Dear Glen & Ralph,

I've taken advantage of an invitation to visit the Harvard Project here in Pacca, just to see what they are doing, and also to get an opportunity to contemplate what is going on in the Project with some perspective. I know that my failure to write has probably caused you some concern. It has not been without careful consideration, but it hasn't written. There have been a variety of reasons for this. Firstly, the situation in the Project, being serious and complex, is not easily articulated. This problem is compounded by the fact that I have been subject to listening to many points of view regarding the Project and the relevant personalities, by the relevant personalities. Secondly, I consider the situation so the Project in the Project to be serious—on fact, it can be said that the Project is in crises. Before saying so strongly a thing I had to be certain that this conclusion did not reflect an impulsive reaction by a newcomer into circumstances wherein operations were normally difficult. Thirdly, and more superficially for obvious reasons I did not want to dictate what I have to say. I had time to lose this myself has been annoyingly difficult. (I must apologize for my longhand, but at the moment a typewriter is not accessible. I very want to have this typed—so, I'd appreciate your holding a copy for me.) I have started several letters to you in the past two or three weeks, none of which were completed. I am going to endorse...
one of those letters simply because I don't want to bother
re-writing what's therein. I should point out that the
moral problem (which is emphasized in that letter, but
only because it was never contemplated) has shown substantial
improvement. This is partially because Don't Know
has been able to find more for the police to busy themselves
with, and partially because two of the disturbing elements
in the Day Ton apartments were moved out. However, morale
does remain a problem, though a less serious one, let me
just add one further comment in this regard: the announcement
as soon as possible of a new Chief Adviser, in whom they
can find leadership and from whom they can place their trust
and respect will just about remove the morale issue
from the list of serious problems here. (I use the word here
in referring to Saigon.) I know you are aware of this, but
it still needs emphasis.

In that letter I am enclosing I spoke of the project
being stalled close to dead center. I was unable to expand
on that remark then. In this letter I actually talk of serious
about the stronger term I will write later in this letter, but
it would of course be without relation to what I have to say
here about 'dead center.' Several areas of the program
are not proceeding because of the simple objective fact that
they are awaiting Vietnam Government approval before they
can go ahead. In almost all these cases the approval would
have to come from the President. As yet none have come.
Briefly these areas include:

1. The Research Section - Several (5) proposals have been submitted via the President. There has been no reaction. Several proposals have come from the VN6 side, but with one exception (involving the urban housing) these proposals would do little to resolve the kind of research we would require. Again, we could without being specific, the concept of research, as you know, has not yet achieved acceptability. One attempt by Kennedy, Woodruff & Nickby to meet with some Vietnam actually resulted in a repudiation.

2. The Consultative Section - Through the Presidency Letter were sent asking for comments from various committees. With no reply, and Murphy is continuing his fine work on the budget. This year the government is re-seeing his budget concurrently with their old. Next year it is expected the old will be dropped. End USOM who thought the budget more and the withdrawal (and after a little storm) recognizing that the budget problem is being successfully handled. Paradoxically unfortunately, since Murphy is better man regarding both the

progress in the VN6. I have gotten the sound of the reasons, but I have to see him returning to Easter in this frame of mind. We feel he has been mistreated here. There is an element of truth to that. I admit, we cannot coddle our staff, but better understanding of their problems is required. I'd rather not write more on this, but I will want to discuss it with you.
The root of consultancy is flourishing in some other world, primarily that on the floor of the Treasury. There is no considering bringing Consultancy & Research together. Consultancy is suffering from the heritage of Mode. There has been a general stiffening on the part of the UN about which I hope to write later. However, Mode is generally accepted as being the cause of this stiffening. I do not intend to defend Mode [I have carefully read some of his reports & I have looked at his interview records (in hopes they'd be useful for research—which they aren't) quite obviously he was guilty of superficiality and *many in the press* the serious extent that UN is recanting not all can fall on Mode's shoulders. But everyone, Wes, Barrows, Kest, even Vietnam, spoke of the damage Mode caused. Consultancy now suffers from that stigma. Conclusively, the role may thus be good for us (amazing)

3. Civil Guard - here the President finally took a stand to limit it has proved ambiguous. He won't call it military and he won't call it civilian. Logistically, he's placed it under Defense, but describes it as having a peacetime as well as an emergency role. US MGJ has been obligated already some of the funds destined for the Civil Guard through MGU & C. The situation is confused further by lack of clarity in the US position on the issue the details of which - because of the uncertainties & changes & centers
changes as to motivations, etc. within the US community. I prefer again not to discuss here. I think you already knew how this stand by the President can affect the rest of some of our policies.

4. The VBI - here too a long awaited response by the President to MSU6 proposals to regional reorganization just was received and again лишь much to the desired from the point of view of MSU proposals. Formally, local VBI agents report to President Chiefs, not to central VBI legs.

5. On the revenue side of the ledger - for the moment, Tassararv and established a central identification office and a Central Criminal Laboratory as per MSU6 recommendations.

