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Comments:
Gary: Recognize anyone pictured or named in file attached?
Can you believe this worthless guy referred to Mme Nhu as "the wife of South Vietnam's president"?

Al

IF THIS WERE TO FALL INTO THE WRONG HANDS... THE FREE WORLD MAY COME TO AN END

THE IDEA BEHIND ONE IN SIX AMERICAN HOMES

Freddie Mac
8200 Jones Branch Drive, McLean, VA 22102
Ramparts

The university on the make
[or how MSU helped arm Madame Nhu]
WAR ON CAMPUS
MICHIGAN STATE

Although not as well publicized as some other anti-war protests, the long-standing unrest on the East Lansing campus led to a 1970 riot and a 1972 two-day standoff with police.

By Michael E. Unsworth

On February 17, 1970, with the thermometer at 17 degrees and plunging, more than 200 protesters marched from a strategy meeting at the Michigan State University Student Union building to the East Lansing City Hall two blocks away. There, leather-clad radical “Weathermen” smashed the building’s windows with 6-foot-long iron fence posts. After 20 minutes of this mayhem, which drew a crowd of more than 1,000 onlookers, police stormed out of the city hall and began to club and tear-gas their besiegers. Bolstered by contingents from neighboring jurisdictions, the officers began pushing the mob over icy streets toward the campus. A bank sign indicated the temperature was zero when some in the crowd began smashing windows in the adjoining business district. Local observers were shocked that such violence could happen in the dead of winter. But Michigan State University (MSU) would soon witness the biggest campus strike in U.S. history and, two years later, a tense standoff over a student blockade of a highway.

Halfway through the 1960s, though, nobody could have predicted the turmoil that would wrack Michigan State. The school was basking in favorable publicity. The football team was nationally ranked, and the school surpassed Harvard University in its enrollment of National Merit Scholars. In the 20 years since World War II, MSU’s domineering president, John Hannah, had transformed the university from a prototypical “cow college” into an institution that combined a solid undergraduate education with advanced research in all fields. Hannah capitalized on the demand brought by the postwar GI Bill and the subsequent baby boom to expand the East Lansing school’s enrollment, which went from 8,000 in 1940 to 38,000 by 1965.

Hannah himself had previously gained national stature by serving as an assistant secretary of defense (1953) and as the chairman of the U.S. Civil
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Rights Commission. Despite his commitment to producing an educated citizenry, many believed the MSU president ran the campus autocratically; he was especially averse to activities that ran counter to his Cold War concept of patriotism. For instance, he ignored faculty votes to end compulsory Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) participation and blocked any activity he deemed subversive or disrespectful of authority. However, most people on the campus and in the state at large gave Hannah high marks for the meteoric rise of Michigan State.

President Lyndon Johnson's introduction of American regular units into Vietnam in the winter of 1965 sent shock waves through U.S. colleges. His avoidance of a national debate on sending troops into combat was a piece of high political finesse, but the success of his policy depended on constant measurable progress, something that was hard to produce in guerrilla warfare. As his administration ascended the need for more and more troops, its credibility fell. College faculty and students were among the first to criticize the government's inconsistencies. Certainly, many in East Lansing opposed the war. Some, like MSU economics professor Walter Adams, were against the conflict on strategic as well as economic grounds. Others, like minister Lynn Jodahl (today a Michigan legislator) and student David Stockman (Ronald Reagan's first director of the Budget) opposed the war on religious grounds. Some, like sociology major Beth Shapiro (now director of Rice University's library), opposed the war for civil rights reasons. Others, like Air Force veteran Jack Sartle and his wife, Sue, were dissatisfied with the lies of American society and looked to radical solutions. A number of professors, many of whom were World War II veterans, acted as coordinators, advisors and champions of the anti-war groups.

Ironically, the core of the MSU "movement" came from the very groups that Hannah had recruited to add luster to his campus: National Merit Scholars and professors. But anti-war groups were not large, either in percentage or in total numbers. For instance, the MSU Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) chapter, which was second only to Harvard's in size, numbered 200 members at its peak, thus representing only .5 percent of the student body. Its effectiveness lay in its ability to energize the curious and the questioning. SDS protests often brought out crowds of hundreds and sometimes thousands.

