FINAL REPORT
COVERING ACTIVITIES

of the

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
VIETNAM ADVISORY GROUP

For the Period

SAIGON, VIETNAM
June, 1962
ERRATA

Page
1  Next to last par., 1st line: Change "fields" to "field."
   2nd and 3rd line: The word "Vietnamese" should be divided
   "Vietna-mese".
10 2nd par., 3rd line: Change "effecting" to "affecting."
11 2nd par., 4th line: The word "responsibility" is misspelled.
12 Last line: Change part of last word to "budg-".
13 1st line: Change "set" to "st".
   3rd par., 5th line: "prepared" is misspelled.
17 Begin par., 5th line: with "The vacillation..."
18 2nd par., 14th line: The word "eight" is misspelled.
20 Next to last line of 1st par., under "SURVEYS AND ANALYSES:"
   Omit comma after the word "section".
24 3rd par., 1st two lines: The word "adoption" should be
   divided "ad-op-tion".
26 1st line: Place semicolon instead of comma after "1956".
   4th par., just above "THE ACADEMIC PROGRAM", next to last
   line: The word "accessible" is misspelled.
31 2nd par., 5th line: The word "training" is misspelled.
33 2nd par., next-to-last and last lines: The word "beginning"
   should be divided "be-ginning."
   Last par., 1st line: Change "recommended" to "recommends".
36 4th par., 2nd line: Change "advance" to "advanced".
46 2nd par., 8th and 9th line: Under "Traffic": The word
   "distributed" should be divided "distrib-uted".
53 Next to last par., next to last line: Change "bu" to "by".
   Last par., 5th line: Change "soon" to "some".
55 1st par., 3rd and 4th lines: The word "envisaged" should
   be divided "envis-aged".
61 Under the heading "CHIEF ADVISOR'S OFFICE," "Fishel, Wesley
   P.", should be listed as the "second" chief advisor instead
   of the "first".
   Also under "CHIEF ADVISOR'S OFFICE," "Lloyd D. Musolf":
   Change beginning date as Chief Advisor from 7/19/59 to 12/3/59.
This Report has been prepared and submitted in compliance with contracts between Michigan State University and both the Republic of Vietnam and the United States Agency for International Development. With the exception of the initial submission, the Michigan State University Group has released previous reports semiannually. This final report, however, covers not only the last six months of activity but also spans the complete life of the project in Vietnam. Our present staff are largely responsible for drafting the report, but we should like to acknowledge the assistance of several former MSUG members in making helpful suggestions and in preparing several sections. We owe a special debt of gratitude to Mrs. Ralph S. Hatry and Mrs. James Montgomery for their invaluable help as editors.

Guy H. Fox
Chief Advisor
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GENERAL

This final report will briefly summarize and analyze the more than seven years of Michigan State University Group activities in Vietnam—from May 20, 1955, the date of arrival of the first chief advisor, until June 30, 1962. The report does not purport to be a detailed history, an analytical case study, or even a comprehensive record of the multifarious programs MSUG has undertaken. Rather, it is primarily a summary review of our goals, organization, major programs, problems encountered, and results. Frustrations, delays and failings as well as accomplishments will be recorded.

Officially the project grew out of the recommendation of a four-man Michigan State University mission sent to Vietnam by the Foreign Operations Administration for a month’s survey trip in the fall of 1954. The sending of the mission had resulted from a long-time association between the Governmental Research Bureau of MSU and Ngo Dinh Diem while the future President was still in political exile, and later, following the Geneva Conference of 1954, from the activities of an MSU professor serving as a consultant to Diem, then Premier of Vietnam, and to USG. Following the mission’s recommendation for the establishment of an MSU technical assistance project in Vietnam two contracts were negotiated and signed in the spring of 1955: one between the Government of Vietnam and MSU, and the other between the Foreign Operations Administration and MSU. Each was for a two-year period. At their expiration they were revised and renewed until June, 1959; and, in 1959, a three-year renewal extended the expiration date until June 30, 1962.

In number of personnel, scope of activities and complexity of problems involved, the MSU project probably exceeded any other university overseas contract then in existence, at least for the first four years of its operations. At its height the MSUG staff consisted of fifty-one members appointed by the University’s Board of Trustees and one hundred fifty-one Vietnamese and other locally hired employees.

All these personnel were engaged in carrying out, or giving administrative support to, programs in two major fields—public administration and police administration. Public administration activities included surveys and recommendations designed to improve government departments and the Office of the Presidency; consultation to the Government of Vietnam in the fields of budget and fiscal administration, taxation, personnel, and organization and management; and advice and assistance to the National Institute of Administration, on which MSUG public administration activities were concentrated after 1957. The National Institute of Administration is primarily an educational institution for preparing students for the highest echelon of the civil service, but it also conducts related programs for in-service training, research, library development, the sponsorship of organizations and conferences seeking administrative improvement, and international cooperation.

MSUG has given advice and assistance in several areas of the police fields. The principal areas have been: research and training; municipal police; the Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation programs; the civil guard; scientific crime detection; communications; traffic engineering and records management; records and identification; and the national identification card program.

To carry out its heavy responsibilities in public administration and police administration, MSUG was obliged to provide its own administrative support both
in Saigon and on the East Lansing campus. In Saigon, administrative services were necessary for budget and fiscal administration involving counterpart (plaster) funds; personnel management; and logistic support, including housing, maintenance, travel, commodity transportation, motor pool, participant processing and so forth. The Coordinator’s Office on the MSU campus served as a liaison with various campus departments and officials, with AID/Washington (originally FOA and later ICA) and the Vietnamese Embassy in the United States; supervised and assisted the scores of participants sent by the project to the United States; recruited project personnel, in collaboration with MSU functional departments; developed and conducted orientation programs both for MSU personnel before their departure for Saigon and for Vietnamese participants arriving on the campus; provided transportation of both personnel and supplies; managed the project’s dollar budget; and handled numerous other administrative details.

Although the carefully selected staff, with rare exceptions, undertook their assignments with dedication and enthusiasm, even those who had previously worked within foreign cultural contexts encountered an environment and problems unique to their experience. As noted in one of MSUG’s early semiannual reports, the art of counseling people of another culture on a subject so sensitive as the conduct of their government is a difficult one in which, generally speaking, Americans have had relatively slight experience.

The MSU Group found themselves not only working in an unfamiliar cultural context but also living under unstable, tense, and at times unsafe conditions. When the first arrivals of the Group came to Saigon a large section of the city was in ruins caused by a clash between government forces and the Binh Xuyen sect. Until that sect was finally defeated in a major battle on October 10, 1955, fighting in the outskirts of the city was frequently clearly audible in Saigon. For awhile, dissident die-hards of the former colonial regime were setting off plastic bombs almost nightly in key utility installations, in an effort to discredit the government. The resultant explosions frequently rocked the residential sections of the city, and this was somewhat disconcerting even to the most impassive members. Through a violent raid on a hotel in which they were temporarily residing, six MSUG members and their families suffered considerable property damage. Another was kidnapped by the army of the Cao Dai sect, but later released unharmed.

Later years proved comparatively less tense, especially from 1957 through early 1959. By late 1959, however, the Viet Cong (communists) had noticeably increased their acts of subversion, sabotage, terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Because of this, travel outside of major cities was restricted beginning in 1960. American officials were required to obtain special permission for surface travel through the countryside. And by late 1961, Saigon residents could again hear distant sounds of skirmishes and sometimes battles—this time between the government and the Viet Cong.

Even within the city there were occasional disturbances. On November 11, 1960, three government paratrooper battalions attempted a coup d’état. Although no MSUG personnel were injured in the resultant battle involving tanks, bazookas and cannons as well as small arms, several of their houses were hit, and three members and their families had to be evacuated from their homes. Later, on February 27, 1962, two dissident Vietnamese Air Force pilots bombed and strafed the presidential palace, near which the homes of many MSUG members were located. On several other occasions Americans were, or were presumed to be, the targets of hand grenades thrown by unidentified assailants.
The brief background of tense conditions and alarming incidents is presented not to inject drama into the report, but rather to give an understanding of the setting and to underscore the calm, effective way in which the overwhelming majority accomplished program objectives despite the stresses and tensions under which they often worked. In addition to these psychological aspects, MSUG members had to adjust to the tropical climate and to learn to cope with physical disorders which frequently had a debilitating effect.

The political environment of Vietnam was also strange and, in some respects, unpalatable to many MSUG members accustomed to the political democracy of the United States. Although no MSUG member ever expected to find in newly independent Vietnam all the civil liberties firmly established among older western democracies, some members had misgivings lest the project's technical assistance might serve to strengthen an autocratic regime and retard the development of democratic institutions. Most members, however, believed our activities were valuable not only in increasing administrative efficiency in Vietnam but also in creating among the Vietnamese a critical attitude for seeking truth and knowledge through systematic research, promoting the study of social sciences from the western viewpoint, raising the general level of educational standards, and implanting in the minds of government officials, police officers and teachers the ideas of responsibility and responsiveness to the public, individual dignity and other such concepts, the acceptance of which is a prerequisite for the eventual evolution of free institutions in Vietnam.

Obviously the influence of MSUG upon the attitudes and behavior of Vietnamese officials, students and teachers cannot be measured and recorded. For this reason the final report will necessarily emphasize the solid, tangible results of MSUG programs. But a record even of tangible results will to some extent indicate an impact on the spirit and general outlook of the Vietnamese. For example, the increased use of empirical research by NIA professors is evidence of a new critical attitude; the recent wide acceptance of NIA-MSUG sponsored in-service training programs indicates the emergence of progressive tendencies; the courteous behavior and helpful attitude of Vietnamese traffic policemen testify to a public-oriented training heretofore lacking; other concrete examples will be found in the text below. Significantly, many Vietnamese have expressed the view that the intangible influences constitute the most valuable contributions left by MSUG.

Unfortunately, a basic, irreconcilable difference between the Government of Vietnam and MSUG precluded the project's continuation for an optimum period. The Government regarded MSUG members as confidential advisors with an obligation to support the existing regime—or at least not to criticize it—even after returning to the United States. MSU, with a university's obligation to seek and foster truth and knowledge, could not accept this viewpoint. The University's viewpoint was that it would not, could not and should not attempt to control the writing of returning scholars.

In this final report it may be well to record the correct version of the front-page publicity and inaccurate accounts which appeared in many United States newspapers regarding the termination of the project. After a careful committee analysis of National Institute of Administration needs, in early 1961 MSUG concluded that the interests of the NIA would be served by continued University assistance on a limited basis. MSUG recommended to the campus that, if an acceptable contract could be made either with AID or a foundation the University should agree to furnish three or four advisors to the NIA for a three-year period.
following June 30, 1962. Campus officials replied that the University would consider continuing the project either under a foundation or AID, but insisted that: 1) the initiative for a new contract must come from either the Government of Vietnam and AID and/or a foundation; 2) any University assistance given must be on a limited scale and confined to NIA academic matters; and 3) the contract must contain provisions to safeguard the University's academic integrity.

Informed of the University's position, the NIA, with approval of the President of the Republic, submitted a formal application to AID (then ICA), requesting a three-year extension of MSUG's assistance. USOM/Saigon, the American Ambassador in Vietnam, and AID/Washington were in accord with the desirability of such renewal. While expressing a desire and willingness to negotiate, MSU reiterated that the University would enter into an agreement only if the contract terms were acceptable.

At this stage the attitude of the President, heretofore favorable to a contract extension, underwent a change because of several articles written by former MSUG members. The government regarded these articles as being harmful to its interests and indicating a lack of loyalty by MSU, but MSU felt obliged to defend, within the limits set by security considerations, the freedom of expression for those returning from the project.

In response to the government's application for a contract renewal the University's Dean of the College of Business and Public Service came to Vietnam in February, 1962, to ascertain whether, from the University's viewpoint, there was an acceptable basis for a contract. While the Dean was still en route to Vietnam, the Chief Advisor of MSUG received indirect and informal word that because of writings of MSUG returnees, the President did not wish to renew the government's contract with MSU. At the time of the Dean's visit, the President formally affirmed this view, and negotiations ended.

Although the continuance of technical assistance to the NIA by several MSUG members would have enabled the University to round out its work and to help the Institute through the forthcoming crucial period (discussed in the Fourteenth Report), MSUG considers its work in Vietnam largely accomplished or, in the case of certain activities, transferred to USOM. From the outset the University's purpose had been to work itself out of a job in Vietnam either by preparing the Vietnamese to assume tasks undertaken temporarily by MSUG, or by enabling the Vietnamese to perform effectively certain important programs without further technical assistance. Therefore, most gratifying of all are the personnel, trained directly by MSUG technicians or sent abroad under participant grants, who will carry on the programs for which the University was responsible in establishing or developing.

Without the cooperation and assistance of the USOM and the American Embassy's Administrative Service, MSUG's programs would have been far less effective. Numerous difficulties would have been avoided and many economies effected, however, if MSUG had received a greater degree of administrative support than USOM was prepared to give in such matters as housing, disbursement, accounting for property, travel and shipping.

From time to time differences also arose between USOM and MSUG. Perhaps the most serious of these concerned the role of MSUG's economists vis-a-vis the economic and finance advisors of USOM. Related in part to this issue were a
number of knotty questions, never entirely answered to the satisfaction either of USOM or MSUG, over the interpretation of the contractual provision saying MSUG activities should be performed "under general policy guidance of the USOM Director" but that MSUG "will be responsible for all professional and technical details of the contract."

In view of the frenetic work situation and sensitive political problems faced by USOM and MSUG, and of the necessity of close work relations and daily contacts between the two agencies, there were surprisingly few instances of friction; cordiality and understanding were the rule in USOM-MSUG relations. MSUG is especially grateful to the USOM Director and to officials in the Public Administration Division, Executive Office and Program Division of USOM for their generous assistance and cooperation during the difficult phasing-out period. An orderly transition of a number of programs from MSUG to USOM was possible largely because of the warm, cooperative relations existing between MSUG members and members of the relevant USOM divisions.

The results of MSUG's project in Vietnam reflect the framework of trust, confidence and rapport within which the group were able to work with the Vietnamese. Such a framework, built upon a foundation of mutual patience and understanding, was possible, it is believed, partly because MSUG were representatives of a university rather than an American governmental agency. It was due partly, also, to the large percentage of dedicated MSUG personnel, whose interest and sincerity of purpose were evident to their Vietnamese counterparts. In all areas of their work MSUG personnel worked closely and intimately with the Vietnamese. From the opening day of the NIA in August, 1955, to the end of the project MSUG had advisors stationed at the Institute, at times sharing offices with NIA professors. MSUG members were not always able to break the barrier of formalities, so often characteristic of relationships not only between foreigners and Vietnamese but among the Vietnamese themselves. But MSUG was, at least partially, successful in establishing cordial, pleasant associations and in lasting friendships and bonds of scholarship.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Consulting Activities

Until mid-1956, consulting activities were given a high priority among MSUG activities. The original agreement executed in April, 1955, between the Government of Vietnam and the University provided that MSUG would give advice and assistance to the government regarding (1) the Office of the Presidency and (2) regional and provincial administration. For carrying out these activities, MSUG assigned several of its personnel to a Presidency Project and created a Field Division. From June, 1955, to July, 1957, the Presidency and Field Administration projects encompassed virtually all MSUG's consulting activities. The original policy of the Group was to direct its consulting activities toward "crash" programs—programs which would have an immediate impact. By early 1957, however, as it became evident the newly created nation would survive successfully the series of crises which threatened its existence at the outset, the emphasis of consulting activities was shifted from emergency programs to programs of long-range consequence.

Because of the influx of approximately 850,000 refugees from communist North Vietnam into the South, the Vietnamese government and USOM requested MSUG in July, 1955, to devote a major portion of its efforts to an emergency program of providing an efficient field administration capable of supplying the refugees with essential government services. With a stream of 5,000 new refugees who had to be fed and housed pouring in each day, the situation was critical. The existing administration structure was designed to move people and this it did very well. Since it was not designed for rehabilitation, however, it was experiencing difficulties. In accordance to the request for assistance, MSUG was obliged to change drastically its original plan and tables of organization. Approximately one-third of the contemplated staff of thirty was assigned to Field Administration.

During the summer of 1955 the Division's entire effort was devoted to the problem of improving the organization and management of the refugee program. This operation led to the publication of Recommendations Concerning Proposed Reorganization of the Commissariat for Refugees, dated August 6, 1955, and Recommendations Concerning Proposed Field Organization of the Commissariat for Refugees, dated September 20, 1955. Most of MSUG's recommendations were adopted with satisfactory results. As a part of its implementation efforts, MSUG assisted the Commissariat of Refugees in a two-week training course for 56 field officers in January, 1956. Because many different factors and efforts contributed to the success of the refugee program, MSUG's contributions cannot be readily isolated nor accurately measured. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the University had a significant role in one of the most successful cases in history of mass population resettlement and rehabilitation on so large a scale.

