C.A. in Viet-Nam. He said that there are now 10 projects underway in addition to the M.S.U. projects and if I wanted to count a visiting team from Japan that would be there for a short time, that would make 11 projects. He stated that more and more as time goes on these projects will be projects conducted by private corporations in the United States rather than by personnel
employed directly by the I.C.A. He expressed the opinion that these
companies were in a better position to conduct the kind of project contempl-
ated than the I.C.A. was to conduct such projects independently. He
that said of course, none of these projects compared in their scope or in the
money expended for them to the Michigan State University projects.

Wes had asked me to remain after the afternoon cocktail party and take
dinner with himself and his wife. They would go out with me to some good
restaurant. We went to dinner at about eight-thirty that evening. We were
at the table about two and one-half hours. During that time, we discussed
at considerable length Wes's ideas with reference to the future of the M.S.U.
project and he made the statement that the President had said that he assumed
there might be a need for at least twenty years for technical help of the kind
that Michigan State University would provide. He looked upon it as a very
long-range project and not as a short-range project.

Just to keep the record straight so that we know we didn't lose any time
while we were in Saigon, that when we had finished with the conference with the
President that we went out to dinner. Reeves, John Dorsey and his wife, Mr. and
Mrs. Hendry and Mr. and Mrs. Seghee-Soo. We rearranged the sitting arrangement
so that Floyd would have a chance to sit next to Mr. Seghee-Soo to quiz him
about not having had an opportunity to talk with him much the night before.
I'll simply pass on from this dinner which lasted until ten-thirty or
eleven o'clock I suppose to our trip to the mountains the next day. I
mentioned already that arrangements had been made for the use of the
President's plane and we were to be at the airport quarter to seven on
Wednesday morning for takeoff from VIP gate. The party consisted of
Hendry, Stoutenburg, Dr. Fouck, Jerry Hickey and myself. This trip you
remember was to take us to Bamsetuot area which had been precluded in the
earlier schedule. The total trip took about an hour or hour and fifteen
minutes, something of this sort and shortly out of Saigon we were over
some of what they call the tribal areas and then pretty shortly we got
into the mountain districts itself. We were able to see (part of the time)
the plots below, the areas that had been used in the past by the mountaineers
for their slash and burn agriculture. Of course, I couldn't
judge the altitude at
which we were flying, by how big these plots were, but it certainly from
what I could see, this did bear out the notion that Hickey had brought up
several times that the amount of land that these people were using in their
slash and burn agriculture was not a great number of acres. They appeared
to be small plots dotted about here and there throughout the forest. When
we landed at Bamsetuot we were met by a delegation of province chiefs et cetera
who took us into their cars and jeeps and took us to the headquarters house in
that province. I might add that apparently traveling by the President's
private plane had called a great deal of attention to our trip and con-
sequently limited our time and some of the things that we could have gotten
done otherwise. I was told that any number of telegrams had been sent out
from Saigon that we were on our way as representatives of President
himself and that all sorts of services and et cetera should be
 accorded us. This is interpreted apparently to mean that all of the
officials from big to little to turn out in some force to greet us and
 accompany us on our trips. We had planned at Banmeot to go into an area
nearby a lake where the old emperor had kept a sort of guest lodge or
hunting lodge. This kind of thing and it was in this area that a good bit
of anthropological research has been done previously. One good bit of research
that has been done in this area is by some Frenchmen whose works Mr. Hickey
is now in process of translating. First we were taken to the government house
in this area and then they scouted around and got three jeeps to take us out
on this trip. They kept apologizing for the kinds of roads they knew that we
were going to find and said that we would be very uncomfortable and this was
very true and as it turned out roads were impossible to the lake area so this
part of the trip had to be cut out. I don't know how on earth we would have
gotten it done anyway, the amount of time that it took to see the other villages
that we did visit. First we went out to visit some of the refugee areas.