The anti-Vietnam groups had a number of targets: Michigan State's ties to the federal government and defense contractors, the Air Force and Army ROTC programs on campus, the draft, American foreign policy, and the university's alleged heavy-handed treatment of protesters. Moreover, these appeals could be tied to dissatisfaction with archaic university social rules (such as males wearing ties to dormitory meals), drug busts, racial injustice, and the perceived inequities of the capitalist system.

Tactics evolved over time, often gaining in sophistication. They included "teach-ins" (informal meetings that ran the gamut from discussions to ideological browbeating), petitions, marches (both local and national), publishing (from fliers to "alternative" newspapers such as The Paper), film series, organizing communities, harassing military and industrial recruiters, disrupting ROTC activities, and occupying buildings.

The MSU administration, puzzled by this unwelcome surge of dissatisfaction, took measures to counter the protests. After a May 1965 open-housing rally led to the arrests of 59 MSU students, the East Lansing Police Department and the MSU Department of Public Safety formed a political surveillance unit that spied on hundreds of faculty and students. Its files were shared with the Michigan State Police "Red Squad" and the FBI. As part of the surveillance, the authorities used informers, the most effective being students who were already members of anti-war groups. Many had been arrested for drug violations and "turned" in exchange for the dropping of charges.

Hannah frequently denounced the protests and insisted on the prosecution of demonstrators. His stance was based not only on maintaining his authority but also on shielding MSU from interference from a conservative Michigan legislature that met only three miles away. Hannah's unflinching defense of MSU's and Johnson's policies played into the hands of the anti-war movement. His shrill pronouncements and inept actions fueled sympathy for protesters among students and faculty.

The pattern was set with the controversy over an April 1966 cover story in Ramparts magazine. Illustrated by a color drawing of the wife of South Vietnam's president (Madame Nhu) in a Spartan cheerleader's outfit, "The University on the Make" repeated the charges of CIA involvement in a 1950s MSU project aiding the Republic of Vietnam. Hannah and Wesley Fishel, political science professor and project founder, vehemently denied the article's accusations. But other university officials made contradictory statements about the project's activities, and a former CIA inspector general stated that the project was indeed a cover for agency "spooks."

The fallout from the controversy was increasing. Only a month earlier the harsh sentencing of SDS members as the result of a demonstration had drawn unfavorable local and regional media attention. Now national newspapers and television covered this latest controversy in detail. A state senator chastised the university and threatened to hold special hearings. The legislature took an appropriation for a law school, one of Hannah's dreams.

But the most important result was long-term and lasting. Pro-war supporters now had scant scholarly and personal credibility in the university community. Since the spring of 1965, Fishel had countered anti-war criticism with his group, the MSU Friends of Vietnam, often engaging in debates with anti-war protesters. President Johnson quietly funneled $25,000 in private money to Fishel to establish a national pro-war speakers' bureau and research center. But the Ramparts charges were substantiated by readily available facts in official university publications. Advocates of the Johnson policy were in a disarray from which they never recovered.

More ominous, radical students were attracted to East Lansing because of the controversy. And the anti-war advocates had
some important off-campus allies. Respected local clergy supported them. An active chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union eagerly offered legal assistance to faculty and student protesters. The Michigan Democratic Party and the United Automobile Workers hierarchy flexed their political muscles to protect anti-war professors such as economist Charles Larrowe and labor relations instructor Bob Repas. Finally and most surprising, Michigan's Republican governors for the entire Vietnam era, George Romney and William Milliken, were public doves. Few anti-war groups at other schools enjoyed such strong outside support.

While the MSU anti-war advocates had off-campus sympathizers and minimal pro-war challengers, they did not have automatic support. Most of the students kept busy with their normal academic and social pursuits. Males, of course, were concerned with keeping an adequate grade-point average to avoid the draft. Junior faculty had to perform the teaching-and-research balancing act to gain tenure. For them, anti-war advocacy meant cutting into their time and gaining unwelcome notoriety. Outspoken faculty members like Ben Gasko, a psychology professor and advisor to the local SDS, were denied tenure. (Gaskoff referred to his colleagues as "bourgeois assholes." He went on to help organize the "Weather Underground" spin-off from SDS.) Tenured faculty such as Larrowe and Repas had the job security to actively support the anti-war movement, but such professors were few in number.

MSU faculty and students were generally split over the war by academic disciplines. The "hard" sciences and business programs, located in the new buildings on South Campus, were conservatively inclined and were uncomfortable with the protests. The social sciences and humanities departments, which occupied the pre-World War II buildings of Old Campus, were more divided about Vietnam. As things developed, the anti-war movement benefited most from the federal government's inability to present a clear and successful Vietnam policy and from the MSU administration's hand-hammed suppression of campus dissent.