6. Academic Instruction - thing remaining unresolved. It's hard for Montgomery to make contact with him. Apparently he wants to squeeze us out of all but the teaching fraction. NIA problems w curriculum etc. on never discussed with MSU6. Without consulting us MSU instructors were dropped from all but one undergraduate course. Things is just as inept that allows for communication between MSU & NIA only at the top level. (Doug has pressed a good case in this respect). Doe now feels that the close tie of the Institute to the Presidency is detrimental. Things want Presidential approval for anything involving MSU, & since money now flows to the President from all areas of VNI, there are long delays.

Montgomery, by the way, is proving disappointing. He has ideas. Two excellent ones, in fact - one a study proposal & the other regarding the graduate curriculum.
However, he suffers from some of the inadequacies regarding working with the Vietnamese, that did Wally Hodge. Dallas believes, on reasonably good evidence, that he washes too much HIV blood at VSMU. He may close with Carson, they're old friends. Dorsey is concerned, and was should be.

7. In Service Training - Here again we are moved to the plus side of the ledger. This program, which did enjoy adequate attention,Weekert was too often drawn into consulting, I & Murphy, acting in the interim, was not too interested, partially because it fell not his area of competence and partially because he was too involved with budget. Now, Haywood despite general VN g resistance is moving ahead with considerable imagination & tact. Dorsey had put him in full charge, and I think we can expect results here also.

5. Police Plan generally certain advances are in evidence. The easing of gunfire, too far removed their progress as compared to Pub Act. They are active in training, especially in advice regarding training. But they too, sense the moral oft-mentioned resistances. I'll talk more of Hoyt & Ryan later.
Thus far I've discussed the 'team spirit' aspect as distinct from the 'crisis' aspect. Obviously, the 'team spirit' stems from the increasing ability attitude we are sensing in the Vietnamese. N5V6 people have put a 6 to 8 month figure in trying to judge when the stiffening was final. The reallocation of most of our effort is to believe that only N5V6 is affected, or at least to ignore the possibility that other units of the American Community are affected. (Interestingly a similar phenomenon is occurring in East Pakistan.) Any real
the problem is viewed as an N5V6 problem possibly to the
great an extent. However, it is a problem, a major one.

It is less easy to explain the 'crisis' nature of the
situation. I want to point out that I'm using as 'crisis'
a term after careful consideration. I've had lengthy explicit
and open discussions about this with Dorn, and he concurs
on the seriousness of things. To the greater extent since
the term 'crisis' in regard to relations with the Government
however, I am becoming increasingly aware of a deteriorating
situation in Barracks and VMF.

Since my arrival here the 6 VN has called for a
review of the proposal 1550-6 VN contract. It had been
my understanding that the signing was imminent, and
therefore had cleared what I thought was the final
draft with Hay & with IC/1W. Then CUN announced that / they would stay / like the specie, and / which he did / shortly after my arrival. Some points were missed, other / major. For instance, the role of IC/1W is the / should be confined to the teaching of courses / we would lose the contractual role (apparently, we're already lost in / practice) of advising on curriculum, teaching methods, etc. / There are several check key issues. Much discussion. / We present counter proposals, compromising on crucial points. / We then felt that a meeting with Thong & Chan at the / same time would be advantageous: this would avoid / buck passing - we could better tell whether it was thing / for both Thong and Chan, who was throwing up road blocks, / A meeting was scheduled. Then they couldn't make it, / and scheduled a meeting for us with Thong (Us being / Fisheal, Dorey, Stoughton & me). But then it turned out that / Chan & Thong actually did meet at the time originally scheduled / to meet with us. They made plans for this slippery hill, / but we felt that a first move had been gotten away before. Then / meeting with Thong was in response to our counter-proposal / as prepared by Dorey, Stoughton, Wood & myself. And this / meeting resulted in a series of counter-proposals by Thong. Then
They leave for his trip to Jakarta, Bangkok, Delhi, Karachi, and Bandung with Wang to try from Function Publique. (This trip is another story. We met them in Jakarta, John in Bangkok. I was supposed to spend almost 2 weeks with them last 3 days, but only after some hard fighting did I succeed in pulling out & leaving them on their own, This is a story where facts & motivations will never be clear times.) Things left from Thursday, Nov. 21. On Friday, Chau called for a follow-up discussion regarding our new counter to Thong's latest counter. He wanted present at this meeting was Darsey, Vass, Ryan, Stoughton, Montgomery, Ashley Wood, and myself, this meeting prevent completion on Monday, 25th although. Was by this time had left for Jakarta. More about these two sessions in a moment.

During the several weeks of these negotiations I kept raising to Wes the implications of these new obstacles. Darsey was with me in several of these conversations with Wes. Did this thing's work or does this contract problem reflect the general government position regarding NSC? Wes kept reassuring me the latter was not the case. Both the President and Chau know that Thong is incompetent, and there does exist. Wes said, a possibility of his removal, not necessarily immediately. (I pointed out that we only have 15 months left to counteract.) Darsey did claim that
at least Chan did feel so negatively about Thang. Any rate
if Thang were the obstacle, would removal come soon enough
to save the H5V role? The answer most likely, even Wes
admits to this, is no. But what about the other part of
the question: is the contract obstacle a reflection of general
UN policy to us? I won't attempt to state Wes' position
on this, it's too complicated. However, I feel secure in
stating that Parsley would agree with me in stating that
that probability is quite high. Frankly, I'm more negative
than he—Dorey has more faith in Chan & Tham than
I have thus far been given cause to have. But Dorey is
concerned.

