Enclosed the first four sections of my analyses of Vietnam - published first in the New Republic, Roche, India, where we were stationed for 4 years, written partly to find out what my opinions were - really started out to determine my views on the last few sections, yet un-written, although many score pages of notes in folders.

I learned much - recognize many shortcomings - but found out about my overall attitudes and tentative conclusions.

Pleased to have your reactions.

Cherry

Believe you will find the other's analyses interesting if you find the opportunity to examine.
AN ANALYSIS OF VIETNAM

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AN ANALYSIS OF VIETNAM

By Orion Ulrey
Department of Agricultural Economics
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In mid-1965 the writer was requested to prepare an analysis of the debates and reactions of citizens of the United States to the military and political struggles in Vietnam. He started to read numerous articles and books, to listen to the legion of television and radio discussions, to follow the regular comments of columnists and travelers, to record the arguments of the doves (directly to peace) and the hawks (peace through expanding war), and to analyze the possible reasons for American involvement in Vietnam. In the pursuit of facts, ideas, opinions and positions on Vietnam, the writer, because of his interest in rural societies and democratic institutions, became even more deeply concerned about the long-term alternatives for Vietnam, Southeast Asia and other disadvantaged areas which may be battlegrounds for ideological struggles and civil wars during the next few decades.

The accumulation of notes were shaped into possible outlines beginning in mid-1967, and the writing began. By this time the writer had concluded that the issues were very complex and that almost all of the individual reports on Vietnam were far from adequate; that there seemed to be shortages in understanding of the basic conditions in Vietnam, the global nature and historical setting of the conflict, the alternative methods of bringing change in Southeast Asia, the scope of participation in the conflicts, and of realistic long-term alternatives and solutions of the problems and for the forces involved.

The accumulated notes and ideas of the writer seemed to be classifiable into seven general topics: the global setting of the Vietnam conflict; a brief history of the current struggle; the allies and neutrals in the war in Southeast Asia; the conditions, forces and development in Vietnam; an evaluation of the conflicts to date; the great debate in America over Vietnam; and the possible alternatives and solutions of the conflicts.

Principal problems of speakers and writers on Vietnam include: estimating the accuracy of data, selection of materials, analyzing the various opinions, and perhaps the personal biases. The estimates especially need to be questioned. Although the various sections of the total paper of the writer have been remodeled a few times, the author is certain there are many shortcomings. He trusts that the total report presents a fairly accurate and balanced analysis of the struggles in Vietnam. He certainly is not a specialist or authority on Vietnam. But, who is!
I. THE GLOBAL SETTING OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICTS

The world has been changing very rapidly during the Twentieth Century, and especially since World War II. Education, science, technology, speed of communication, trade, and social action have been among the primary underlying factors encouraging the disadvantaged and traditional peoples to seek a larger amount of the material possibilities and to obtain a major voice in their own destiny. They have sought and obtained their political freedom from the European powers of yesterday, and have started tremendous programs to improve their lot through education, economic development, and new political systems.

The new forces include the two relatively young political powers, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.; the host of new countries which have recently acquired nationhood; the United Nations and its various affiliates, and nuclear energy and atomic power. The foreign domination and colonies of yesterday has been replaced by nationalism, and new nations, by membership in various regional and ideological structures as well as in the United Nations, and by two major political-economic-ideological systems which are competing for the friendship and collaboration of the new nations.

Several factors seem to have influenced the expansion of various types of assistance to the new nations: the development of plans and requests from the new governments; the expansion of concern among citizens of the more developed societies for people of ill health, who are poorly fed and housed, and with limited or no education; the realization that most is gained from trading with people who are productive; the recognition that the have-nots may cause violent disturbances if their lot is not improved; and the competition for supporters between the major forces in the Cold War.

The Cold War is the name given to the struggle between some of the largely
capitalistic and some of the largely socialistic powers for economic sources, for political influence among the new nations, and for spreading their ideology as a means of promoting peace and solving the tough problems of man. A variety of methods are being used to gain the objectives of the foreign policies of the powers, including various forms of aids to the have-not nations. Several of the latter are capitalizing on the competitive situation, and are obtaining assistance from both sides.

Role of the United States in World Affairs

The U.S. has played a leading role in international affairs since the thirties for several reasons: her size in terms of resources; her production and technical knowhow; the humanitarian motivation and concern of her citizens; her desire to create conditions for the evolution of peace by reducing the economic and cultural factors which cause violent disturbances and little wars; and the plans and programs of Russia and Communist China to expand their activities into the areas of disadvantaged people, and to take advantage of or to create local disturbances. Considerable amounts of the $126 billion of assistance to foreign nations provided by the U.S. since 1947 undoubtedly has been motivated by the desire of the majority in Congress to prevent the spread of Communism.

The expanded assistance programs were initiated following a talk at Harvard University by Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, on June 5, 1947 when he said, "our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, desperation and chaos." Around $13 billion of aid assisted Western Europe to get on its feet during 1947-52. The Commission for European Economic Cooperation, created in July, 1947, was open to the countries of Eastern Europe. Soviet pressure kept them from joining.

The Marshall Plan was extended to check the spread of Communism by civil war in Greece, and to strengthen Turkey; then to countries around the rim of Russia and Communist China, and finally to retarded countries of Asia, Africa and the Americas. Aid to the Western European countries was discontinued in the early fifties, and to 24 other countries during 1960-66 when they became able to handle
their own development through regular channels.

Three to four billion a year of foreign assistance have been provided by the U.S.-AID program since the mid-fifties. The trend has been to reduce military aid and to expand assistance for education and economic development. In recent years about 90 percent of the direct aid has gone to Laos, South Korea, Thailand and South Vietnam. Grants and loans to Vietnam have totaled about 1-1/2 million dollars a day as compared with one million daily to India.

Other U.S. government programs include: the U.S. Information Agency which has provided books and information about America; Food for Peace has provided food for many nations, and the funds have revolved within the countries to assist in development projects; the Peace Corps, which has provided motivated Americans to assist in various educational and economic projects; and the Central Intelligence Agency which was created to counteract the secret operations of the Communists in several of the developing countries.

In addition, the people of the U.S. have participated in several score private programs, such as: CARE, a cooperative to provide such items as food, heifers, equipment and books for needy persons abroad; Youth Exchange, to send American youth abroad and foreign youth to the U.S. to live with families; and People-to-People, to send adults abroad and bring adults to the U.S. A legion of local organizations and individual families have worked out cultural and personal relations projects with groups and families abroad.

The services of the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation are widespread in India where assistance has been given to a variety of projects such as: agriculture, community development, education and technical training.

The U.S.-AID programs have been used occasionally by the recipients to assist the cold-war enemy. For example, $905 million of food products under the Food for Peace project was supplied Egypt during 1953-66. The funds were left in the country for development. This permitted the United Arab Republic to export food to Communist countries such as Cuba, and to barter it's cotton for Soviet arms.
After World War II, as following World War I, the national defense budget of the U.S. was reduced in the belief that the United Nation's organizations would materially reduce the likelihood of wars. The invasion of South Korea by the armed forces of North Korea, in the early fifties, resulted in the involvement of the United Nations, since the U.S.S.R. was temporarily boycotting the Security Council. The U.S. supplied almost all of the U.N. armed forces to repel the North Koreans. Communist China sent "volunteers" to aid the latter and prevented a united country.

Russia developed the atomic bomb, expanded her navy and air force, kept troops in Eastern Europe, and expanded her efforts to promote her system in many of the developing nations. She was fearful, undoubtedly, of the military power of the U.S. and of a rejuvenated Germany; and wished to prevent another invasion from the West, which resulted in destruction of vast areas and in the death of around 27 million of her people during World War II.

Strong national defense budgets have received the support of the large majority of the U.S. Congress, as 45-55 billion dollars have been provided annually since the mid-fifties. Political and military alignments, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, were established to assist in checking the expansion of Russia and China. This was a part of the Cold War.

The U.S. military forces in many islands of the Pacific and in countries of East Asia totaled around 770,000 by mid-1967. Troops are also in Europe. Ships from her navy have been operating in the Mediterranean and in the waters of Southeast Asia.

The primary objectives of the national policies have been to maximize the security of the U.S. and the world by assisting in the rehabilitation of Western Europe and Japan, and in the economic and educational development of around 80 other countries; and by providing a national defense and military alignment system which would deter aggressors.
The citizens and government of the United States did not seek this global role. The U.N., which many believe should have an expanded role, has not been provided with resources and a system which would permit it to serve such global responsibilities. In fact, the various power groups have attempted frequently to use the U.N. for their various purposes.

The domestic critics of the national defense policies maintain that national security of the U.S. would be better achieved by using more funds for foreign assistance in educational and economic development. The realists point out that, without the fear of Communist expansion, the funds for development assistance would have been materially less; and that a policy of international relations is preferable to isolation at this stage in world history.

Role of Russia in World Affairs

The Soviets also desire security. They believe that an expansion of their system will not only best serve the disadvantaged people of the world, but also provide a safer world. They are opposed to the encirclement policy of the U.S. Their aims apparently are to reduce the power position of the U.S.; to destroy the regional political alignments of the U.S.; to employ tactics which will remove U.S. bases and troops in Europe and Southeast Asia; weaken the Western influence in the developing countries, and assist their political friends everywhere.

Analysts of the Soviet policies have concluded that they want economic progress at home, a Communist world without war, and victory rather than peace.

The Soviets use a variety of means to obtain their objectives: direct diplomacy and through the U.N., trade and development assistance, propaganda by radio and publications, the training of nationals for political leadership, and by attempts to divide the West on political and economic issues.

The Communist group of countries has provided about $2 billion of economic aid to the developing societies since 1954, of which the Soviets supplied around 70 percent. Their aid has been almost entirely based on low-rate loans and barter for commodities.
In recent years, Russia has placed major emphasis on expanding her influence in the Near East and North Africa. She has provided loans, sent missions, and supplied military equipment and training to Egypt, Algeria, Somaliland, Zambia, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, for example. The analysts point out that the Arabs have turned to Russia, not for ideology, but for economic aid, diplomatic support and military provisions. A national desire, for generations, has been to obtain a foothold in the Mediterranean—to break out of the Black Sea.

The 1967 summer war between the Arabs and Israelis perhaps has given Russia a chance to strengthen her position in the Mediterranean. She now has navy ships at Alexandria, Egypt. She has defended the position of the Arabs in the U.N. She has replaced most of the aircraft and armaments lost by Egypt during the war with Israel. Undoubtedly, she was disappointed that her guns and aircraft were not used more effectively by the Arabs.

Since 1955, the estimates are that Russia has provided around 2 billion dollars of military supplies to Egypt, as well as assistance in organizing and training the armed forces.

A few analysts of the Near East have concluded that Russia encouraged Egypt in her May-June build-up, apparently, to attack Israel and thus strengthen her opportunities in the area. Close political alignment with Egypt is basic to Russia for an expansion of her influence and control of the Eastern Mediterranean, and to provide a land bridge to Africa.

Another political analyst reports that primary fears and worries of the leaders of Russia include: expansion of the influence of America such as in Vietnam, the revenge seeking aspirations of West Germany, and the expansion and aggression of Israel in the Near East.

The U.S.S.R. supported the recent adventure of President Nasser of Egypt in Yemen, where he used 60,000 or so troops to support the leftist group for three years.
The U.S.S.R., as well as the West, have high stakes in the Near East and North Africa: in the oil fields which contain perhaps one half of the known reserves of the world; and in the system of economic and political development of the area. Close relations with the nations in the Near East would provide Russia direct access also to the Arab nations farther west and the African nations farther south. Restrictions could be applied which would handicap trade and relations with the West. However, the Near East and North Africa must sell their oil and gas, and largely to the West.

Russia also has used her embassies in several Latin American countries as propaganda centers for her system. She has assisted the Communist government of Cuba with military equipment, training of military personnel, and attempted to assist in building launching pads for missiles until checked by President Kennedy in the fall of 1962. She provides a market for most of Cuba's sugar. The estimates are that the adventure in Cuba is costing the Russians around a million dollars a day. In mid-1967, a sizable delegation of Vietcong were in Cuba transported in Soviet boats and planes.

The July-August 1967 meeting in Havana, Cuba, of revolutionaries from 27 hemisphere nations and territories was designed apparently to stimulate the Cuban brand of revolution—which may interfere with the Soviet's efforts to establish trade and diplomatic relations in Latin America. Cuba continues to train guerillas for revolutions in Latin America.

Many analysts question whether the Soviets believe in peaceful coexistence, as yet. Undoubtedly, there are doves and hawks in the U.S.S.R. The evidence to date indicated that she wishes bases for influence and power in Southeast Asia as well as in the Near East. An American policy is to contain her with the hope and expectation that she will be less revolutionary as her production and standards of living rise.

The U.S.S.R. is on the move. The American policy-makers believe that if the
U.S. does not assist a country or area, that the Russians will. She has not only expanded her fleet, and especially her submarine, but also her merchant marine, beginning in 1928. She adopted a 5-year plan in 1956 to build a new and modern merchant fleet, which could be readily converted to war purposes and also used as a naval auxiliary. In 1960, she adopted a 20-year plan to make her merchant marine superior to any other. In the mid-sixties she was using the navy yards of 10 nations to build this fleet. Her fishing vessels also are found in all profitable waters, and apparently are frequently used for spying purposes.

In comparison, the U.S. has a weak merchant marine. Seventy percent of her boats are obsolete. Limited construction is underway. Heavy subsidies are necessary to pay the high wages of American seamen in order to operate the U.S. ships.

Some analysts point out that the U.S.S.R. is changing. She has passed the violent stage of revolution. She is making loans and gifts to developing nations, such as India. Her citizens have had a taste of consumer goods and are demanding more. Military assistance abroad is not popular at home. The economy may be in the process of being decentralized. The satellites in Eastern European countries frequently do not follow the policies of the Soviets, and are developing types of mixed economies. However, the system tolerates only one party, and maintains control of news. Foreign investments are not permitted. Foreign and domestic trade are strictly controlled. The Communist policy is to protect and develop rather than to trade with outsiders. Russia has a closed society, and apparently intends to protect her citizens from ideas and associations with foreigners, even including the citizens of Eastern Europe. Moscow has refused to limit the arms race, to keep weapons out of space, and to cooperate in reducing tensions in the underdeveloped world and to end the war in Vietnam.

The analysts also believe that the Russians desperately want peace with the U.S. but on their terms. The Soviet leaders fear that the erratic and emotional behavior of the Chinese leadership may result in future conflict, and they fear the potential pressure and power of around 800 million Chinese on their Siberian border.
They disagree decidedly with the Chinese on the goals and especially on the methods of Communism.