1. The legal and permissive basis for MSUG's consulting activities in the original contract is contained in paragraph 1 of the main document, paragraphs 12 and 13 of Annex I, and paragraph 4 of Annex II.
Simultaneously with the conduct of the survey of the Refugee Commissariat, a work program was prepared to cover the original responsibilities of the division. The stated objectives of the program were:

To assist in bringing the activities of the government more effectively to all the people of Vietnam;

To assist in improving the field services of the several ministeries and commissariats of the national government;

To study and plan for integrated and democratic local government; and

To review and place in perspective the inter-relationships of the several levels of government;

For carrying out the foregoing objectives, the Division adopted a procedure involving three phases:

(c) A research phase in which data was collected through a systematic use of documents, interviews and field observations on the operations, functions, procedures, organizations and problems of the central government in Saigon and the field offices of the department;

(b) The analysis and report-writing phase, which entailed systematic study of the information collected and the preparation of a report containing the major findings and recommendations to correct deficiencies found. A decision, later to be regretted, was made to distribute all such reports throughout the government, rather than to submit them only to the ministries concerned.

(c) The implementation phase, in which MSUC staff assisted by the government in making changes in the agencies surveyed. Continuing consultation was provided by staff members and by short-term consultants who were made available by MSUC as the need for specialists arose.

It soon became apparent that local government as such was almost non-existent in Vietnam. Government authority and services were highly centralized; the regions, provinces, and districts were, in reality, administrative units in the hierarchy of the Ministry of Interior of the national government. The Field Administration Division found it was impossible to work effectively with the field organization without also working with the national offices of the departments. In the fall of 1955, therefore, it was decided that the first phase of the program would be to study and make recommendations concerning the organization and administration of the Ministry of Interior and its relationships with regional, provincial, district, canton and village administrations. The second phase of the program would be to study and make recommendations regarding the relationships of the hierarchy of local units with the central office and with field staffs of other national ministries and commissariats.

The survey of the Ministry of Interior was started in the fall of 1955. Since it entailed considerable travel throughout the country, the survey was in part performed in cooperation with members of the Police Division. In conducting the
study, the Division held approximately 225 central office interviews, 56 in regional offices, 336 in provincial offices, 116 in districts, and 363 in villages. In the report, which was published in January, 1956, a number of sweeping and significant changes were proposed. In June, 1956, the Chairman of the Department of Political Science of Yale University arrived as a short-term consultant to work with the Division in implementing the Ministry of Interior report.

The recommendations for Interior received a mixed reception; some were accepted completely and others in part; still others were accepted only "in principle" or rejected outright. In accord with the recommendations, the government abolished regional administration—a move which, it should be pointed out, had already been under consideration before it was proposed by MSUG. The government also reduced the number of cantons substantially, but did not eliminate them as MSUG had recommended. The President of the Republic said that he agreed "in principal" with MSUG's proposal for a drastic consolidation of provinces but that such consolidation must await an improvement in the security situation. Only a few provinces were merged. The government also acted to implement the recommendation calling for removal of officials from Saigon to the field, but not nearly to the extent MSUG had envisaged. Eventually the government accepted a number of the recommendations for budgetary improvement.

The Division's recommendations regarding the relations between central technical services and their programs in the provinces were not accepted nor did the government establish elected local councils as MSUG suggested. In December, 1961, the government did act to create provincial councils, but these were not made elective. At the time of the creation, officials at the Presidency declared that as soon as stability and security are attained in Vietnam "the councils will be elected by universal, direct and secret vote."

After completing The Ministry of Interior study the Field Division revised its method of research. To make more rational the use of research time the Division decided that during a single visit to a specific area representatives would obtain data which could be used for more than one departmental study. Under this new procedure the Field Division undertook a simultaneous survey of four departments: Agriculture, Agrarian Reform, Education and Civic Action. Because of an extensive revision in the organization of the Commissariat of Civic Action during the time of the study, the only outcome of the Civic Action survey was a short, preliminary report in which the principal recommendation called for enhancing the position of the agency and raising the Commissar General to the rank of Secretary of State. In 1961 this recommendation was carried out, but the degree to which the government was influenced by the MSUG's suggestion to take this action is not known.

The influence of the MSUG's recommendations for reforms in the departments of Agriculture, Agrarian Reforms, and Education is somewhat clearer. These recommendations were embodied in the Report on the Department of Agriculture, the Report on the Organization of the Department of Land Registration and Agrarian Reform, and the Report on the Organization of the Department of Education, all published June 30, 1956. Following the issuance of the reports, division staff and departmental representatives cooperated in implementing several important proposals. In the case of the Department of Agriculture, the four MSUG recommendations pertaining to the utilization of personnel and the five recommendations relating to general administrative practices were adopted. Although
recommendations pertaining to the departmental organization, involving the transfer of units between governmental departments, were not accepted, several of their basic ideas were incorporated in a general administrative reorganization in May, 1961.

Two important MSUG proposals for improving the Department of Land Registration and Agrarian Reform were accepted: establishment of a separate unit to deal specifically with land reform operations; and consolidation of all agricultural credit functions into a single agency. In view of the political significance of agrarian reform, the division's recommendations to abolish the department and to transfer its functions to other departments was rejected. With the administrative reforms of May 27, 1961, however, the Department of Land Registration and Agrarian Reform ceased to exist as a department and—closely conforming to the MSUG recommendations, although not necessarily because of them—was combined with agriculture, agricultural credit, and a number of related agencies into a newly created Department of Rural Affairs.

MSUG recommendations in the education report dealt basically with three problems; (1) lack of schools and facilities; (2) shortage of teachers; (3) illiteracy. Among the MSUG's proposals for coping with the first problem were suggestions for the use of standardized plans for school structures, simplified procedures for letting contracts, and other measures to reduce the time which elapsed between the approval for and the erection of schools. Subsidies for semi-public schools were recommended to make additional school facilities immediately available without capital investment by the government. The principal reasons for the teacher shortage, it was found, were the low salaries and inefficient hiring procedures. Recommendations covering these points were made. One of the recommendations for reducing illiteracy was the proposal for a well organized popular education program. The department accepted all the foregoing recommendations and, largely through the efforts of six implementation committees on which both MSUG and USOM were represented, the Government of Vietnam carried out most of them.

In the fall of 1956 the Division began surveys of the departments of National Economy and of Information and in January, 1957, published reports containing recommendations for administrative improvements. In its report on National Economy, MSUG expressed special concern at the lack of over-all planning and coordination of various aspects of economic developments, and recommended the establishment in the Presidency of an Office of Coordinator of Economic Affairs to be responsible for economic planning and general surveillance over economic affairs. At the time the report was published the Secretary of State for National Economy was also the Vice President of the Republic and, by virtue of his prestige and close relationship with the President, was able to obtain favorable action from other departments concerned with the nation's economy. Probably for this reason the government did not at the time act on MSUG's recommendation. But in the Reorganization Act of May, 1961, a new Secretary of State was appointed to National Economy and, as MSUG had proposed in 1957, a General Coordinator (at present, the Vice President) for Economic Affairs was named.

MSUG's recommendations for the Department of Information included proposals for regrouping activities to permit clear lines of authority, detachment of Youth Affairs and Sports from the department, establishment of Radio Vietnam as an autonomous unit, setting up of journalism training, and creation of a government printing office. A few months after MSUG's recommendations were made a
National Printing Center was established and Radio Vietnam was set up as an autonomous unit. Later in 1967 Youth Affairs was separated from the Department of Information, which, in October, 1960, lost its departmental status and was converted into a Directorate General. MSUG's recommendation for a program to train journalists was not forgotten. By 1962 plans for NIIA to give public information officers both pre-service and in-service courses in journalism were completed, and the establishment of a school of journalism was under serious consideration.

In addition to formal departmental surveys, the Field Division was called upon to make a number of special studies. Perhaps the most significant of these was an analysis and review made in early 1957 of government programs effecting the mountain tribesmen (the Montagnards), who constitute a large and important minority group in Vietnam. The study was undertaken at the request of the President of the Republic, who had received reports of widespread discontent among the mountain tribes.

Under the direction of a well-qualified anthropologist, a division team analyzed government programs, especially in the fields of education and agriculture, within the context of tribal political structures, land ownership customs, and other cultural factors. The reasons for discontent among the mountaineers soon became evident and were published in an MSUG report which included recommendations for sorely needed reforms. The Government did not accept recommendations.

From 1957 until late 1961 the report on the mountaineers was virtually forgotten. In the meantime the government had acted, independently of MSUG's proposals, to improve the lot of the Montagnards, but the measures taken were not adequate to resolve some of the basic difficulties. By exploiting the grievances of the mountain tribes the Viet Cong were winning an increasing number of supporters among them. A special committee to examine the problem of the disaffection of the tribesmen was set up by USCOM. Since the MSUG report on Montagnards was the most recent and complete available, copies of it were used by the committee to provide background information and ideas. At a staff meeting the USCOM director remarked that if the government had put into effect the MSUG suggestions when they were submitted in 1957 the Viet Cong would have had far less success in gaining converts among the mountaineers.

At about the time the mountaineer study was initiated the Field Division began to sense a reluctance on the part of Vietnamese government officials both in Saigon and in the provinces to discuss administrative affairs with MSUG personnel. This attitude was reflected in an order requiring prior Office of the Presidency approval for government officials in the provinces to confer with foreign technicians as well as requiring presidential clearance for all field trips by MSUG technicians. The Vietnamese government also acted to regulate the issuance of MSUG reports. With MSUG assent the government decreed that drafts of each MSUG report be submitted first the affected ministry, whose representatives would prepare comments and/or rebuttals before submitting it to the Presidency.

At this point it was recognized that MSUG's practice of distributing the survey reports to all levels and agencies in the government had been a mistake. The officials in departments being surveyed were averse to having their colleagues in other departments read reports which subjected them to analysis and criti-
cism. It was decided that henceforth less formal reports would be submitted directly to the Secretary of State concerned and not distributed until his concurrence had been obtained.

In April, 1957, all progress to date was measured and suggestions for improvement were incorporated into a revised work program. Although major objectives remained the same, emphases were changed. It was decided to stress the concept of decentralization of authority and responsibility and to carry out research and study in depth fewer agencies, rather than to attempt to cover all agencies. Since finance and personnel administration affected all areas of the government, these fields were selected for concentrated study.

Spring of 1957 brought a considerable turnover in the personnel of the Field Administration Division. The Division chief and his deputy left Saigon and the remaining staff consisted of a personnel administration advisor, an organization and methods specialist, and two research specialists. Shortly thereafter, MSUG underwent a reorganization in which all non-police program activities were concentrated in a Public Administration Division. The Field Administration Division changed to the Consulting Section of the Public Administration Division. In keeping with the revised work program, research in the fields of finance and personnel administration became the responsibility of the Consulting Section.

The accomplishments of the Field Administration Division, though they were fairly substantial, would probably have been still greater if, first, the Division had possessed a larger number of personnel experienced in making administrative surveys and, second, if the Division had been successful in institutionalizing its work. At the time American personnel were recruited for the Vietnam project, the University did not expect to become so heavily involved in administrative surveys and, therefore, did not obtain enough qualified technicians for this highly specialized task. Only after its initial personnel had arrived in Saigon did MSUG, at the urgent insistence of the Government of Vietnam, agree to divert many of its staff, chosen for other purposes, to field administrative activities. The American staff then, in turn, handicapped by the lack of available Vietnamese personnel with a knowledge and understanding of government procedures and traditions. Nevertheless, since both Vietnamese and American staff members devoted themselves to their work and had a will to learn and improve, they overcame the handicap of inexperience to a considerable extent.

A more serious shortcoming of the Field Administration Division's programs was its inability to work through a counterpart Vietnamese agency or agencies. Ideally, from the outset a Vietnamese agency should have performed the actual surveys under the guidance of the Division, and eventually have carried on the work without technical assistance. Instead, Division members themselves were obliged to assume almost the entire burden of making surveys and recommendations. An attempt was made to have the NIA undertake the task. Although research facilities of the NIA and the Division were linked as a first step toward this end, the Institute never received the personnel or financial resources to undertake comprehensive surveys. For the same reasons efforts to establish the Budget Direction as a locus for field administrative studies were futile. Other ideas for institutionalizing the work in a single Vietnamese agency proved fruitless.

From the vantage point of hindsight it appears that the most feasible course for the MSUG to have followed would have been to insist on a thorough involvement of the agencies surveyed. Although during the survey Division personnel kept department officials informed and discussed problems or possible solutions with them,
resultant findings and recommendations did not represent a joint product of the Department and the Division. Perhaps MSUG acquiesced too readily to department pleas that because of the lack of personnel, resources, and time, MSUG advisors should serve in a staff capacity to make the actual surveys. In reviewing Division activities in late 1957, MSUG staff members agreed, generally, the Division should have made joint Vietnamese-MSUG participation a requisite condition for each department survey. In spite of its difficulties, this procedure, it was believed, would have increased the educational value of the surveys, made for greater cooperation during the study and interviews, identified the departments with findings and conclusions, and thus helped to insure departmental acceptance and support for the recommendations.

Consulting Services Provided by the Presidency Project - June, 1955-57

As mentioned previously, during the first two years in operation, the second area in which MSUG provided direct consultation in public administration to the Vietnamese government stemmed from MSU's responsibility to assist in strengthening the Office of the Presidency.

In August, 1955 the first phase of the Presidency Project was begun with a systematic survey of every position in the Presidency, to determine resources available and the responsibilities delegated to each office. A detailed work plan was then drafted and submitted to the Government of Vietnam and USOM. The plan included the following principal stages:

a. survey and research
b. analysis and recommendations
c. conferences with the President and/or his representatives
d. assistance with implementation of recommendations accepted by the government
e. in-service training as needed for the improved functioning of the Presidency.

In October the President requested MSUG to broaden the scope of the project to include a consideration of the relationship of the government's budget and personnel function to the Presidency. At this time--in line with MSUG's preliminary, informal recommendations--The Directorate of the Civil Budget and the Directorate of Civil Service were moved directly into the Office of the Presidency.

Intensive research into the organization and activities of the Presidency resulted in a report which was presented to the President in November, 1955. This survey found, in part, that:

"The Presidency is not at present equipped to give leadership and direction to the Government on the development and control of economic and budgetary policy, this is one of the widest gaps in the organization of the Executive. With problems of economic stability and development coming to the fore, and with a significant proportion of the national budget, for the moment, based on foreign aid, there is a need for a policy focus close to the President in these matters."

The report recommended a strengthening of the budget function in the Government of Vietnam as a means of permitting the President to exercise positive policy leadership and formulation.

These proposals proved to be in accord with the President's own views. He asked the MSUG to prepare plans for modernizing and strengthening the Vietnamese bud-
get system.

To help carry out this request, the Director of the Budget for the State of Michigan, who had previously served as budget advisor in the Philippines, joined MSUG as a consultant in May, 1956, for a three-month period. His assignment was to review the existing budget operation and to prepare a practical and feasible program of improvement. As an alternative to the "crash" type of operation, in which a private management consultant firm is contracted to install a new system complete with forms, procedures and instruction manuals, he recommended that MSUG hire a budget specialist and an accounting specialist as permanent additions to its staff. These two, assisted by a research associate, would function as a team, to furnish needed technical advice and assistance for at least two years.

As a result of this proposal, MSUG recruited a budget specialist, who arrived in August, and an accounting specialist, who came in December, 1956, to work on the Presidency Project. Their activities eventually resulted in a major reform of the Vietnamese government's budget and accounting system.

In the fall of 1956 the President requested a report on the existing system of budgetary administration in Vietnam, its deficiencies and proposals for its improvement. The report was to convince the President's Cabinet that steps were needed to improve Vietnam's financial administration. With assistance by other MSUG staff members the budget and accounting specialists prepared the requested report and presented it to the President and the Cabinet in March, 1957.

Shortly thereafter it was distributed to others in the government for study and comment. The report was designed to stimulate attention, and even controversy, within the government on the need for modernizing the financial administration of the country. In this aim it was successful. Vietnamese officials offered many rebuttals to specific criticisms and very few of them accepted MSUG's recommendations in toto. Nevertheless, most of the ideas advanced by the MSUG were received remarkably well by Vietnamese officials, and there appeared to be a surprising amount of agreement with MSUG's report on the main faults of current practices, and the methods which could be used to correct them.