These two meetings with Chan & the way of H5V's
were announced to us by Wes as the occasion wherein
Chan would state his recognition of H5V's accomplishments
and wherein he would display the government's sincerity
in wanting to work with us on and continuing basis.

Here it is apropos to bring in mention of the
police program with special reference to the Civil Guard
issue and the issue of West vs Wes. As I've
already mentioned the President attempted, about three weeks ago,
to another U.S. H5V & Embassy demands for a final position
on the Civil Guard. This stand was equivoed to U.S., at least
as disabling—most of the funds on the assumption that
the Civil Guard will not be organized as per MSV proposals. There are
facts to this issue that I would not want to put in writing. Suffice it to say that within the American community there
have been degrees of mistrust of others within the community
seriously affecting relations therein. (I'm sorry if I'm being
cryptic here.) At any rate, this situation represents a serious
example of how a part of MSV cannot proceed because of
the 6VN.

Worse, the role of Wesley has also been brought into focus
here. His relations with the President are, by his own admission,
degraded and cast in mystery. The disillusionment over the ability
of his influence to obtain VN6 support for MSV6 has set in
at a time when a little aid from above might have broken the
logjam re consulting, Research, Civil Guard, etc. Wesley & me seem
not to have been able to produce. (It could be argued that the situation
would have worked without Wes' presence.) My estimation of
the situation, then, is that Wes' role vis à vis the President
has led its usefulness as far as the Project is concerned.
To the extent that that relationship has just produced the
breakthroughs from the VN6, the relationship becomes
negative in that it weakens Wes' role as leader of the
project. Where the MSV6 staff has looked to the US to
obtain VN6 approvals they have not received them. By
no means feel that Wes is at fault in any of this. This
friendship with one man, regardless of the influence of that
(I am now in Laos visiting my brother who is with the embassy here in Vientiane. The ways of this trip to "acca and here I'll touch upon later. But more important, I'll have something to say as a result of this trip that will be relevant to the main purpose of this letter.)

one man upon his own people - and that influence is subject to increasing doubts - is not sufficient to affect what appears to be the changing attitude in the aggregate of those people.

Whether Wes senses this effect on his leadership I cannot say. My belief is that he does. He has been quite confidant with me, and he says sufficient to me for me to infer that he senses it although, of course, he cannot say so. What no doubt keeps the problem foremost in his mind are the vocal outbursts of Hoyt. Ryan is as critical of Wes as is Hoyt, but I believe he is far more discreet in how he expresses it - at least to my knowledge. (I've had some open discussions with Howard regarding his outbursts. This was done with Wes' knowledge, in fact, at Wes' suggestion. I appealed to Hoyt on the grounds that by talking down Wes both in front of his own men and over at USOM he was weakening the NSG organization, Hoyt's own, and that he couldn't possibly gain support for his part of the organization from without and from his own staff if it was felt that from the top down respect was not warranted.

In other words I didn't feel that I could change Hoyt's perception of Fishel - Wes, damn him, keeps throwing Hoyt fuel by his frenetic administration, but I did feel that Hoyt could be appealed to on the grounds that his own part of the operation was being affected. I feel a little successful at this venture. Hoyt promised to tone down Ryan. And at least on two occasions since, he has jumped to Wes' defense. One of these occasions was in my presence, one was not, and there may have been others.

I don't delude myself into thinking that this removes the problem. The situation is too far gone, I believe, for Hoyt to change his basic attitude in the few remaining months of Wes' time here. And an attitude will always show through - but at least it may have been toned down. However, a lot of damage has already been done via USOM and arrows, but also via a vis our own staff, which is the point I want to make here.

As I am now about two pages removed from the subject of the two meetings with Chau for which the presence of Hoyt, Ryan, Stoutengur, Montgomery, Hendry, Dorsey, "good and myself was requested. As I mentioned we were to give Chau an occasion to restate the good faith of the government. There was another purpose. Wolf Ladensky at Wes' request gave me the full details of a talk he, Wolf, had with the President. One subject of that talk regarding the police and their activities I will touch upon later; the other was to tell me that the meeting was arranged partially to show as large a part of the NSG staff that were in fact still did have these high reaching contacts within the VNG and that they were effective. Chau's frankness and statement of good faith would prove that he could be respected by the President and his higher representatives still respected Wes and his organization. That the meeting was necessary to discuss the contract there is no doubt. I am sorry that it had to be used to restore faith in Wes by his own staff. I am sorry that Wes felt it necessary.