**Role of Communist China in World Affairs**

China, controlled by the Communists since 1949, has attempted to spread her influence and brand of revolution in South and Southeast Asia, in Africa, and in Latin America. She has worked through her embassies, trade missions and news agencies. She has established a few pro-Peking Communist parties, as in India. The Chinese embassies apparently have served as centers of activities for three continents. She has been especially active in 1967 in Mali and Brazzaville Congo.

The minority groups of Chinese in Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have been used to develop organizations and to disseminate propaganda favorable to Peking. Trade and road building have been used to gain contacts and influence in Nepal.

The Chinese intelligence and methods have failed almost everywhere. Her delegations have been sent home by several African countries, as they have been short on strategy and effective diplomacy. Her brand of Communism has tended to build anti-Communists. She has fallen out with Russia over leadership and ideology of the Communist revolution. Apparently, Albania is her only real national friend in the world society.

The primary areas of concern of Communist China are naturally nearby Siberia and Southeast Asia for her system, trade, raw material, and for her surplus population.

The multitude of internal problems is temporarily retarding her foreign activities and expansion programs. Some say she is now a weak giant. The analysts expect her to play a more effective role around her borders during the years ahead, as she reduces the intensity of her domestic difficulties.
Role of Western Europe in World Affairs

Since World War II the countries of Western Europe have been undergoing a period of rapid economic growth, of cultural interrelations, and of political adjustments. The nations of the European Common Market are steadily moving towards closer economic relations and perhaps integration of their economies. The other nations are attempting to join the ECM to obtain the benefits from production and trade under the principle of comparative advantages, from pooling of technology and from quantity output for the mass market. In the process, trade and travel are reducing the cultural and perhaps political barriers.

Colonialism is an institution of the past except for some lingerings in Africa by Portugal and Spain. The Europeans recognize the advantages of trade and the high military and development costs of being an outside ruler.

The European nations, consequently, are concerned with an expansion of trade among themselves, and with Eastern Europe and Russia. They need the resources and markets of the developing nations. They realize they must live with Russia and her satellites, and consequently are concerned less about the Cold War than are the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

The governments and private groups in Western Europe are expanding educational and economic development assistance to the new nations and their traditional societies. They have almost entirely discarded their former roles of maintaining peace and order in the underdeveloped world.

The leaders are aware of the efforts of Soviet Russia and Communist China to expand their influence, trade and systems. They have concluded apparently, that time and maturity will change the objectives and methods of these new world powers; and that the local struggles and wars are a part of the times.
In this sophisticated age of weaponry the small nation is at a distinct disadvantage in influence through military might, pressure and action. The medium powers of Western Europe consequently, have moved to even greater use of strategy in diplomacy, and to expansion of trade and integration of economies to provide both security and a rising standard of living; and to depend partly at least upon the United States to assume the leading role to check Communist expansion.
The Troubled World Ahead

Many analysts of the times expect that the rapidly changing world will likely be filled with riots, insurrections and military struggles during the next century. The exploding populations, the rising expectations and frustrations, the quest for resources and markets, and the competition of the political-economic systems will encourage revolutions and warfare of various types. The national, tribal, personal and ideological differences will stimulate the struggles. The have-nots want more of the fruits which the haves enjoy. Injustices may be more difficult to ignore in the world of rapid communication of situations and ideas. Political freedom, however, has brought a host of new problems such as internal struggles, military coups and civil wars as in the Congo and Nigeria.

England has stated plans to withdraw her forces from all bases in Southeast Asia by the mid-seventies. She withdrew from Aden in November, 1967. She maintains that the economic burden is too costly and the political problems too difficult, even though her per capita income is at its highest level.

About two-thirds of her investments and trade are east of Suez. Apparently, she has decided that her best security and economic advantages will result from becoming a part of Europe. She expects to reduce her military force by one-fifth, or by 75,000.

What forces will replace and provide the stability provided by England, for example, for many decades?

Few expect the U.N. and its agencies to be given the resources and authority to deal with the expected conflicts in the developing world, which covers most of Latin America, Africa, the Near East, and South and Southeast Asia. A relatively high degree of order was maintained by the European nations during the nineteenth century. The first half of the twentieth brought two world wars, and scores of new nations created from traditional societies. Education, science and trade brought hope for change and progress.

Nuclear weapons may have materially reduced the possibilities of sizable
wars, and of benefits even to the victors; but have not been a factor in reducing local wars.

One analyst of the times has pointed out that the great powers can't make peace although they can make wars; that they can't put the world in order, although they can assist; and that they can't police the world or contain the anarchy of the small nations. He pointed out that the primary problem of the great powers is to find out how to coexist with each other and with the anarchistic small nations.

The new techniques for change include: subversion, riots and civil wars from within, along with development and military assistance from outside.

At no time in man's history has economic, educational and health assistance been provided on such an extensive scale—probably 25 to 35 billion dollars a year by the developed nations in terms of direct aid and investment loans. Yet, this is less than one percent of the annual gross product of the developed nations, and only one-fifth to one-fourth of the expenditures on military preparations.

The conflict in Vietnam and Southeast Asia is only one segment of the struggles which seem to be in prospect during the decades ahead.

How can the maximum degree of order and discipline be maintained in the world during the next century? The developed nations do not have the will or resources to provide adequate assistance to the retarded societies. An expansion of resources for development assistance, even up to 1 or 1-1/2 percent of their national outputs, would be helpful. But the new nations may not be prepared to effectively use such amounts of assistance immediately.

A reduction in military defense budgets and the sale of arms to the small nations would be helpful. But how prevent the two sides in the Cold War from assisting their friends, or potential friends, with military supplies and services? How prevent the manufacturers and merchants of weapons from selling to government officials and private groups in small nations, especially since national and individual status and power seems to be associated with the possession of weapons.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CURRENT CONFLICTS IN VIETNAM

The historians inform us that the people of Vietnam have suffered from local, area and regional military struggles during most of the past 2,000 years; that China ruled the area for about 1,000 years; that the people defended themselves from their neighbors for 600 years; and that civil wars have occurred, primarily between the North and South, for 400 years.

The results of such experiences has left a fear of the Chinese, an appetite for conspiracy, a suspicion of outsiders, and unusual efforts for self-preservation.

The French were able to maintain a high degree of internal peace and order during their many decades of rule. The civil war and the regional and international struggle now focused in Vietnam are somewhat different from any of the military involvements of the past.

Under the French Colonial rule of Indochina, little attention was given to the development of education, the economy and the people. Social reforms were not introduced. Few native civil servants were prepared for administrative posts. The traditional conflicts and tensions among the ethnic and language groups, the tribes, and among the economic groups remained during the French rule. The levels of production and standard of living were not materially improved.

The notes below outline a few of the significant events and steps in the current war in Vietnam, and explains why and how the United States became involved.

When the Japanese captured Southeast Asia during 1942-44, various reform, private power and nationalistic groups assisted the allies with the belief that they would obtain their freedom when the Japanese were defeated. Following the war, three countries were established: Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, primarily on the basis of historical areas and ethnic groups.
Struggle With the French. Ho Chi Minh, one of the most active leaders to defeat the Japanese, especially in the North, was recognized by the French as the primary leader of Vietnam. He went to France in early 1946 to work out terms of commonwealth relations. The French had sizable investments in trade and in rubber plantations, expected to re-establish much of their former economic position, and consequently planned on playing a major role in the Commonwealth of Vietnam: to be in general charge of the economy and foreign relations. Ho disagreed and decided to fight the French, and to use nationalism as a tool to unify and motivate the citizens in the struggle which lasted 8 years, 1946-54.

Military action began at Haiphong over who should serve as custom collectors, a primary source of revenue. The Vietminh developed plans and started action to communize the nation. The French searched for anti-Communist groups to assist them. The Catholics and various Buddhist and private-power groups were opposed to Communism.

During the early years of the struggle against the French, the leaders of the Communist Vietminh systematically liquidated hundreds of non-Communist nationalist leaders. Thus, the Communists captured the nationalistic and reform movements. The choice then was between the French and the Vietminh.

The United States, which was providing assistance to France to rebuild her economy after World War II, and thus resist internal Communism, opposed the French policy in Vietnam during 1946-49. The army of the Red Chinese won all of China by December, 1949. The post-war policies of Russia in Eastern Europe and the efforts of Communist parties in Western Europe resulted in steps being taken by leaders of the West to contain the expansion of the Soviets and of Communism. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization of 1949 was followed by comparable treaty arrangements in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

During the struggle against the French in Vietnam a division naturally developed between those who favored and those who were opposed to Communism among the Vietnamese.

The French requested aid from the United States to assist in defeating the Communists and in strengthening the anti-Communist groups in Vietnam. A few billion dollars of U.S. aid apparently were used by the French in the war which had developed. The French were defeated; partly by the guerrilla and military forces of the Vietnamese;
and partly by the desire and pressure of the French people to end the military, economic and physical costs of an uncertain struggle in a distant land.

**Geneva Agreements.** The leaders of nine concerned nations met in Geneva, and in July 1954 worked out a temporary arrangement which included: temporary division of the country at the 17th parallel; a shifting of population—anti-Communists to the South and Communists to the North; a plan of holding elections in 1956 under direction of an international commission to determine the wishes of citizens about the type of government desired; and no foreign troops or arms to enter Vietnam.

Analysts have pointed out that Ho was encouraged by both Russia and Red China to participate in the Geneva meeting since there was fear that the United States might send troops to Vietnam under the SEATO agreements. The terms seemed favorable to the Communists who were certain they could win the forthcoming elections and unify Vietnam under a Communist government.

Over one million Catholics and other anti-Communists moved to South Vietnam, but few Communists moved to the North. Elections were not held in either South or North Vietnam; Communists do not permit elections which involve opposition candidates or ideas. The government of the South, and also the United States, undoubtedly were fearful that the Communists would win at that time.

Also, if outside-supervised elections were not held in the North, why should they be held in the South—was a natural question of the Southern leaders who were opposed to Communism. However, neither of the governments in Vietnam had signed the Geneva Agreements; nor had the United States.
**Current Conflict Begins.** The Communist government of North Vietnam rapidly introduced land and other reforms, and liquidated the reactionary opposition. The struggle for power among the private armies in South Vietnam eventually resulted in Ngo Dinh Diem, a leading Catholic, achieving control of the central government in 1955 and becoming president without an election, as had Ho in the North.

South Vietnam requested and received U.S. aid, beginning in 1954, for training of the police and the military, and for educational and economic assistance. Michigan State University assisted in a program to train government officials, beginning in 1956. The contract was initiated because of the friendship of President Diem with a staff member, and was terminated in 1962 after two other staff members wrote articles criticizing the program of the Vietnam government.

The administration was centralized as Diem apparently lacked confidence in outsiders, lacked trained administrators, and lacked contact with and the confidence of the citizens. Reforms were slow and corruption was widespread, and bitter struggles continued among the various groups. After four years, the regime of Diem was overthrown in 1963, when Diem and other family members were killed.

The conflict between the Communists and others, which began as early as 1950, was at low pressure during 1954-56, since the Communists expected to win the 1956 elections. The Communists’ cells and arms remained in South Vietnam after the Geneva Agreement. The cells became secret societies, and membership recruitment was pushed. In 1957, the Communist shifted to illegal political activities, to terrorism, to killing of the opposition leaders, and to expanding their areas of control. The civil war was steadily expanded against the government of Diem, whose officers had but little understanding of the fundamentals of a people’s government.

In 1960, Ho Chi Minh made trips to Mainland China and to Russia to request help in extending military action against the government of South Vietnam.
parently received favorable answers, since military supplies soon started to move to Hanoi.

North Vietnam assisted in establishing the National Liberation Front (Vietcong) in 1961, the Peoples Revolutionary Party in early 1962, and central command of the Vietcong forces in 1962. Infiltration from the north was expanded during 1961-63; first by advisers and later various technical experts. Underground structures for supplies, headquarters and resting places were established in many sections of South Vietnam. The military phases of their operations were steadily expanded; railroads and highways, and life itself, became unsafe for government officials and their local leaders. By early 1964, the Communists were ready for the final drive to take over South Vietnam.

U.S. Provides Military Assistance. The South Vietnam government requested military assistance, instead of only advisers, in early 1964. The military efforts of the Vietcong, with the assistance of infiltrators from the north, was threatening all of South Vietnam. An attack was made on two U.S. destroyers in the Bay of Tonkin in early August, 1964 by small P-T boats of North Vietnam. The reactions in the U.S. resulted in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of August 7, which was approved by the U.S. Senate, 88 to 2. The Resolution gave the President authority "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack," and thus gave control over armed action in Southeast Asia to the President.

In early 1965, the Vietcong and North Vietnam decided to drive the U.S. out of South Vietnam as they had the French a decade earlier. They attacked the U.S. positions and American citizens. The American dependents were evacuated from South Vietnam in February, 1965.

Infiltration from the north of soldiers and supplies was increasing. U.S. bombing of military objectives in North Vietnam and of the supply routes to the South was initiated in February, 1965 by planes from outside of the country. The objectives were to reduce the flow of supplies and men from the North, to raise the moral of both civilians and the armed forces in the South, and to discourage the military plans of the Communists.
The Communists were winning in early 1965 and were about ready to cut South Vietnam into two parts. The government of the South was unstable. It had been infiltrated also at lower levels by the Vietcong. Defections from the army of the South were increasing. President Johnson made the decision in July, 1965 to commit sufficient troops and efforts to the area to prevent a victory by armed Communist aggression.

During 1965-67 the U.S. forces in Vietnam were increased to almost 500,000. Bombings of military targets in the North and of the supply routes to the South were intensified. The ground war was expanded, and the heavy concentrations of Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops were destroyed or dispersed. Modern equipment and devices were injected into the military struggles. South Vietnam and her allies had control of the air and water, but only uncertain control of about two-thirds of the land area.

Infiltration of the North Vietnamese military was stepped up, to maintain the ratio of about one to four—the normal advantage of the guerrillas in a forested and swampy country where the local citizens attempt to remain out of the struggles. Advisers, technicians and military equipment and supplies were increased from China, Russia and Eastern Europe during 1965-67.

Rural rehabilitation, which was started by experimental teams of Americans, was expanded by the government of South Vietnam. A few hundred volunteer workers from abroad were assisting in community development in late 1967. The army of South Vietnam was shifted more towards the assistance and protection of rural and urban areas, while the heavy fighting was carried on by Americans and the troops from Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Thailand.

The great debate on Vietnam was underway in America—on the objectives, methods, problems and criticisms of U.S. action in Southeast Asia. Three large groups evolved: the doves, who wished to reduce and end the participation of America; the hawks, who wished to expand military action and shorten the war; and the administration which adopted a policy of a limited war with limited objectives. The debate took place in Congress, in the colleges and universities, in the press, over the radio, and wherever Americans met.
The debate over America's role in Vietnam also spread to citizens of many countries of Europe and Asia, and to the United Nations. Over 30 nations assisted South Vietnam 1967 with military action, medical services, and educational and development services.

