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RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR,
THE REGIONS AND PROVINCES

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Summary of Proposals

1. That the three regional offices of South Viet Nam, Central Viet Nam, and Pays Montagnards du Sud be eliminated.
2. That in place of the present regional-provincial system, there be established a system of area administration (enlarged provinces).
3. That the chief of area have the following functions: (1) give leadership in the accomplishment of goals, (2) review and report to the central government, (3) be the general coordinator of area representatives; by working together, they can accomplish more than by each working independently, (4) be the ceremonial head, (4) assist the area representatives by giving effective administrative support services, (6) be responsible for approval and recommending removal of central government representatives in the area requiring implementation within a definite period if concurred in by the respective department.
4. That the area representatives of the central government technical services be responsible to the interested departments. Within the areas, each technical service area representative would be responsible for plans, for compiling budget requests, for over-all operation of the technical service, and for working together with the other area representatives under the general supervision of the area chief.
5. That the area council be elected directly by the people. The council would meet at regular intervals and assist the area chief by passing specific resolutions for consideration by the chief of area. These resolutions would express the desires of the people and would concern the effectiveness of the government and the administration of all services within the area. The council

would have additional responsibility for budget review and power of approval and removal of the area chief and the deputy area chief. Such resolution of removal must be implemented by the Secretary of State for Interior within a 90-day period.

6. That the area budget be a part of the national budget. The general area administration would be included in the Department of Interior budget, and the technical services would be part of their respective departments' budgets. (The question of village or local budget is not being considered in this paper. It is assumed that they would continue or perhaps become even more important than at present.)

7. That assignment of a deputy secretary for area affairs be part of the reorganization of the Department of Interior. The deputy secretary would act as the liaison person with the other national departments and would supervise the area chiefs.

8. That the Department of Interior provide a uniform, systematic review of the areas for the general purpose of uniform application of the national programs throughout the country and for effective area management.

9. That direct appointment of administrative officials supplant the present indirect system.

10. That the police functions be revised so that

(1) a thorough study of existing and contemplated Vietnamese laws is made in order that each law enforcement agency's responsibilities and authorities are clearly defined and delimited. -

(2) the Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation (Sûreté) is directly and only responsible to the central headquarters in Saigon.

(3) standard operating procedures are developed immediately at the Civil Guard headquarters and that they are installed uniformly in each area.

(4) the municipal, village, communal police are controlled and responsible to the appropriate local governmental body.

(5) the gendarmerie is completely integrated into either the Civil Guard or into the military services as military police.

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Preface

The Government of Vietnam, like any other government, is trying to achieve certain goals, and the organization it establishes is a means of achieving them. The current organizational structure in Vietnam is not appropriate for the changed government. In order to determine what kind of organization would best govern the country, it is necessary to understand the goals the Government is striving for. Then the organization can be redesigned to help the Government achieve these objectives.

As we studied the regional and provincial organization of Vietnam, the following government goals with respect to regional and provincial organization emerged. In the first place, the Government wants to reach the people all over the country and to meet their needs. This in turn should give the Government popular support. Closely related is the Government's desire to unify a country which is geographically stretched out and historically has been divided. The Government further feels a need to break with the colonial pattern and to reorganize itself to meet the requirements of a new nation. Another consideration is to think not only in terms of meeting present needs but also to plan for the future. Still another goal is to develop loyal, efficient government officials to give leadership to the Government in achieving its broader purpose.

Michigan State University Role

The central objective of the Field Administration Project, Michigan State University, is to assist in getting the democratic policies, programs, and activities of the government in Saigon to the people throughout Vietnam.

In line with this aim, we were invited by the Government to undertake a survey of regional and provincial administration with a view to submitting suggestions which might improve governmental operations. Our survey first examined the central offices of the Department of Interior through which regional and provincial administration is channeled. After a brief though systematic examination of the administrative operation in Saigon, we proceeded to the field phases of our survey. Over a period of 14 weeks from September through December, 1955, we completed visits to all three regions and 21 provinces of free Vietnam and the three autonomous municipalities. In each case we interviewed government officials and observed the functioning of administration. After 119 provincial and regional interviews, observation and analysis, we are now prepared to submit this report and series of suggestions.

The proposals which follow represent attempts to modify our own administrative "principles" and experiences to conform with the Vietnamese situation and culture. Part of the value of a survey such as this lies in the insertion of a new or different approach or viewpoint into the everyday operations of an administrative organization. We recognize the fact that our administrative experience has been largely gained in the American scene; and we can anticipate a probable need to adapt and interpret these specific proposals so as to correspond more closely to the Vietnamese situation. We stand ready to urge the acceptance of our proposals and to work with the Government in their interpretation and adaptation.

Note

This report was orally reviewed with the Minister of Interior and with the President on December 21, 1955. On December 24, 1955, Presidential Ordinance

No. 17 and Presidential Decree No. 38-TC were issued, which provided the following:

Ordinance No. 17

Article 1. The administrative personality and the budgetary autonomy of the Regions are suppressed from January 1, 1956.

Article 2. The General Prefects will represent the Government and each of them will be in charge of a group of provinces or municipalities fixed by decree.

Article 3. Beginning with January 1, 1956, the regional budgets will be incorporated in the National Budget: the receipts and expenses will be apportioned, according to their function, to the different ministerial Departments.

The regional properties will be incorporated into national properties.

All the existing regional services will be responsible to the different Departments and financed by the National Budget.

The different administrative personnel and technicians of the regional administration will be administered by the ministerial Departments involved.

Article 4. A further decree implementing the present ordinance will define the administrative organization of the Country and determine the status of the General Prefects.

