CONFIDENTIAL

Saigon
November 17, 1957

Dear Glen and Ralph,

Firstly, a quick but serious apology for not having written until now. I recognized shortly after my arrival that I was going to be subject to much verbalization from many quarters and that therefore my attempts to understand and evaluate the situation here would themselves be subject to currents to and from various directions. In short, I simply wasted time to assert, to mull, and to articulate. (Although I now feel that what I might have written three weeks ago would make an interesting comparison to what I'll herein set forth.)

If the delay in word from me has caused you any disturbance or concern I can only apologize. It would have been easy, I know, to dictate a few quick superficial remarks, but my pattern of activity has been intense in a way that didn't lend itself to convey type communication. I might also add that another factor leading itself to this long delay has been the problem of setting time aside for writing (and typing) this myself; I preferred not to dictate this letter for what will be, I think, obvious reasons.

Four weeks leaves me with the general conclusion that the Project is too uncomfortably close to『dead center』being held or dead center. The rest of this letter will can probably be considered qualifications to that statement. However, I caution you not to infer too much negativity from the statement itself. There remains, as I had always assumed, a large potential for progress; and there exists good reason to believe that things can occur to get the『mix』machine into gear. Probably the most unfortunate thing about the statement is the fact that too many of the staff, especially the consumers, hold the same belief.

Surely, these people have an inability to recognize significant progress accomplished by the Project over the past five years. Progress has been in tangible and difficult to measure. I have devoted the greater part of my time to getting the answer; it has taken intense questioning and digging. (It is certainly a matter of fact that there has been progress, but I want to register the caveat that there is a huge of disappointment『hangs』on my part.) However, the answers have not had the time nor the resources necessary to discover for themselves. That therefore has become part of my role has been that of general encourager.

My first two weeks were devoted discussions with as many people as possible. This included Division Heads, Section chiefs, lesser nomenclature in some cases, NSC personnel, WSC personnel, and anyone else, e.g. Landefinsky, whom I felt could offer serious critiques. It took little time to learn that the morale problem predominated the thinking of the NSC people, I, therefore, will touch on that subject firstly. In my scheduled appointments wherein I had hoped to discuss a staff member's substance activity (to learn where his function has been, where it is now, and what he is planning for the future) I found that the discussions were concentrated on what is wrong with the Project, personal complaints, expelling accusations via a ramshackle staff, complaints about misinformation given during briefing in the NSC,『survivors』mistrust of President etc. (or those about him), etc., etc. I feel that in those circumstances it could be best for me to become accessible to everyone with gripes against the Project. I lost a week at this, but I believe it served a good purpose since it gave them an opportunity to explode at someone representing the Project and NSC with all their gripes, etc. I later learned from many of the new arrivals, especially in the police group, and actually
Been 'gunning for me' since they felt certain things had been promised before they had come and that ISU wasn't delivering. Originally they had 'gained' for Brandstatter but he was wise enough to stay only five days and not become a target. Some of these complaints were legitimate, most weren't. By concern was with the attitude they reflected. To the university these people were decidedly hostile. (The recent ISU decision to stop all post allowance payments didn't help this problem. They had been promised that increment by the university; the contractual arrangements between ISU and ICA was no concern of theirs. There was muddle about lawsuits or actually leaving.) At any rate I think that by walking them head on, by letting them get it all off their chest I did succeed in removing what was a serious irritant.

Just as an aside here. In going over Brandstatter’s recruiting on a scale I would say that he has been surprisingly successful. There is at least one person, possibly two, who represent definite mistakes. Two could be considered average. Six definitely above average. And three would make the top end of the scale. This, of course, is a hasty appraisal, but it represents my own observations combined with discussions with Hoyt. Howard tends to get overly critical of Brandstatter’s recruitment because of the one or two mistakes, but when pressed he admits to the quality of his staff. On the other hand, Brandstatter is to receive some blame for the morale problem stated above. He promised some things that we couldn’t produce. Fortunately the bulk of the recruiting is over. But should his role again become active in that sense the Coordinator will have to keep a careful eye on what he tells these people.

Housing has been another irritant to the morale problem. The fact that it is an irritant simply reflects, I believe, the fact that people in this kind of a situation are 'not themselves'. This might be referred to as culture shock. The demands made by so many dissatisfied staff members regarding housing have been incredible in light of the phenomenal job we did in getting good housing for all. (Any reservations I may have stated about Nuh’s ability to meet the demands. None of this recent mass of arrivals had to live in hotels. Houses were ready for all of them. I think Ralph will appreciate the severity of that accomplishment. The problem was that these people did not. There has been an emphasis at Nuh because our family was a little further out and that therefore costs became more expensive; another felt that his house didn't reflect his status; etc. This area of the morale problem more reflects the nature of the human animal than a failure to adequately provide for our staff. Unforeseen (and more subtle ones) maxims do exist for low morale: frustrations in working with the Vietnamese, for example; the associated disappointment regarding the accomplishments of the project; etc. These go to create the attitudes that are manifested in petty bickering over housing or other similar problems. And, of course, it does no good to explain that this is why there is a hardship differential.