1) This was simply 1) to give us a look at these areas that we had heard
discussed before and 2) to give the scouts time to see how we could get
into the lake area to see the primitive Rhade villages. I was very much
impressed by the kinds of work that are going on in these refugee villages.
In this area, we were able to visit villages that had been in operation for
varying periods of time from two years right up to some very new arrivals.
As a matter of fact, we visited one area where nobody is living as yet, but
they are clearing the land to bring in refugees. The peoples in this area
have adopted the building materials for their houses from the mountain groups.
That is, they use thatch and bamboo, but interestingly enough they build
their houses right on the ground as opposed to the type of houses that the
Rhade build which are built on piles, off the ground. This particular area
that we visited in a fairly low lying area and sometimes gets a good bit of
water in it and when we asked Dr. Fouck and some other people who had worked
with the refugees about this type of construction, they said well they knew
this was not going to last, that they would, get sometimes water in their
houses and that they were going to have difficulty with dampness even if
water itself did not come in, but somehow they guess they sort of overlooked
asking the people to build their houses on piles, since the refugees coming from the North never had used this kind of construction, so they decided that the best thing to do was to let them go ahead and build them right on the ground, and eventually they would either come along and build new houses or raise these houses up on piles. These people are being encouraged to plant subsistence gardens. The idea is that these people are not really going to at this point, go into any production that is going to bring them in any money over and above what they will need for a subsistence basis. They said that this might be a long-range program, but at the moment they were concentrating on home gardens. Each one of these little huts had a garden either beside it or in front of it, I would say something maybe 50 by feet wide by 100 long; something of this sort, very small. We asked about fertilizer. I saw the people scattering some gray looking stuff and they said no they were not using fertilizer, but this was burnt ashes which made Hickey comment that well this is what the mountaineer people had done for generations and generations if that was part of the reason for the slash and burn practice of agriculture was to use the ash for fertilizer. I asked Dr. Fouche how well these people had transplanted from the North into this area and he looked a little surprised that I should think that
there would be any problems involved, and he said that there were really none. These people were so happy to have homes once again and have the opportunity to grow food for their own consumption that they hadn't really bothered about whether they were happy or unhappy this simply answered their problems at the moment. From these refugee villages we went into two Rhode villages. There was very little difference from one village to the other as I could tell these were clusters of long houses. The one village which I would suspect had somewhere between 20 and 25 such houses, the other one had slightly less of this. These are the typical long houses that you find in Polynesia, built up on piles made of bamboo and thatch, which houses an extended or joint family which may take in as many as three generations.

The nuclear families that live in these houses have their own little compartments of bamboo. Each family does its own cooking et cetera, but the fields are cultivated, we did not see incidentally, since they are somewhat removed from the villages themselves, in a joint family kind of way, so that everybody pitches in and does the work and then the produce of the fields is divided among the whole joint family. I was told that some of these people in this village are doing day work for the Viet-Namese in the area, and incidentally there are relatively few Viet-
Namese in the mountain areas. I was told that 1) they thought this was not a healthful climate and had learned to be afraid of all sorts of mountain animals, mountain spirits and the climate and part of this was due to the fact that the French had discouraged them from going into the areas. The French had wanted to hold these areas for their own exploitation. Now this latter explanation, the French, doesn't explain why the Viet-Namese had not gone into that area before the French came on the scene. There are in this area some tea and coffee plantations that are still being operated by the French and I am told that a good many of the Rhades do work by the day on these plantations.

Again, when we went into these villages we were accompanied by the chief of the province, two or three army officials including a colonel and a captain and a couple of other people. Eventually there was added a province chief for the P.M.S. groups themselves. This was a Rhade man who had been in civil service I believe he told me for 21 years. Most of the questions that we tried to ask of the natives themselves were very quickly answered either by the province chief or by this Rhade chief himself giving the villagers themselves no opportunities to answer the question. Part of the difficulty was that this had to go through
two or three different kinds of interpretation, you had to ask your question if somebody in English have this interpreted into French and then they in turn interpreted this into the Rhade language. Now the Rhade man, who was of course, spoke French and the Rhade language, always answered questions himself without referring them to the villagers. When we were talking with this Rhade man about education and cultivation of the people, here how difficult it would be to get them to change their type of agriculture. He pointed to one village where a sort of central garden that was fenced off and said that here was an example of what could be done with these people, that they had been encouraged by the Viet-Namese to plant their gardens near their homes rather than plant them off at a distance, and this was supposedly one of the achievements the Viet-Namese had made.