In midfall 1966, the peace movement at Michigan State had two main threads—separate sometimes, intertwined at other times. One strand, represented by the University Christian Ministry (UCM), saw that effective opposition to the war and other social ills should be based on mobilizing the surrounding community. The other thread was represented by the SDS, which pursued a variety of on-campus anti-war activities with a radical socialist bent. Both groups shared a disdain for the direction of American society and often castigated those who did not share their concerns. Cooperation between these two threads was informal and personal rather than structured and ideological.

Throughout 1966 and 1967, anti-war groups were busy with a number of activities: anti-draft measures, student government elections and the 1967 Lansing Vietnam Summer. Interestingly enough, the largest demonstration on campus for this period was in late February 1967. Kenneth Heineman, in his book "Campus Wars," writes that "in small dormitory kis-in protesting university rules against public putting degenerated into a 1,500-person passion pit."

By the end of 1967, the two elements of the anti-war movement were diverging. The community organizers continued their slow, nonviolent approach. The other faction, led by the
number) emphasized less violent tactics. By the fall of 1968, the confrontationists had purged the chapter of those who were not truly committed to revolution.

The year 1968 had been a roller coaster of hopes and fears for the other campus peace advocates. Eugene McCarthy's presidential bid early that year energized those uncomfortable with UCM's religious orientation and SDS's Marxist dogma. The assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy, the fiasco of the Chicago Democratic Convention, and Richard Nixon's accession to the presidency created a sour mood on campus. It was accentuated in late September when Hannah announced restrictive new rules for campus protest, bringing out an SDS-led crowd of 1,500.

Hannah stepped down from the MSU presidency in January 1969, his farewell ceremonies marred by an SDS-inspired occupation of the administration building. A divided university board of trustees settled on economics professor Walter Adams as interim president. Adams, a middle-road dove who had cooled passions during a tense 1968 anti-ROTC demonstration, pursued a policy of moderation. Forsaking Hannah's shrill condemnations and willingness to use police, Adams showed up at every anti-war demonstration, often agreeing with many complaints and using a sharp wit to counter increasingly obscene heckling from radicals. Moderation came at a price. Adams was kned in the groin by a female SDSer during an occupation of the Army ROTC building. His flexible stance was viewed with suspicion by conservatives in the legislature and on the board of trustees.

To further stir things, the national SDS convention was held the next month at the MSU Union. Three hundred undercover agents purportedly spied on the 500 "authentic" delegates. The convention itself revealed a developing ideological split. A Maoist Progressive Labor faction urged "Worker-Student Alliances." Rejecting this traditional leftist stance was a faction led by attorney Bernardine Dohr, Columbia SDSer Mark Rudd, and radicals from Ann Arbor, Mich. They proposed that the SDS ally itself with the Black Panthers, the Viet Cong, and other Third World "liberation" movements to fight American "imperialism."

This ideological stress extended to the SDS at MSU. It was aggravated by personality clashes. The group attracted a "disproportionate share of creative academic superstars who sometimes behaved like jealous intellectual prima donnas," according to Heineman. Moreover, the split was taking place along class lines. Those from economically secure backgrounds advocated the aggressive line. SDSers who came from lower-middle-class families (the MSU chapter was unusual in having a large
On's invasion of Cambodia in late April triggered the firebombing of the Army ROTC building. Five days later, the Kent State killings sent 1,000 people marching through the MSU campus shouting anti-war slogans and emptying classrooms. The crowd, now numbering 3,000, surrounded the administration building and demanded that Wharton "honor the slain Kent State students and urge Nixon to withdraw from Cambodia." The student government held an emergency session and called for a strike.

Thus began the largest student strike in American history. That evening 7,000 squeezed into the MSU auditorium to thrash out a list of demands. Besides United States withdrawal from Cambodia and the banishment of ROTC from campus, many other issues were added to the demand list to give it the broadest possible appeal. To enlist black militants there were calls to free Bobby Scale (a jailed Black Panther) and increase minority enrollment by lowering admission standards. Gay students pressed for protection from harassment and police brutality.