The Communist pressure in Southeast Asia was somewhat reduced, at least temporarily, by the overthrow of the Sukarno government in Indonesia in October, 1965. President Sukarno, the primary revolutionary leader creating the new nation after World War II, moved steadily towards many of the positions of the Communists. He was critical of the role of the United States in Vietnam, He withdrew from the United Nations and attempted to create a revolutionary U.N. He encouraged or permitted the build up of the Communist Party, which attempted to seize control of the government and army in October, 1965. The reactions of the army and of Muslim mobs resulting in the killing of 150,000 or so Communists, in the removal of forty members and friends from all government positions, in the removal of Sukarno from power, and in the re-establishment of working relations with the U.N. and the democratic-motivated nations.

Bombing of North Vietnam was lifted on five occasions during the 1965-67 period: Three times for holiday truces and twice with the hope that negotiations and de-escalation of the war might be encouraged. Envoys were sent by the U.S. to many countries to explain the position of America and to seek assistance to end the military struggle. Hanoi and her supporters were not ready to negotiate, since they had not been defeated and were being assisted by "peace" programs designed to win friends and to cause mounting opposition within the United States.

The American President participated in a conference in Manila in October, 1966, aimed at expanding military and service assistance from the nearby countries whose leaders wish to check the expansion of the Communists. The Asian Development Bank, with capital of one billion dollars was established by 19 nations in October, 1966. The U.S. and Japan each provided $200 million of the capital.
Premier A. N. Kosygin of Russia attended the United Nations sessions in June, 1967 to defend the Arabs in the struggle with Israel in the Near East. The Glassboro summit meetings—two sessions with President Johnson at a small college in New Jersey—raised hopes temporarily that peace would be furthered in both Asia and the Near East. The elections of a president, a vice-president and a senate of 60 in South Vietnam in early September, 1967, and of 147 national representatives in October, 1947, provide evidence of the evolution of a peoples' government.

Why the U.S. Became Involved in Vietnam

Perhaps there are four factors which may explain the participation of the United States in the Vietnam war: the experiences in international affairs after World War I and World War II; the desire to contain Communism, and especially the violent revolutionary aspects; the related desire of maximizing the security of America and the economic-political system of the western countries; and the factor of chance—of being present and of making commitments when certain events occurred.

The United States participated in World War I partly for idealistic reasons: to save the promote democratic rather than autocratic regional governments; and to obtain a military victory in order to end all wars. The first world political organization, The League of Nations, was established although the U.S. did not participate until the early thirties. The armies and navies of the world powers were materially reduced. Japan, which took over various Pacific Islands held by the Germans began a military expansion program. The balkanization of Europe by the Versailles Treaty of Peace broke up the normal trading relations of Europe. The loss of her colonies, the reparation payments and a declining world price level were factors creating a frustrated Germany. Hitler and his desire for military expansion were natural results of such conditions. World War II resulted and the U.S. actively participated after the Japanese attacked the military base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on December 7, 1941.

The U.S. was an active leader in creating the United Nations and it's affiliated organizations with the hope that peace and development would be materially furthered. Russia took control of Eastern Europe and incorporated the Baltic States and parts of Finland, Poland and Roumania into Russia. The Soviets expanded her programs of furthering
revolutionary change where she had the diplomatic or clandestine opportunity.

The political leaders of the United States decided that aggressive expansion must be stopped as it was not before World War I and World War II; and that a multitude of limited struggles might be necessary in order to prevent the aggression which could result in World War III. The U.S. had become a world power because of her economic productivity, military might, and desire to build a world of peace and development. Diplomatic, economic and military steps were taken to assist in preventing the spread of aggressive Communism in Iran, Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, Korea, the Congo, Dominican Republic, Vietnam and elsewhere. Consequently, it is logical that the U.S. has become the most hated by the Soviets, the Red Chinese, and by the Castro group in Cuba.

The end and aftermath of World War II found the U.S. as a military power in the Pacific, and with responsibilities especially in Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was created primarily to bring joint action to check the spread of aggressive Communism in the area.

The United States was requested by the government of South Vietnam for military advisers, and for educational and economic assistance, beginning in 1954. The requests for aid and the resulting services provided the foundations for military aid when requests were made in 1964.

In 1954, the government of Eisenhower pledged to meet any threat to sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Vietnam. President Eisenhower repeated the pledge in 1960, as did President Kennedy in 1961, and President Johnson in 1965. The Presidents and their advisers have believed that such pledges must be honored.

The nuclear weapons are a deterrent only for major wars, and did not deter the aggression of North Vietnam or of North Korea. Consequently, the U.S. has engaged in a limited conventional war in order to prevent expansion by aggression in Vietnam, to strengthen the resistance and reduce the fear of Communist expansion in other nearby countries, and to fulfill it's diplomatic, military and moral commitments.
III. THE ALLIES AND NEUTRALS IN THE WAR IN VIETNAM

The international conflict and civil war in Vietnam represent the central focus of what many are now calling the Southeast Asia War. The air and ground fighting, reaching much of the Peninsula, directly involves five nations of the area: Thailand, Laos and Cambodia as well as North and South Vietnam. Troops and supplies from at least eight outside nations are being used in the military struggle. The Communists also are a factor in local rebellions in Burma, Malaysia and the Philippines.

The rest of the world has been relatively neutral, although intensely concerned about the scope and impact of the conflict. There are several reasons for the positions taken by the various nations which include: their own security, the economic and political beliefs of their leaders, the resources which could be made available to assist one side, and the internal problems of the nations.

A brief analysis is presented of the situation or position taken by several nations which have been involved or remained relatively neutral in the conflict.

The Allies

The Communist world has supported the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese with military weapons, food and other supplies, technicians and training, a labor force, and with diplomatic action in the United Nations. The nearby nations which have assisted South Vietnam with troops and other military and technical assistance include: South Korea with 56,600 troops, Australia 6,000, Thailand 2,500, the Philippines 2,100, and New Zealand with 400 troops—in late 1967. In addition, around 30 other nations have supplied medical and technical assistance in South Vietnam.

The Neutrals

Other nearby nations—Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistan—have been relatively neutral for various reasons, which include: with the exception of Japan, they have tough domestic problems
of developing their traditional societies, they want the war ended or contained so that their energies and more outside assistance can be used for educational and economic development. However, India and Pakistan have heavy defense spendings, considering their needs for domestic development. The Japanese realize that they must live near and trade with China. Japan is operating under a policy of utilizing around one percent of her national income for assistance to developing countries, primarily in Southeast and South Asia.

Communist China is in the intense revolutionary stage of her brand of Communism. She has a legion of internal problems, including an exploding population, low levels of technology, a limited technical and professional force, centralized methods which retard progress, internal struggles for power, and conflicts over ideology and methods of operations.

She lives in almost complete isolation, and her people are being propagandaized with a host of biases about the conditions and happenings outside her borders. Her leaders apparently believe that she needs outside enemies to assist in bringing internal solidarity. Her primary enemies are the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

China has both ideological and economic interests in Southeast Asia. She wishes to expand her brand of Communism into the area, and to obtain access to the foods and minerals—rice, oil, timber, tin, natural rubber—for her people and industries.

She has given considerable assistance to Hanoi. Apparently she had supplied a few technicians, around 70,000 in labor units by mid-1967, but no regular foot-soldiers. The Vietnamese, remembering the past, apparently are fearful of direct assistance by Chinese manpower. The analysts believe that North Vietnam will request direct Chinese assistance only if under pressure of defeat, such as by invasion from the South or from the sea.

The possibilities of direct assistance by the Chinese is one of the concerns of many Americans who remember the legion of "volunteers" who came into North
Korea during the early fifties when the North Koreans were losing the military struggle.

Reports are that around 3,000 volunteers are arriving each month in North Vietnam and that the buildup started in October, 1966, in spite of the growing political turmoil in China. Such reinforcements include artillery and mortar specialists in addition to rail and road transportation units.

Soviet Russia has a policy of providing all-out support of North Vietnam for several reasons. She encourages and supports the "wars of liberation" on all continents as a part of her international policy. She wishes to remove or materially reduce the influence of the U.S. in Asia as well as in Europe and elsewhere. Some analysts believe that she desires that the costly war in Vietnam be continued, partly to reduce the U.S. resources available for other areas and purposes. The Soviets appear to desire to block any peace efforts, directly or in the United Nations, until the U.S. withdraws her military forces which step would guarantee a Communist victory.

Russia has supplied a variety of items including fighter planes, munitions, artillery and small arms, anti-aircraft missiles and launching equipment, rice, coal, oil products, machine tools, chemicals and a hydro-electric plant. She has supplied experts and has trained North Vietnamese in the U.S.S.R. She has maintained ships at Haiphong partly to discourage the U.S. from bombing the harbor. The cost to Russia of her assistance has been estimated at around one billion dollars a year.

The supplies from Russia must move great distances: 7,500 miles by sea from Europe to Haiphong, or by rail across Siberia and China. Peking has been accused of slowing down the rail movements, and of examining shipments and removing superior items.

Russia is in competition with China in North Vietnam as elsewhere, and may be stimulated to give extra attention to Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese are probably less fearful of Moscow than of the nearby Chinese who have given them troubles
in the past.

Russia apparently does not want either the Chinese or Americans to be significant winners in Southeast Asia.

Moscow also has sponsored, financed and directed two organizations which have been active in opposing U. S. military efforts in Vietnam. The World Congress for Peace, and the International Institute for Peace have promoted peace conferences, anti-war demonstrations, attacks on U. S. embassies and personnel, and destruction of U. S. Information Agency libraries. The organizations receive instructions from the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, according to the intelligence services of West European Nations. The objectives are to develop unfavorable attitudes towards U. S. foreign policies, to exploit non-Communists and thus give the impression of a broad popular front against the U. S. in Vietnam. In late 1967, around 50 U. S. citizens received briefings at sessions in Vienna for organizing massive anti-Vietnam war protest movements in major cities, and for formation of peace organizations.
Laos. Since the early fifties most of the North, Northeast and the East sections of Laos have come under the control of the Communist-led Pathet Lao. This constitutes about 2/3 of the area and 1/5 of the population of the nation. This political group has cooperated with the Vietcong and the North in building and servicing the Ho Chi Minh Trail used to bring soldiers and supplies from Hanoi into the South. Eastern Laos has served also as a sanctuary for hard pressed Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops to escape from South Vietnam. Northern Laos is also associated with the infiltration and subversion in Northeastern Thailand.

Laos has had its own civil war since the late forties. The country is composed not only of many tribes but also of groups of right-wing, leftist and neutralist political leaders. Sporadic fighting has occurred, especially in the central area around the royal capital at Luang Probang. The war has been intensified in 1967. An estimated 42,000 North Vietnamese troops and 11,000 Chinese Communist troops are in Laos to support the 24,000 pro-Communist Pathet Lao forces. Opposing them in the struggle to control the country and the supply routes from North to South Vietnam are 60,000 loyal Laotian troops, 10,000 pro-government neutralists, 1,000 from Thailand, and 1,000 U.S. special forces.

Laos still has a barter economy. The capital city does not have a commercial bank. There are no railroads, and only one year-around road. Only a few small factories have been started. She imports rice and the national income has been estimated at around $50 per capita.

Under the Geneva Agreements of 1962, the government of Laos was supposed to be neutral and to include persons from the three major political groups. However, the Pathet Lao forces have continued to try to expand their territory. The premier asked the U.S. for military assistance in 1963 to resist the Communists. The
royal army has received military supplies and airplane support from the U.S. and Thailand.

The Central Intelligence Agency of the U.S. has been active in Laos: in developing 3-man teams to watch the supply trails from Hanoi and to report movements for bombing; in financing and building air fields; and in the training and equipping of 10,000 or so Meo tribesmen in Northern Laos to harass and destroy the Communists.

Laos is a part of the total war in Southern Asia. The Communists expect, in time, to take over the entire country. The U.S. policy is to assist in keeping Laos out of the hands of the Communist groups. The U.S. supplied $415 million of economic, educational and military assistance during the 1949-65 period.

Cambodia, another of the new countries created by the breakup of Indo-China in 1954, has attempted to remain neutral from the internal conflicts in the neighboring countries. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who makes all international policy decisions, has been determined to keep his country out of the nearby conflicts and consequently has followed the non-alignment policy emphasized by Nehru of India.

Cambodia has border problems with both Thailand and South Vietnam, since 3 to 4 million Khmers reside in these nations.

The Prince recognized China soon after the revolutionaries gained control in 1949 as he expected that she would soon have control of Southeast Asia. When violent insurgency broke out in both Laos and South Vietnam in 1959, he became pessimistic about the effectiveness of American assistance, as he believed that the Vietcong would win. He swung toward the left and nationalized the banks and foreign trade; and maintained closer relations with Russia and Red China than with the West. He accepted aid from both China and the U.S. until the early sixties, and then decided to refuse aid from both. American aid was stopped in November, 1963, and the American mission of 750 officials and families left by early January, 1964.
The Vietcong have used the border areas of Cambodia as a sanctuary from the pursuing American and South Vietnamese troops. The lower end of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, on which troops and supplies are brought from Hanoi, also reaches into Cambodia. The American bombing of escaping Vietcong on the trails, in the jungles and in the villages of Cambodia has resulted in denouncement by the Prince.

Diplomatic relations with the U.S. was discontinued in May, 1965, on the issue of border aggression by the U.S. Apparently the U.S. has preferred to have a neutral or unfriendly Cambodia recently, since a friendly Cambodia would encourage an extension of Communist action in that weak country.

The expansion of subversion and rebellion in Cambodia by the Communists in early 1967, however, caused the Prince to again shift his position. He denounced China for trying to overthrow his government, fired a pro-Chinese cabinet member, and closed the Khmer-Chinese Society in September.

He has stated that he will use force and will not request foreign help. His army is undoubtedly the weakest in the area. Analysts predict that the Communists would quickly take over Cambodia if they should win in South Vietnam.

The intelligence service reports many supply and rest camps for the Communist forces along the 500 mile border with South Vietnam, and especially North of the Mekong Delta. Such areas are not intensively patrolled by Cambodian troops. The Prince apparently wants to remain ignorant of such conditions. Cambodia has served as a supply route from Hanoi through Laos, and also from the sea on the south. The intelligence service also reports that supplies for the Communists are brought up the Mekong River to Phonon Penh or landed at the enlarged sea harbor at Sihanoukville. The goods are received by Chinese merchants for the Communists. Army trucks and private sampans are used to transport military supplies and rice to the Vietcong.
Prince Sihanouk is facing a dilemma at the end of 1967. The Communists are using the eastern edge of Cambodia as a place to escape from the pursuing enemy, to assemble supplies and armed forces, and to conduct military operations into Vietnam. He wishes to eliminate all foreign troops and all military action in Cambodia. He doesn't have the troops to drive out the Communist forces. He does not openly condemn the action of the Communists for fear of encouraging guerrilla action in Cambodia. He has requested that the International Control Commission, created by the Geneva Conference in 1954, inspect and report on foreign troops in his country. The Polish delegate has declined the request. The Prince apparently believes that the Communists have the best chance of winning over the long period, so does not wish to openly attack them.