As you can see I have been discussing the contract negotiation, and especially these two meetings both in terms of the state of the NSG organization itself and in terms of the relationship with VNG. I'll say no more here about Wes' role and NSG attitudes toward him other than this: With Wes leaving shortly a factor that might (and I do not say here would) add to the critical nature of the Project at this time will no longer be a cause for concern. The critical nature of things as they are revolve around relations with VNG. This involves what I have referred to as an increasingly stiffening attitude sensed from many directions. If this attitude reflects official or implicit VNG policy then we are faced with serious impotence for the duration of our stay. What Wesley's thinking in this regard is I cannot pretend to say. Openly he claims there is no problem. However, Dorsey and I have both been carefully following these contract negotiations to gain some insight into what VNG, be it O'Vn, be it Chau, is thinking in terms of NSG's role. (I should mention here that Chau did, as was said he would, reiterate the faith VNG has in Wes and NSG. He briefly reviewed what has been accomplished, and he did even touch upon the Civil Guard. Regarding the latter point he said that the President's arrest reflected his own thinking, but that in actuality it didn't differ too much from the US point of view. There is much disagreement here (even as to what is the US point of view) but I don't want to get off on that tangent. We then launched into the various points that are at issue within the contract. Let me repeat that some of the points
were minor ones, some major. Even on the minor ones compromise has been difficult, but all were resolved. As for the major ones the kind of resistance displayed does not leave me encouraged. Here are several of the issues:

1. The delegation of someone, either Sec of State of Pres or some other Sec of State with whom the group could contact other Ministries. In other words, a sort of focus is needed within VNG for our role. Of course, the other purpose of this position would be to avoid the necessity of having to get Presidential approval for even so minor an issue as visas for participants. Chau is afraid that such a coordinating position for any Secretary of State would place him above the others Secs of State and make something of a superminister of him. He cannot see (or does not want to see) the MSUG need for someone within the govt to carry the MSUG ball. The question here is does he really want the MSUG ball carried?

2. ICA and MSUG want a clause stating that within the limits of its possibility ties the VNG may give partial support to the contract (over and above counter part, of course). Note that this may be only permissive, but still this remains an issue.

3. The use of research materials for publication by MSUG staff even after their tour of duty is completed. Here Chau wants MSUG to assume responsibility for preventing publication of anything detrimental to the sovereignty, security, and prestige of VNG. Especially on the latter point Dowse is resisting. Chau understands, or at least stated at one early point, why professionals could not be so limited. Then after fishing around — and I emphasise that he had to search for a rationale for his position — he said that under any consulting arrangement professional secrecy was assumed. The point can be considered to be well taken. As he had his position, before he had his rationale for it. Frankly, I infer from this a sign of failure in his stated intent to cooperate.

There are other such points, but I won't go into them here. When Wes and John return from Saigon where they are this week for the ICA Far East Regional Public Administration conference these contract discussions will be resumed.

I have used the contract negotiations to pin point the critical nature of things. If there is no break through in approvals we are now awaiting from the President, and if the contract negotiations do not reveal a more sincere form of cooperation some serious questions have to be asked. The present "stall" can be tolerated only by our professional staff so long as there is some hope that the break through will come. If the stated intent to continue the relationship is sincere why the legalistic blocking over the contract? If the present fears regarding intent prove accurate than we are in trouble. I've used the term crisis hoping to imply that the situation could move one way or another. I am not completely negative in my own reactions. The breakthrough could come upon us suddenly. The right to research might suddenly be granted; requests may suddenly start flowing into Consulting etc. A lot of the thinking on my part and on Dowse's part will depend on how Chau moves on the contract. With the contract at issue, then, I think this is the crisis period. If the contract is resolved in letter, but not in spirit then the results are negative.

And if the results are negative it would be possible for the University to remain in Saigon for the duration of its contract. I'm not even certain that the failure to achieve during the remaining time significant progress would reflect on the University. However, there is a professional staff here. These are people concerned with their own careers and their motivations to professional accomplishment. These, the key people, would not stay; the cost to them would be too high. A few, one significant person, has already stated intent to leave if things don't 'break'. And therein lies the real danger to the project.

My trip to Dacca and Vientiane have afforded me just the perspective that I was seeking. In Saigon my conversations were, of course, to the greater extent with MSUG staff, and these were suffering from the frustrations of the situation. On the part of our staff
it is too strongly felt that somehow MSU has failed; that the purely present situation in the field rests on the result of NOL's bulldozing; that therefore the group has earned the distrust of the entire Vietnamese administration. There is no doubt that NOL did a lot of harm, and in the best of situations we would be suffering. However, the resistance is too ubiquitous; the poor fellow should not be given all the blame.

In Dacca I found similar resistances from the Harvard people from the Pakistanis, although to a far lesser extent. They are a smaller organization, however, and they follow the Ford pattern of 'waiting it out'. At this they've been successful. 

Let me now discuss the police program for a bit. As I've mentioned the President had a discussion with Ledajinsky which was wanted Wolf to repeat to me directly. I've already mentioned one point of that discussion. However, the main purpose of the President's remarks were relative to the police program. Supposedly, this was the first time that the President has ever discussed the MSU role with Wolf. Why he chose to make his remarks to Wolf and not to Wes I could not find out from Wolf. What he hoped to achieve by it I cannot judge. Nor can I judge why he so explicitly insisted the remarks be passed on to me. The remarks were actually brief. The President, it seems, feels that our police people are guilty...
of not only indiscreet remarks about the government, but also they have actually engaged in politicking. Wolf knew nothing more. I tried to find out if the larger part of the police group were at fault or if only one or two were involved. Wolf knew nothing. I tried to find out if this was a sort of informal statement of certain people being persona non grata. No, Wolf didn't think so. Then why did the President choose to tell Wolf all this especially if he wouldn't give details on which we could take action. Wolf in was certain as to motivation on the part of the President. I then tried to work out with Wolf the implications of his remarks. Wolf obviously didn't want to get too involved, but he did agree that more needed be known. Wolf and Wes and I then agreed that perhaps I should meet privately with the President so that he might reveal more to me. The meeting will occur early next week. I'll be happier to receive such information directly and not through Wolf.