This laundry list of radical concerns proved to be the undoing of the strike: some demands (such as withdrawal from Cambodia) were outside the university's power; other demands were soon seen as bones thrown to special-interest groups. While 12,000 students initially boycotted classes and the effort lasted for more than two weeks, support for the strike was paper-thin. Many strikers had never before participated in anti-war demonstrations. Furthermore, SDS members and other radicals turned off many supporters by banning liberals from speaking and by engaging in tedious arguments on ideological purity. Moreover, the strikers represented only a third of the student body. The majority of the faculty and undergraduates disagreed with the strike. English professor Arthur Sherbo's students forcibly booted his strike advocates from one of his classes. Mass action eventually ground to a halt in the third week of May.

Wharton initially tried to mediate between the strikers and their detractors, but gained no credibility with either group. Coming under criticism from the American Legion and the legislature, he shrewdly waited until the initial fervor had declined before calling in the police, taking pains not to arrest...
In the spring of 1972, anti-war protesters staged their last major demonstration on Lansing's Grand River Avenue with a "blockade in response to Nixon's blockade" of Haiphong Harbor. When police tore down their barricade, students on bikes hindered traffic.

faculty members. The strike sounded the death knell for the radical campus left. Many SDSers scattered, some to the siren call of underground revolution.

The anti-war movement was now led by the GI CO and the MSU chapter of Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW). Their patient organizing efforts paid off with dovish candidates being elected to the East Lansing City Council in late 1971. The council in April 1972 called for an end to the bombing of North Vietnam and an accelerated withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia. Also in April 1972 the VVAW was instrumental in getting the MSU board of trustees to pass a resolution condemning the war.

As with the Cambodia excursion, Nixon's policy precipitated the next outbreak of violence at MSU. His early May 1972 decision to mine and bomb North Vietnam (in retaliation for the Easter Offensive) led to a gathering of 400 at the MSU Student Union. East Lansing police, fearing another march on city hall, tear-gassed the crowd. Enraged students, eventually numbering more than 3,000, built a barricade across M-43, the state highway that forms the northern boundary of the campus.

A tense two-day standoff then ensued. Governor Milliken, while anti-war, was not about to abdicate his duties to protect public order. He hoped that state police helicopters overhead would constitute a suitable show of force. Instead, the aerial display enraged the crowd. East Lansing police, having been reprimanded by the city council for being too aggressive, did nothing when students broke into nearby liquor stores. VVAW members tried to diffuse tension by talking to police and students. They also unceremoniously removed Ann Arbor Weathermen from campus.

On May 3, a force of 200 police, protected by state police sharpshooters on adjoining buildings, used bulldozers and tear gas to remove the barricades, despite 800 student bicyclists who tried unsuccessfully to stop the removal. With the barricades dismantled, the protest ended. Seven months later, the Paris Peace Accords ended serious anti-war activity at MSU.

The anti-war protesters at MSU and other schools could claim a number of successes. By the early 1970s they had helped elect dovish congressmen and senators who practiced legislative guerrilla warfare against the Nixon administration. In East Lansing they were able to mobilize a student vote to take control of city hall (they were much less successful in surrounding communities). On campus they helped weaken the MSU administration's hand in controlling campus affairs. Student government became more than a rubber stamp. The campus newspaper State News became independent of university control. Faculty members received protection from arbitrary actions.

But they were not able to effect their main goals. Their protests did not generate a quick end to the conflict. The anti-war movement could not be called decisive when American combat involvement lasted over eight years. Nor did the MSU anti-war groups force the university to sever ties with "the establishment." Throughout the war Michigan State sought and received money from the Defense Department, the Agency for International Development and large corporations. The Army and Air Force ROTC programs produced several hundred second lieutenants.

Why weren't the protesters more successful? They did have to combat a willingness of the American electorate to support the federal government in wartime. Also, the Johnson and Nixon administrations did gain short-term advantages by labeling protesters anti-patriotic. But both administrations had confusing, inarticulate policies on Vietnam. Theoretically, a rational, intelligent university community could have been able to effectively challenge the government and convince the voters. Possibly the protesters themselves were to blame.

Heitman observes that by the time of the Cambodian incursion, "Many people hated the peace movement and despised the war." There were several reasons for this. The counterculture attire and attitudes of many students alienated more traditional citizens. Male college students were often seen as legal draft dodgers. The zeal of anti-war advocates too often sounded like elitist arrogance, regardless of the sincerity or the background of the protesters. Their dramatic demonstrations were ultimately viewed as posturing rather than true concern over the war.