As a consequence in April, 1957, the President merged the Directorate of Budget, the Directorate of Obligation Control and the Administration of Foreign Aid into a single agency, the General Directorate of Budget and Foreign Aid, under the control of the Office of the Presidency. This reorganization had the strong support of the Secretary of State at the Presidency, who recognized the need for integrating foreign aid operations with the national budget function. The move upgraded and strengthened the budget and accounting function. At the same time the President appointed the former Administrator of Foreign Aid to be the General Director of Budget and Foreign Aid, and instructed him to begin a program of budgetary reform. The new General Director welcomed MSUG's assistance and, as will be seen shortly, acted with vigor and determination to carry out the presidential mandate.

Activities of the Consulting Section, Public Administration Division, July, 1957-December, 1960

As already mentioned, in July, 1957, MSUG underwent a reorganization which placed all consulting activities in public administration within a single unit,
the Consulting Section of the Public Administration Division. This move, in part, was to reflect a change in the approach and methods of providing technical advice and assistance. Much of the survey and research into the existing organization and practices of the majority of the government agencies had been completed,* reports making recommendations for administrative improvements had been published, and a substantial number of such recommendations had been accepted and implemented. It was now up to the government to complete the implementation of those recommendations which it saw fit to accept.

Under its revised organization, MSUG was prepared, upon request from the government for assistance, to furnish the services of an organization and methods specialist, a budget specialist, an accounting specialist, a personnel administration specialist and several generalists in public administration. It was hoped that the role of the specialist would be, as much as possible, that of a staff member of the agency he was called upon to aid. He would work closely and informally with Vietnamese personnel in the agency on a day-to-day basis, and would provide advice and assistance to the head of the agency on projects assigned by the agency head. Such relationships were developed in several instances, notably in budget and accounting, with the Department of Health, in tax administration, and with the civil service agency.

BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING

In August, 1957, the Comptroller of the Michigan State Liquor Control Commission joined the Consulting Section as a short-term accounting consultant. After working closely with the Accounting Service of the General Direction of Budget and Foreign Aid he prepared a manual on budgetary accounting procedures that produced some significant changes in the central accounting system of the government. Also, in November, 1957, the Commissioner of Administration, State of Minnesota, arrived as a two-month consultant in the field of administrative reorganization.

In January, 1958, the consulting activities gained increased emphasis when MSUG received from the Vietnamese government a list of some forty-five projects for which assistance was requested. From this list some ten or twelve projects were selected to become the principal work program of the consultants during the next two-year period.

The consulting role of MSUG was expanded under the terms of a contract amendment signed in May, 1958. Reflecting the government's additional requests for consulting aid, Annex II, Section D of the new agreement provided:

"The University Group will carry out, at the request of the Government, studies on any problems of administration or of administrative reforms and will present any reports and recommendations related to each study. The University Group can also propose the study of certain questions to the Government for approval."

The budget and accounting system which was evolved by the Vietnamese government

*MSUG did not receive requests for a survey from the departments of Labor, Public Works, Justice, or Foreign Affairs, and did not study these agencies.
in cooperation with MSUG was a major success. An impartial United Nations budget expert's opinion was quoted in the press as follows:

"Of all the countries I have visited in this region, Vietnam has by far the most advanced and up-to-date system of managing a budget. It is not only a good system and in the keeping with modern trends, it is also the best system I have seen in this region."

Major reforms initiated in the budget and accounting systems were: a redesigned and greatly improved budget document; a modern budgetary classification system of appropriation accounts; mechanoelectric accounting, with up-to-date accounting reports; improved budget execution procedures; speedier pre-audit of proposed expenditures; increased budgetary control through an improved allotment system; improved program review of agency budget requests; and the establishment of performance budgeting in the Department of Public Works.*

ORGANIZATION AND METHODS

An organization and methods specialist joined the Consulting Section in May, 1958. During his tour he worked closely with the Department of Health to install a mechanical system of inventory control of drugs, improved warehousing procedures and improved records management. He also provided advice to the Office of the Presidency in the use of office equipment and the establishment of an improved filing and records system.

PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

MSUG's consulting activities in the field of personnel administration were fraught with disappointments and frustrations and, in spite of the persistent but tactful efforts of a highly qualified technician, resulted in only a few readily perceptible accomplishments. As early as 1955 modernization and development of the Vietnamese civil service system was recognized as one of the urgent needs of the government. The Presidency itself asked MSUG to include a personnel administration project among its activities. Initiation of such a project was, however, delayed until late 1956, pending the arrival of a personnel technician and the completion of earlier commitments.

Research on the civil service system was begun in early 1957. At the outset the civil service agency cooperated fully, permitting MSUG representatives to interview personnel at all levels and to probe into agency affairs. By the end of the first quarter of the year, a number of high government officials had developed a reluctance to subject their agencies to the scrutiny and criticism entailed in a survey. Nowhere was this new attitude more clearly evident than in the civil service agency. In an abrupt change of policy, the Director General of Civil Service requested that MSUG thereafter submit all inquiries in writing to him and conduct interviews only with him. After MSUG explained why such a procedure would preclude meaningful recommendations, the Director General conceded that

* For an excellent account of the steps taken by MSUG's budget specialist to effect changes in an archaic system, see Marvin Murphy, "Overcoming Resistance to Major Change - Vietnam Budget Reform," Public Administration Review, (Summer, 1960), Vol. XX, No. 3, pp. 148-151.
that university technicians might interview certain key personnel, but not on the premises of the Directorate General of Civil Service. MSUG apprised the agency that it could not operate under these circumstances, and temporarily assigned the personnel technician to other duties.

In the latter part of 1958 there was a renewed interest in civil service activities and seemed to be a more receptive attitude on the part of the Director General. A committee, composed of representatives of the civil service agency, the NIA, USOM, and MSUG, was organized to study civil service administration and to make recommendations for its improvement. After several fruitless committee meetings, the MSUG technician, in consultation with the USOM representative, prepared an outline of proposals as a means of focusing the committee's discussions on concrete problems. The Director General, after expressing his appreciation for the document and saying it might provide a basis for further discussions, failed ever again to convene the committee despite several requests for him to do so.

Shortly thereafter the personnel technician left on home leave and returned only upon the request of the Director General, who expressed a desire to move ahead with a modernization of the civil service system. After his return in 1959, the technician prepared drafts for some major changes in the civil service system, but the Presidency decided that it would not be politically expedient to adopt the proposals at that time.

In mid-1960, just as MSUG concluded it was no longer practicable to continue consulting activities with the civil service agency, the Directorate General of Budget and Foreign Aid initiated a personnel census of civil servants and requested technical assistance from MSUG. This project was directed largely by the Director General of Budget and Foreign Aid but was coordinated with the civil service agency. MSUG furnished considerable assistance in planning and preparing forms, codes, and operating procedures.

A final effort was made to achieve some measure of progress in the civil service system. The University's personnel technician devised a plan whereby the questionnaire devised for the personnel census would contain questions which would elicit information regarding position descriptions. This information would permit a classification of positions into major occupational groups and the establishment of position schedules for each agency. The position schedules might be used for personnel control purposes. Even more important would be the indoctrination into position concepts and the taking of the first step toward position classification, which the agency had said it wished to adopt. The plan also briefly sketched a means of transition to a position classification system. Regrettably, the civil service agency has not yet taken any positive steps to implement the plan.

Thus, when the MSUG personnel technician's tour of duty ended in late 1960, there were no clearly demonstrable, major accomplishments in the field of personnel administration. The civil service agency had adopted some minor proposals such as adjustments in pay on a more equitable basis, placing daily workers who are in fact continuous employees on an indefinite employment basis, and the like, but had accepted nothing of substantial nature. The most that can be said for this part of the technical assistance and participant program is that it resulted in perceptible attitudinal changes among a number of civil service officials. Not only in their conversations but also in their reports, papers, and speeches, such officials reveal an
increasing knowledge and understanding of the essentials of sound administra-
tion and a growing awareness of the shortcomings of the existing system.
Before his departure from Vietnam MSUG's personnel technician completed a
comprehensive report on the scope and nature of the Vietnamese civil service—the
first and only report ever written. The vacillation of attitudes and
actions of the Vietnamese officialdom toward modernizing and developing the
civil service system are difficult to apprehend. Initially the President
appeared to support reform while the agency itself seemed uncooperative.
Later the situation seemed to be reversed; on several occasions the agency
actually submitted proposals for improvement of the system which were sub-
sequently rejected by higher authorities. Agency officials also complained
that even routine personnel actions had to be submitted to the Presidency,
where many were lost or, at least, greatly delayed; and that personnel-
actions were frequently decided at the Presidency on the basis of politi-

cal expediency. The archaic, ineffective civil service system remains perhaps
the greatest single impediment to improved administrative efficiency in
Vietnam.

TAXATION

Until 1959 MSUG activities in the field of taxation were confined to re-
search. In June, 1956, an MSUG economist, temporarily assigned to USOM,
published a long, penetrating report entitled An Analysis of Vietnam's Tax
System with Recommendations. In November, 1956, another economist wrote
a report on Taxation in the Provinces of South Vietnam; and in July, 1957,
the same writer completed a two volume study on Provincial and Local
Revenues in Vietnam, of which Volume I was entitled General and Theoretical
Considerations and Volume II, Studies of Important Taxes and Proposals for
Improvement.

MSUG consultation in the field of taxation began in January, 1959, with the
arrival of a taxation specialist. At the expressed desire of the Vietna-

ame Government, his consulting activities consisted chiefly of research
reports analyzing tax policy and administration and making recommendations
for improvement. Five of the consultant's reports dealt, respectively,
with income, land, patents, indirect and excise taxes; a sixth and final
report was summary of findings and recommendations.

The reports, distributed in both English and Vietnamese, have proved to be
helpful research documents. They constitute the first comprehensive study
of taxation in Vietnam, bringing together and organizing scattered and not
readily accessible materials and other information. The American taxation
advisors—both the USOM tax specialist and the Brookings Institution group—
who have worked in the field of taxation after the departure of MSUG's


tech-


tnicians placed on the usefulness of the reports is that certain parts are
"too theoretical" and "not applicable to Vietnamese conditions."

The Director General of Taxation has also said that the reports have been
valuable, especially in depicting the shortcomings of the present tax
system and in stimulating the Vietnamese into self-analysis and indigenous
solutions. His chief criticism of the reports was a "lack of depth" in
probing into certain problem areas and a tendency in places "to oversimplify
complicated matters."
In the eleventh semiannual MSUG report it was said that:

"If instead of using a research yardstick, the effectiveness of this work is measured by the extent to which recommendations have been studied and found acceptance in concrete governmental action, the efforts of the tax consultant must be said to have fallen short of success."

This statement, while still generally true, had come to have less validity by the expiration date of MSUG's contract. By mid-1962 the Directorate of Taxation had given careful consideration to MSUG proposals, and as the agency received authorization from higher headquarters and acquired the necessary resources, was in the process gradually of adopting an appreciable number of the recommendations in whole or in part. For example, the Directorate has adopted the recommendation for eliminating exemptions in the production tax. Also, as rapidly as possible, the agency has been assuming, as MSUG's technicians had recommended, the collection of direct taxes. Other changes along the lines recommended include: an increase of the personnel of the Directorate (though only by approximately 25 per cent whereas a 100 per cent increase was recommended); adoption of more frequent revisions of land assessments than in the past (but not yet annual assessments as recommended); utilization of cadastral services for land surveys; elimination of certain patentee taxes; an increase from eight to fourteen controllers for inspecting indirect taxes (25 were recommended); and, a substantial raise in excise taxes. The foregoing examples, which do not constitute an exhaustive list, furnish evidence that the Government has been moving somewhat in the direction of the recommendations. Of course, the Brookings Institution group and the USOM tax advisor are entitled to much of the credit for the implementation of those MSUG recommendations with which they concurred. But to a large extent the Directorate General of Taxation itself has taken the initiative in tax reforms based on the MSUG's proposals.*

An important lesson in technical assistance was learned the hard way from the experience of MSUG's tax consultant. The lesson grew out of the close identification by the consultant with the Secretary of State for Finance and his subordinate, the Director General of Taxation. Such an identification may have been desirable in a stable political situation where allocations of authority and responsibility correspond essentially to organizational charts. But in Vietnam persons with access to and the confidence of the President often determine policies on matters outside their formal jurisdiction. In the case of taxation, the consultant discovered that the Director General of Budget and Foreign Aid, who at the time enjoyed the confidence of the President, had greater influence in determining policies than did the Minister of Finance, who had formal responsibility. Because of his differences with the Finance Secretary the Director General of Budget and Foreign Aid was prone to disregard recommendations emanating from the Finance Minister or anyone associated with him. Especially after the political kaleidoscope shifted once again and still another figure, the Secretary of State for National Economy, emerged in early 1962 as the person with the greatest influence in determining tax matters, the lesson became evident:

* It is apropos to note that many of the tax reforms recommended by the advisors in the Philippines during the early 1950's were not accepted until the 1960's.
In a country where the decision-making process corresponds so little with formal charts, and where intense political rivalries result in frequent changes in the power structure, consultants must exercise great political sophistication to avoid, or to enter with utmost caution, entanglements which tie the success or failure of their programs to any one political figure.

For reasons which have already been largely indicated, an evaluation of MSUG's consultant programs is difficult. Figures based on percentages have little meaning. For example, in a review of its progress in the spring of 1957, the Field Administration Division estimated that the government had accepted approximately sixty per cent of its recommendations, and a later check would have shown the adoption of the substance of a considerable number of additional recommendations. Percentagewise the number of acceptances would be impressive. But the figures would not take into account the relative importance of the proposals accepted and rejected—which could be ascertained (though not with precision) only by a painstaking empirical study.

Even if a systematic tabulation were made of the number and importance of MSUG recommendations accepted, the results would still be misleading. Undoubtedly many government changes would have been made even if MSUG had not suggested them. Indeed, in some cases the University's role was mainly one of giving support and publicity to the thinking of progressive elements in the administrative agencies. Also, since all change is not necessarily improvement, a proper evaluation would necessitate an analysis of the result of each change for which MSUG was responsible.

Equally difficult to measure is the part played by MSUG as a stimulant for the innovation of ideas by the Vietnamese themselves. Nevertheless, this was one of the most important and satisfying roles of the University. By calling attention to defects in the existing system, delineating problems, explaining the experience of other countries, sending Vietnamese administrators on study and observation tours to the United States and third countries, MSUG frequently made it possible for Vietnamese officials to arrive at their own solutions, which were often as good as, or better than, those advocated by the University.

Finally, the full impact of MSUG's consulting activities, or of any technical assistance program, cannot be judged for many years. For instance, only time can tell whether the government will ultimately adopt those proposals which were accepted "in principle" but not implemented because of political and security considerations. It is also possible that the future in other ways will present a different perspective: conceivably, those consultant activities which now appear successful, such as in the budgeting area, might prove to be less successful in the years ahead than the activities, such as in personnel, which now seem disappointing. As noted, there is hope that progressive elements will prevail in the civil service agency. On the other hand, there are growing misgivings that the Budget Directorate will be able to maintain the high standards of performance it has achieved.

Moreover, a long-time perspective is essential because MSUG consultants have often advocated changes which embrace new ideas and concepts—often in conflict with traditions and vested interests—that need time to generate, to become understood, and to gain acceptance. To be sure, Vietnam need not necessarily follow every slow, tortuous evolutionary stage which characterized the development of modern administrative institutions in other countries. However, a
period of evolution cannot always be avoided—and indeed may sometimes be desirable if the end result is to be an acceptance of the substance rather than the mere outward trappings of consultants' recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Only a few general recommendations will be made for the areas in which MSUG has conducted consultant activities. MSUG has not made departmental surveys since 1957, and its other consultant programs ended approximately a year and a half before the issuance of this report. Therefore, the University would be presumptuous to present comprehensive, detailed proposals for areas in which it has not operated for so long and in which it does not have an up-to-date, intimate knowledge. A number of lessons to be learned and pitfalls to be avoided for future consultants and several recommendations for administrative reform in Vietnam have already been mentioned and need not be repeated.

SURVEYS AND ANALYSES

MSUG recommends that the Budget Directorate be encouraged in its efforts to establish an effective Management and Organization section. This section, it is believed, should do more than recommend procedural improvements based on work flow and work process studies. Quite appropriately, for instance, the section might audit the extent to which administrative programs attain policy goals; make proposals, after study, for better departmental organization; conduct work to improve governmentwide management; and provide guidance for inter-departmental relationships. Studies of the Management and Organization section, should, of course, be continuous.