It's not hard to believe that the President was referring to Hoyt or Ryan or both. No doubt both are vocal, and although I'd accuse Hoyt of the greater guilt on that score I feel that Ryan would most likely be the one to involve himself in any activity. But with this kind of information coming indirectly through Ladejinsky I do not believe we have, thus far, sufficient basis for action. That is one reason why I hope the President will talk to me directly.

Again here I should mention the strong disappointment sensed by the police over the President's failure to follow USU's recommendations re the Civil Guard and the VBI. A lot of their resentment is taken out against Wesley since he was not able to use this mysterious influence of his to get the President to decide otherwise. Wesley is also resented by the police (and perhaps others in the Group as well) simply because he is so closely tied in to the President. And here I have to emphasize that the American community does not perceive Diem in the favorable light it did a year ago. This may partially stem from their frustrations deriving from the resistances they face from the Vietnamese in general. But less and less is Diem regarded as the man who will bring democracy to Vietnam. And more and more the regime is considered corrupt. (On the latter count some still say it is not Diem, but only those around him.)

The point is that the American community as far as I can tell has lost its respect for Diem and his goals. The police having been subject to the vocalness of Howard and his leadership have not been an easy responsibility for Wes. This, of course, is further complicated by Barrows' view that Hoyt is his police advisor, thus putting Wes in the position of responsibility for an activity over which he has neither final say sometimes he feels complete knowledge. (Although Hoyt and Barrows have sworn up and down that Wes is kept fully informed.) In all I think here too Wes feels the police situation getting out of control. I think there may be some connection between all this and the Ladejinsky-Diem exchange. Now, I want to emphasize that I suspect this as a possibility. I have no objective facts to support such a thesis, but over a few week period it is possible to infer certain things from a myriad of remarks, none of which in themselves is significant. I'm saying all this so much to dispute anything to anyone's behavior, but to give some idea of the tenor of operations here these days. Via a via Ryan and Hoyt I don't believe there yet is any action to be taken on the counts as Diem is supposed to have stated them.

However, the role of the police program as we've already discussed should be reconsidered. There are many facets to the problem:

1. USU has undertaken a large operation, but has seen fit to send only one of its own staff into the field. The rest have no loyalty to the University. The University is seriously gambling its reputation under circumstances that are decidedly une.
of operating as a Big Deal. And the loss of the police role would do most to remove the charge that we are involved in policy.)

Should we make the decision to give up the police function I think we will be doing so from strength. It is easier in the police area to articulate our successes. Despite all the criticism of Hoyt to my knowledge, at least, his competence has not been questioned. We need not fear the charge that we are giving it up because we have failed. In fact, it would be expected that MSU would take the police unit over en masse, implying faith in their operations thus far. Barrows has faith in Hoyt's abilities, and the shift to his jurisdiction would not imply a loss of faith vis a vis MSU.

The role of Brandstatter. As stated in the start of an earlier letter I attempted, a copy of which is enclosed, he has done a respectable job of recruiting. However, he has damaged the name of MSU here because of the junkets he has made, and because of the irresponsible way he gave information to personnel before they came. (At least this latter part of it won't happen again.) It should be remembered that MSU has the police program because it is competent in the area. However, aside from the recruiting and the junkets Brandstatter has shown no interest in the substance of the program here. This hasn't endeared any of the police staff to MSU nor has Art gained the respect of any of them. Five days here, two of which were out hunting, did not give him much of a chance to go over their roles with the individuals on the staff. (I should also point out that while Wood is already questioning the expenditures on Art as a Consultant, I don't believe we can afford another such trip.) At this point I think it essential that even if we keep the police program only until the end of the present contract that we get at least one more of the regular MSU permanent staff out here on a 1x1 long term basis. (Although this may be difficult now inasmuch as the Civil Guard decision may have served to have left us overstaffed.) I also think it would be wise to consider sending Art out here for a two or three month period to really involve himself in the program, and possibly to serve as the basis for further involvement by the Police School in the international programs. With the start we've had I should think that a program for training participants could be developed, but only with a more responsible attitude at the top level.

One other thing about Art. When he was here he discussed with Howard a raise for Ryan. The raise was to be about $2,000. I think you are aware of the story. It still hasn't been resolved at this end. I stand in objection to the raise. Howard of course supports it, but agreed after learning that Jack received $3000 as a merit increase in July that a figure like $500 might be more acceptable. That strikes me as ludicrous is that so large an increase was proposed for a man about whom the Project has raised serious questions as to his continuation. We Brandstatter object to his coming out here and without gaining any knowledge of the project and Ryan's role in it, propose so drastic an increase. As for the problem of Jack's removal I don't think that was as yet has answered your questions on that point. Jack leaves here December 7th and was arrives back from France December 6th; it's unlikely that the decision can be made in time to hand to Jack before he does leave, which should be the way it should be done. He cannot delay his departure inasmuch as he wants to be in France with his wife when she gives birth.