The South Vietnam Army and allies also face a dilemma. The war cannot be successfully prosecuted against the VietCong unless their military and rest centers in Cambodia are attacked with planes and troops. Washington, especially would be accused of aggression if American troops were operating in Cambodia as do the Communists.

Thailand. Communist activities have been developed in two sections of Thailand: the Southern Peninsula and the Northeast. Both sections are undeveloped, the people very poor, and little attention has been given by the central government to the areas until recent years.
The Communist terrorists, who were driven out of Malaysia around 1954, established a semi-rule over much of the four mountain provinces of the Peninsula. They acted under the banner of the Malaysian Liberation Front, and so were favorably received by the Malay population of the area, who have not been well treated by the Buddhist Thai civil service. The Communists have engaged in political assassinations, collected forced taxes from the rubber planters, cultivated their small gardens and provided some assistance to the villagers. The central government has initiated special operation centers and mobile development units in an attempt to win the support of the population, with some success. However, the differences in language (Malay dialect) and religion (Moslem) is making the task of the Thai-speaking Buddhist officials difficult.

Northeast Thailand, with about 1/3 of the 30 million people, is very poor and underdeveloped. The tribes have had traditional hatred of and conflicts with the Thai rulers. Peking and Hanoi have sent agents into this area as has the Pathet Lao of Laos. Communist-motivated Vietnamese have settled in the Northeast. Apparently, the Communist leaders expect to expand into this area. Captured documents have shown a link between the terrorists of the Peninsula and the Northeast.

The Communists apparently are increasing their efforts in the Northeast, with over 100 assassinations of local officials during the past year, and with a decided increase in recruitments by the guerrillas. The terrorists apparently are steadily expanding their programs of terror and organized attacks.

In recent years the Thai government has pushed the development of the area with the assistance of the U.S. Mobile Development Units have been operating in the area. Feeder roads have been built. Primary schools have been expanded. Local government has been furthered. The Bangkok government has allocated a high proportion of it's national budget to such programs as Accelerated Rural Development and the training of local Volunteer Defense Corps. The rehabilitation program is moving slowly. Several reasons are given: centralization of final decisions in Bangkok, the inexperience and inefficiency of the rural development force, corruption of officials and the fear of the military of strengthening the national
police for anti-guerrilla operations.

The U.S. provided $408 million of economic assistance and $65 million of other aid to Thailand during 1949-66. The outright grants totaled $386 million and the remainder were loans. The Thai government also requested military assistance against the Communist insurrection in the Northeast. Considerable aid of a military nature has been provided: highways to the Northeast, beach landings, a new deep water port at Ban Sattahip, military bases, training of officers and munitions. About one billion dollars have been invested in the port, airfields, and other facilities around Sattahip. Some consider the area a military substitute for Singapore.

Around 37,000 U.S. personnel were in Thailand in mid-1967 to assist in the military and economic programs.

Thailand has been developed into a strategic base for checking the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia. Almost all of the 32 million people are Thais and are relatively loyal to the government. The nation has a surplus of food and exports around 1.5 million tons of rice annually. The country is well-located to assist in the struggle, and consequently, airbases are used by a large proportion of the planes attaching North Vietnam.

The Thai leaders have been deeply concerned about the threat of Communism since 1948.

Malaysia. The leaders have expressed their support of the U.S. in Vietnam. A 12-year internal war, 1948-60, was required to overcome the Communist guerrillas in Malaysia, with the assistance of the British. The Communists have remained a military burden on the border with Thailand and in the jungles of Sarawak. The government of Malaysia has assisted South Vietnam with military equipment and the training of officers.

A high official reported his conclusions that the Communist revolution in Malaysia was not nationalistic, but a part of an international conspiracy; the overthrow of the Communists in Indonesia was due to the presences of the U.S. in Vietnam; the Communists will not come to the conference table unless by so doing they can take over; they do not live up to agreements as shown by a multitude of
cases; the Communist revolution in South Vietnam will end, not by negotiation, but by the members and activities declining as more citizens gain confidence in the government; and that the results in Vietnam are of deep concern to 200 million persons in Southeast Asia.

Burma. The military and socialist dictatorship government of General Ne Win was friendly with Mainland China until late 1967. Burma was the first non-Communist nation to recognize the Peking regime. The Chinese agreed to provide a limited assistance program, such as a paper mill, sugar mill, textile mill, plywood factory and bridges. A mutual treaty of friendship was signed, and an agreement was reached on long-disputed areas along the 1,200 mile border.

Burma has had a sad experience with Chinese assistance, which was launched in 1961. Nothing happened for three years. The first projects were bridges to China, and possible military routes to Northern Thailand. The goods sent from China were of poor quality; seconds and rejects. Political activities were a major part of each project.

The Chinese used their opportunities to encourage Communism in Burma: to stir up the dissatisfied tribesmen in the Kachin and Shah border states of the Northeast and to form local organizations to carry on propaganda programs.

The government decided in 1967 that Peking was attempting to ferment a people's war. Rioting broke out in Rangoon in June, 1967, against the excesses of the Chinese. The Chinese foreign aid was cancelled, the Chinese press and news agency were closed, Peking sympathizers and 412 technicians and officials were sent home. Peking expressed outright support of the pro-Mao Communists' activities in Burma. The guerrilla activities, such as the bombing of trains and bridges, and the killing of government officials, were materially increased.

The Burmese government, which had cancelled U.S. aid in the late fifties, requested assistance again for fighting and overcoming the Communist guerrillas. Tons of U.S. arms were flown to Rangoon from nearby Thailand. The Premier, General Ne Win, made a trip to Washington for renewing mutual relations in late 1967. The Russians also diverted arms for North Vietnam, to Burma, in November, 1967.

Singapore. The government has expressed support of the position of the U.S. in Vietnam. Lee Kuan Yew, the Mayor, expressed the belief that the pressure of the Americans had developed the will to resist the Communists in Southeast Asia; and that if the Communists won in South Vietnam, the guerrilla and military struggle would be
extended to Singapore and to all of Southeast Asia.

India. The Conference of nine nations which met at Geneva in 1954 to work out an agreement on Vietnam selected representatives from three nations, India, Canada and Poland for the International Control Commission to partition temporarily the two segments at the 17th parallel, and to supervise the elections in 1956 for determining the wishes of citizens about their government. India has maintained diplomatic relations with both Hanoi and Saigon.

The position of India on Vietnam has been based on her policy of non-alignment in the Cold War, and her desire to prevent the spread of the conflict. Her government has emphasized international policies such as: national self-determination, negotiated settlements, and non-intervention by outsiders. In early 1966, her official views on Vietnam were expressed as follows: 1) A military solution was not possible; 2) A political solution should be based on the 1954 Geneva Agreement; 3) The U.S. should stop bombing of North Vietnam; 4) The U.S. should withdraw from Vietnam after cessation of hostilities, and; 5) Reunification should take place in time.

Political analysts have concluded that there seems to be decided differences in attitudes expressed and policies of the administration, and the views of the big majority of Indians who know about Vietnam. The newspapers seem to be more in favor of the American position than is the government, with a few exceptions.

Indians may have had their views towards China changed by a number of events: the expansion into Tibet and into areas claimed by India in the fifties, the attack of the Chinese in the Northeast in 1962, the attacks in 1967 on the border of Sikkim, the destructive revolutionary activities of the Communist rebels in Thailand and Malaysia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, and the activities of the pro-Peking Communist Party in India. The India press reports that the Communists were active in peasant revolt of landless labor at Maxalbari, and supported the Kisan Sabra organization in 1967, which resulted in the arrest of a few thousand. India is familiar with guerrilla warfare in the Northeast where Peking Communists also have become active among the Nagas and Mizos tribesmen.
India is in competition also with the Chinese in Nepal. China built the Kathmandu-Tibet road; provided assistance for building power-generating plants, factories and warehouses near the northern border; and has carried on anti-West and anti-Indian programs through travelling theatres, radio broadcasts and publicity materials.

India has had an economic and educational assistance program in Nepal since 1952, which includes: an Indian-Nepal highway, an east-west highway underway, and dams and canals for irrigation. Private capital has started six industries in Nepal.

The U.S. also has been active in Nepal in strengthening the country, and consequently, the position of India and the West, by providing around $12 million annually for educational and economic development.

Many Indians apparently now believe that the domino theory of Communist expansion may apply in their section of Asia. An Indian statesman, Dr. C. Rajagopachari, in June, 1965, expressed the view "that if America withdraws and leaves Southeast Asia to itself, Communist China will advance and seize the continent." Another leader stated in 1967, "that India must support the U.S. in Vietnam—that America was checking the Communists until India could build up her economy."

European nations

The governments of Europe have taken various positions on the Vietnam conflict. The Eastern European countries have provided limited arms and supplies for Hanoi. France has suggested that the Americans stop all bombing and withdraw her military forces. In England, the conservatives have generally supported the American position while labor has been divided. The administration has supported the U.S. with resolutions, but not with troops and supplies. The Vietnam war appears to be unpopular, although the British assisted Malaysia in fighting the Communist guerrillas for 12 years.

The newspapers frequently express the sentiment that there should be an honorable settlement, but not an immediate withdrawal of American forces.
Minor segments of the citizens of several countries have sponsored peace rallies which were critical of the American position. Some fear the escalation of the conflict into a World War III. The European people have been enjoying a recent rapid rise in their standard of living. They remember the effects of previous wars and do not wish to become involved. The citizens of several of the European nations have wished to trade with Saigon. The U.S. has attempted to reduce such trade through diplomatic pressures.

One European political analyst stated that the U.S. has given of her blood and resources to assist in Europe during two World wars, in Korea and now in Vietnam; that those accusing the U.S. of imperialism might now be under Hitler or in a concentration camp; that the Marshall plan assisted in rehabilitating Western Europe; and that those who accuse the U.S. of materialism forget that she has supplied around three-fourths of the international cost of aid to refugees created by the wars during the past quarter of a century.

The leaders of Western Europe apparently have given up one of their former missions in the underdeveloped world: of maintaining discipline and order as did England, for example, during many decades in much of Asia and Africa. The new historic mission is to assist in development. The new view is to permit each people to find their own way, even though many local conflicts may result.
IV THE CONDITIONS, FORCES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM

A thorough and balanced examination of the military and political struggles in South Vietnam probably should cover the basic conditions in the country, the types of conflicts, the forces involved and their objectives, the developments and reforms underway, and an evaluation of the military, political and economic positions at the end of 1967. Such objectives are attempted in the following two sections of the total report.

The Conditions in Vietnam

The writer suspects that Vietnam is one of the most difficult areas in which to obtain relatively rapid economic and social progress; and that either a strong central force or maximum attention to democratic processes are necessary to speed up development of the people and the land resources. The primary problems of Vietnam might be classified under those of a traditional nature, and those intensified by the civil and international wars.

The traditional problems include: around 90 percent illiteracy, concentration of property ownership and control in the hands of a few, corruption of government officials and private business, economic exploitation of the mass of workers and villagers, ill treatment of citizens by the rulers, several races and languages, conflicts within and among the religions, poor nutrition and health, shortages of trained and concerned technical and administrative personnel, low level of technology, lack of social organizations and local governments to serve citizens, and very limited transportation and communication facilities.

The monsoons and the jungles have intensified the problems of disease, poor health and transportation. The tribals of the highlands have been maltreated by the Vietnamese lowlanders through the centuries. The results of such traditional conditions have been low productivity, income and standard of living; high infant mortality, high incidence
of disease and parasites, and a short life; constant misery of a sizeable portion of the people; and a pattern of corruption, lawlessness, thievery, gangs and violence of at least a minority.

The additional problems created by the wars and political changes of the past 25 years include: destruction caused by the struggles against the Japanese and French, and the civil and international wars since 1942; the collapse of the limited local governments and municipal services; and the expansion of corruption, speculation and black market operations; inflation and depression of a thin economy; the struggles for personal power and survival; the refugees from the North and from the Vietcong controlled areas; the uncertainty of life in the villages and cities, and on the roads due to the operations of the Vietcong; the decline in production of rice and other foods; the congested life in cities such as Saigon; and Vietnam has become a battleground between two ideologies or methods of change.

Western people, with a background of a few centuries of educational, technical and political progress, may have forgotten their slow evolution to their present institutions and understandings. If left alone such areas as Vietnam might require decades to double or treble their per capita productivity because of population pressures, power of the vested interests, and the retarding influence of their cultural traditions. The Vietcong, as well as other internal forces, seem determined that change shall be brought about immediately, and if necessary to employ a violent revolution to overthrow the vested controls.

Types of Conflicts

The analysts have provided several classifications of the wars and conflicts in the total struggle in and about Vietnam. One classification includes the following conflicts: a civil war between the Government of South Vietnam and the Vietcong for control of the people, resources and government; a war between the Communist and the anti-Communist forces in the area, supported by their allies; a struggle between those who wish rapid revolutionary change and those who prefer slower evolutionary
reforms which gives a temporary advantage to the vested interests and the corrupt practitioners; and the international struggle between the Communist and anti-Communist world to obtain the support of world opinion and to influence the potential followers in many countries.

Another classification, which may be more usable in describing the situation in Vietnam includes four types of conflicts: conventional battles, clandestine aggression, economic and political.

The Conventional War which uses modern military equipment is rather different from most recent wars. There is no front line, except perhaps at and near the 17th parallel. Fighting occurs wherever the enemy is found. The U.S. has provided much of the battle force in recent months for the South against the Vietcong and the North. The U.S. uses tanks, helicopters, bombers, trucks and modern arms in the conflicts in the South; bomber and fighter planes in attacks on military objectives in the North; and a fleet and airplanes in the coastal waters. Troops, supplies and the wounded are moved by air.

The Vietcong and the North move both supplies and soldiers partly by truck but largely by foot and bicycle, except along the coast and in the Mekong Delta where boats are used. Their forces are very mobile and depend upon surprise attacks; and their mortars are located at a distance and are well hidden from their enemy. North Vietnam uses modern anti-aircraft guns and missiles and a few fighter MIGS to repel the bombing attacks. Military supplies from the North are transported on the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and Cambodia into South Vietnam; and by sea to the Mekong Delta and through Cambodia.