As special projects, MSUG recommends that the Government of Vietnam, with advice and assistance from USOM, make several important surveys. A team composed of professors from NIA, the University of Saigon and selected government officials, especially from the Department of Interior, would be an appropriate group to undertake the proposed studies.

Among the valuable studies which could be undertaken is a survey of relationships between the central government and local government units. At present, lines of authority among the Office of the Presidency, the Department of Interior, and various functional departments over local governments are cluttered and nebulous.* Problems of national-local relations pertaining to finance, local autonomy, economy, size and nature of national administrative subdivisions are only a few of the areas which require study and recommendations for remedial action.

In formulating national policies aimed at increasing popular support and combating subversion it would be helpful to conduct a survey (using polling techniques, among other methods) to determine the efficacy of various government programs in the villages and provinces which have been made fairly secure from communist threats. Studies and analyses would also be beneficial preparation for needed government actions on such problems as the administration of mountain tribes and the cooperation between the civil administrators and military authorities.

*Some, but by no means all the difficulties are due to the fact that the posts of both the Secretary of State for the Presidency and of the Secretary of State for the Department of Interior were occupied, for a long period, by the same individual.
BUDGET

MSUG recommends that the USOM, with the consent of the Government of Vietnam, bring a budget consultant to Vietnam periodically to give advice and make suggestions to the Budget Directorate. MSUG's former budget advisor (now Chief of PAD/USOM, Cambodia) or a former MSUG budget consultant (now Chief of PAD/USOM, Philippines), for example, could readily be brought to Saigon from time to time for short assignments. There has been no budget advisor in Vietnam since November, 1960, and the Vietnamese budget director, who was so largely responsible for the rapid progress of the Budget Directorate is no longer connected with the agency. To prevent retrogression and to encourage future progress, MSUG believes occasional assistance is highly desirable, if not essential.

PERSONNEL

MSUG recommends that its former advisor, now personnel specialist with USOM/Saigon, be given complete support in his efforts to modernize the outmoded civil service system of Vietnam. Undoubtedly the most important step the government could take toward modernization would be, with USOM's technical assistance, to formulate and follow a series of stages culminating in the abolition of the cadre system and its replacement by a position classification system.

TAXATION

MSUG recommends that the Government of Vietnam make the Tax Directorate, actually as well as legally, the principal source of tax policy recommendations. It is further recommended that the Government furnish the Tax Directorate the resources necessary to implement those MSUG recommendations which it accepts. If given proper authority, personnel and physical resources, the Directorate of Taxation is prepared to adopt the greater number of these recommendations, with which both the USOM tax specialist and Brookings Group consultants, who are working in the field of taxation, are also in general agreement.
Introduction

With the opening of a new campus in January, 1962, the NIA entered upon a critical period—one which should determine whether the Institute will fulfill its aims and aspirations. The task is staggering. The NIA is entrusted with the recruitment and training of a new generation of officials who must, if Vietnam is to keep pace with global modernizing trends, be equipped with new skills and concepts of a public service emphasizing responsibility and service rather than privilege and prerogative. Respect for the power of knowledge has deep traditional roots in Vietnam. If the tasks that lie ahead are to be met, these roots must be tapped and nurtured in the production of modern and rational public policies.

The new campus complex, which includes buildings constructed by United States aid funds totaling 33,423,471$VN (inclusive of reimbursement for previously expended aid funds on the old NIA quarters), provides the essential physical facilities.* With the assistance of MSUG, important steps have been taken toward the acquisition and training of necessary faculty. Ultimate success demands, however, that the NIA take aggressive steps to generate within its faculty and student body an esprit de corps and the feeling that they comprise an educational institution of higher learning rather than simply another government bureau.

*For further description of the new NIA facilities, see Fourteenth Report of the Michigan State University Group, pp. 4-5.
THE OBJECTIVES

MSU's principal objective in the field of public administration was to develop the National Institute of Administration as an effective instrument for enhancing the capacity, effectiveness, and responsibility of the civil service. Its activities were grouped into three basic program categories: 1) assistance in developing an academic program to prepare administrative managers; 2) assistance in developing an in-service training program for civil servants; 3) promoting the development of research into the administrative process and related areas. In addition, the NIA conducted a number of miscellaneous programs for the improvement of governmental administration such as sponsoring a professional society for public administration and conferences to discuss managerial problems.

The long-range aim was to help bring about an improvement in the administrative performance of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and thus contribute to the development and productivity of a friendly country.

BACKGROUND

MSU's project began in 1955 when France finished the transfer of sovereignty to the new Republic of Vietnam. With this Vietnam inherited a basically colonial administration ill-suited to its tremendous needs. Moreover, the French, having pre-empted many of the top-level administrative positions, left a vacuum of qualified personnel upon their departure.

In 1914 the French suppressed the traditional mandarin civil service examinations based largely on merit which began in 1075 in Vietnam. They founded Ecole de Droit d'Administration in Hanoi, in 1917, which was renamed Ecole des Hautes Etudes Indochinois in 1924 and was closed in 1940. Following the war a few attempts were made to train Vietnamese provincial and district officials both in Hanoi and Saigon. The training followed the French system, primarily juridical with no instruction in public administration. These hesitant steps culminated in 1953 with the founding of a National School of Administration at Dalat. This school had a two-year program, little physical equipment, and was dominated by the juridical concept. Its program included courses in administrative and judicial organization of Vietnam, administrative accounting, civil and penal law, civics, social legislation, social and political economy. A year after the opening of the school, several ranking Vietnamese officials replaced the French advisors and professors.

THE FOUNING OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADMINISTRATION

A presidential arrête established the National Institute of Administration in 1955 following the signing of the technical assistance contract between Michigan State University and both the Government of Vietnam and the Government of the United States. By the terms of these contracts, MSU agreed to send a staff of professional, technical, and administrative personnel to Vietnam to assist the government in establishing and operating the NIA for the purpose of improving the training and competence of government officials and employees, and offering instruction at the university level related to a degree or certificate program in public administration. The contract stated further the MSU staff in Vietnam shall assist in the preparation of suitable courses of study, training, and practice.
related to a degree or certificate program in public administration, political science, police administration, public relations, economics, finance and accounting, statistics, secretarial courses, and so forth.

The initial steps taken by the Vietnamese and American members of the NIA to implement the contract were as follows: 1) to acquire an adequate building and equipment in Saigon; 2) to absorb the Dalat School of Public Administration by moving it to Saigon and bringing one of its faculty members, two administrative officials, and its student body to the NIA; 3) to plan for maximum utilization of building and equipment; 4) to set up currently effective organizations for the Institute into which a degree program was merged; 5) the creation of a curriculum which would better meet the needs of students; and 6) procuring administrative, maintenance and teaching personnel.

These initial steps were followed in late 1955 by the following changes: adoption of a new curriculum; the establishment of night classes; expansion of the teaching staff; expansion of course offerings; an increase in the number of students in the degree program; institution of in-service training and research activity; holding of seminars in which Vietnamese and American staff could exchange ideas; and procurement of additional equipment and training aids.

ACADEMIC INSTRUCTION

Thus, in less than a year after the presidential 'rroto,' a complete program in public administration was in operation in Saigon. A new Rector was appointed and the teaching staff was enlarged to include American advisors and professors. The first steps were taken to send Vietnamese faculty members to the United States to begin specialized training in the field of public administration. Quarters for the NIA were provided, under the American aid program, in a former Catholic mission house near the Presidential Palace.

Beginning in 1956, steps were taken toward delineating the roles that United States aid program and Vietnamese contributions were to have in the development of the Institute. The Vietnamese staff began to assume duties that were heretofore in the hands of the American personnel and thereby began to prepare for the future when the United States financial and technical assistance would no longer be available. For example, the specialized courses in the field of public administration, including such subjects as budget and fiscal administration and personnel administration as well as courses in economics (such as economics of finance and banking) were transferred to Vietnamese professors who were working closely with their MEUS colleagues.

By the end of 1956 plans were being made for the construction of a new physical plant for the NIA.

It should be pointed out that during the first two years of the development of NIA, the primary responsibility for the direction of the Institute lay in the hands of Vietnamese officials. MEUS's role was purely advisory. It consisted primarily in providing advice on the initiation and development of programs and on the introduction of new courses which utilized a scientific approach to the study of public administration. American professors temporarily taught several courses for which there were no trained Vietnamese. Therefore, unlike some countries where national institutes of administration have been established, the greater part of the planning, direction and development was carried on by
By 1962, American staff members taught few regular undergraduate courses. MSUG therefore began to direct its efforts increasingly in the direction of improving course content, teaching methods and curriculum, and in developing research and in-service training programs.

A. Direction and Teaching Staff

During the entire period of NIA's existence in Saigon, 1955-1962, direct control over the NIA has been exercised by the President of the Republic of Vietnam, who has acted through the Secretary of State at the Presidency. The presidential office has initiated Institute policies and exercised the right of approval of proposals originating at the Institute. This supervision of NIA activities has included approval of members of the teaching staff as well as the administrative staff.

The Institute has enjoyed a continuing direction since 1955. During this period the primary responsibility for its direction has rested in the hands of two men who have continuously exercised the titles of Rector and Vice-Rector. The Rector, Mr. Vu Quoc Thong, initially exercised functions of Secretary of State for Health and Social Action, Vice-President of the National Assembly, President of the Council of State, and Professor of Law at the University of Saigon. Since 1957 direction of the Institute has been Mr. Thong's primary executive task. The Vice-Rector, Mr. Nhiem Dang, a high-ranking career civil servant, has served continuously except for the period of a brief visit in the United States. Mr. Dang participated in the planning of the Dalat school of administration and has afforded the Institute in Saigon important continuity of leadership.

A Board of Administration, a panel of high governmental officers which includes the Director of the Civil Service, and a Faculty Council also participate in policy-making at the Institute. Since 1955, these groups have been responsible for completing two comprehensive three-year plans for the progressive development of the NIA. The innovations of these planning techniques followed MSUG advice.

By 1960 the NIA had developed a primary faculty of some 16 members, two of whom had degrees equivalent to the Doctorate. One professor had the higher degree of Agregation. In 1961 the staff continued to increase until it included some 28 persons, including 16 professors and 12 part-time lecturers. Finally in 1962, the first staff member to complete a Ph. D. in Public Administration in the United States was appointed. Several members of the staff have completed B.A. and M.A. degrees in the United States and are currently candidates for the Ph.D. at American universities. Twelve participant trainees, nine of whom are under MSUG sponsorship, were engaged in graduate study in the United States in 1962, and they are expected, upon their return in 1962-64 to join the NIA teaching staff. Still in 1962 the majority of the staff is composed of men who have been educated and trained in the French tradition.

B. The Student Body

Like Vietnamese universities the NIA requires candidates for admission to have the full baccalaureate degree, with one exception, the diploma requirement is waived for Tham Su's under 37 years of age who have at least three years seniority in this grade. The number of candidates for NIA has risen steadily
since 1956, more than 1,000 students compete each year for the 100 available places.*

During recent years civil servant interest in regular admission has not been great, since usually officials with the baccalaureat already have high positions in the public service. Low-ranking civil servants generally lack the educational background that would enable them to pass the entrance examinations. The student body includes some women students, though the Institute's by-laws limited their number to ten per cent of the total student body.

The NIA recruitment program falls short of promoting the selection of a democratic higher civil service comparable to those of western democracies. Vietnam's limited educational system, influenced by economic and other environmental factors, precludes a high school education for most Vietnamese, especially those with "rice-roots" and other worker-type backgrounds. As a result a disproportionate number of students are from Saigon and a few other cities.

In addition to these social barriers to the general development of education, there are certain intellectual principles inherited from the traditional French educational system which positively restricted the development of higher education in Vietnam. The guiding principle of French educational theory is that the educational process should produce only a small social elite to whom the leadership of the nation is entrusted. According to this theory, the great majority of the population should receive a basic education, with only those of exceptional intelligence being permitted to enter the halls of higher learning. At this stage in the evolution of the Republic of Vietnam its education system continues to be molded on the French elite system, whose application in France is currently being greatly modified. This principle is in conflict with the theory, if not the practice, of Vietnam's traditional examination system which in principle opened the mandarinate to all. Any major expansion of the social base of administrative recruitment in Vietnam is dependent, therefore, upon building a modern system of education accessible to children throughout the country.

C. The Academic Program

The curriculum approved by the Presidency on May 5, 1957, comprised three years of study. In principle the first year of resident study emphasized theoretical studies and general cultures, but the curriculum covered a variety of subjects (Introduction to Public Administration, Economics, Constitutional Law, Finance, Statistics, Practical Drafting of Administrative Documents, Accounting, and so forth).

Under the revised 1957 curriculum, specialization began in the second year, when the students were divided into two sections, General Public Administration and Economics and Finance. Students of the General Public Administration section

* 1,700 applicants competed in June, 1962, for admission during the academic year beginning in August, 1962.
concentrated on subjects related to the administrative sciences (administrative problems, civil service, labor, law), while those in the Economics and Finance section concentrated on subjects such as capital formation, economic planning and economic problems in Vietnam. All students were given practical studies including office management, budget practices and organizational methods, human relations and visits to government field projects.

In the third year, the two sections were broken down into several groups in accordance with student preferences and abilities and with the needs of the administration. The groupings were thus: central administration, banking, local administration, treasury, taxation, and so forth. The efforts of the third year were divided among field training, actual work experience and follow-up seminars at the NIA. Members of the NIA staff made periodic visits to central and field offices in order to observe student apprenticeship training.

In June, 1960, the Presidency gave final approval to a revision of the three-year degree program. The revised curriculum, originally proposed by an NIA-MSUG committee, combined the "practical" emphasis of the old program with an expanded social science perspective intended to give NIA graduates an essential background and understanding of the social, economic and political context and implications of their work. Under the new curriculum the NIA initiated two courses in sociology, one of which was taught at the outset by an MSUG member.

In 1961 MSUG conducted an extensive study of the NIA which concentrated on the utilization of the teaching faculty, problems of the Institute, and areas for improving the training of civil servants at the NIA. Thus study was the basis of a series of conversations, first between the NIA and MSUG, then within NIA itself, concerning the continuing improvement of the NIA.

The NIA adopted some of MSUG's suggestions, resulting from these meetings, agreed in principle with a substantial number of others, and stated its intention to give still others serious consideration. Two important changes made were the modification of the examination system and the elimination of dual faculty appointments.

Another major change was initiated in the 1962 curriculum when the Faculty Council of the NIA, upon instructions of the Presidency, decided to integrate the administrative and finance-economic sections. The new directive was motivated by the belief that students needed a more "generalist" type of instruction because in the future they would be called upon increasingly to perform general managerial functions as provincial and district officers. The Faculty Council also decided on February 1, 1962, to make the instruction of English a selective rather than a mandatory subject. Finally it was decided to modify the curriculum to increase the regular academic study in the third year to 2 and one-half to 3 months. MSUG was asked for an opinion regarding these proposed changes in the curriculum and for concrete recommendations as to how these changes might be carried into effect.

In reply the following general principles were recommended: First, the increased emphasis upon the "generalist" dimensions of administrative training might best be achieved by offering fewer courses and thereby reducing the number of class hours. This would require fewer mandatory specialized and technical subjects and more emphasis upon courses relating to a liberal arts education.

Second, more reliance should be placed on outside reading materials, including texts, articles, and reports currently available in the NIA library.
Third, the general policy should stress the importance of writing and translating relative materials by the NIA faculty.

Fourth, the NIA might adopt a policy to encourage the faculty to stimulate class discussion and student debate. It is also noted as important for the faculty to expand its requirement for report writing and library research. This would stimulate the students' active participation, initiative and academic interest, as well as generally improve the documentation available to the students.

MSUC pointed out that if the objective of giving more attention to the study of Vietnam per se was to be achieved, then it was urgent that the NIA and its faculty take the initiative in research in order to provide data in presentable form to the students. In order to achieve this goal, it will be necessary for class presentation to emphasize examples from Vietnamese political, administrative, and sociological environment, and for the NIA faculty to require that individual student research relate specifically to this environment.

It was noted that although the availability of scholarly materials in the Vietnamese language had definitely improved during the past few years, there was still an acute need for NIA students to have at least a cursory reading knowledge of the English language in order that currently available materials in the NIA library might be fully utilized, both by the NIA faculty and the student body. Moreover, most of the world's written materials in public administration and the social sciences are in the English language. Therefore, MSUC indicated that it would be unfortunate to change the curriculum requirements concerning the instruction in English.