This is a very small kind of a garden and appeared to be as much for decoration as anything else because when I asked about some of the trees in it, these did not produce fruit, and so far as I could tell were simply ornamental. At another however, we did find such things as bananas and pineapple growing and they said that this garden was for the use of the whole village, but it wasn't explained on what kind of a basis it was worked or how the food was shared et cetera. After our tour of these two villages, then we went back to headquarters for lunch and after that to the airport to pick
up the plane again for Dalat. At Dalat we were met by three vehicles full of people from the town of Dalat itself including various governmental officials and escorted into town. Here we made our first stop at I think it's called a delegation house or cabinet house, and here five or six other officials were waiting to greet us and we were taken in immediately teazed and cognaced and our plans changed again in terms of the weather. I had expressed a desire to see the areas that the President had talked about where he had constructed these barracks and people had taken to wet rice agriculture. Now they knew about this all right, but made no comments on how affective it had been nor did they know how many people were using these wet rice areas, but pointed out that it would be impossible to visit there. It was raining pretty hard and you could get within a distance of about two one-half miles by jeep and the rest of the way you would have to walk, so they decided that we couldn't do any more in the afternoon towards visiting villages and that we should go to see the city of Dalat itself. We were shown around this place in great fashion of the old emperor's palace and a couple of other places of historic interest and then taken back to the hotel. At night we had dinner at government house again. There were quite a number of people here, the chief of the cabinet, the mayor of Dalat...
who had been there earlier in the day. The mayor of Dalat is also the chief of security in the town and we found that from the minute we arrived until we got on the plane to leave that we had been provided with a security guard, which changed from time to time, but nevertheless they were always around.

The discussions that night were very pleasant and good bit in terms of how people do things at M.S.U., the kinds of programs that are offered so on and so forth and again a detailed discussion of our schedule for the next day. The next day we were to visit Djiring and Blao and some villages along the way. These villages were to be mountaineer villages as well as refugee areas. When we left Dalat the next morning, we found that we couldn't pay for our hotel bills, our food nor even the tips for the boys at the hotel, that was being taken care of by the President's representative and we were told we were allowed to pay nothing, and when we got outside to leave, we saw all these automobiles lined up eventually there were eight of them and headed by a security police force in a bright shiny green jeep. These guys had on their shiny white uniforms and green and white helmets. Incidentally I don't know if these colors or not. Somewhat to my embarrassment when we left the hotel, the security guard opened up his sirens and we went through the streets of Dalat in a great procession with these screaming sirens and everybody moving off the streets, and this was true throughout.
the whole trip, being preceded by this jeep load of security guards that and
whenever we met approaching traffic the traffic was simply pushed
off the road and told to stop. All traffic stopped as we went along. The
first place that we made a stop was just outside Djiring, another P.M.S.
settlement. This was a different group from the Rhodes, these were Kobo group. Now this I am sure was the model village. We were met outside
the village again by the chief of police of Djiring and three other officials
who escorted us into the village where we met the village chief and his
council staff, and we were presented in a little native ceremony (the brass bracelets of friendship and the wine jars were brought out
for us to sip from, and a chicken was killed and the blood of the chicken clustered around under our feet. This is a very interesting village in terms
of what you could see of the Viet-Namese pattern that had been taken
over by the Koho's. Now we again we find the long house of a different
type of construction. These long houses were made of wood, patterned after
the Viet-Namese structures in the area and roofed over with tin. We were
struck by the cleanliness of this village and I am sure that it had just
been swept out before we arrived. All under the houses and the paths and walks
and so on, but again you had the feeling that this must be done fairly
frequently otherwise you would see more debris lying around. These people also keep pigs and chickens and buffalo. Now these are set-up in their own little houses. There is a house for the chickens, they don't sleep under the long houses, and there is a pigsty for the pigs. They don't sleep under the long houses as they do in the Rhade villages that we saw nor do the cattle. They are separate pens for these. Each family group has its own garden and we examined a couple of these and saw a variety of things growing there - pumpkins, beans, corn, melons and so on and then down below the village where we did not visit, but was visible from where we were was quite a field of wet rice, and this was built in kind of terraces with irrigation and I would judge there must have been a good thirty acres or so in rice agriculture, and we were told that this belongs to the village, that this was owned by the Koho's, but I don't know what kind of an arrangement was worked out here. I asked if this was the new village and they said that the Koho's had lived here for a long time, but that the particular structures were new, and that they had exchanged their old bamboo type structures for the wooden structures and that they had started the program of conservation here working with the villagers, they had terraced these rice fields and had put them into production. Moreover, they showed us, with a great deal of pride, a little thatched school. This building I suppose was 25 feet long and maybe 15 wide.
roof and maybe dirt floor and very rough kinds of benches that were set-up
to serve as seats and a board across the side for a desk. They kept apologising
over and over for the poor school building we pointed out that it
wasn't the building itself that made for education, but what went on inside,
but you might just as well do this outside anyway, which seemed to please
them and they said that these were for the young. They would start school
here at the age of about four, they were being taught Viet-Namese and
French and that after they had gained some mastery of Viet-Namese, and
they were sent to a village school that goes up, I believe, to the equivalent
of sixth or seventh grade something of this sort. Not much to me, I didn't
get too much information on it, but this school is just for the villagers.
It is not for the other Vietnamese for Koho kids alone.