Many hundred sorties of U.S. planes have bombed military targets of the North which includes supplies, bridges and roads, and more recently power dams and factories; and the military trails to the South. The estimates are that one-half million North Vietnamese are required to maintain transportation and supply routes in useable condition because of destruction of the bombers.
The aims of the conventional war are to destroy the enemy, his resources, and his desire to carry on; to destroy his strategic bases, his headquarters, his troop concentrations, and his supplies; and to reduce his area of control, his mobility, his motivation and to make his movements unsafe.

The conventional war in South Vietnam has been materially affected by the climatic and geographical features. The heavy monsoons beginning in October restrict bombing and movement of troops and supplies; and shifts the advantages to the small mobile forces which use but limited equipment and vehicles. Jungles and low mountains, which cover two-thirds of the land, provide abundant places for an enemy to hide, and permit undetected movements. The railroads and modern roads are few, and unsafe in much of South Vietnam because of the operations of the Vietnong.

The steps in the military action of the U.S. in Vietnam since 1956 have been: advisers until 1965; a few fighting units in the South in mid-1965, and bombing of the North; a step-up in military forces and bombing in early 1966; and a concentration of military forces in a few areas in late 1966, and especially in the northern provinces where the North Vietnamese were concentrating.

The steps in the military action of the Vietcong and the North have been: hit and run action until 1964; larger military units and battles with government forces during 1964-65; and dispersion of forces, and hit and run tactics since late 1965 after the start of the build-up of American troops.

The military and political objectives of the Communist forces since the American troops arrived seem to be: if necessary for victory, to fight a protracted war of 5, 10 or 20 years, and to press local attacks and destroy the maximum number of U.S. and South Vietnam forces; to negotiate only from strength, to encourage the belief that negotiations would be possible if America would eliminate certain military activities; and to use small mobile units so that the expected limited reinforcement of U.S. troops would not be adequate for a military victory.

Some of the results expected by the Communists probably include: the cur-
etailment of U.S. service activities in other countries, which would in turn encourage local "liberation" movements; the slowing up of U.S. domestic programs which would in turn bring criticisms of the government policy in Vietnam; and to expect conflicts over the war between the military and civilians in Vietnam, and between Saigon and the U.S. The writer doubts whether the 1968 elections in the U.S. will materially change these objectives and expectations of the Communists.

The hit and run tactics of the Vietcong have forced the U.S. forces to adopt a policy of search and destroy, which has probably resulted in more searching than destruction. The mobile forces can hit and run, rest and assemble more equipment and supplies before the next attack, perhaps in a different area.

The Clandestine Aggression of the Vietcong has been very effective and difficult to overcome since 1961. Earlier, they operated extensively as a service and propaganda organization, and were able to capitalize on the poverty conditions and unfair treatment of villagers by landlords and government officials. As the government forces became stronger, the Vietcong changed their methods to the murder of officials, terrorizing of villagers, impression of youth, and to forced taxation. In the rural areas they come together at night, attack the government and American troops, and they have used the bomb extensively.

Considerable time and effort are required to find and destroy the Vietcong. Few villagers will inform on them partly for fear of death. The regular Vietnam Army has been given the task of overcoming the guerrilla Vietcong; by retaining so as to win the confidence of the villagers, by making safe both life and property, by providing security of the pacification and development teams, and by destruction of the hardcore Vietcong in the villages.
The economic struggle is also a tough one. The war has reduced the food supply and increased starvation, has encouraged violent inflation, has stimulated corruption, and has stagnated the economy. Taxes have been difficult to collect from business and private citizens. Estimates are that around one-half of the legal taxes are avoided. Such conditions are favorable to the operations of the Communists. Peace is essential for economic growth and progress, for the building of new plants and factories, for the extension of services to civilians by the government and private agencies, and for movement towards unity in the total society.

The political struggle between the Communists and anti-Communists for the support of the citizens—lowlanders, tribes, villagers, youth, laborers—may be the most pertinent factor in determining the final power-force and political-economic system in Vietnam and S.E. Asia. The Communists, an organized and centrally-controlled group, have a distinct advantage in an atomistic waring society.

The forces of representative government, and of freedom and democracy have a tremendous challenge of developing a people's chosen government, an unfolding educational system, and an expanding economy if they are to win this struggle over the long period.

The Forces and Their Objectives

The Communists have a variety of objectives in their plans and activity in Vietnam. The mass of citizens who voluntarily join the party want to improve their opportunities and status by eliminating the feudalistic system of economic controls, the corruption of government officials, and the predatory practices of private business.

To accomplish such objectives and to build a modern society, the leaders believe they must change the motivation and belief of the villagers, must discipline and bring unity in goals and action, and consequently must have only one political party to control the political thought and the economic system. The militant revolutionists believe that only force and violence will drive out entrenched colonialism, feudalism and predatory capitalism. Chairman Mao of China has said that "political power grows out of the barrel of the gun."
The theorists and idealists, among the Communists, believe that they must move their system into all sections of Southeast and South Asia by political action, wars of national liberation and by whatever means necessary to gain control. They believe that the opposition is weak; that local people are tied down by traditions, lack unity, and can be effectively reached by propaganda and indoctrination; and that help from across the sea to the weak local governments will be only temporary. They do not want a neutral Southeast Asia, and do not intend to retreat since they are convinced that their system is "the wave of the future."

The Government of North Vietnam is in the military and political conflict in the South because the leaders want to liberate the South from the local corrupt system and from the American "imperialists," and especially to bring about a unification of the two sections of Vietnam; and to establish the Communist system throughout the country. The political and army leaders are well indoctrinated in both the theories and practices of Communism, and in the methods of peoples' wars. They believe that the Americans can be defeated as were the French in 1954 when the latter had control of the cities and the industries of IndoChina; that the Americans will tire if a victory does not come relatively rapidly; and that they have a stronger will, a tougher mind and more patience than do their antagonists.

The regular army of 250,000 or so is well trained, and highly motivated. A total of one-half million are under arms of which around 60,000 are in the South. The armed forces, as is much of the rest of North Vietnam, are organized into cells for indoctrination, surveillance, and action. The leaders were harsh and frequently brutal, and exterminated all opposition as they moved the society towards a Communistic system. The visiting newsmen report that bombing of the North has brought a feeling of solidarity among almost all of the citizens; and that the entire nation is organized and motivated for war to consolidate the
The President and leader, Ho Chi Minh, has undergone long years of training and indoctrination in Russia, China and Europe. His frugality tends to set a standard and to win the respect of his associates. His book, *The Theory of People's Wars*, is a blueprint for a program of action in Southeast Asia: destruction of the local power structure; the use of terror, disruption and assassination; the methods of propaganda and indoctrination; the policies of patience and public relations; and how to utilize the weaknesses of the opposition.

The conditions of peace prepared by Ho in 1965 apparently have not been materially changed: the U.S. forces to withdraw; the Vietcong as the sole representative of the South; the application of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 which provided for elections to determine the opinions of the citizens (in the South only); and the settlement of differences by Vietnamese only.

The policy of North Vietnam apparently is to continue the struggle and delay negotiations; to await the promotion of peace groups and their influence in the U.S. and elsewhere; to encourage the American and other doves to believe that North Vietnam would negotiate if U.S. bombing of the North were discontinued; and to expect that American and world-wide opposition to the present U.S. policy in Vietnam would mount, and that political pressure within the U.S. would cause the latter to seek peace at almost any price. Many analysts believe that such policies will be continued until at least the 1968 national U.S. elections, with the hope that both American doves and hawks will want to bring the boys home. However, there are probably doves as well as hawks in North Vietnam.

The National Liberation Front (Vietcong), the Communist group in South Vietnam, was formally organized in 1961. However, its forerunner, the Vietminh, came into effective existence after the invasion of Indo-China by the Japanese in 1942, and was strengthened during the 8-year struggle to prevent the French from returning to control of the area. Most of the Vietminh remained in the South after the division of
the country in 1954, and continued to strengthen their power position. North Vietnam sent specialists to assist them in organization and in methods of expansion, and later with military supplies and troops.

They obtained increasing support from the villagers during the 1954-63 period because of the extreme poverty, the inequities of the landlord-tenant system in much of the country, and the inefficiency and corruption of the government officials and predatory business. They, at first, used peaceful educational and propaganda methods for expansion. Recruitment was voluntary. They obtained funds from road tolls, market fees and voluntary contributions. In areas under their control they introduced land reforms and civil services.

As their position was strengthened they moved towards a class war. They attacked social injustice, denounced poverty and corruption, and sowed suspicion and distrust in the villages. They turned the tenants against the landlords, the servants against the employers, and the poor against the rich.

The years 1957-60 apparently were crucial for the Communists. The government forces of President Diem made massive arrests of former Vietminh, who then involved many innocents to stir up local anger. Few were won over at the re-education centers and most returned to the villages as active Communists. The government also handled land reform poorly. During the war with the French, the Vietminh distributed land to the villagers. When the government reappeared, the land was taken from the peasants and returned to the landlords, which served to strengthen the position of the Communists.

The villages consisted of three classes of farmers: the very poor who owned little or no land, and made up over three-fourths of the total; a few middle class farmers who owned around 3 acres; and the very few wealthy landlords who usually also were merchants and money lenders. The Communists obtained their recruits from the poor.

The Communists had several distinct effects upon village life. The youth, who constituted most of the membership became active in local affairs. Attitudes were
changed towards worship at the temple and the belief that poverty was a result of not being blessed. The rich were "encouraged" to cooperate and give away land. Marriages were made more simple—without dower, and by selection of own mates. Village thieves were tried for corruption, and in some cases were led around by ropes. The results were that the big majority of villagers felt more secure; they were no longer in constant fear of the rich and powerful.

The conversion of village youth was a thorough process. Self-criticism sessions played a major role. The traditional superstitions had to be removed, and individual selfishness curbed. The Communist cause was made bigger than self. Constant pressure was applied through indoctrination and fear. The Communist preferred village boys as recruits since they had fewer attitudes and experiences to overcome. One analyst concluded that the government recruited the bodies while the Communists recruited the souls of the youth.

Many villagers joined the Vietcong not because they wanted to be Communists, but because the latter led the resistance against the French and organized the movements for reform. During the war with the French the Vietcong took over land and distributed it to the cultivators, which was very popular. After the war, such land was taken away from individuals and collectives were organized, which was not popular. A former top officer of the Vietcong estimated that about one-half were trained and dedicated volunteers, one-third were conscripts from "liberated" areas or government deserters, and the remainder joined for a change and excitement. The officer also reported that the peasants wanted justice, good government and something better for themselves; and not Communism.

The Vietcong developed an effective system for organizing and controlling the rural areas. First, they established a cell of a few young men in a village. Later, they organized associations of youth, women, adult men and workers in each village.
The entire country was organized at five levels: 2,500 villages, 250 districts, 43 provinces, 9 regions and a 7-man presidium. Three types of organizations were created: local associations; political parties—socialist, communist and peoples; and the liberation army.

The emphasis was on reform and nationalism. Their methods resulted in an indoctrinated, disciplined, dedicated and enthusiastic group of leaders. Their build-up to control areas containing 4 of the 15 million persons by 1960 was possible because of the poverty conditions, the corruption and slow process of reform of the government; and their methods of organization and operations.

The strengthening of the police and the armed forces of the government, partly through the assistance of the U.S., encouraged the Vietcong to change their methods. They established military fortifications, and supply and control centers, frequently underground, in well-hidden and strategic areas. They found recruits in the towns and cities as well as in the villages. They expanded their area of control to include 6 million persons by 1963 and probably over one-half of the land area. Their local armed forces totaled 50,000 and their village guerrillas probably 110,000. They were operating in each of the 43 provinces, and had established a second government which collected taxes, provided services, and carried out local public work projects. They were strongest in the mountains, jungles, and the Mekong Delta but had active groups in the urban areas throughout South Vietnam. By late 1963 the Vietcong were assembling larger regiments to take over the country.

Analysts reported in 1963 that the Vietcong was the only organization capable of rallying the citizens and of bringing unity to the country without foreign assistance.

The Vietcong apparently believed they were ready, believed they could use the lessons from the experiences of Mao in China and Giap against the French in Vietnam to rapidly gain control of all of South Vietnam.
The year 1964 brought a change in the methods of the Vietcong. They expanded their terrorism to create fear and win support. They insisted on help or they would destroy the village. They disrupted transportation and travel by firing on buses, mining of roads and destruction of bridges. They increased their kill of local government officials, village leaders, intellectuals and teachers who did not join them. Their cruelty was designed to prevent cooperation with the government. Young men were conscripted, assessments were raised, and food was taken by the Vietcong. They made rapid progress in destroying the opposition in much of rural South Vietnam.

The government of South Vietnam requested military assistance from the U.S., in 1964, and perhaps earlier. The U.S. military specialists concluded that the government must have assistance or the Vietcong and North Vietnam troops would soon take over the South. President Johnson waited until early 1965 to commit military units to Vietnam, after he became certain that assistance was necessary to prevent a Communist takeover.

After 2-1/2 years of war against the government forces and the American troops, the Vietcong have not been destroyed. Most of their military strongholds and supply centers have been captured. The fighting units have been dispersed, but they continue the fight. Why? They are indoctrinated and dedicated in their beliefs; well-trained in guerrilla methods, and they have the voluntary and forced support of many villagers. They have the mountains and jungles in which to hide, and if near the borders can escape into Cambodia and Laos if hard pressed. They can live off the land in many sections. Apparently they are not afraid to die. They believe that they will win eventually. They may be peaceful farmers by day and active military Vietcongs by night. The estimates are that they can operate on 100 tons of outside supplies daily, while the U.S. forces require 25,000 tons. Around 4 government troops and service persons are necessary to check the operations of one Vietcong.

The Vietcong has not been recognized by any government, although the Communist family assists them with military and other supplies; yet 89 nations have recognized
the government of South Vietnam.

The Vietcong had delegations in 17 Communists countries in the fall of 1967. The leaders announced a few policies for South Vietnam: land reform—reduce the size of the large estates, remove land ownership from those who assisted the Americans—and the creation of a democratic government with representatives from the various religious, social and economic groups. These steps were taken undoubtedly to influence opinion both within South Vietnam and abroad.

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was developed from several sources: the defeated French army, the private armies in the South, and from conscription. Many of the officers came from the North. The total ground forces have been increased from 275,000 in 1961 to 790,000 in late 1967, of which 325,000 are regulars (ARVN) and the remainder are special regional forces and militia recruits for temporary service. The army officers have been responsible for several changes in the government since the overthrow of President Diem in November, 1963.

The army has been criticized for its inefficiency, corruption, factionalism and nepotism; and for promotion on the basis of family, religious and other personal reasons rather than merit. The training has been limited and inadequate, the pay has been low, and provisions and medical care limited. The soldiers frequently have taken provisions from the villages. The officers, who are privileged, have devoted much time to smuggling, black marketing and other forms of graft. The social system and economic practices of civilian life have been carried into the armed forces.