Finally, it was suggested that if the objective of producing high administrators, who were truly "generalists" in the sense of having attained a high level of well rounded knowledge, is to be realized, it is important that attention be given to the addition of a fourth year of study. It might be noted that the French National School of Administration requires non-fonctionnaire students to have as a prerequisite for admission, the equivalent of the licence. Even if the NIA adopted a four-year program, its graduates would receive far less formal preparation than those at the French School of Administration. The fourth year would be particularly beneficial both in terms of developing a curriculum stressing the Vietnamese cultural development and in enhancing the prestige of the credentials of the NIA graduates. MSUC suggested it would be feasible to begin the four-year program in August, 1962.

In line with these general principles, specific recommendations concerning the integration of the administrative and the economics-finance sections of the NIA were offered to the Rector. The suggested curriculum reduced the normal load of eight courses each semester to six. It was recommended further that once materials become readily available in Vietnamese, the course load could be eventually reduced to five each semester.

Finally it might be mentioned that the NIA has decided to adopt several new academic programs and has others under serious consideration. To be reactivated in August, 1962, is a special course to enable mountain tribesmen, an important ethnic minority group, to assume administrative positions with their own people. A special two-year program for training head clerks for the Tam Su class will also be initiated as soon as possible. Furthermore the NIA expects to continue offering courses for army officers who have been appointed to civil administrative
positions. The NIA also agreed to offer pre- as well as in-service programs for both public information and tax officers. Several problems must first be resolved. It is also considering, eventually inaugurating courses to prepare students in foreign affairs and business administration.

Acting contrary to NSUG advice, in 1959 the NIA, experimented with a graduate program in public administration. This failed for several reasons. 1) It sought primarily to attract career officials who could not devote sufficient study time. 2) Because of the mixed educational backgrounds of the students, subjects could not actually be taught on a graduate level. 3) Lack of incentives which would encourage civil servants to enroll and study assiduously was a serious deficiency. However, after the Ph.D. participants receive their degrees and join the NIA faculty, it is hoped that the NIA will establish a meaningful graduate program for full-time students who will receive adequate recognition for obtaining a higher degree.

D. Examinations and Appointments

Following MSUG's 1961 study, the examination system underwent changes. Examinations are now given in each course at semester-end. Each consists of two parts. Students answer five to ten short-answer essay-type questions in addition to writing a long essay. Oral examinations—consisting of only one question—were eliminated. The admission system has been modified, with written examinations reduced from five to four. The large number of applicants has deterred acceptance of our recommendation of an oral examination or interview before actual admission. Some 500 students have graduated. Their current positions are about equally divided between central and provincial posts.

E. The Evening School

Evening courses—with around 500 enrolled per semester—were first instituted in 1955 to help low-ranking civil servants increase their professional ability and prepare them for promotional examinations. Since 1959 those completing the program have been awarded a Certificate of Proficiency in Administration; by 1960, 417 had received them. Students outside Saigon may follow correspondence courses. With several thousands having already completed their training, only 30 to 50 students are now enrolled and future classes may be small. It has served a valuable purpose, but unless the program is revamped or revitalized it probably should be discontinued.

F. Concluding Observations

1) The NIA is established and functioning; it has taken significant steps toward improving administration. 2) It actually provides personnel for high-level positions, thus serving to improve both the quality and quantity of high administrators. 3) It is taking leadership in rekindling ideals of yesteryear when merit had a prime place in recruitment. 4) Significant changes in thinking about what constitutes best training for higher echelon civil servants have been made. An appreciable place has been given to instruction in scientific administration, and a beginning made toward acceptance of an understanding of the dynamics of public administration. Several faculty members have been trained in American schools of public administration; others have had short observation tours. Finally, the NIA did not develop entirely on the American model; rather it maintained many characteristics implanted by French administrative and educational systems.
In-service Training

In its October, 1954, report the four-man MSU-FDA team recommended that American assistance be provided for "immediate in-service training" in Vietnam. Such training programs were emphasized because it was believed they would produce rapid results which seemed so urgently needed in view of the political, economic and administrative state of the country after partition.

As a result of the original recommendation, the first MSUG contract included a Civil Administration Assistance Project to help the Vietnamese government strengthen its local government organization and administration. According to the 1955 contract, Vietnamese civil servants already on the payroll were to become trainees. It was also assumed that "command level" personnel would be considered in the training program. Courses were to be offered either during or after working hours and were to be either intensive (one week) or somewhat spread out (one or more hours a week for ten weeks). In addition to formal courses, special conferences, conventions and meetings were anticipated as training devices appropriate for higher level administrators. MSUG also had the responsibility for frequent round tables of government officials and bureaucrats as well for stimulating development of administrative professional associations and publications of technical works.

Unfortunately, the in-service training program did not begin in earnest the first summer of MSUG's tenure in Vietnam. Urgent needs meant that emphasis was given to police and field administration rather than to in-service training and research activities. For some time the training program served only to support higher priority activities, although courses relating to office management, secretarial responsibilities, tax administration, many phases of police work, advanced economic theory and Refugee Commission personnel were offered by MSUG staff members. The National Institute of Administration also began assembling an in-service training staff, and started establishing a training and visual aids center. The NIA Council approved a format for in-service training and sought to have the President ask the various ministries to provide both trainers and trainees for the courses. The NIA also circulated a questionnaire which was intended to attract support for supervisory and executive development programs.

The basic philosophy and statement of goals for the training program in Vietnam, Form Plan and Statement of Philosophy for In-service Training, was completed in October, 1955, and henceforth served as a guide for subsequent activities. According to this essay, MSUG and the NIA were to assume responsibility for inculcating the concept of in-service training so that it might become an accepted personnel procedure in the Government of Vietnam. It stressed that the effectiveness of American training methods and devices should be intensively and extensively contrasted. It was assumed that the government would then accept those aspects considered advantageous and integrate them into the Vietnamese government routine. Of a program, it was argued, should begin at the top with agencies of the central government, preferably through leadership courses at the NIA. Creation of a training office in each government agency, staffed by full-time training personnel was also envisioned.

MSUG's objective, confirmed by the President in his communiqué of December 1955, to "direct the in-service training of officials on the democratic way, realize it in a short time." MSUG members assumed that democratic supervisory techniques would be instilled with both specialist and generalist training, the former involving departmental and NIA training in specific skills, and the latter
including development of leadership training cadres. It was also supposed that general in-service training could be conducted as part of the implementation of recommendations made by MSUG's field administration advisors.

It was hoped that the government would put into effect a more flexible personnel administration system which would reward persons who benefited from in-service training; would see that training standards were developed; would provide for training officers to see that good and effective training was available in each ministry, under the general guidance of the Civil Service or the National Institute of Administration. In an attempt to implement these in-service trainings aspirations, two meetings of the Interdepartmental Council on In-service Training were held in 1966. When the Council failed to become an effective instrument, however, new and less lofty goals were devised, and the NIA offered three remedial proposals: (1) the Council should be more active and the representatives on it should be from the highest possible departmental levels; (2) the NIA's in-service training staff should be enlarged; and (3) each government department should appoint its own training officers and staffs.

This third suggestion opened the possibility for decentralizing the embryonic in-service-training operations. A recommendation was made to the Presidency that advisory councils and in-service training staff be established in each department and province, to oversee program operations. NIA was to provide technical coordination of the various programs and assistance to training divisions for beginning their operations. A presidential order designating the NIA as secretary of a comprehensive government-wide decentralized program was sought. Under this order the NIA would also provide leadership, library facilities and materials, and a program for training both directors and trainers. This attempt to provide legal sanction for a national in-service training system met with failure. At first the President requested a redraft of the suggested order, to meet structural changes in regional administration. The changes were incorporated in the proposal; and an NIA canvass showed that all except one government department (the Directorate of Budget and Foreign Aid) favored the projected program. Despite this, the proposal was not signed by the President.

A comprehensive system remained the ultimate goal of in-service training advocates in Vietnam. This was restated in the 1967 MSUG Work Plan for In-service Training.

" Somehow, eventually, the great needs for in-service training felt in the Presidency as well as in many other parts of the Government are going to be tied to the September 1966 Council recommendations for accomplishing the training. When this finally happens, in-service training in Vietnam can really get underway."

Nevertheless a shift in strategy and pursuit of a much more attainable intermediate goal was recognized as necessary. For example: under MSUG-NIA auspices, courses in accounting, budget administration, records management, etc., continued to be offered; research concerning specific administrative and office practices received increased attention; use of less formal instructional techniques, such as the case method, was encouraged; special lectures and lecture series were given; the staff, library and facilities of the NIA In-service Training Section were expanded until the Section became a regular NIA Division; and publicity about in-service training was intensified.

The publicity was accomplished chiefly through the In Service Training Newsletter
and has since been continued with its successor, Progress, which is sent to approximately 6,000 civil servants and read by an even larger number. This has been supplemented by dissemination of a brochure entitled What Is In-Service Training? and of many translations of foreign materials covering such subjects as conference leadership, training methods and administrative problems. The basic shift in strategy was, however, in the method of striving for government-wide in-service training even without the backing of a presidential order. As part of this new proposals were made for seminars on in-service training to be offered for pertinent higher government officials and for construction of in-service training centers in the provinces.

In 1957, therefore, plans were made for construction of training premises in Central Vietnam where wartime destruction of buildings had been especially severe. Completion of six such training centers in addition to training facilities in Saigon was viewed as a significant step toward strengthening Vietnamese local government through a government-wide program of personnel development and work improvement. Later, plans were expanded to include construction of training centers in all provinces.

In August, 1963, when the project for providing physical facilities for training had passed blueprint stage, MSUG made new recommendations covering central and local government training. This Proposal for the Division of Responsibilities for In-Service Training in the Government suggested that (1) departmental and semi-autonomous agencies should create training centers and devise plans of action; (2) the Civil Service Directorate, in addition to providing guidance, evaluations and studies, should issue appropriate regulations to enable it to increase the quality and scope of in-service training; (3) an interdepartmental council on in-service training should integrate programs generally; and (4) the NIA should provide publicity, translation and preparation of training materials, research, consultation, special training officers' programs, participant training, and courses in human relations, typewriter trainer development, and supervision. Despite the fact that no supporting formal regulations or acknowledgments were made by the government, many aspects of this proposal were implemented.

Seminars for central government and provincial officials, undertaken in cooperation with the Department of Interior and the Civil Service Directorate caused some attention to be focused on in-service training within government agencies and units. Three interdepartmental seminars on in-service training attended by representatives from all provinces formally acknowledged the value of in-service training and approved plans for organizing training divisions in each province, with officials budgeted for training director positions.

These plans still have not been fulfilled, but, despite the fact that no agencies or ministries have set up training divisions staffed by full-time trainers, the NIA has been able to provide gradually projects to train trainer cadres for all levels of government. Courses and seminars have included a government training officer seminar, two organization and methods courses for upper-middle management, and an organization and methods course for selected civil servants from twenty different agencies. Although not as systematic as a comprehensive national training system might have been the NIA projects have produced impressive results.
Three further steps have been significant for future development: the creation of a training service in the Department of Interior; the construction of twenty-one provincial training centers; and the basic training officers' courses conducted by the NIA. (See map on page 35).

In 1961 and 1962 four seminars for training officers and directors were held, two for central government training directors and two for provincial training officers, all of whom have been carefully selected to become trainers. In principle, seminar members were to work full time as in-service trainers in their respective agencies. Thus far, however, many of them must perform both their training duties and other work assignments. As a result, the corps which has been developed is not being fully utilized and the objective of the training program has been only partially realized. Nevertheless it can be said that an adequate beginning in training trainers has been made.

Although a presidential order sanctioning in-service training and providing for necessary organizational, budgetary and personnel allotments would have been an easy way to achieve long-range goals, it remains what it has always been, a rough equivalent to a blessing from Heaven. Besides the absence of such an order other difficulties had to be surmounted. Following French custom, personnel administration in Vietnam was based on educational background and academic degrees rather than on training in relation to one's work or to competence displayed on the job. Persons who achieved relatively high positions on this basis had no desire to see their positions or prestige undermined by an alien scheme for providing executive or administrative competence. There was also considerable skepticism over the new training techniques, such as conferences, the case method, and role playing, and a feeling that such training was inferior to more conventional styles of teaching. These techniques caused uneasiness among numerous executives who were not themselves equipped to handle them. There was an almost universal lack of familiarity with the concept of human relations development, a basic theme of the in-service training program. These attitudes translated themselves into indifference, opposition or only passive support from key government agencies. And finally, continued security problems made it difficult for many administrators to leave their posts long enough to receive training, for provincial training sites to be selected and constructed, and for governmental attention to be diverted from immediate emergencies to long-range development of trained cadres.

In view of all this the program can be adjudged relatively successful. Results include indirect achievements of various dimensions. A foundation has been laid for permitting a well-trained group of trainers to educate others. When the competence of this group is considered together with the physical facilities in the provinces, furnished with modern training materials and equipment, and the staff and facilities of the NIA itself, progress is undeniable. This progress can continue toward developing greater administrative skills and competence and improving governmental procedures and functions.

Recommendations

MUG recommended that the NIA's ultimate goal in in-service training be essentially of a staff nature. At a time when no other agency had the interest or ability to assume leadership in the field, the NIA assumed the initiative of coordinating and developing in-service training activities on the national level. As other Vietnamese agencies, especially the Fonction Publique (Civil Service) and the Department of Interior, assume logical responsibilities for training, the NIA, it is be-
lieved, should—move out of the actual training operations with certain exceptions mentioned below. Experience indicates that the future efforts of the NIA's In-Service Training Division can be most fruitful and helpful if devoted mainly to five functional areas: information, research, consulting, stimulation, and executive development training.

1. The information function involves publicizing in-service training and translating foreign training material. The newsletter, Progress and the brochure What Is In-Service Training? are examples of informational activities which the NIA might well continue. Although the NIA has already made and disseminated numerous translations of relevant foreign materials, it is expected that this activity will be necessary and useful for many years to come.

2. The research function refers to activities such as the survey of training needs; the preparation and publication of original training materials; and the study of concepts and practices of foreign training practices, with a view to their adaptation and adoption.

3. The consultation function refers to rendering advice and assistance as requested by other agencies. Normally such assistance would consist of providing only guidance on the establishment and conduct of training programs, and not of actually conducting classes.

4. The stimulation function involves encouraging and coordinating in-service training activities. It would be appropriate, for instance, for the NIA to continue to take the lead in organizing conferences, institutes, and workshops, at which officials discuss training problems, exchange information, and observe demonstrations of techniques. Also, the Institute should expand its efforts to create an interest in professional associations in the training field and to sponsor their development. Such associations, if they are vigorous, can generate original material on training and serve as a clearing house for information on training.

5. The executive development training function would consist of organizing programs to improve the general administrative ability of top managers. The staff of the NIA is best qualified to prepare generalists for high-level administrative posts and should, as soon as possible, confine their efforts to this area, MSUG believes. For the foreseeable future, however, it may be advisable for the NIA to continue to offer the basic trainer course for which it already has experienced, expressly trained instructors. Also, for the time being, the NIA may be the only feasible locus for courses in middle management supervision. If this proves to be the case, the NIA should perhaps temporarily assume the responsibility, but MSUG urges the NIA to exert increased efforts to disengage itself from training activities in specialized or technical fields such as typing, organization and methods, budgeting, accounting, and the like. The NIA moved into these areas only by default of the other agencies which are more appropriate and better qualified to organize and conduct technical courses. These other agencies should be encouraged to assume their training responsibilities.
DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVING FOLLOWED IN-SERVICE TRAINING COURSES

- Technical Officials: 18,326
- Top Ranking Officials: 1,224
- Executive Officials: 3,472

IN-SERVICE TRAINING CENTERS IN VIETNAM
PARTICIPANT PROGRAM

MSUG has carried out a fairly extensive program for sending Vietnamese participants to the United States and to third countries such as Philippines, Malaya, and Japan. Included in this program have been Vietnamese government officials from many fields including budget, taxation, and personnel; police officials of various categories; and staff and potential staff of NIA. In Appendix A is a yearly breakdown into three major fields of the 179 participants sent abroad by MSUG.

Among NIA staff who have visited the United States under MSUG auspices for the purpose of study and observation are the Rector, Vice Rector, and all other members of the teaching faculty with the exception of five members (four of whom were recently employed). Several NIA administrators have also been sent, including the Chief of Administrative Services. One participant was sent to the Philippines to obtain her B.A. in library science, after which she was made head librarian at the NIA. Another Institute librarian received her B.A. in January, 1962, from an American university and is expected to complete her M.A. in library science by the end of 1963.