As we left this village to go into Djiring where we were to have lunch
eventually and again a great deal of time was taken up by stopping
to meet all the officials that came out to see us, we went on to
Blae to have a look at the agricultural school and the experimental farms.

We didn't see the experimental farms we saw precious little of the school
itself because time was getting away from us. Again we had to meet all of
the officials and be invited in for tea et cetera. They apologising there was
nobody was around the school this was the summer vacation, and from there we went
on to look at a couple of more refugee villages, and all we could do at these
last two places was simply to ride through the villages, which was really too
bad because they had arranged a delegation of village officials and school
kids et cetera to talk to us, but we simply didn't have time we had to get
back to catch the plane, which again is a reflection of what happens
these officials really get going on a project, they want you to see
everything and in the meantime you have to stop and talk with them and have
tea et cetera, and they wait end to schedule twice as much for you as you
can possibly see consequently you just tear around from one place to another
and really get no more than a superficial view, but I think this in itself is

There is one good point to this that you lose so much by not having time to
stop and talk and see these things, but on the other hand, you get an
appreciation of what people working in this area are up against when they
go out on an official visit, and it made me wonder then how much President

who had said he made some trips to these areas, how much he actually gets to
see of what is going on because I am sure he is surrounded more than we were
by village officials and provincial officials et cetera. I was also amused
that Jerry Hickey and the other Americans made so many comments about the
waste of time that you found when the officials escorted you around, and I
thought this was terribly funny because it was just an extension of what had happened to us in Saigon at their hands, and the same thing was going on that where we were not by all these officials and we were escorted around so that every minute of our time was taken up by the schedules that they had made, and you had very little time to see anything on your own, which brings me to one comment which might be left to later. I was struck by how often the American group kept telling us about their wonderful relationships with the Viet-Namese and how well they had integrated themselves into the community and how much the Viet-Namese thought of them and so on. I had the feeling that if they would leave us alone for fifteen minutes that we might be able to find out something of this ourselves and not have to be told it. This just about ends the account of the trip to the mountains, we had what should have been a hurried lunch at Djiring but which stretched on and on and got back to the airport thirty minutes late. We had let the other plane go back to Saigon since we found we could get a commercial flight out of Dalat, but even this was held up for us for about thirty minutes. Of course I felt like an idiot holding up a commercial line, but if there was any feeling about this nobody said anything they simply waited until we showed up. When we got back to Saigon about three o'clock in the afternoon and went to the hotel to get ready for my appointment with the ambassador at four
thirty. The conference with the ambassador may have been cut short by the fact that we arrived late or he may not have had any more time anyway. At any rate it was scheduled for four thirty and Wes was going to pick me up at twenty-five past four. He got involved in things at the office and as it happened it was about ten minutes of five when we did arrive at the ambassadors. He was rather amused by the story I told him of the V.I.P. treatment that we got and said that the next time he made a trip up there he would see if he could avoid this because he really wanted to have a look at the villages themselves without being surrounded by security police and coteras.