Only a few of the officers lead their men in battle. Only one field officer had been reported as wounded by early 1967. Desertions have been high, totaling around 90,000 in 1966. One division was reported to have sold rice, supplied by the Americans, to the Vietcong. Because of limited motivation and inferior leadership, the record of the army has been bad. In comparison, the Vietcong forces have been motivated and well led. Many units of the ARVN, however, have had military contacts with the Vietcong, and their losses in killed reached around 53,000 in late 1967.
The army has been given the major function of assisting in the rural pacification program; by policing the areas where the rural development teams are operating, by finding and destroying local Vietcong and by assisting in the various services. The army has not been well prepared for such tasks since few officers have been concerned about the welfare of the villagers.

The Government of South Vietnam has been afflicted with weaknesses comparable to those of the armed forces: ineffectiveness, corruption, nepotism, and lack of concern about the welfare of the citizens. After the 1954 division, the private groups and armies vied for power. The groups supporting Ngo Dinh Diem, a Catholic layman from the North, won control of the central government in 1955. He ruled largely as a dictator until disposed by army groups in 1963. A few peaceful changes in the army leadership were made until Nguyen Cao Ky became the Premier in 1965.

The administrators of the provinces and districts traditionally were appointed by the French and then by the central government at Saigon. The civil servants also have been under the control of the foreign ruler, the military and the landowners; and consequently have had but limited concern for the citizens.

In recent years the top administrators have been primarily from the armed forces, since military action has been under their control. Traditionally, graft has been the major motivation, and service a minor factor in the operations of the government officials. Such conditions help to explain why the Vietcong have murdered and kidnapped many of the government officials, and won support from the villagers for such deeds.

In the past Vietnam citizens have had but limited experience with representative democratic government. Landowners, war lords and the French have provided the ruling forces during the decades. The American advisors however, have encouraged several democratic political actions since 1963.

A provisional assembly was elected in Sept. 1966, to prepare a new constitution. Elections of councilmen were held in hamlets, villages and cities. Around 83 percent of the qualified voters participated in the election of a President,
Vice President and 60 senators on Sept. 3, 1967. A total of 1200 candidates in a relatively peaceful election of 137 members of the national House of Represent­atives on Oct. 22, 1967. The candidates came from many groups: Buddhists, Cath­olic, old line national parties, and the religious sects.

The Communists have opposed all elections, and requested the citizens not to participate. The participation however, has been comparable with the proportion of citizen voting in the long-established western political democracies.

The Civilans of South Vietnam consist of a variety of groups. Of the 17 million population in 1967, probably 13-1/2 may be various sects of Buddhists, 2-1/2 million Catholics and 1 million tribals living in the hill areas. The Buddhists range from conservative to modern, from pro- to anti-government, and from pro- to anti-war in attitude. Some groups are critical of the Catholics whom they believe have had excessive power in recent governments. Apparently, a sizable proportion of the Buddhist leaders have no love for Hanoi, Peking, the U.S. or the West. The tribals have much hate for the Vietnamese who through the decades have taken the more fertile land and pushed the former into the hills.

Most of the civilian leaders expect a payoff for any service. They have little concern for the welfare of the masses. Some engage in black marketing of food, medicine and military supplies stolen from the U.S. The great proportion of citizens of which three-fourths live in rural areas, had but little influence in the political happenings in Vietnam before 1966. However, they provide the source of recruitments for the Vietcong, and also the final voice on the position of the Vietcong in the society.

A 2-month survey of opinion in areas under control of the government, by the Columbia Broadcasting System in Dec. 1966 and Jan, 1967, found that: 81 percent wanted peace at almost any price, 63 percent by negotiation; 15 percent wanted victory by military action; and that almost all were critical of the Vietcong.

A Princeton University opinion research sample in Vietnam in late 1966 found that: 90 percent supported the government in it's military efforts; 62 percent placed the blame for the war upon the Vietcong, Hanoi and Peking; 73 percent op-
posed the participation of the Vietcong in any government; and they wanted reuniﬁcation but not Communism.

A sizeable minority, at least, of the college youth and students consider that the war is not theirs, but is more of an American war. They are critical of the government, the Vietcong, the economic-political system, and of the Americans. They attempt to avoid the military draft, and if drafted desert as quickly as possible.

A minority of citizens in the cities, at least, are critical of the Americans for upsetting their economy, for corrupting their women, for trampling on their culture, and for inﬂuencing the Sept. 1967 elections. Anti-American feelings are displayed on the streets of Saigon. The police permitted citizens to beat up a 3-man American press team in Sept. 1967, probably to show that the government was not a puppet of the Americans.

The primary support of the war efforts in Vietnam has come from the vested interests, the Catholics and the military, in spite of the fact that the big majority of citizens dislike the Vietcong and Hanoi.

Refugees. Estimates are that over one million citizens, mainly Catholics, ﬂed from the North during 1954-56. Many came to the Saigon area but most were resettled in the Northeast along the coast. Since 1964, more than 1.9 million, of which one-half are children under 14 years, have ﬂed from areas under control of the Vietcong. About 1.2 million have been resettled, while the remainder were in 364 camps in mid-1967. The refugees undergo many tribulations; they do not wish to leave their homes where their ancestors are buried; the provincial governments show little concern about their welfare; there are but limited resources available to assist them; and they are confronted with the problem of foods, housing, health and employment.

Foreign Assistance to South Vietnam. The U.S. services to the government and citizens in South Vietnam was started in 1956 in the form of advisors for the police, army, education, administration and the economy. Armed forces of the U.S. were committed to Vietnam in March, 1965, when the evidence indicated that the Vietcong assisted by North Vietnam would overthrow the government of the South.

The American administration apparently expected initially that a few thousand
troops, supported by an air force and fleet, would be adequate to overcome the rebellion. The enemy, however, was underestimated. Troops and supplies from the North were increased. The American forces also were increased as harbors, terminals, cement and asphalt roads, work shops, airfields and supply facilities were constructed. Thousands of acres were covered with supplies, trucks, airfields, and 5,000 airplanes, for example. The forces had reached almost 500,000 by late 1967. Approximately 400,000 Americans arrived and 400,000 left Vietnam during the past year since the service period is for one year. The costs to America rose from 1 billion dollars in 1964, to 7 in 1965, 14 in 1966 and probably to 23 billion in 1967—or up to around 3-1/2 percent of the Gross National Product. The building program alone—harbors, airfields, barracks, etc., has cost at least 1-1/2 billion dollars. The total loss of American lives reached 15,000 in November, 1967, and an additional 95,000 had been wounded in combat. More American troops have been afflicted by disease than battle wounds, and around 2,800 have been killed by accidents and other causes. The need for an increase in U.S. armed forces in Vietnam was probably due to several conditions: the Vietcong and the North are dedicated and resourceful fighters; a 4 to 1 ratio of troops appears necessary to control mobile guerrilla forces such as the Vietcong; North Vietnam increased the assistance in terms of supplies and troops; and the armed forces of the South were required in the pacification and development programs necessary to provide security and to win support of the villagers.

The major responsibility of the U.S. army, including supporting planes and helicopters, was to find and destroy the armed forces of the Vietcong and the North. The airforce and navy planes were to destroy military objectives in the North and the supply routes to the South; and the fleet was to prevent the landing by seas of supplies and troops from the North. Approximately 68,000 troops from other countries were assisting the South in mid-1967—from Korea, Australia, Thailand, New Zealand and the Philippines. A total of 30 other countries had supplied some type of aid to South Vietnam.

In addition to the armed forces, many thousand civilians from abroad were
assisting in South Vietnam in rural development, health, handling the refugees, distribution of supplies, and in other social services.

**Development and Reforms**

**U.S. Assistance**

The Vietnam adventure of the U.S. is the first time in history apparently, that an outside nation has helped simultaneously in a fighting war and also in development and reform. The $620 million of U.S. Aid in 1966 provided $480 million of imports of which $80 were for foodstuffs; $60 for public works, health, education and job training; $20 for training and equipping a national police force; and $60 million for rural development—pacification, local government, rehabilitation of defectors, agricultural extension, etc. This aid was equivalent to $37 per capita for the 16.5 million population. The professional services were provided by U.S. doctors, teachers and engineers, for example, as in South Korea in the fifties.

Several thousand motivated American citizens have served in Vietnam with construction companies, religious and philanthropic organizations, with hospitals, and to assist in the distribution of supplies. Over 100 doctors have served in Vietnam without pay. A total of 22 volunteer agencies such as CARE, International Volunteer Services, American Friends Services, American Red Cross, Foster Parents, Community Development Foundation, Inter Rescue Commission and Asia Foundation have provided a variety of services to the civilians of Vietnam. Over 700 voluntary workers were serving in mid-1967, with at least one in each of the 43 provinces. International Voluntary Services had the largest group: about 65 teachers, 50 community development workers, 30 agricultural teams, and 18 aid groups to assist the refugees.

The U.S. army in Vietnam has assisted these agencies as possible.
Experimental Village Programs

Under the government of former President Diem, a "new life" or "strategic hamlet" village program was attempted. Villagers were moved to strategic locations, concrete blockhouses were built, and soldiers were used as protection against the Vietcong. The program failed as the villages were infiltrated by the Vietcong.

A national priority area program also was attempted. The general plan was to start with areas surrounding cities such as Saigon and move out with village-assistance programs. The primary weakness was that the villagers were not effectively reached so they would play a significant role in weakening the Vietcong.

The Pacification and Rural Development Program was introduced in 1963 by two Americans and a team of 27, in an attempt to materially improve on the program proposed and provided by the Vietcong. The objectives were to further land reform, to provide services and closer personal relations with the villagers, to introduce necessary changes, to provide a system of security and thus win the rice-roots support of the villagers.

The plans for the mass training of 8,000 team members in one batch, and three groups a year, indicates the acceptance by both the Vietnam government and the Americans. The training includes: building and living in a demonstration village hamlet so that they could defend themselves; tactics in the use of weapons and guerrilla warfare; and political indoctrination designed to develop motivation and to prevent corruption and special privileges.

The three major aspects of the program include:

1. Selecting and training young men and women for the 59-member village teams on a mass basis, 7 days a week, on motivations, methods and projects, for periods of 6 months.

2. The armed forces of South Vietnam have the responsibility of providing security: cleaning out the guerrillas, of finding draft dodgers and deserters, and
of providing arms and training of local militia.

3. The operations of the teams in the villages: talks and discussions to
win the confidence of the citizens; leadership in service projects; entertainment
by shows and traveling actors; and assistance with supplemental food, medical
treatment, schools, agricultural extension and organizing of local government.

The rural development teams are expected to win the confidence of the villa-
gers, to become a part of village life, and to assist in restoring community
spirit. The most successful teams help in renewing village celebrations and attempt
to involve all villagers in the various activities. Major Nguyen Be, who is in
charge of the RD training program, is opposed to the issuance of rifles to any of
the team members. They wear black pajamas as do the rural peasantry and the Viet-
cong.

The scheme seemed sound but has been handicapped by a series of problems:
inadequate training, experience and motivation of the team members; suspicion of
the villagers and their fear of change; local thefts and corruption; and harass-
ment by the Vietcong. The latter had killed 218 members of the teams and wounded
an additional 300 by mid-1967.

A total of 200 teams were operating in September, 1966, and around 400 a
year later. The rural development force probably totaled around 20,000 in late 1967.

The Combined Action Platoon (CAP) was initiated by the U.S. Marines in the
First Corps Area which includes five provinces just south of the 17th parallel.
The objective was to reach and win the confidence of the villagers. The members
of the teams learn the language of the villagers. They have assisted in the security
of the Vietnam villages by training local militia and by assisting in building
fortifications. Their civic action projects to help the villagers include: im-
provement of the roads, building of culverts, operation of dispensaries, and the
opening of new ricelands.

Usually, several weeks or months are required before the local villagers
would report on the local Vietcong. Apparently, they have had to believe that the CAP teams and the U.S. military would remain before they would risk providing information on the Vietcong who may have members and sympathizers in any village.

In the fall of 1967 a total of 77 CAP teams were operating in the First Corps Area which had around 3,500 local militia. A total of 700 such teams would be needed to cover the area.

Many of the U.S. military units serving in Vietnam have provided medical services, food and other supplies to villagers without any charge.

Land Reform has made but slow progress. Most of the fertile and level land has been owned for decades by landlords who exacted the maximum of rent from tenants; for example, about 65% of the fertile Mekong Delta riceland have been farmed by renters who paid up to 50% share rent, although the legal maximum was only 25%.

Under a January 1955 law the legal rent ceilings were 15 to 25 percent, and the maximum size of the land holdings 100 hectares. The law was evaded such as by transferring title to a part of the land to other members of the family.

The Vietcong has pushed the distribution to persons in the areas they have held, which helps to explain their strength in the Mekong Delta. The distribution of land by the government has been retarded by corrupt practices of province chiefs. In some areas the villagers have been killed by the Vietcong if they possessed land titles recently obtained from the government. Estimates in late 1967 were that the government had distributed 667,000 acres to 128,000 families since 1954.
EVALUATION OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES IN VIETNAM

The opinions to date on the results of the struggles in Vietnam vary widely, depending largely on the attitudes towards the war, and on the type of information and opinions which the individual has had available and has sought. The analysis below is an attempt to present some of the significant military, political and economic facts and factors, as in late 1967.

The Military Situation

In 1964, the military forces of the Vietcong and North Vietnam seemed about ready to take over the South. American forces began to arrive in mid-1965 and reached about 500,000 in late 1967. Ports had been deepened, acres of supplies stored for use, and around 5,000 aircraft brought to Vietnam, for example. Airplanes were being used to regularly bomb military objectives in the North and the supply trails from the North, and also to support ground action in the South. The U.S. and South Vietnam (SVN) troops had control of the sea and air, and only the land was contested.

The military position of the forces of SVN and allies was improved during 1965-67. The South Vietnam Army was strengthened and the role of Saigon in the military and political struggle was expanded. The fortunes of the enemy seems to be declining. A large proportion of the villages was more secure from the Vietcong. The changes in the military situation in South Vietnam might be summarized as follows: 1965, the Communists were threatening to take over the country; 1966, a gradual buildup of U.S. military equipment, facilities and forces; 1967, turning of the military tide towards possible success by the SVN and allies.

The area under control of the Vietcong and of the government of South Vietnam has been questionable. Some analysts estimate that the relatively secure proportion of the population for the South has risen from 45 to 65 percent in 3 years. However, the Vietcong are...
in or near three-fourths of the 12,000 villages. The S.V.N. forces may control during the day but not during the night. If the SVN forces were to leave the Vietcong would again assume control. However, the population living under the Vietcong has been cut to less than 20 percent. More of the roads and highways are relatively safe for traffic.