Chiefly because of the reluctance of the Government of Vietnam to permit its talented youth to be absent for a long period when they were needed at home, MSUG was unable until 1958 to inaugurate a program for sending prospective NIA faculty members to the United States to obtain their doctorates. Since that time three candidates have returned to the NIA without their Ph.D's: one is now returning to the United States to complete his dissertation after which he will rejoin the NIA faculty; a second is a faculty member at the NIA; and the third, until recently a member of the NIA's In-service Training Division, is a draftee in the army. As of June 30, 1962, nine MSUG-sponsored Ph.D. participants were studying in the United States at quality universities. Four of these are expected to complete their degrees in 1962, four in 1963, and the last one in 1964. Another Ph.D. candidate now studying in the United States under USOM auspices, is scheduled to obtain his degree in 1963 and return to the NIA as a faculty member.

A committee composed of representatives of the NIA, USOM, and MSUG selected two additional Ph.D. participants in 1962. Both were advanced graduate students in the United States at the time. Their selection increased the number of Ph.D. candidates, committed to become NIA faculty members upon receiving their degrees, to twelve. Because of an unclear policy (now clarified) in one case and the failure of a participant (though he signed an agreement to join the NIA staff after receiving his doctorate) to reveal a prior commitment, it may be that two of the twelve participants upon graduation might join the Department of Foreign Affairs rather than the NIA.

PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Government of Vietnam procedures for processing participants are too stringent and complicated. More flexibility is desired. Furthermore, the present mobilization policy excludes as participants practically all male students between the ages of 18 and 34 except those who are studying science and technical subjects. An MSUG working paper on Vietnam's human resource needs in the fields of administration, teaching, and social science research with recommendations
concerning the potential role of participant programs in meeting those needs has been submitted to the Government.

2. Follow-up on the returned participants has only recently received concerted attention, although MSUG members have had almost daily contacts with returned NIA staff members. The new USOM programs for follow-up activities unquestionably should be accorded a high priority.

3. Improvements in orientation for participants should be continued. Good progress has already been made in the betterment of English language instruction for persons going abroad. Another phase deserving attention is the re-orientation of participants upon their return to Vietnam.

4. American university degrees acquired by participants should be properly recognized by the Vietnamese civil service. Although by mid-1962 there was far less inequity in equating Vietnamese and French degrees with American degrees than there was several years ago, Vietnamese officials, most of whom are products of the French system of education, still tended to discriminate against American degrees. It is suggested that Vietnam adopt a fair, impartial method of equating degrees.
Research

MSUG's research efforts at the NIA were directed primarily toward the development of the Institute as a significant center for systematic inquiry into administrative, economic, and social problems in Vietnam. The Group therefore devoted considerable attention to aiding and encouraging empirical, field research by the NIA faculty, and to demonstrating and teaching research methodology to both faculty and students at the Institute. A great deal of NIA-MSUG research was designed to provide information and understanding of the Vietnamese environment, as an essential background for enlightened government programs and for effective technical assistance work. During the entire project, NIA faculty and MSUG members gave high priority to the preparation of textbooks and other classroom materials for academic programs. Also, a large amount of in-service training materials was prepared. Although all the research activities at the NIA have had utilitarian value, they were often motivated by intellectual curiosity and by a quest for knowledge itself.

The initial contract between the Government of Vietnam and MSU provided that "the University shall assist the Government in establishing a comprehensive research and reference program in the problems of government in Vietnam, and in developing a reference library." To this end a research coordinator was appointed to maintain high standards of research throughout the police, field, presidency and finance projects. In the National Institute of Administration a chief was named for the Division of Research and Documentation who was the counterpart to the research coordinator.

At the outset, conditions in Vietnam necessitated MSUG's giving top priority to applied--rather than basic--research in the divisions of police and field service. As noted in the October, 1954, report of the special FOA mission from MSU, "the immediate emphasis...will be on implementing proposals for action..." These applied research results of the police and field service divisions are covered in another section. Therefore this section of the report will cover only the research efforts of NIA.

Not until 1956 did NIA research receive top priority; however, the research division had been functioning effectively with a small staff since its beginning in 1955. Some early activities of the division included research conferences attended by representatives of the ministries, informal meetings on research methodology and goals, and a study of survey methods. MSUG assisted members of the NIA's research division and the Institute students to develop questionnaires, code the results, and become familiar with the use of IBM machines for processing data.

An important part of MSUG's early work was in preparing teaching materials and textbooks. MSUG members wrote textbooks and complete sets of lectures for various courses and prepared collateral readings for others; all these materials were translated into Vietnamese. Also appropriate American materials, including textbooks, brochures, and articles, were translated into Vietnamese for classroom use. Vietnamese faculty members also began early to prepare teaching materials. At present they have written about twelve textbooks and others are in preparation. These textbooks constitute a collection of the articles and materials written by the faculty through the years. An outstanding text is the three-volume work in public finance and fiscal administration written by the Vice Rector of the NIA.
An association of Administrative studies was organized in 1957 and it now publishes Administrative Research, to which most NIA staff members contribute frequently. NIA and MSUG staff also contributed extensively to the following social science journals: Que Huong (Fatherland), Law and Economic Review, Concept, ERPA Review, and Progress.

Since NIA's research division began, projects have been assigned it by the GVN. These have ranged over the following topics, to mention a few: problems of price control, means of repressing inflationary forces, government budgetary expenditures, and the Civil Service (Fonction Publique). These in addition to the consultative services did not leave much time for pure basic research until mid-1957. However, individual research studies done by MSUG even prior to that time covered such topics as: exports and imports of Vietnam, taxation in the provinces, and a study on government budget processes.

Another important feature of the early stages was the development of the case study program. The Case Advisory Committee, consisting of three NIA and three MSUG staff members, initiated a series of cases designed to illustrate problems in Vietnamese provincial government. The cases, written both in Vietnamese and English, were published in a book under the editorship of an MSUG staff member. Also a government organization manual, the only one written since the beginning of the Republic, was finished, supplemented, and at the end of this period was being completely revised.

In 1957 the NIA and MSUG organized a joint research program to investigate social, economic, administrative and political conditions in Vietnam. Projects were drafted, directors appointed, consultative counterparts assigned, and regular meetings held. However, even after obtaining GVN and American agency approvals for specific research projects, the "collaborative aspect" was a failure. This is not difficult to explain: certain NIA members were overburdened; none had experience in, nor orientation toward empirical research; the NIA incentives system (promotion, salary, etc.) was not geared to research accomplishments; the Presidency served as a veto agent and displayed a lack of awareness of research needs; and GVN agencies at the central level were uncooperative on occasion. However, by the end of 1958 there began to be appreciable collaboration and exchange or research ideas and findings.

Concurrent with the important economic, sociological and administrative village studies covered in more detail below, studies were also made of the social effects of light and medium-sized industry in Vietnam; social and economic aspects of industrial work forces in Saigon; structure and functions of the banking system; Vietnamese exchange control; urbanization of Saigon and similar related topics.

Finally, since 1959 the NIA has served as the research and documentation center for the Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration. Although the NIA has had neither sufficient facilities nor personnel to handle this last responsibility adequately, it has, with MSUG assistance, been instrumental in constructing and processing questionnaires and tabulations relating to Far Eastern central-local government relations, and municipal and metropolitan area administration. Currently the NIA is involved in obtaining and processing data pertaining to Asian civil service systems and civil servant training.

However, the greatest success and perhaps the most ironic failure of the cooperative projects involving research has been the development of a research library.
For the first four years of the project MSUG assigned an advisor, full time, to library management, training, establishing efficient library procedures (e.g., the Dewey decimal system, open shelves system, a microfilm reader), and building an excellent social science collection. The NIA’s head librarian was sent to the University of the Philippines to obtain a bachelor’s degree in library science. Another Institute librarian is expected to receive her master’s degree in library science in the United States at the end of 1982.

Today the library’s social science collection includes over 16,000 books, 900 United Nations documents, 200 Vietnamese government documents, 1,300 miscellaneous documents, and 1,500 bound periodicals. In addition it now includes over 1,500 non-catalogued documents and 500 book orders. The library collections also have been constantly expanded through periodical subscriptions totaling 150 different titles. In addition it receives 13 different daily and weekly newspapers on a continuing basis.

In short, the development of a research library has been quite successful, but problems have plagued its research aspects. Primary among these has been the absence of an arrête making the library an official GVN depository. Appeals to the Presidency and frequent requests to GVN agencies have not helped. This hinders research because official documents are the present source of current data. A few texts have been written in Vietnamese; MSUG basic research materials partly fill a wide contemporary information gap, and materials concerning French research into earlier periods of Vietnam’s history are available.

However, these existing sources are inadequate. Lack of basic research undertaken by Vietnamese scholars has meant that the impressive collection available in the NIA library includes almost exclusively works in English and French plus a few translations into Vietnamese. Further, only a small percentage of the works in the library pertain directly to Vietnam. The publications available provide raw materials for methodology and theory relating to all phases of social science inquiry into contemporary Vietnamese phenomena, including both basic and applied research. Until adequate use is made of Vietnamese research teams in the field, the present stock of publications cannot become adequate for the needs of Vietnamese research officials.

The most urgent current problem is a product of Vietnam’s archaic personnel administration system. MSUG has attempted, without success, to obtain status and salary for the librarians and their assistants commensurate with their proven competence and training. However, the Civil Service has refused to relax its personnel regulations based almost entirely on educational background, and this background has always been evaluated in terms of French education and degrees. The NIA has usually been unwilling to interfere aggressively on behalf of library personnel. In an effort to attract good library personnel MSU paid slightly higher salaries to the assistants. When MSU funds are no longer available these people will either become NIA personnel in clerk cadres at considerable reduction in pay or leave the civil service. Only two library personnel have remained with the closing of the MSU projects. The lack of qualified library attendants has forced NIA to close the doors of its library to all non-Institute-affiliated readers.

The NIA has displayed a general unwillingness to cooperate fully in library development; e.g., lists of reading materials for courses have not been given to the library as the two chief librarians have repeatedly requested. Some NIA staff
members almost never return borrowed books, despite several procedural changes to enforce the two-week check-out provision. Furthermore the NIA has accorded the library a low priority, sometimes refusing to issue it even rudimentary equipment and maintenance materials.

In the final analysis, the continued success and even the survival of the library research facilities will depend on the acceptance of the importance of this project by USOM and other agencies which may assist with the NIA. Thus far, the Public Administration Division of USOM has taken several steps which indicates an interest in the welfare of the library. The Division has made adequate provision for book and magazine procurement during 1962. Moreover, it has made the necessary arrangements to sponsor as a participant the NIA librarian now in the United States. In addition the Division has agreed, upon the return of the librarian now abroad, to send the present head librarian of the NIA to the United States for a master's degree.

MSUG BASIC RESEARCH

Although MSUG always stressed cooperative research with the GVN, its best work was done by its own American and Vietnamese staff. This work will have a lasting effect on both the academic community and Vietnam.

After the dissolution of the Field Administration Division in 1957 MSUG was able to give much greater emphasis to basic research. Even before that date, however, several significant empirical research studies were completed. Notable was the study—already mentioned—of land use, administrative organization, and health practices of the Montagnards. Another meritorious study, later used by the author for his doctoral dissertation, was a two-volume study of Vietnamese local taxation.

With the de-emphasis of consultation activities, MSUG was able to undertake empirical research which would (1) provide basic data previously unavailable, and (2) provide a foundation for systematic and applied research. MSUG's ninth semiannual report dated June, 1959, comments:

"Effective governmental decision making requires at the minimum a basic general understanding of the political, social, and economic environment plus reasonably accurate data and analyses of the current situation. 'Academic' or 'basic' research tends to develop the former, while 'applied' or 'action oriented' research and intelligence tends to produce the latter—although obviously the distinction between the two, even at an abstract level, is not precise. A more important distinction is the rigor and method by which data are gathered and analyzed, whatever the purpose. Nevertheless, the distinction is useful for some purposes, particularly since the former kind of research objective is often less readily accepted than the latter when resources are scarce."

MSUG's most extensive research project was a survey of Vietnamese rural community organization which included economic, administrative and sociological studies. This is the most extensive basic research project undertaken in Vietnam and presents perhaps the best available commentary on southern village life. Each study required two or three years' intensive work.

Although questionnaires were used in the economic study, information was largely
gathered through observation and interviews with officials, notables and chosen villagers. The researchers visited the subject village three or four days a week although the security conditions precluded their staying overnight in most cases.

Further empirical research on local community organization was based on the above studies. This included surveys at provincial, village and district levels in both Southern and Central Vietnam. First, visits were made to evaluate possibilities, make contacts and explain the project to the local officials. These were followed by the data collection trips.

In the provincial and district studies the researchers interviewed the officials, stayed with them in their offices and observed day-to-day operations; they analyzed correspondence, official documents and financial records. Methods of obtaining and implementing requests from the population were analyzed and, while extensive interviewing of the population was not possible, many observations were made of the daily activities of local residents.

A different approach was used in the villages, since these were primarily sociological studies. Interviews were used extensively. These were applied to officials, elders and persons coming into southern agrovilles and into village offices to pay taxes, change residence permits, etc. The Government of Vietnam banned one of the village studies because it disclosed conditions reflecting adversely on government policies.

The local and rural community organization studies were supplemented by a history of village government and by statistics concerning local government, finances, personnel, etc. Data were obtained from French and Vietnamese sources, field trips and reports from the Department of Interior.

As a result, considerable material has been collected on rural life. There have also been studies on Vietnamese capital formation (banned in Vietnam), and of the urban labor forces; sociological studies of the NIA students, typical Vietnamese customs, and urban resident occupational prestige and aspirations; and administrative studies of development of the Vietnamese bureaucracy and public administration in the Saigon area. A listing of authors and titles of these and numerous studies may be found in Appendix F.

This research is a substantial base upon which to develop administrative, sociological and economic competence in Vietnam.

RESEARCH PROBLEMS IN VIETNAM

MSUG accomplished its basic research despite a dearth of accurate statistics; it had to rely, in large part, on data collected under its own control.

1. There were obvious limitations on the use of questionnaires as we know them, but MSUG was able to use this device in Saigon and in the economic phase of the rural community project.

2. Although, in general, MSUG was able to cope with the local population's lack of receptivity, there were some unavoidable problems. Too much time was lost in ceremonies; there was great initial suspicion (i.e., the people thought the researchers were tax collectors, government snoops or American-aid agents to be regarded with requests).
3. Because of the regional language differences, even the Vietnamese researchers had difficulties over the language. The Vietnamese researchers in particular had to exercise caution so as not to give offense-by emphasizing their status as researchers-and all researchers had to undergo rigorous living conditions to establish the needed rapport.

4. Local officials cooperated in varying degrees throughout the MSUG's stay in Vietnam. However, in recent years the tensions of the security situation have multiplied the difficulties inherent in red tape. In general, though, the MSUG's prestige has been high with local officials.

5. MSUG was hindered by the censorship regulations of the Government of Vietnam. All MSUG publications which were to be distributed within Vietnam had to have prior approval either by the Rector of the NIA or the Director General of Information. In practice, the censorship problem did not become significant until the security situation began to worsen in 1960. Beginning with that time the government followed a policy of limiting or prohibiting the distribution of MSUG studies which the government regarded contrary to its interests. The items and works found objectionable by the government did not involve topics of secret information but rather disagreements as to the wisdom of disseminating information obtained through intensive and extensive research. For example, the government often expressed the fear that MSUG's inclusion of certain materials (such as a reproduction of a communist tract) might be misunderstood by unsophisticated readers; or that certain other materials (for example, findings showing the unpopularity of a particular government policy) would serve the purposes of communist propaganda.

Usually the Rector, in his review of MSUG studies, made suggestions for certain changes which, if made, would mean wider distribution. MSUG's general attitude was that it was better to have a restricted distribution than to compromise with the truth of its findings. Each author was completely free to decide whether or not he could accept without violating the intellectual integrity of his study he suggested changes which would allow general distribution. As already noted, so MSUG studies were banned from even limited circulation.

Although the censorship problem did not dampen the candidness and integrity of MSUG researchers, unfortunately it inhibited the NIA from undertaking some needed basic research projects.

EVALUATION OF MSUG RESEARCH IN VIETNAM

MSUG has completed some of the most significant social research ever undertaken in Vietnam. In many cases its efforts stand alone. Its studies of local communities and administrative, economic and sociological problems have been particularly noteworthy. Its theoretical contributions in economics provide a sound basis for action.

Vietnamese scholarship has profited from its contact with MSUG's methods of empirical research. This is exhibited by the growing use of systematic research techniques and the marked increase in writings by NIA professors over the past few years. This and improved teaching methods could lay the groundwork for even broader and more significant work aimed at the improved preparation of scholars and administrators.
Perhaps MSUG should have started psychological investigations into personality types in this time of important social change.