I told him that my notion of what could be done with the mountain groups was to begin an action program, and I of course I saw this in terms of social scientists working with the program and to minimize the "research angle". When I had talked with Jerry and some other people about this Jerry in particular was for a long-range research program that had to precede anything that was done in this area. I had already gotten an indication that the President and some other groups were a little bit tired of being told that everything that had to be done had to be preceded by research. In spite of the fact that it seems to me that very little preliminary research had been done. This may simply be a matter of the way Vietnamese view research. Wes was pointed out to us by Wes and
Jerry and a couple of other people &/that the Vietnamese have little notion if any of what we mean by field research. But research to them is sitting down in a library and reading some documents or as Wes put it once "naval contemplation." This struck a spark though in the ambassador and he said that if he were doing it he would recommend that you leave out research completely because he had got the answer just exactly this himself from the President, that he was getting tired of being given the answer that we have to have research before we can do anything, and that what the President really wanted was some kind of an action program, was to get started doing something with these mountain groups, teaching them new ways of agriculture, new ways of life et cetera. I talked this over later with Jerry Hickey and maybe I will have a little bit more to say about this later on.

Later on, I think it was while we were at the airport on our way to leave, Dr. Rass, Dorsey and I discussed this problem together, and later in our discussion Wes Fishel came out and the matter was mentioned to him that the major job was to talk in terms of programs and not in terms of research. At various times during my conversations with Wes and John mention had been made of the fact that the director of the institute of public administration and the various members of the President's cabinet did not know the meaning of research and that they were not interested in having research done, but
they were interested in action programs. We all agreed that it was probable
that if we started out with action programs more research would really be
done in terms of conducting those programs could be done if a special
research program of any kind were set-up and designated as a research
program. On this point something we talked specifically with
Hickey after we had come back from the mountain provinces, and he was still
pretty much of a mind that he should do straight research. He couldn't
see how he could do an action program without this great backlog of research,
but as we talked with him longer about this I think he was beginning to come
around. I don't know, maybe he was simply agreeing with me, but I feel pretty
sure that this kind of a feeling on the part of the Vietnamese is absolutely
no sense in trying to ram a "research program down their throats" and as
Floyd says if you will start with your action program that you will probably
come out with as much or maybe more research than you would if it was
labeled a research program anyway. Now I feel that with this mountain problem
that there is enough basic information already about family relationships,
types of family structure, land tenure and so on. How they may not be all
that a person would want on this. You could work on this problem for years
if you wanted to, to make a program of research just on land tenure
and what would you do with it, but if you have enough that you have some feel
of what the culture is like then start your action program on the basis of this and gather your data as you go along, changing your program in terms of what you find about what will work and why it doesn't work and try to answer the questions of why this particular part of the program doesn't work, is there something going against the social system etcetera, and if so, change it in terms of that. I think that everybody would be happy about the thing and you would have some results then. This was another point I made that once if you start to say in one area with an action program and you can show them the results and others results of this program and you say that this is based on certain principles of social science that we have learned about these people, that whether we learned it while we were working with them or whether we got this out of other books then you can pound this point home that have done this in terms of principles of social science, and this points up then the need for further continued research. Then I think you will get somewhere, but what they want to see is results of this, that the hell good does social science do unless you can get some results out of it. I think this is their point.

[Signature]

I have listened to the entire discussion by Dr. Reeves and Bill Ross and to many other brief discussions during the days since they returned from
Saigon. This plus a brief visit a year ago gives me certain impressions that may be worth putting on this record. First of all I have the impression that very much excellent work has been done by the M.S.U. group in Viet-Nam. There are certainly many people who have real concern and dedication to helping the Viet-Namese. We are not here however primarily concerned with the strengths of the program, but rather analyzing it so that it may be even better than it has been in the past. My very casual observations, therefore, deal with three problems or weaknesses as I have gleaned them from the discussions and my very limited observation. First of all, is the problem of delegating responsibility and authority within the M.S.U. group. Either because there has been inadequate personnel to whom to delegate responsibility or because of an unwillingness to delegate, the chief adviser has spent too much time dealing with minor affairs that could much better be handled by other personnel. This has taken so much of his time that he has had little opportunity to consider the overall responsibilities and the overall program of the M.S.U. group. This may be remedied by the new organisation and the provision of personnel to assist in administration. On the other hand, it may be impossible for the chief adviser to release the concern with all sorts of matters for various reasons involving his personality makeup and his fears concerning the place of the M.S.U. project. This I will
mention again.