In my last conversation with "as on the point he was inclined to let Ryan return. Originally I felt the same way; in many respects regarding the substance of the work Ryan is a pillar of strength. Now after hearing from "as about the remarks of the President my mind has been reopened until I've given more concrete evidence (or statements). I just hope we're not backing into the return of someone the same way we did with Anderson. Ryan doesn't reach Lansing until well after the 1st of the year. Here will still be time, but obviously the decision should have been made before he left. One other factor that has to be seriously considered regarding the decision on Ryan is the reaction of Hoyt. Assuming Hoyt is with us another two years irreparable harm may be done vis a vis our relations with Hoyt and possibly also with Barrows if it is decided Ryan shouldn't return. Hoyt's reaction...
can be anticipated. He'll accuse Wes and MSU of coddling a corrupt government by sacrificing Ryan. The point overlooked of course is that that government is our host. Until it is decided by MSU that the government is corrupt the Group and its staff, Hoyt included, are committed to giving assistance to it as its guests. This bit of logic, unfortunately, won't do anything to change Hoyt's attitude. And with that attitude his usefulness to the project will be severely lessened. An alternative is that both Hoyt and Ryan should go. Such a move would immediately further incite the wrath of USOM and Barrows unless MSU had a solid case in which case the move should be made with Barrows in consultation (and with a strong MSU man ready to step into Hoyt's place). If there were sufficient reason to more decide against Ryan's returning, again I would say to lay the facts clear to Barrows; this would help keep Howard's reactions in check. But thus far I don't believe we have sufficient with which to go to Barrows; and with what we have to decide negatively on Ryan would create an impossible situation vis a vis Hoyt. Unless the President is willing to take a less obvious method than a vague statement through Wolf I don't think we are in a position to act. What is called for is a strong Chief Advisor who can sit on Ryan and Hoyt. He should lay out cold what they can and cannot do, and what in a foreign country like this they can and cannot say. And then accept no breach.

Another point about the police program vis a vis MSU: It is so involved with USOM and the dollar aid program in a dollar sense that MSU's jurisdiction becomes vague. As a rule we had been taking to any and sundry meetings concerning the project. But at one point there was a police meeting with Barrows, Hoyt, and Wes which I question was not invited to on the grounds, as Wes put it, that it really didn't involve MSU. I make mention of this to show that if the police program is so far away from us then we should certainly get away from it.

Salter was in Saigon last week which fact presented a situation where the four corners of the rectangle were in one place. MSU, MSU, USOM and DAO. Here we took advantage of the opportunity to case past June 1959. I took the position that the University was not ready to commit itself yet although it would be absolutely essential to extend the contract for final phasing out should the University make the extreme decision not to continue. (The mechanics of phasing out would require us to go past June 1959.) Implicit in the discussion was the present background of the present resistances felt from the Vietnamese. However, neither side really ever admitted to the fact. (Esman sat in for Barrows who was in Hong Kong, and I sat in for Wes who was in Jakarta, but with Stoutenburg present.) What surprised me was that even Esman, who is probably the most vocal and most anti-MSU person at MSU, felt that with any kind of a breakthrough the project should be continued. September 1958 was set at the target date for commencing new contract discussions; in the meantime all hands would, of course, continue to mull and discuss informally the pros and cons.

Vis a vis USOM and Barrows I sense that relations are somewhat poorer than usual. A lot of this can be attributed to the decision on the Civil Guard. Barrows feels that somehow the rug was pulled out from beneath him, and in an irrational moment he made an outburst to me regarding the MSU role in the matter. He admitted when he calmed down that his remark was unjustified, but it does indicate the tenor of things. Another factor has been an abnormal focus of MSU 3rd country travel within a short time span. However, even Wolfe admitted that the frictions over that were manifestations of a more deeply rooted irritation with MSU. Esman is something of the culprit over there. At the slightest provocation (and often without such) he'll launch into a diatribe of MSU clichés against MSU and its big wheeling and dealing operations. His remarks are superficial; I used the term 'clichés' because everything he says has been heard from other lips many times. It is fairly obvious that he's emotionally oriented against us; his remarks have no substantial foundations. Salter had to at one point make it clear to Esman that MSU had served a very positive role and the contract had been designed to fill a definite need. Problem is that Esman, right or wrong, is very, very vocal.
Barrows, on the other hand, seems to have a more balanced view. He has his complaints against us, and he wants me to come in so that he can articulate them. But he himself stated that he has no doubts as to the quality of the work accomplished by the group.

Barrows also stated a concern over the departure of Finshel. I don't agree with his position. And his position is a strong one considering his frictions with Wes. He feels that MSU contacts with VNG will be even more hampered when Wes leaves. Most of our contacts, he said, resulted either from Wes' relationship with Diem and the support Diem gave us (which support today I have to look hard for), or else it came from fear on the part of some VNG administrators of Wes' power with the President. Once Wes leaves, Barrows said, MSU may have rough sledding gaining the cooperation of various VNG levels. This is the kind of argument for which or against which it is difficult to offer evidence. I don't agree, however. In fact, I think that Wes' very contact with the President tends to preclude contact by MSU staff at lower levels. In a way Wes feels that his unique relationship with the President is the way through which to channel most MSU activities, especially on the Pub Ad side. In a very subtle way this tends to inhibit our staff from more energetic attempts to create contacts.