Ideally, as representatives of a university, MSUG members should have begun its basic research earlier and eschewed governmental consultation. Here, however, political realities and pressing needs overruled academic desires.

More progress in developing a Vietnamese library on the East Lansing Campus would have been desirable.

MSUG should have had some of its better reports reproduced in a more permanent form. These also should have been more widely distributed so as to provide scholars with this valuable data.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Empirical research should receive increased and continued emphasis in Vietnam. This type of research will be aided by the return of MSUG Ph.D. participants, who, it is suggested, should not be overburdened with non-research functions.

2. American agencies should also encourage research and will undoubtedly do so as they continue to find present publications useful in policy decisions.

3. Continued USOM aid should be given for further development of the research library at the NLA.

4. Participant programs in social science research should be given high priority.
This section of the report summarizes the various projects undertaken by the NSUG Police Administration Division during the period 1955-62. It does not contain detailed accounts of the day-to-day problems encountered; numbers of people or things involved; proposals discussed but never implemented; or speculation about political, personality or other reasons why certain projects succeeded and others failed. Neither does this report evaluate the long or short range values of the many and varied activities of the Division, since under the still fluid security conditions in Vietnam it would be premature to do so. Rather, this is a brief description of the major areas of work and a statement of accomplishment.

**Training**

Probably the Police Administration Division's most significant accomplishment with the greatest long-range potential was the establishment of a variety of training programs. In 1955 existing training programs within the police and security services of the newly independent nations were still not well organized. NSUG police advisors immediately conducted a survey to determine the training needs of the municipal police, the Surete and the Civil Guard.

As the outcome of the survey, two major training centers—one at the National Police Academy and the other at Surete Headquarters—were established. In addition modifications were introduced at the Saigon Municipal Police Training Center and the Civil Guard Training Center. To make these training centers effective a series of courses were devised to train Vietnamese police officers to be instructors. Until this series of instruction was concluded NSUG advisors conducted training sessions. Upon completion of the courses for instructors NSUG advisors worked with the police to develop further training programs staffed by those who had taken the courses, but with continued advice and guidance from Division advisors.

The major training courses which were set up included basic police tactics, typing, filing and police record bureau operations, firearms and firearms maintenance, criminal investigation procedures, fingerprint classification, driver training, traffic control, low-echelon radio maintenance, and audio-visual equipment maintenance.

Training aids for conducting these courses were provided—NSUG advisors prepared conventional aids. Classroom instructional material was written, translated and published locally. These included a Police Training Manual, a Guide for the Use of Tear Gas, a Classification of Fingerprints Manual and similar texts. Library material was also procured, and through direct American aid other materials such as audio-visual equipment, training films and related items were supplied.

By the end of the NSUG program the Vietnamese National Police and Security Services had a successfully operating training program to provide both basic and specialized training for police officers. A cadre of instructors was well established, and physical facilities were available with still more under construction. Most important, it is believed, the concept of training
within the service seemed well ingrained and likely to be continued, within the limitations of local capabilities and available foreign assistance.

Participant Program

The participant program was pursued vigorously with the National Police and Security Services. This included special training not only in the United States but also in other countries, such as Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong and the Philippines, where the conditions and experiences to be studied more closely resemble those in Vietnam. Participants were sent from the Surete, municipal police and Civil Guard units, and their performance after returning to duty was observed as closely as possible to determine the effectiveness of the training. A detailed evaluation of the participant program can be found in the MSUG Police Participation Report, 1960.

Traffic

Traffic problems in Vietnam received only sporadic attention from the Division, principally because neither of the two advisors assigned to this side of police work was able to remain long enough to complete the program. Much progress, nevertheless, can be noted when present-day traffic control is compared with lack of road discipline that prevailed in early 1935.

Following a survey of existing conditions a number of programs were proposed and implemented. In Saigon traffic lanes on main thoroughfares were marked; traffic flow was studied and a pattern of one-way streets was set up; stationary stop signs were erected as needed; and additional automatic traffic signals were procured by MSUG and installed by the Saigon Public Works Division. Both municipal police and various community service clubs were introduced to the notion of joint campaigns to promote traffic safety habits. Illustrated pamphlets to educate the public on traffic safety were published and distributed. Advice and guidance on how to improve the operation of the public transportation system in Saigon were also provided to appropriate officials. To assist the persons planning the construction of a four-lane thirty-mile highway from Saigon to the City of Bien Hoa, MSUG made a study of the origin and destination of vehicles using that route.

In addition to these efforts to improve traffic flows and safety, improved systems of motor vehicle registration and a uniform motor vehicle code were devised, most of which were adopted by the Vietnamese police in 1960-61.

Training courses for traffic control officers, of course, supplemented other accomplishments in this field. Most of the work was carried out in 1957-58, but final phases were implemented in 1960. Thereafter plans for re-instituting the traffic advisory program were developed by USOM's Public Safety Division.

Municipal Police

Assistance to the municipal police was channeled through the National Police and Security Services, although the avenue of communication was sometimes more
direct. This assistance was rendered principally to the Saigon police but in some phases was extended to the police in other major cities. Field trips were made to all municipal police departments in the other major cities of the country and a variety of training programs were presented both in Saigon and elsewhere, as initial surveys indicated a need for such courses. In some instances municipal police officers and Surete personnel were trained in the same classes and in other situations training was provided exclusively for municipal officers.

In addition to conducting appropriate training programs and distributing instructional material, the Division arranged to supply, wherever possible, motor vehicles, small arms weapons and tear gas. Distribution of all American aid material was controlled by the Director General of Police and Security Services.

One Saigon precinct was studied in detail, including a survey of records, and then procedures were set up so that precinct could serve as a model for other precincts. Among the improvements effected was the installation of a fingerprinting and photography program. Schedules of distribution of weapons to patrolmen and maintenance training was also established.

Numerous changes to improve the efficiency of the Records Bureau at Saigon municipal headquarters were recommended and carried out. Jeep patrol cars were also provided.

In the fall of 1957 the nucleus of the present municipal police radio system was installed. This was subsequently expanded and, in 1961, a communications building at police headquarters was completed. Initial plans for a police call-box system were developed. The task of modifying and implementing these plans was taken over in 1960 by USOM's Public Safety Division. In 1961 plans which had been developed for the construction of a municipal police training center and for improvement of the firearms practice range were also turned over to the Public Safety Division.

Thus by the conclusion of the MSUG contract the municipal police had benefited perceptively through participation in various training programs; traffic safety advice and receipt of traffic control equipment; and the acquisition of motor vehicles, radio communications equipment and supplies of arms and ammunitions.

Surete

The Surete, or internal security service, was the agency through which much of the American aid program for police and security services was funneled.

In 1955 various installations of the Surete were widely scattered and it became one of MSUG's initial tasks to assist in transferring and organizing them in one location. This was accomplished in 1956 when the Surete moved into a former French army camp.

Concurrently, considerable time was devoted to a study of this existing organization and proposals for improving it. Some proposals were accepted and, in piecemeal fashion, implemented. In 1961, however, the organization still fell far short of the revised set-up which had been recommended.

Despite government unwillingness to adopt the over-all plan, a number of pro-
Prosals were successfully adopted: A personnel inventory system was instituted. The aforementioned training programs were carried out and the Surete Training Division assumed responsibility for operating the National Police Academy. An interrogation center, detention center, vehicle maintenance building, an identification center, a crime detection laboratory, and a communications center were all either renovated or constructed. Plans for a central record service were also developed. In addition, customary police equipment including vehicles, arms and ammunition, tear gas, etc., were provided.

Civil Guard

The MSUG advisory work for the Civil Guard was marked with a continuous series of impasses, stemming primarily from a divergence of opinions as to the role of the Civil Guard within the police and security system. Despite these conflicts, a number of police-type training courses, adapted to the paramilitary nature of the Civil Guard, were conducted; and vehicles and related police equipment were distributed to them. Beyond these accomplishments not much progress was made in implementing plans for improving the organization of the Civil Guard. Advice to and support of the Civil Guard was transferred to the Public Safety Division of USOM in 1959.

Several projects related to the Police and Security Services deserve separate comment.

Fingerprint Identification Program

In 1955 a program was initiated to introduce the Henry system of fingerprint classification to gradually replace the Poettecher and Parisian systems which were already in use. This was done so that the Vietnamese police and security services would have a system compatible with those in use in the other principal countries of Southeast Asia. A corps of identification officers was trained in the English language, typing, filing, and the basic principles of fingerprint classification. From this nucleus a larger staff was developed, and when suitable office space and equipment had been procured, the Henry system was installed and used for all fingerprints thereafter taken.

To prevent a serious disruption in the routine process of criminal identification, the former system could not be immediately discarded. It is anticipated that the two systems will have to be continued until about 1964, by which time it is believed that the former system will have been consolidated into the Henry system. Beginning in 1961, the Central Identification Bureau, with MSUG's technical assistance, began to convert the old fingerprint classifications made under the Poettecher and Parisian systems to the Henry system. Approximately 600,000 cards in the criminal and subversive files had been reclassified under the new system.

Meanwhile, during the transition, retraining courses were conducted, a Fingerprint Classification Manual was translated into Vietnamese and French, existing files were reviewed and expanded, and plans were developed for constructing a record and identification building large enough to accommodate the growth of the bureau which started with the inauguration of the national identity card program.
National Identity Card Program

In 1958 the Government of Vietnam discussed the need to improve its identity card program. The cards then in use were inadequate for positive identification and hence little help in combatting communist infiltration.

In April, 1959, the national identity card program was begun in two southern provinces, but had to be abandoned because of the deteriorating security conditions the following year. In June, 1960, the effort was resumed in Saigon and adjacent areas, and another project was carried out in Dalat. These were completed by early 1962.

In November, 1961, the Government decided to proceed with the program on a nationwide scale by making special efforts to surmount the security risks involved. Mobile teams were organized to work in the provinces. At the present rate of their work it is hoped that by the end of 1962 the entire population over 18 years of age will have been issued an identity card. Since the communists have also recruited or used a number of youths, serious consideration is being given to extending the program to those in the 12-to-17 age group.

As of June 1, 1962, a total of 3,023,947 ID cards have been issued. This has directly resulted in the arrest of 50 Viet Cong and 163 military deserters, and has revealed 4,440 instances of faulty or erroneous identity papers.

Execution of the national identity card program has required the solution of a number of knotty problems. The most serious of these has been the Viet Cong's efforts to stop or inhibit the program. Whole villages have been threatened with reprisals, hand grenades have been thrown, identity card teams have been ambushed, and some security agents have been killed. The Government has countered this by giving military protection to the teams and by restricting the movements of the inhabitants in dangerous areas. To discourage the chances of the Viet Cong's obtaining and misusing identity cards a relatively high price has been proposed for replacements of missing cards, and a system of lost card control has been developed.

To prevent forgeries, a difficult-to-duplicate paper and method of lamination were chosen. For this, special lamination machines had to be purchased and installed.

To overcome other technical difficulties a portable camera with a portable independent power source for lighting had to be selected, and to be adapted to use the less expensive 35 mm film. Darkrooms were built in each province, equipped with air conditioners provided by AID.

A small fee charged for each identity card issued has made this program largely self-supporting for the government.
Police Records

Apart from the consultant service provided in the review of a municipal police precinct operation, and the development of miscellaneous forms, a major effort was made toward unifying and centralizing police records. With the completion of an archives building in 1959 the first step was realized in the consolidation of records from the former South District of the Surete and from the office of the Minister of Interior. Further consolidation of similar records from the Central and North Regions have also been planned. Coincidental to the consolidation and centralization of records a program for a uniform system of crime reporting has been developed. In August, 1961, the only remaining MSUG police advisor was attached, for operational purposes, to the USOM Public Safety Division. Since then standard reports forms have been designed and tested in certain pilot police departments. Considerable legal research involved in adapting forms from the English Common Law system to the French Penal Code.

Communications

MSUG police communications advisors worked directly with the Surete and Saigon municipal police to develop a communications system. During the period 1955-59 a survey was made to determine what kind of network would be most suitable for installation on a national basis and for providing communications for police departments in Saigon and some of the other principal cities. Equipment was installed both in the Saigon police department and in the Surete. A radio teletype system linking Saigon, Ban Me Thuot and Hue became operational in 1960, and by 1961 communications buildings were completed at both Surete headquarters and Saigon police headquarters.

Low-echelon training courses were conducted and one group was sent to a training program at the Phu To Technical College. This latter program was not deemed successful. A small group of participants received specialized training in the United States.

During 1959 differences of opinion on both technical and operational matters developed between the MSUG advisor and the communications advisors of USOM, with the result that in 1960 responsibility for continued implementation of the communications project was turned over to USOM.

Crime Detection Laboratory

The scientific crime detection laboratory installed in the Surete under the French administration had fallen into such disrepair between 1945 and 1954 that the capabilities of the laboratory were extremely limited. In 1955 a modest aid program was drawn up which consisted mainly of replacing obsolete equipment and providing only such new equipment as could be utilized by the staff. Several participants were sent to the United States for training in crime detection and, as these staff members returned, the facilities of the laboratory were gradually enlarged. In 1960 the laboratory was transferred into Surete headquarters. Specialized training courses were given, both by
laboratory personnel and American advisors. A series of courses to show police personnel how the laboratory could be utilized for routine criminal investigation were given at regional Surete centers.

Counter Insurgency

During the last few months of the reporting period the sole remaining MSUG advisor (attached to USOM, Public Safety Division) has devoted his time to developing counter-insurgency measures involving the government's civil administration. This has included work to improve the internal security of strategic hamlets, registration and identification of family groups, and control of the movement of both population and material. Instructor teams to train cadres of the Ministry of Civic Action and provincial officials have been proposed, and instructor training courses were planned.

Research

A complete list of publications of the Police Division is found in the appendix.
these depended on the willingness of civil servants to take time from busy schedules to make the observation meaningful. Where large numbers of visitors, from MSU and from other universities and agencies, are constantly requesting this kind of support it becomes inevitable that cooperating government agencies tire of the drain of their time and sometimes minimize the effort put into programs of observation. Unless a participant can devote a fairly large amount of time to an internship, and unless there is scope for him to become involved in the work of an office, it is doubtful that he can derive much from the exposure.

Another type of problem, this time on the campus, concerned professors sent for non-degree work in one of the departments. Status problems were sometimes acute in these situations, for the visiting professor often resented being put into a class with other students, did little or no work in the course, did not attempt to get a grade, and as a result usually failed to establish rapport with, or to receive sympathy from, the instructor. Too often the level of competence of the visiting professor was no better than the average undergraduate, realization of which seemed to generate feelings of insecurity and resentment. This was not true of all visiting faculty, but it did apply in a substantial number of cases.

Fack of understanding of English also complicated participant programs. English courses were given before departure from Vietnam, and, when necessary, additional courses in English were given to participants after arrival in East Lansing. Still, widely recognized deficiencies on this score led to a compensating tendency to lower the standards applied to the work of participants because of the language handicap; it also led to resentment by some faculty when they found participants in their classes. Again, this was not a universal experience and many of the participants did excellent work during their stay, but most of these were people who were here for longer periods and who were working toward a degree.

This experience underscores the necessity to ensure that participants acquire a high degree of fluency in English before starting course work. It also indicates that even those who had some English before coming did not always perform well. Perhaps the optimum would be to select participants on the basis of proven ability in their previous school or university work and then provide them with a thorough course in English before going further. The present system tends to exert a bias against such able people who do not have a command of English, and it has not eliminated the language problem. Better people would probably acquire a mastery of English faster than those less able, even if the latter had enough English at the start to pass the screening examinations that are now given.

Language problems have also contributed to a tendency for participants to associate largely with each other, particularly when large numbers were on campus. This was less true when there were only a few participants on campus and housed apart from each other, so that they were forced, by necessity, to use English rather than Vietnamese outside the classroom.

By and large the administrative problems were not too great once participants arrived in the U.S. Most of them managed their personal finances admirably, and, while some requested, and got, more special attention on minor matters than others, this did not create any major difficulty. At one point there was a slight morale problem because students in some areas of the U.S. received lower per diem allowances than those in other areas, but with the passage of time this resentment has subsided. The East Lansing office has brought participants attending
other universities to the campus periodically to maintain contact and to discuss their academic progress; the office has also tried to write to them fairly frequently so that they would not feel completely disassociated from the project. Participants who were in the U.S. for doctoral training have commented, however, that they would like to have received more news than they did from the NIA. As it was, they did not feel as informed on NIA developments as they would have liked, and did not really feel a part of that institution even though they will return as members of the NIA faculty. On more than one occasion this need was brought to the attention of NIA, but there was not much improvement as a result.