The second observation that I would make concerning the problem is that the M.S.U. group has an extremely great concern with details of such matters as keep greeting visitors, providing for the comfort of their personnel, all types of social life and matters of protocol. The time consumed by these matters all of which are necessary is so great that the time of the Michigan State staff cannot be devoted to the duties which are important in their work with the Viet-Namese. The explanation of this course is difficult to identify. Certainly the conditions under which the project got underway created a situation in which there was real concern for the keep and safety of the people. The social activities and the provision of all kinds of schedules and greetings for visitors may be a way of reassuring themselves that the situation in Saigon is not so bad. It may also be an attempt to compensate for their feelings of inadequacy and fear that have developed in the situation. These are very casual and brief hypotheses that certainly need to be examined more carefully.

The third observation that I have from listening is that the M.S.U. group has an inordinate amount of fear which might be described almost as an obsession that they will not be looked upon with as great favor by the Vietnamese as our other I.C.A. groups or other foreign groups in Viet-Nam.
I have the impression that this fear is not justified and that if the M.S.U. group simply went about their business of advising and assisting in any way that they can (the Vietnamese) that no one would question the value and the competence of their work. Conditions that apparently had existed in the for some time of the M.S.U. project concerned with the relationship of this group with other I.C.A. personnel, however, has it seems to me created a situation in which they constantly demonstrate to themselves and to the Vietnamese that they are the friends of Viet-Nam and are doing an outstanding piece of work.

The second and third of these items are of course, closely related and the explanations I have given are merely conjectured. It may be that these fears and expenditure of energy on the activities that I have mentioned arise from the personalities of some of the personnel, but they may also arise from the general conditions under which the project got under way and continues to operate. It would seem to me that a real service could be performed by someone who could go to the entire group and in a very understanding manner explain the kind of observations that I have made and point out to them that they do not need to devote all of their energies to these activities nor do they need to fear that people at Michigan State and that the Vietnamese do not appreciate them.
The comments that Wilbur, Bill and I have made today and recorded on these records have been made following a number of hours of discussion among us concerning the program in Viet-Nam as we have seen it. I have just two final comments to make. First, when Larry Boger was with me on my first trip to Saigon, we spent about three hours at lunch and following with Wolfsadamski in which he spoke to us completely off the record. He expressed a very strong feeling that most of the projects of our government and of foundations with which he was acquainted had been built up on the mistaken idea that the number of people involved in the conduct of the project was related directly to the importance of the project. He expressed the opposite point of view, referring directly to the project in Viet-Nam he expressed the opinion first that that project were to remain an I.C.A. project would be more affective if it were conducted by Wes with a total staff of one or two additional people to serve as advisers. He felt that the time had now arrived when instead of expanding this year the staff as has been done, the staff should have been curtailed. As a number one qualifications for members of the staff could be affective was the love of human beings and an understanding of the points of view of those of other cultures, and that the more additions that are made to a staff of advisers the more the project is likely to be criticized first by people.
in the nation who are critical of the operations of the government and second, by the government itself. He expressed the feeling that at this time, there was real danger in Viet-Nam that the project might be built up to such a point that those in opposition to the government would use it as a means of defeating those aspects of the present program in which America is most interested. As I recall it the second point that Wolf stressed was the two-way relationship in the benefits that might come to the nation providing technical assistance and the nation receiving it. Then Wolf made the suggestion that he thought it was always a dangerous thing for any agency of government of one nation to provide a program dealing with government or public administration for any other nation, that was the most sensitive area of all the areas in which technical assistance can be provided. In one or two sentences in Wolf's letter to me that is what he is referring to when he mentioned the fact that he welcomed the opportunity to explode to us as he had done at the luncheon and following the luncheon, and when he there was nothing personal in what he said. He expressed the opinion that if it were possible to divorce the American aid in the field of public administration entirely from any agency of our government and secure a foundation grant that would provide for that aid the probability of success in such a program would be very much greater than in a program such as M.S.U. is now operating in