In spite of the gains of the forces of SVN and allies during 1965-67, the enemy was far from defeated. The build-up of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese was not as rapid as the increase in the military ability of SVN and allies, on a 1 to 4 ratio. Their armed forces and guerrillas in the South were increased from about 180,000 in mid-1965 to around 240,000 in Nov. 1967. They adjusted their military action to surprise attacks, selection of the battle site, and hit and run tactics. The quality of their weapons, largely from Russia, and their military strategy were materially improved. Supplies and military forces continued to flow from the North by the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Increasing military supplies were coming by sea through Cambodia. New military and supply centers were established in the more distant jungles. Military action was intensified in and along the demilitarized zone by the North where missile locations north of the zone were not subject to ground attack by the U.S. forces.

The Vietcong were still strong in the densely populated Mekong Delta where the Saigon government had made but limited progress in land reforms and military action.

The Vietcong. The larger units of the Vietcong had been destroyed or dispersed. They were having difficulty in moving about in more areas of the South. Many of their military and storage centers had been destroyed. Their losses had been increased: members killed, weapons and supplies captured, and numbers deserting. The ratio of weapons captured favored the Vietcong in Dec. 1963, about 2 to 1; and favored the U.S. and SVN in mid-1967, about 4 to 1. The Vietcong defectors have been estimated at 5,400 in 1964, 11,100 in 1965, 20,200 in 1966, and at the rate of 30,000 in 1967.

However, few of the hard core Communists had defected. The recruitments were
down to 3,600 a month in 1967 or about one-half of the new recruits in 1966. An increasing proportion of the prisoners were 12 to 14 years of age. The Vietcong were relying more on reinforcements from the North, or about 6,500 a month in 1967.

The population under control of the Vietcong had been reduced by 3 or 4 million. The estimates in late-1967 were that 17 percent of the 17 million population and 4,038 villages were under VC control; 67 percent and 5,188 villages were largely under SVN control; and that 16 percent of the population and 2,723 villages were contested.

The losses of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese military forces were estimated as 2 1/2,000 killed from Jan. 1961 to Oct. 1967—around twice the number of armed forces and civilians killed by them in the South: 15,000 Americans, 1/3,000 South Vietnam armed forces and 65,000 local officials and civilians. The loss of combat troops from wounds and disease was probably considerably higher than for troops of SVN and allies because of the shortages of medical professionals, supplies and hospitals for the V.C. and NVN forces.

The intelligence service of SVN and the U.S. estimated in Nov., 1967: the Vietcong main forces were 64,000, or down a few thousand during the year; the N.V.N regulars in the South were 54,000; the Vietcong guerrillas were 70,000 to 90,000; the headquarters personnel were 35,000 to 40,000; or a total of 225,000 to 248,000 of the Communist forces. This would be a ratio of 1 to 5 to the armed forces of S.V.N. and her allies.

The evidence indicates that an increasing number of Vietcong were becoming pessimistic about the future of their political organization. Many of the former Vietcong were providing intelligence assistance to the forces of S.V.N. and allies in 1967.

Some of the Vietcong, who have defected, have assisted the American troops in the Northern provinces as scouts. The reasons for such shifting probably include: loss of confidence in the objectives, operations and future of the Vietcong; the
favorable pay for such services, and their treatment with dignity and respect by the Americans. A few have been killed, several have won medals for valor, and apparently none have re-defected back to the Vietcong.

The Army of South Vietnam was showing evidence of considerable improvement in 1967: the killing of the enemy was up, the desertions were down although still around 13 percent a year, and the forces were more successful in combat. Attacks on the Vietcong in the Mekong Delta were mounting. SVN pilots were flying about one-fourth of the combat missions below the demilitarized zone in mid-1967. The estimates were that 180,000 of the 325,000 ARVN troops were capable in late 1967. The regional forces of 282,000 also varied widely in motivation and performance. The U.S. military officials expressed the belief that ample manpower (over 700,000) are under arms in South Vietnam to carry out the military objectives when they are adequately trained and equipped.

The U.S. troops, better trained and led, and better able to handle modern sophisticated weapons, have been fighting in the base areas. The ARVN troops are becoming ready to use the modern weapons and consequently to carry more of the burden of the heavy fighting.

One analyst reported that the SVN army had been improved from a very bad to perhaps a fair army. Incompetence and corruption are still common. The armed forces continued to be short on motivation and leadership. Many in the armed forces suffer from an overdose of war, which reduces their motivation. They do not have the one-year rotation system, as do U.S. troops. Continuous service may influence their desire to desert. The steady improvement in some units indicate that the SVN troops are not naturally lazy, and are not low in ability. They may be short on nutrition and may harbor a goodly supply of internal parasites.

Military students point out that the Korean armed forces had comparable problems to the SVN armed forces 15 years ago but have developed into a very excellent military machine as demonstrated in South Vietnam.
In late 1967, the primary functions of the S V N. army were to eliminate the Viet-
cong from the Mekong Delta, and to assist in the pacification and rural development
programs. A few units were operating in cooperation with U.S. forces.

North Vietnam continued to strengthen her military forces during 1965-67; to
maintain a flow of supplies, perhaps 300 tons a day to the South; to provide perhaps
an additional 6,500 trained persons a month to supplement the Vietcong forces; and
to expand military action along the 17th parallel. The function of the N.V.N.
troops along the demilitarized zone apparently was to keep American troops occupied
so they could not be used in the South. The quantity and quality of arms from Russia
and China materially raised the military power to defend North Vietnam from air
attacks, and to attack U.S. forces in the South. Almost all of the North was operating
on a war basis; to provide supplies for the armed forces and the Vietcong; and to
repair damages caused by the air raids.

Hanoi continued to refuse a series of peace appeals and offers of negotiations
proposed by representatives of several governments, including the United States.
An analyst reported that Hanoi was not committing a sizable proportion of her armed
forces for fighting in the South, partly for fear of invasion. Another analyst stated
that the Russians have not supplied the type of missiles which could perhaps destroy
the airfields and supply centers in the South, and the American fleet in the nearby
seas. The aid from Russia apparently has been increased to around one billion dollars
a year.

Hanoi appears to be conditioned to a long military and political struggle and to
years of guerrilla warfare. The population and industries have been dispersed. Almost
all able-bodied citizens have undergone military training and have been issued rifles.

Bombing of North Vietnam by the U.S. airplanes has received much unfavorable
comment by the press around the world. The bombing of military objectives in the North,
and supply trails to the South was started in February 1965 from carriers and distant
islands; and shifted primarily to airfields built in South Vietnam and in Thailand.

The objectives of the military bombing, according to one analyst, were to
support the troops by denying the enemy a safe sanctuary to rest, recoup and rearm; to exact a penalty for actions taken against the South; to limit the flow and raise the cost of infiltration of men and materials from the North; and to perhaps reduce the morale and further the desire for negotiations on the part of the North.

The bombing has severely curtailed North Vietnam's industrial and agricultural production, and thus weakened her war-making capacity. For example, the only modern cement plant, the only explosives plant, and 80 percent of the electrical power generating capacity have been removed from production. Bombing has reduced the output of earners of foreign exchange, such as coal and phosphate. An analyst reports that around 500,000 workers have been diverted from production or the army to repair damages to plants, bridges and supply lines. A total of 5,000 freight cars, 8,000 trucks and 19,000 water craft have been damaged or destroyed. Ships have been tied up for long periods in the harbor at Haiphong because of damage to transit and storage facilities.

Bombing of the North has been costly to the U.S., as well as destructive to the North. Over 750 U.S. aircraft with a value of around three billion dollars, have been lost in the air raids; probably 350 members of the crews were rescued, 150 went down with the airplanes, and 550 were reported as missing, were captured and interned. The evidence indicates poor treatment of American prisoners. Their food and housing have been inferior, and some have been subjected to public harrassment. The Red Cross has not been permitted access to exchange mail and relief packages. The Geneva Agreements, on the treatment of prisoners of war, have not been applied by North Vietnam since war has not been declared.

The U.S., during the first two years, had not bombed four targets; the docks and wharf at Haiphong because of the ships of neutrals and of Russia; the dams providing water for the rice land because of the effects on the short supply of food; the international airport near Hanoi which is used by non-military planes and diplomats; and the military airport about 40 miles Northwest of Hanoi. The latter has been heavily bombed, however, beginning in mid-October, 1967.
Russia has provided the anti-aircraft guns and the missiles which has made
the bombing of the munition plants, oil storages, supply centers, bridges, and
power plants a dangerous war activity. Russia has also supplied MIGS, the excellent
fighter planes, and has trained pilots to operate them.

Critics of the bombing of North Vietnam point out that destructive bombing
tends to kill civilians, to hit non-military targets and to strengthen the will to
resist and to carry on; and thus serve to unify the people. Others contend that bomb-
ing has had but limited effectiveness since the Vietcong soldiers requires but a
small amount of supplies necessary from the North. One critic stated that teams
of 400 on bicycles could transport 100 tons of supplies daily and that bicyclists
are elusive targets for bombs.

Some critics of the bombing believe that if North Vietnam is adequately
weakened she will request the assistance of the manpower of China; and conclude
consequently that if China is to be contained a strong and independent North Viet-
nam is required.

Critics of bombing of the North have contended that stopping of such bombing is
a necessary step to encourage negotiations by the North. Almost all of the U.S.
military opinion appears to be that bombing should be continued and extended to all
possible military objectives. They point out that the bombing pauses--5 days in
1965, 37 days in 1965-66, and 6 days in early 1967--were used by the North for re-
covering production of military items and for an expansion of infiltration of men
and supplies to the South. The critics reply that the bombing pause must be
permanent to encourage negotiations. The defenders reply in turn that the critics
do not understand the policies and practices of the Communist leaders. The policy
on bombing, determined by the U.S. President and SVN leaders, is that bombing
of the North will cease when assured that de-escalation of the war has been started
by North Vietnam.
The Bombing and Killings by the Vietcong in South Vietnam has not received the publicity as has the bombing of the North, since the actions and results of the latter are much more accessible to the news services. There is also perhaps a natural reaction against a great power bombing a weak nation, and perhaps killing and maiming civilians. The critics of bombing of the North have almost entirely ignored the bombing and killings of civilians in the South by the Vietcong.

The destruction of a Village of 1,800 Montagnard tribesmen, Dak Son, about 74 miles northeast of Saigon in early Dec. 1967, is an example of the operations of the Vietcong. Around 175 villagers were killed and 200 were taken prisoners. The tribesmen had supported the government and refused to assist the Vietcong. A lesson had to be provided for those who might dare to assist the government even by reporting on the Vietcong.

Some analysts and newsmen have stated that the Vietcong may have killed and maimed many times more civilians in the South than have the airplanes in the North. Buses, buildings, bars and restaurants have been bombed by the Vietcong. Roads have been mined where civilians traveled in buses. Around 65,000 civilians--local officials, teachers, adults, women and children--were killed by the Vietcong during the 1961-67 period. The defenders of bombing of North Vietnam point out that the military policy of the U.S. has been not to deliberately make war on civilians in the North, while the Vietcong openly have killed civilians for military and political reasons in the South. The critics reply that some bombs may fall by chance in civilian areas, but there is evidence of terror bombing in the villages surrounding Saigon. U.S. bombing in the South has also by mistake killed both U.S. and SVN soldiers as well as innocent villagers.

The objectives of the Vietcong have been comparable to the objectives of bombing points of military value in the North: to weaken and destroy the opposition, to discourage cooperation with the government, and to bring fear and the desire for peace. These objectives of the Vietcong also have been only partly effective.

Military Projections The early estimates on needed U.S. military forces and on time to destroy the enemy in South Vietnam, by some U.S. military leaders and government officials, were overly optimistic. Apparently they did not adequately understand the resources of the enemy
and the environmental conditions in the South. By 1967, the statements on military expectations had become very cautious. In Nov., 1967, General William C. Westmoreland stated that within two years the S.V.N. armed forces should be able to play major roles in handling the primary military tasks; provide territorial security for citizens, search out and destroy the enemy guerrillas, and handle the defenses on the frontiers.

The general outlined four military phases of the War: Phase I, up until mid-1966 when the efforts were to prevent a collapse of South Vietnam and consequently a Communist victory; Phase II, mid-1966 to end of 1967 when the efforts were to destroy the main forces of the enemy, to drive them into hiding, and to improve the quality of the S.V.N. forces; Phase III, perhaps during 1968, when the number of U.S. military advisers in the S.VN. army training centers should decline, an increase in number of S.V.N. troops to defend at the demilitarized zone, and an increase in U.S. troops in the Mekong Delta; Phase IV, after 1968, when infiltration will continue to decline, the Communist structure in the South will be reduced, the SVN government will become more stable, the SVN army will be able to handle the Vietcong, the U.S. units will be reduced and the military resources steadily turned over to S.V.N.

Such estimates of future military possibilities are very uncertain in such an area where the civil wars and international struggles are likely to be intensified in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand.

The military analysts believe that the war in Vietnam may be a long and arduous struggle lasting for years. They expect that the enemy will find it progressively difficult to maintain large forces, and consequently will be forced to operate as guerrillas and attempt to use sanctuaries across the borders. Frontier defense, which is expected to be a very important task in the future, will require mobile forces and advanced equipment. Steps are being taken to prepare the S.V.N. armed forces for such military duties.
The Political Struggle

The political struggle for South Vietnam is also undecided in late 1967. The citizens desperately want peace and are probably willing to support the group which they believe is most likely to end the war. Some progress has been made in creating representative governments, and in starting a pacification and rural development program. The recent harsh treatment of civilians in many sections by the Vietcong has not improved their position in the political struggle.

Representative Government. Under the influence of American advisors, the military government of South Vietnam took important steps towards the creation of elected representative governments during 1965-67: provincial and municipal elections in 1965; a constitutional assembly in 1966, and the elections of a President, Vice President and 60 national senators in Sept. and of 137 national representatives in Oct. 1967. The high turnout of voters indicated concern and desire to participate by the citizens. The elections were relatively peaceful for a country torn by internal military strife. Defeated candidates brought many charges of local corruption. Some group of the Buddhists were convinced that they were not adequately represented in the New government.

The new house of representatives seems to be split into many small groups: Buddhists sects, Roman Catholics, active and retired military officers, active and retired civil servants, and a few from ethnic minorities, for example. A majority vote may be difficult to obtain.

The accomplishments seem important: a legal civilian government chosen by and from the people, and the beginning of a separation of the government from the armed forces. A political analyst reports however, that: the same power structure, the military and friends, remains; the military remains in control of the provinces; politics are still based on personal jockeying within the military leadership and the associated civilian cliques; President Thieu has learned and used the cathexism of the social revolution, but may not push social projects; and that the cynicism of the citizens remains.
The question has been raised: How to bring unity of the various segments of South Vietnam, except by major use of the armed forces or by the Vietcong. Time, experience and training are necessary to improve the performance of the people's representatives in a traditional as well as in a more mature society.