At any rate Barrows seems pleased with MSU's longer range goals vis-a-vis the Project. He feared a certain empire-building tendency; I think that to the greater extent his mind is open on the subject. Last year's contract negotiations didn't help, but he stated that he'll be happy to see recently stated University intentions given a chance. By this I suspect he was referring to Diem's remarks during his trip last year (which remarks I can assume although I don't know) and to my own which I believe to have been in support of Diem's.

In my remarks I've had to say certain things about Wes. This has been rather difficult, and I think it was a subjective factor causing the delay in getting this letter off the ground. I've tried to state things as I've seen them. In some cases my remarks represent mere suspicions and as such they are not factors to be used for evaluation of either the project or of Wes. I'll not here go into the positive elements in Wes' role. I don't believe they're as pertinent to what I've been trying to emphasize. However, I am concerned that certain things I've said herein about Wes may be misconstrued. I therefore want to make clear that those remarks are for yours', and Ralph's, ears only. Even at that I haven't been completely frank. When I get back we'll have plenty of occasion to get the rest of my story.

I am particularly sensitive to the harm that can be done to an individual by these sort of observations because of the harm that I feel has been done in a way to Dorsey via Dr. Reeves and Bill Ross's remarks concerning the emotional, father-son relationship existing between him, Dorsey, and the President. I know that because of those remarks you have felt negatively about Dorsey becoming Chief Advisor. (I don't feel Dorsey should be Chief Advisor, but for other reasons. To pull him out of the Division would seriously hamper that Division and would waste Dorsey's talents.) What disturbs me is that this factor affected so important a decision, especially when I am without doubt that those remarks are without foundation. I'm quite certain that Dr. Reeves picked up the notion from Ross. When I saw Ross he went into a complex description of Dorsey's behavior in the President's presence, from which he inferred not only the President's feeling towards John but also vice versa. The description of Dorsey's behavior fits Dorsey's behavior in almost any serious conversation; somewhat slow and nervous. If there is an relationship between Dorsey and the President there is no existing evidence of it. Since Dorsey has been here, he's seen the President at only two meetings, one of which included Ross and Reeves, and at about two or three receptions, and that is all. Further, at one of those receptions Dorsey was standing near the President who was alone. He made an attempt at conversation which failed; a few niceties were exchanged and that was the extent of it. I am disturbed here that responsible people on a three day visit could make so profound an observation. I hope you will accept my assurance that absolutely no such relationship exists. But I repeat I am not here pumping for Dorsey for Chief Advisor. 
I am now back in Saigon. (Dec 5th). I've been playing with the possibility of retyping this epistle, but have decided against it. Time has been a problem for me here and the returns from retyping would not, I believe, warrant the time I'd have to devote to it. Again I must ask you to forgive its sloppy physical condition, and the fact that it is basically unedited. When I get back to Lansing I might want to smooth it out somewhat, in case I have not been entirely clear (or grammatical). I feel at this point it is more important to get it to you in any shape. I have also considered retyping it with the express purpose of deleting some of remarks about sesmivy. But for the life of me I find it impossible to present the picture here without some discussion of his role and personality.

As for my return I hope to be back in Lansing by the New Year. John and Wes return to Saigon from Manila on Saturday, and I expect the contract talks will be resumed next week. I think I should stay, and so does John, at least until we can get some indication of the intent of VNG. I well recognize that within the remaining two weeks such an indication most probably will not be forthcoming. However, if their is an inkling that we might soon know I will be damn willing to gamble an extra couple of weeks. (I might also be gambling the success of my marriage - my wife is threatening me with divorce unless I show up soon.)

I think I should chide you for having done me something of a disservice by letting me come out here. In a sense I've now tasted blood, and to sit in East Lansing when there is so much that can be done here is perhaps going to seem sterile and frustrating. In many ways here I want to take the reins in hand and start solving some of the problems I believe to be solvable, where I've been able to do so I already have. But I recognize this is not my role here, and that I should not overstep myself. There is too much disorganization already; I don't want to add to it. But as you are well aware I feel I have a large personal stake in the project. It is not easy to see it in its present shape and not be able to take action myself.

As for my returning to campus to generate a research program I have grave doubts. With research at a complete stall here I do not see how we can get any data for use in Lansing. Even if presidential approvals were to come through now authorizing research, I have not yet been able to work out any sort of program feasibly tied into Lansing. The same remarks, of course, go for my own dissertation. I am more than ever anxious to write on Vietnam. However, the only topics that seem possible would have to be done at this end. As you may well imagine, I am quite concerned about this. If I stay in East Lansing a topic on Vietnam is out of the question. However, for the next couple of weeks here I intend spending most of my time trying to work something out.

One suggestion I would like to make is that we get some foundation to finance a couple of scholars here in Vietnam to do research. We've got the good basis for a Area Program in Vietnam, but tied into USCM and into the VNG officially I see nothing but problems ahead in attempt for the Project to involve itself in research. Independently operating scholars could make personal contact and could be much more effective. The Asia Foundation is a likely possibility. But if the Project should phase out in the next couple of years without it being used, directly or indirectly, for research, then a good potential will have been lost.
While here I've kept as careful a check as possible on all administrative matters involving East Lansing. I know this does not seem apparent in light of the absence of my name anywhere, but I have been hovering. At times it has been difficult for me to see the mail before it goes out and at least on one occasion I would have stopped (or attempted to) one enclosure. This one concerned Calder. I don't believe we should be involved with two architects at once for the same job, especially when one has already begun plans. However, for the moment there is nothing pressing re Calder as I'll save the discussion till I get back. But for informational purposes it does look as if USOM will purchase Brown's plans.