There is always recruiting problems in getting qualified people to go abroad, and this is more difficult when recruiting from off campus. However, during the period when the project was largest, recruiting needs far exceeded the capacity of departments to meet them, and for a time a majority of those in Saigon were not originally from MSU. These conditions cannot always be anticipated, and there is no implication that those from off-campus are less qualified than those who come from the campus. Nevertheless, the University does not derive the full benefit which should come from overseas projects where off-campus recruiting predominates, and this fact, plus the pressures on the departments when a project drains too large a number of their faculty, points to a need to keep university projects fairly small and within rough limits set by the ability to fill staffing requirements largely from the campus departments. Recognition of this resulted in the decision that any extension beyond June, 1962, would have included only a very small number of faculty, drawn mainly from the campus and concentrating on the assistance of the NIA. Smaller overseas staffs also reduce the need for administrative personnel abroad and at home to support them.

When staff return from the project, there is need to assist them to complete research begun abroad and to create opportunities for the university community to derive some benefit from their experience. This is not always easily accomplished because departmental teaching needs do not always match this new experience available to them, or if they do match in part they provide only limited scope for "feed back". By making time available to them the coordinator's office has made it possible for returning staff to write a number of articles, papers delivered at academic meetings, three books, and two bibliographies. A conference on Vietnamese Financial Administration was held on the campus in the summer of 1958, and a number of people came to East Lansing from time to time seeking interviews with returned staff or to use documents collected by the project. The coordinator's office has tried to cooperate in such cases, and made its facilities and contacts available to anyone seeking information on Vietnam.
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

When the first formal contracts with the International Cooperation Administra-
tion and the Government of Vietnam were signed by Michigan State University in
April, 1955, the creation of an Administrative Services Division was not envi-
saged. The contract stated that within its capabilities the Government would
provide the facilities, equipment, materials and supplies necessary to accom-
plish the mission of the University Group in Vietnam. Also within its capabili-
ties the Government was to provide an adequate Vietnamese staff for the Uni-
versity's mission, including research personnel, interpreters and translators as
well as secretarial, clerical and custodial personnel.

Upon the arrival of MSUG staff in Vietnam, however, it became immediately ap-
parent that the Government of Vietnam was unable to fulfill the literal terms
of its contract and that the United States Operations Mission in Vietnam had
neither the facilities nor the desire to provide administrative support for the
MSUG. Many conferences with USOM and Government of Vietnam officials led to
the inevitable conclusion that Michigan State University would be obliged to
provide most of its own administrative support. During the early months of the
contract no procedure existed for MSUG officers to make any disbursements in
local currency; no local staff had been recruited to fill the needs of MSUG; nor
had suitable office space been arranged.

Initially the chief of the MSUG, the chiefs of the Police Administration and
Public Administration divisions, and their staffs were allotted temporary desk
space in USOM offices. At this stage in the project the chief of the Group and
the Executive Officer concentrated on obtaining housing and necessary facili-
ties for the staff, and on securing with USOM and the Government of Vietnam
understandings which should have been reached before the Group's arrival in
Vietnam.

One of the most urgent problems to be solved was that of local currency disburse-
ment. The MSUG had no clearly defined legal status; no authority nor procedure
for paying its bills, fulfilling its obligations, or entering into any legal
agreement with either an individual or an organization. Since MSUG declined to
assume responsibility for the disbursement of local currency funds, for approxi-
mately a year all disbursements for housing and offices, local payroll, and
general expenditures were processed through the USOM Controller's office. In
late 1955 arrangements were finally made so that the Government of Vietnam's
Direction General of Budget and Foreign Aid would make disbursements on behalf
of the MSUG. The procedures agreed upon were not actually put into effect, how-
ever, until mid-1956.

By March, 1956, the problem of providing administrative support for the
growing group became so acute that purely administrative personnel were
recruited by the University and sent to Vietnam. A separate Administrative
Services Division was then established to perform administrative functions
on behalf of the group. The major problems then were still providing
adequate housing and office space; recruiting and hiring local personnel;
Budgetary control and fiscal operation; and organizing a motor pool,
custodial force and security guards.
The need for office space was a continuing one. The Group rapidly outgrew its first offices secured in June, 1955. The following year with the cooperation of USOM and the Government of Vietnam, a building was leased which served as housing for part of the staff as well as office space. In October, 1955, when the National Institute of Administration was established in Saigon, several MSUG staff members were allotted office space in the NIA building.

The task of providing adequate housing for the increasing number of staff members and their dependents occupied a substantial amount of the time of the Administrative Services Division. Unlike rental procedures in the United States, houses and apartments in Saigon are customarily rented on long-term leases, frequently with one or more years' rental in advance; and maintenance, repair and general upkeep are often the responsibility of the tenant. Locally available housing seldom included such appliances as stoves, refrigerators or hot water heaters. Thus, upkeep and provision of equipment had to be arranged for by the Division. Since MSUG in Vietnam had no legal authority, the earliest leases had been made on behalf of the Group or by either the Government of Vietnam or USOM. About mid-1956, however, a standardized lease form was developed and used, by which the Administrative Services Division could obligate itself and in turn demand certain necessary services from the landlords.

Almost all equipment needed either for the office or for staff quarters had to be purchased outside Vietnam. Because MSUG had no authority or mechanics to obligate the dollar budget; and needed to save delivery time, early equipment and supply purchases were made from Hong Kong, Manila or Bangkok rather than from the United States. These purchases entailed development of special procedures for currency exchange, accounting and inventory control.

To carry out the work of the project much personnel had to be recruited locally. Until mid-1956 MSUG found itself competing with other American agencies for qualified Vietnamese employees. MSUG often made contractual arrangements which differed from the personnel administration procedures of USOM or the American Embassy.

This proved to be the cause of considerable friction between American agencies and MSUG; but was largely eliminated in mid-1956 when arrangements were made for MSUG to utilize the American Embassy's Central Personnel Section for hiring and determining wage scales for locally hired employees.

About the same time, arrangements were made for the MSUG to share the overall administrative support of the American Embassy. This step was most helpful in systematizing the operations of the Administrative Services Division. Thenceforth MSUG operated within the regulations of the Embassy with respect to local personnel and all other shared support activities.

The MSUG reached its maximum staff strength between mid-1957 and mid-1958. During this period housing, equipment, office space and maintenance were the major concern of the Administrative Services Division, which then
included five American and sixty-five locally employed persons.

After this peak period was passed there was, naturally, a shift in emphasis and new procedures had to be developed for orderly administration of the gradual phase-down. The relinquishment of leased houses and the accountability for surplus or unusable equipment required careful attention.

Through ICA and local USOM audits it was learned that honest errors had been previously made in interpreting, those clauses of the contract which concerned with travel arrangements for staff members. Special care was exercised in arranging for the return travel and transport of effects of MSUG members and their families, to assure legality of policies and procedures.

As the phase-down continued, most administrative work became routine and more attention was devoted to carrying out specific assignments from the chief adviser, the National Institute of Administration, or, occasionally, from the other divisions. By late 1959 locally hired personnel were assuming more and more responsibilities within the Administrative Services Division. Bookkeeping, personnel management, motor pool operation, and custodial functions were by then being carried out smoothly, with decreased supervision by American staff members.

One important administrative problem renewed itself during the phase-out period. The Vietnamese Directorate General of Budget and Foreign Aid, which in 1955 had reluctantly assumed disbursement of MSUG counterpart funds and which had intermittently thereafter requested MSU to make other arrangements, once more asked to be relieved of this responsibility, indicating that it had been undertaken only temporarily. The policy set forth by MSU in East Lansing was that MSUG could not and would not assume responsibility for counterpart fund expenditures. Since all other similar contract groups in Saigon did actually disburse funds, it was difficult for the Administrative Services Division to defend its policy of no responsibility. Fortunately, the Directorate General of Budget and Foreign Aid did not actually stop disbursing funds, so MSUG operations were able to continue. The issue of responsibility remained, nevertheless, unresolved. In any future project it would be desirable to clarify financial responsibilities, either in the contract or by separate written agreement, before beginning actual operations.

By July, 1961, it was decided that the small remaining staff of MSUG would no longer require an Administrative Services Division. The remaining functions, and work connected with the transfer of the group to a newly constructed NIA building, were carried out by a finance officer and general services officer.

Besides the administrative and support tasks mentioned above, the Division also was responsible for maintaining a clerical pool and a translator pool; administrative assistance to participants selected for training in the United States; publication, distribution and storage of reports and studies prepared by staff members; preparation and distribution of internal
bulletins, announcements and reports; and many other less important chores which nevertheless augmented the success of the program and aided the morale of the staff. It should also be mentioned that the inevitable interrelationship between the Administrative Services Division and the Public and Police Administration divisions provided perhaps less tangible but nevertheless worth-while contributions, in that many locally hired employees acquired broader practical experience, and that quite a few of these were then prepared to assume positions with NIA or other government agencies.

From the information presented in this section and the specific details available in the Appendix, it can be seen that the administrative needs for a group the size of the MSUG were numerous and often difficult to accommodate. It can also be seen that the Government of Vietnam's non-fulfillment of these needs was the reason for establishing the Administrative Services Division. The experience gained demonstrates the need—in any similar technical assistance program—for a clear definition of financial responsibility and firm understanding as to how administrative services will be furnished.
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A

Participants - 1955-61

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### APPENDIX B

#### AMERICAN STAFF

(On Dollar Payroll)

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<td>Ball, Joyce K.*</td>
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<td>6/11/55 - 12/30/55</td>
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<td>Frizzell, Clifford*</td>
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<td>2/12/56 - 4/3/56</td>
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<td>6/26/59 - 6/12/56</td>
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<td>6/25/60 - 6/30/62</td>
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* Regular Staff Members of Michigan State University
1/See also under "Public Administration," page 57; tour of duty began as Chief, Public Administration Division
2/ Includes period of home leave
3/ See "Chief Advisor's Office," page 56; tour of duty completed as Chief Advisor
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*Includes consultants.
**APPENDIX D**

LENGTH OF TOURS

**MSU Board-appointed Staff, Including Consultants**

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## APPENDIX E

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<td>1,530,245</td>
<td>2,458,995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Operational</td>
<td>366,339</td>
<td>522,256</td>
<td>595,365</td>
<td>369,241</td>
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<td>Overseas Operational</td>
<td>379,662</td>
<td>2,157,455</td>
<td>2,026,254</td>
<td>393,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRANSPORTATION OF THINGS</strong></td>
<td>120,237</td>
<td>52,210</td>
<td>116,232</td>
<td>122,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Property</td>
<td>93,502</td>
<td>52,156</td>
<td>76,135</td>
<td>92,816</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>27,735</td>
<td>40,097</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37,796</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>COMMUNICATIONS</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Telephone</td>
<td>70,229</td>
<td>166,760</td>
<td>110,211</td>
<td>132,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable Charges</td>
<td>5,571</td>
<td>50,574</td>
<td>81,065</td>
<td>106,566</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>16,433</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>20,527</td>
<td>11,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RENTS AND UTILITIES</strong></td>
<td>27,031,411</td>
<td>10,260,228</td>
<td>14,424,645</td>
<td>10,261,760</td>
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<tr>
<td>Office Rents</td>
<td>222,363</td>
<td>2,222,697</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>1,571,320</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rental of add'l vehicles</td>
<td>12,600</td>
<td>72,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>750,352</td>
<td>1,340,364</td>
<td>2,327,442</td>
<td>2,503,959</td>
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<td>Rents - Residential</td>
<td>25,488,611</td>
<td>6,651,526</td>
<td>10,537,103</td>
<td>6,567,701</td>
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### Details

- **APPENDIX E**
- COUNTERPART EXPENDITURES
  - **PERSONAL SERVICES**
    - Non-American
    - Overtime
    - American Personnel
    - Terminal Leave
  - **TRAVEL**
  - **TRANSPORTATION OF THINGS**
    - Personal Property
    - Other
  - **COMMUNICATIONS**
    - Local Telephone
    - Cable Charges
    - Others
  - **RENTS AND UTILITIES**
    - Office Rents
    - Rental of add'l vehicles
    - Utilities
    - Rents - Residential
## APPENDIX E (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Fiscal Years Ending</th>
<th>June 30</th>
<th>6/25/62</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRINTING AND REPRODUCTION</td>
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<td>Printing &amp; Reproduction</td>
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<td>494,623</td>
<td>767,607</td>
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<td>Public Administration</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>468,238</td>
<td>364,372</td>
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<td>Police Administration</td>
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<td>13,000</td>
<td>152,235</td>
<td>348,653</td>
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<td>CONTRACTUAL SERVICES</td>
<td>2,236,585</td>
<td>5,762,709</td>
<td>2,040,005</td>
<td>2,333,192</td>
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<td>Representation</td>
<td>16,375</td>
<td>81,335</td>
<td>119,334</td>
<td>67,042</td>
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<td>Motor Repairs &amp; Maint.</td>
<td>35,407</td>
<td>122,612</td>
<td>224,577</td>
<td>326,213</td>
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<td>Residential Repairs</td>
<td>1,052,640</td>
<td>900,759</td>
<td>606,006</td>
<td>764,975</td>
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<td>Office Repairs</td>
<td>106,002</td>
<td>1,225,223</td>
<td>120,166</td>
<td>171,714</td>
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<td>Translation &amp; Research</td>
<td>29,700</td>
<td>1,205,736</td>
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<td>225,209</td>
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<td>Others</td>
<td>1,046,557</td>
<td>2,132,154</td>
<td>685,822</td>
<td>593,316</td>
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<td>NIA In-Service Training</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>SUPPLIES &amp; MATERIALS</td>
<td>226,074</td>
<td>1,158,059</td>
<td>1,620,062</td>
<td>1,602,652</td>
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<td>Office Supplies</td>
<td>433,232</td>
<td>552,220</td>
<td>671,874</td>
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<td>Motor fuels &amp; lubricants</td>
<td>151,019</td>
<td>120,473</td>
<td>112,974</td>
<td>133,713</td>
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<td>Materials and Residential</td>
<td>324,423</td>
<td>123,361</td>
<td>527,403</td>
<td>722,038</td>
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<td>Supplies</td>
<td>17,400</td>
<td>237,811</td>
<td>5,693</td>
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<td>EQUIPMENT</td>
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<td>2,615,026</td>
<td>2,002,159</td>
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<td>359,760</td>
<td>252,702</td>
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<td>Office Machines</td>
<td>224,995</td>
<td>127,002</td>
<td>134,544</td>
<td>46,427</td>
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<td>Residential Furn. &amp; Fixtures</td>
<td>1,646,670</td>
<td>2,127,443</td>
<td>1,523,542</td>
<td>216,562</td>
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<td>Library Equipment inc.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23,677</td>
<td>111,441</td>
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<td>Books</td>
<td>102,750</td>
<td>7,693</td>
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<td>Other Equipment</td>
<td>221,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28,560</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*This represents gross expenditures. From this figure should be deducted income from miscellaneous sources totaling 2,178,932 VN$, making a total of 177,581,325 VN$.*
APPENDIX F

REPORTS AND ACADEMIC MATERIALS

This bibliography lists all of the essays, surveys, reports, recommendations, and publications concerning research data that have been issued by MSUG. Special reference is made to the language or languages in which each entry was issued: English (E), French (F), and Vietnamese (V). None of the following categories is mutually exclusive in that many items relate to publications dealing with more than one topic. The following breakdown for the classification is used solely to provide some assistance to the reader who is interested in specific fields of competence dealt with by MSUG during its tenure in Vietnam.

ACADEMIC INSTRUCTION MATERIALS


Charlesworth, James C. Budgetary Administration. (Quan Ly Ngan Sach). Translated by Nguyen Tien Hoanh. (V) 17 pp.


Hunter, John M. Advanced Economics. Fall, 1955. (E)


Murphy, Marvin H. Modern Concepts of the Governmental Budget Process. Lecture given to the National Assembly


Police Division. The American Police. (E) 3 pp.


AGENCY SURVEYS AND FIELD ADMINISTRATION


BIBLIOGRAPHIES


BUDGET


LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION


LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES


SOCIOLGY


Nguyen Van Thuan. Rites of Passage. April, 1962. (E) 71 pp.


ECONOMICS


**NATIONAL TAXATION**


**POLICE REPORTS**


Projet De Reorganisation De la Suredé Nationale De Republique Du Vietnam. (F) 20 pp.


TRAINING


-81


Strecher, Victor G.; Turner, Ralph F. Review of English Language Training Program for Police and Security Services and Civil Guard Participants. (E)