Rural Development

Around 400 pacification and rural development teams were operating in Oct., 1967, with the cooperation of the armed forces. The program has received many criticisms: that the members were poorly selected, motivated and trained; were not given adequate protection by the military; that a local militia was not being created; and that the programs was not winning the confidence of the villagers. One, on-the-ground analyst, believed that about one-half of the teams were starting to make real progress.

Around 2,000, 59-member RD teams are necessary to cover the 12,000 hamlets in South Vietnam.

A more sophisticated computer method, the Hamlet Evaluation System, had been developed to measure the military and political results of the war. Each of the 12,000 hamlets is graded on the basis of various security factors. The conclusions in Oct., 1967, were that Saigon had major control of 42 percent of the hamlets and 67 percent of the population, or an increase of 10 to 12 percent of the population in a year. The measurements of changes in attitudes of the villagers, which were not reported, may be the most significant political factor.

One critic reports that the rural development program is frequently introduced by bombing villages to drive out the Vietcong. He contends that you can't destroy the grass houses of the villagers, even if they are rebuilt, and obtain the support of the villagers. Another critic states that youth from the cities, who make up the big majority of the RD teams, are not motivated to understand and to work with villagers.

The rural development program is new in the experiences of citizens of Vietnam. Attitudes of both team members and villagers must be changed. Experience, training, and the finding and adoption of improved methods are a part of the growth processes. To
accept the program the villagers must believe that the team members respect them and are attempting to further social justice; and that the program is furthering literacy, education, enforcement of land reform laws, and agricultural and handicraft production.

The Vietcong apparently are worried about the possible success of the program designed to reach and win the support of the villagers, because they have stepped up their harassments and killings of the members of the service teams.

One analyst of the conditions in Vietnam contends that the armed forces could win all battles yet lose the war, unless the villagers feel secure and their confidence and support is won. The pacification and rural development program consequently is very essential if such objectives are to be accomplished.

**Experiences of U.S. Volunteers**

Approximately 45 out of 170 dedicated volunteers in the International Voluntary Services in Vietnam resigned in Sept., 1967. The reasons given were their belief that the U.S. programs were unsound; and that their reports and recommendations had not been considered by the U.S. administrators in Vietnam, so they decided to leave and be heard.

They were critical of the inefficiency of the rural development teams who were poorly trained and frequently were draft dodgers; of the U.S. support of a corrupt and inefficient power group who ran the country; of the Saigon government and the army which have shown little appetite for fighting, and no real desire to reduce corruption and to win the support of the people; and the giving of a large share of U.S. imports to wealthy interests to buy their support.

The volunteers are idealistic and liberal in attitudes, and concerned about the welfare of the villagers. They became frustrated and depressed by the poverty, the violent inflation, the shortage of food, the treatment of the villagers, and the repression of civil liberties; and by their belief that the military program in Vietnam was very destructive of lives, was not leading towards peace, was making
people more dependent rather than self sufficient, and also more anti-American. They questioned whether any political gains had occurred during the year.

International Public Relation Programs

The results of the efforts of the military and political adversaries to win support among the peoples of the world are not entirely clear. The public relations program of North Vietnam and the Vietcong include the following: suggest the possibilities of negotiations to minor diplomats and visiting doves if the bombing of the North were entirely stopped; release socialist rather than Communist manifestos about the future of Vietnam; and statements by diplomats and friends in the Communist nations. The U.S. has attempted to win support of world opinion by a variety of methods such as: by statements that peace was the objective that the military objectives were limited; that they were ready to negotiate at any time, and by sending top diplomats to various countries to present their desire for peace and negotiations. Some analysts believe that such statements and proposals are primarily designed to weaken the enemy, and thus improve the chances of a military victory.

The government leaders and the big majority of citizens of Southeast Asia apparently support the temporary presence of America; although many may question the strategy and effects of the bombing of North Vietnam, and may react favorable to certain types of criticisms levied at U.S. economic and military policies. The confidence of the people of the area, of checking Communism and the Chinese, undoubtedly has been strengthened. Some express the belief that they will have more time to build their democratic political structures and their economies before wars of liberation are seriously attempted in their countries.

Some of the citizens in Southeast Asia and in other developing countries seem to believe that the U.S. plans to stay in S.E. Asia since America emphasizes her objective of security as well as self-determination in Vietnam. This is also the third war in which U.S. troops have been sent to Asia.
Some of the citizens apparently believe that the U.S. will try to dominate Southeast Asia and that such action will draw Chinese power into the area.

The position of the people of Western Europe is also uncertain. They do not wish to become involved, and clearly prefer that the U.S. shoulder any military burden and a large share of any development costs. A sizable minority at least are critical of the bombing. Many students of the times seem to doubt the possibility of checking rapid revolutions in traditional societies with a host of built-in problems, by the slow system of building representative governments.

The Communist world has increased their support of the Vietcong and the North. Perhaps the nature of the struggle in Vietnam has expanded the opportunities of the Communists to recruit additional supporters and agents in "intellectual" circles.

The Economic Situation

The military and political struggles in South Vietnam have reduced the output of food and other consumer goods; resulted in violent inflation, war profiteers and black marketing; and lowered the economic integrity of the society; probably furthered the alienation of the rural and urban citizens; and has deepened the economic misery of the big majority of the people. The economic gap between rich and poor probably has been widened, since many of the former are war profiteers and know how to minimize the taxes paid.

A few thousand hamlets have been destroyed or partly destroyed by the fighting forces. Over three million persons became refugees of which three-fourths may have found permanent or semi-permanent homes. The larger cities, such as Saigon, have become crowded with humanity. Economic life for the big majority has become even more uncertain. Income maladjustments have been widened. The bar girls make more money than the cabinet ministers are paid for their governmental services.

Population continues to rise at a net rate of around 2 percent, or 350,000 persons a year. Medical care is probably better than before the war. The war and related losses in human lives is probably about one-fourth to one-third of the net increase. Economic progress,
even in a non-war traditional society, is difficult with such a population increase.

The economic assistance and support by the U.S. government and the spendings by members of the armed forces have been factors to mitigate such difficulties.

The material improvement of a poor traditional and war-crushed economy awaits peace, a stable government, security of life and property, incentives, vocational and technical training, social services, a system of national planning and a host of other means used in building more modern societies.

The military struggles in Southeast Asia are having a decided impact upon the economies of Korea, Japan, the Philippines and Thailand since one billion dollars a year is spent in those countries by the U.S. for supplies. In addition, the U.S. provides subsidies for the troops from Korea and Thailand who are in Vietnam.
A Few Tentative Conclusions

The results of the various struggles in Vietnam during the three years ending in 1967, in terms of the position of South Vietnam and her allies, perhaps should include the following tentative conclusions:

A. Primary Military in Nature

1. Considerable progress in the military situation: in destruction of the basic Communist forces in the conventional war, and in containing the guerrilla operations of the Vietcong.

2. An escalation of the military aspects in both North and South Vietnam by South Vietnam and allies; and also by the North with assistance from the Russians and the Chinese but not at quite the same rate.

3. A widening of the war in terms of guerrilla activities of Communists in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand; and the use of Cambodia especially as a haven for Communist forces.

4. A significant deterioration process appears to be underway among the Vietcong. They are recruiting more of the younger youth and females as shown by prisoners and bodies. Recruitment has become more difficult, desertions more frequent and morale has been lowered for all but the hard core.

5. The war options by South Vietnam and allies in late 1967 include: 1) de-escalation such as by reducing or eliminating bombing of the North and the supply trails to the South; 2) continue as per the 1967 operations; 3) extension of the war, such as by: (a) bombing of the dock area at Haiphong; (b) hot pursuit of escaping airplanes and ground troops into nearby countries; (c) bombing of supply depots and bases of enemy in Cambodia and Laos; (d) increase in foreign forces; and (e) attack with troops north of the demilitarized zone, which North Vietnam has been using for military purposes.
6. The Communists still expect to win in South Vietnam for several reasons:
1) Use of Mao-type guerrilla action in the rural areas, and of Soviet type uprisings in the cities;
2) The almost nation-wide infra-structure of the Vietcong, which has not been severely dented by military action;
3) Determination, ability and integrity of national and local Vietcong who are indoctrinating the soldiers to fight fiercely, continuously, everywhere and for annihilation of the enemy;
4) Use of troops and supplies from North Vietnam; which supplies are provided almost entirely by Communist nations;
5) Assurance of military equipment and supplies from Russia and China;
6) Utilize a three-phase approach: political, socio-economic reform, and military;
7) Attacks against the Americans through news agencies and friends: in Asia, as aggressors, imperialists and colonizers; in America, Europe and elsewhere by criticisms of the U.S. Vietnam policies. These attacks and criticisms are expected in time to become the important factor in reducing the efforts of a war-weary America in Southeast Asia.

7. Border defense and protection from infiltration of supplies and troops through Laos and Cambodia have become more important in the military struggle. Some of the trails from North Vietnam to the South have been improved into all weather roads usable by trucks during the monsoons. More Communist camps are located in Laos and Cambodia. More supplies are coming by sea through Cambodia.
8. Several of the initial assumptions of American policy makers have proven inadequate after almost three years of experience:

1) That bombing of North Vietnam would lower the morale and victory expectations of the North, and thus, encourage Hanoi to negotiate. The will of the North apparently has been hardened as there seems to be no desire to negotiate;

2) That bombing of the North and the trails to the South would increase the costs and reduce the flow of supplies and men to the South. Methods have been found to partly overcome the handicaps resulting from the bombing—by use of more manpower to move the supplies and repair the destruction, improvement of trails, the extensive use of bicycles for transportation, and by new routes to the South;

3) That military assistance to the South, including bombing of the North, would strengthen the will and effectiveness of the government, army and civilians of the South. Perhaps some progress has been made in this direction;

4) That the military destruction of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese army regulars would decidedly weaken the Communist political structure in the South. The infra-structure of the Vietcong in the villages remains in most of the South. However, the villagers are increasing their resistance to the Vietcong over the use of local resources;

5) That military assistance to South Vietnam is evidence that the U.S. keeps her military commitments, and thus, strengthens the will to resist the Communists in South Vietnam and other countries of Southeast Asia. The evidence indicates that this has happened;
6) That holding the line against Communist aggression in South Vietnam will prevent expansion in other countries of the region. Revolutions may be encouraged by Communists but conditions in Vietnam and other countries are largely responsible for guerrilla action against the entrenched interests who resist the needed socio-economic changes.

9. North Vietnam is severely suffering from the war. She is short of rice and depends extensively on food and military supplies from abroad, about 70 percent of which comes through the port of Haiphong. Over half of the troops sent to the South are destroyed within months. She fears invasion from the South which ties down most of her regular troops.

B. Primarily Political and Economic in Nature

1. The chances of negotiations with the Vietcong and North Vietnamese are very limited. Communists apparently do not negotiate unless they hope to bring about favorable results immediately or over the longer period.

2. The prospects of outside assistance to obtain peace, by the United Nations or by individual nations, also are very limited. Russia might hasten negotiations, but apparently her leaders have concluded that she has more to gain if the war continues.

3. The past three years of military and political actions in South Vietnam has brought:

   1) An expansion of area and population under control and perhaps influence by the South;
   2) A beginning in creating representative local and national governments, and a start towards involvement of civilians in policy-making;
3) A beginning in an essential program of pacification and rural development in the villages;
4) A further deterioration of the thin economy;
5) A mass movement of a few million citizens and the resulting hardships, but which may tend to break cultural habits so that such citizens become more willing to accept change.

4. The war and related political activities have brought several experiments and demonstrations, which may be of value in other societies with comparable difficulties, such as:

1) Medical research on the control of virulent and resistant strains of malaria;
2) Planning and operating guerrilla warfare by the Communists; and of attempting to destroy the guerrillas by the anti-Communists;
3) Planning and operating a program to win the support of the villagers and to build an infra-structure by the Communists; and a counter program by the anti-Communists;
4) Testing of military equipment and supplies and maneuvers under war conditions.

5. Several analysts believe that the South Vietnam society has become even more corrupt during the war years; that a new crop of grafters and smugglers has been created; that there has been no basic changes in the attitudes of officials and civilians since the Americans came; and that the corrupt officials and war profiteers are severe handicaps to an eventual military-political victory of the South.

6. The presence of the U.S. may be having the following effects upon Southeast Asia:
1) The leaders have not needed to deal with the Chinese Communists to obtain military and political protection, since they have been less threatened by nuclear weapons, military takeover, internal rebellion and political blackmail;

2) The leaders have been encouraged to work more closely together for collective security, and for mutual defense and development. The success in Indonesia in eliminating Sukarno and the Communist Party has encouraged others to become more certain of overcoming internal Communist aggression;

3) The support of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam seems to have been strengthened by the military gains, the possibilities of the rural development program, and by evidence that the U.S. will maintain long term commitments in the region.

7. Many of the new nations have been built by rallies around a popular hero who took the lead in the political processes and in maintaining working harmony among the traditional waring groups. There is no popular hero in the South, which increases the problems of nation building.

8. Some new directions in policies, plans and possibilities seem to be evolving:

1) The rural pacification and development program is designed to destroy the Vietcong infra-structure in the villages, as well as to bring economic and educational improvements. The assumption is that with security the rural peasants will take care of the Vietcong and the Communists, and will support the government if the latter improves it's services and integrity;
2) The government of South Vietnam must be strengthened so that it can handle the pressure of the Vietcong. This means a democratic government in fact as well as name; the shifting of policy making towards people-chosen civilian leaders; retraining of the armed forces so they can effectively assist pacification and rural development, expand military action in the Mekong Delta, protect the borders and control the guerrillas; and a social revolution lead by a government with officials of higher efficiency and integrity;

3) A strong Vietnam democratic political base is necessary to cooperate with the improved SVN military forces and the military might of the U.S. to eventually check Communist guerrillas and aggression.

9. Some analysts have concluded that the U.S. has been assisting the "bad guys" rather than the "good guys" in Vietnam: that the former represent the vested interests and resist the needed social-economic reforms; while the latter insist that such reforms must be brought about rapidly, even if guerrilla warfare and destruction of the opposition are required to accomplish the objectives. Unfortunately, perhaps the American government citizens have not developed the attitudes and methods to work with such "good guys"; nor have they evolved adequate democratic methods and patterns to adequately speed up change.

The writer trusts that the data selected for the above analysis are fairly accurate, and that the ideas assembled present a fairly balanced picture of the conditions and happenings in Southeast Asia. He recognizes that there are a host of shortcomings in the study.