At any rate Cliffe seems to be doing a really creditable job of avoiding major complications. I didn't envy his having to step into the position so soon after arrival on campus. Looking back at my absence it begins to appear more and more that this particular time was best. Recruitment is going to become a focal point again just about as soon as I return. Even if the project were to grind to a complete halt in June 59 certain spots, eg Statenburg, Mclean will need replacement. Cliffe has probably already passed on two memos from Gardner. Gardner has done an excellent job here, and would stay on but for his health. A replacement for him is essential now that the library program is going full steam. As his memo states he'll stay into the fall. I would also urge careful consideration of his statement regarding an international librarian. He's an excellent man and I'd hate to see HSU forego the opportunity of getting him on its permanent staff.

As for the proposals I've seen on the Chief Advisor vacancy. I had lunch with Harver Bernstein at the New York meeting, and the mention of his name as a potential candidate was very favorably received by me. I was sorry to learn later that he was no longer available. I react negatively to Keith Caldwell; from the contacts I've had with him I don't think he has the imagination nor the strength with which to handle the problems here. I should caution you in this regard that even at Indiana he has a rather limited role. Laves does the recruiting, and the contract negotiation. This was true, at least, when I was there last spring. As you know the reaction here generally to Collargue was also negative. I hadn't been too impressed in just two personal contacts, but I had also picked up in the past few months several negative remarks about him. All of these cannot be considered good grounds, I recognize, for taking a stand. However, 'yes' and Morrey's own thinking reflected the things I had heard.

As for Dorsey, as I've mentioned earlier, I don't think he should be assigned given the present structure of the project. Were it simply a Public Administration operation on a smaller scale there would be no better man. He's got the strength and the ability to work with the Vietnamese, as you know. But we'd be losing our pillar of substantive strength in the pub ad area if he were assigned to that role. I know you are already aware of the sensitivities here regarding the method in which the choice is made. Make absolutely certain that Wes and John are brought into the picture and kept up to date. There have been several exchanges of letters between you and Wes which I don't get to see (I find this kind of secrecy irritating) and most probably you are trying to get as much information here as possible. I merely repeat that it is important to do so.
I know also that Dean Seelye and Guy Fox are active in the recruiting problem. Which raises a point. Several weeks ago someone here received a letter stating that there had been something of a coup on campus. Namely, that Seelye was now directly in charge of the Project and that the role of the Office of International Programs was now predominantly of a housekeeping nature. I find it hard to believe that such a change could have taken place without me having been told or without your having been told. Nevertheless, such a rumor can have a disturbing effect. I think you would do well to articulate what, if anything, has happened.

I am at the moment going to rush this to a close in order to catch the mail. A fourth and final apology for the slovenliness of this letter, and for the fact that I haven’t redited it.

Before I do close I’d like to summarize:

A vast potential of manpower, some of it permanent MSU staff, is faced with eighteen months of idle time. The present attitudes of the Vietnamese government, apparently at all levels, sets the limits within which we can operate. These limits are narrow. I am not convinced that either MSU leadership nor USG leadership is displaying any imagination in trying to push back those limits. Further, and equally as bad, organizational problems within MSU are preventing utilization of MSU potential even up to the extent of those limits that do exist now. (The morale problem, touched upon in the accompanying letter, is serious.) The whole picture is further complicated by a government here that apparently is moving from some sort of autocracy to a dictatorship. The stability here is explosive. That may sound paradoxical, but the extent to which we can ‘look” touch with and the confidence of the people was probably the greatest shock I received here. Since the assassination attempt public appearances are limited, and when he does appear, say, at an exhibition the crowds are moved out. There is no formal political threat now. A military coup in this kind of a situation is a strong possibility. The economy is deteriorating. Another assassination attempt is always a possibility.) But to repeat, evidence is such that the government is moving in a direction not may be embarrassing to US foreign policy. MSU should seriously consider its role in such a development (and need I again mention especially the police force in what may be a police state). Thus I am recommending not that MSU pull out, but that it seriously consider such a possibility. (Glen, I hope you’ll be here long enough to get past the messier to which quick guests are subject. I also hope that I’ll get sufficient time with you to expand on these remarks. I really wish we could be out here concurrently.) What I say here is with regard for the name of the University, nothing more. And again to repeat, I have a profound belief that there is a vast potential here given the right kind of leadership. I hope you make the correct choice.

So that’s it for now. It will be easier for me to get out subsequent remarks to you, but the bulk of what I want to say has been said here. If I have sounded alarmist it will have served a purpose. Sitting in East Lansing I had no concept of the true state of things here. A better means of communications is going to be necessary.

At any rate I miss all of you and will, in a sense, be anxious to get back. This has been an exhausting routine for me. I’ll have been here about 60 days. There are 50 on the MSU and another 30 or so Vietnamese who all feel some responsibility about my social well being. I have finally had to call a halt.