Article 5. All the former dispositions are abrogated, which are contrary with those of the present ordinance, particularly the ordinance No. 21 of August 4, 1954, concerning the suppression of the administrative personality and the budgetary autonomy of the Regions.

Article 6. The Secretaries of State and the Délégués of Government in the Regions are charged, each within the limit of his own function, with the execution of the present ordinance which will be published in the "Journal Officiel" of the Republic of Vietnam.

Decree No. 38-TC

Article 1. The President of the Republic of Vietnam is the principal executor of the National Budget.

Article 2. Beginning with the fiscal year 1956, the execution of the National Budget is assured:

- (1) by the Secretary of State for Finance, deputy manager for the receipts,
- (2) by the different Secretaries of State, deputy managers for the expenditures concerning their respective departments, with the exception of the common expenditures,
- (3) by the general prefects, deputy managers for the expenditures within the limit of their functions,
- (4) eventually, by the general prefects or the Prefects, acting as auxiliary managers, for the expenditures of the ministerial departments.

Article 3. All previous provisions contrary to that of the present decree will be abolished.

Article 4. The Secretaries of State and the Délégués of Government in the Regions are charged, each within the limit of his own function, with the execution of the present decree which will be published in the "Journal Officiel" of the Republic of Vietnam.

Part I

Problem, Issues Involved, Proposals, and Implementation of Proposals

A. The problem. For some time one of the most serious problems of the Vietnamese government has been the lack of adequate contact between the central government in Saigon and the people in the countryside. Roughly 80 per cent of the people of free Vietnam live outside Saigon. The problem has been how the government could bring itself to the people. Propaganda techniques can only accomplish so much. Government services must reach the people.

B. Issues involved. During our research within the Department of the Interior, we have tried to identify the issues involved in the Government's problem in trying to reach the people by means of its field organization. The central issue that came out of the research concerns the number of levels of administration. There appeared to be too many levels for the size and problems of the country.

There also emerged a number of subsidiary administrative issues that should be considered at the same time as the number-of-levels issue. These issues are: division of responsibility, the functioning of the budgetary system, the utilization of personnel, the degree of democratic participation in regional and provincial government, and the adequacy of the field administration service.

These issues are far from unique. Certainly administration in other lands has faced these same issues. Administration in the United States, for example, faces the problem of "technical expert versus generalist" which in many of its ramifications parallels the problem of divided responsibility. In fact, it is because these issues are closely related to our experience elsewhere

that our suggestions regarding them might be useful. Before turning to our proposals, however, a brief consideration of the issues in their Vietnamese setting is in order.

1. The central issue: the number of levels of administration. The Vietnamese government has within it divisions and subdivisions of the administration which in view of the size of the country appear to be excessive. Between the central government and the people there is a regional administration and administration at the provincial, district, canton and village level. At one time such divisions may have been deemed wise, but at present they seem undesirable. Difficulties created by these various levels seem rather obvious. Politically, they tend to slow down thorough unification of the country. Administratively, they create a need for clearances, paper work and red tape, which slows down operations and increases expense. Socially, they tend to stimulate unnecessary and unrealistic parochialism or regionalism in thinking.

2. Subsidiary issues:

a. Division of responsibility. A certain division of responsibility is found on both the regional and the provincial level. Examples are found in the various technical services maintained at each level. At the province level the chief of a technical service is responsible to the province chief on administrative matters and to the corresponding regional service and through it to the respective department on technical matters. At the regional level, administrative matters are the primary concern of the Délégué, and the chief of the regional technical service reports on technical matters to the technical department. The complicating factor must be recognized, that there is no clear-cut operational definition of "technical" which at all times differentiates it from "administrative." There is bound to be a "grey zone," and each field

official must realize the essential fact that this division of responsibility requires group planning and group operations in the field. The multi-budgetary system is another example of the multi-character of administration. Some funds for a service such as education might come from budgets at any of the four levels--national, regional, provincial, or village. Several sources of funds such as this cause difficulties, but it is many times inherent in democratic field administration. It should be recognized and identified as such; and every attempt should be made to define as clearly as possible the respective responsibilities of the operating officials.

b. The functioning of the budgetary system. The extent and detail of our research into the budgetary process does not permit us to suggest specific changes or to give detailed recommendations concerning general fiscal and budgetary problems. It does, however, allow us to identify a few of the difficulties closely related to provincial and regional administrative organization and procedure. At present the budget process does not provide for coordinated planning of services throughout the country. Provincial budget administration is not coordinated with regional and national budget preparation. Conversely, regional and national planning is not coordinated with provincial budget preparation. The resulting budgets appear to show this lack of coordination. Subsidies from one level of government to another, which in some cases account for the major share of the budget, also confuse the picture. No provision is made for an adequate post-audit, and the time-consuming pre-audits carry with them duplication and red tape without added control. Although we would recommend a more complete fiscal survey in order to make more specific recommendations for improving this situation, our proposals regarding provincial and regional administrations do suggest changes in present procedures which should be of partial help.

c. The utilization of personnel. For a variety of reasons Vietnam is seriously short of administrative and technical personnel, particularly outside Saigon.

In the administrative sphere the lack of large numbers of good administrators has meant that top administrators have been reluctant to delegate work to lower levels. The result has all too often been that top administrators have become administrative bottlenecks. They have been physically unable to do all that is required of them.

In the technical sphere, the small supply of good technicians has been concentrated primarily in Saigon and secondarily in the regional capitals. Few are left at the province level where there is greatest opportunity to serve the needs of the people.

d. The degree of democratic participation in regional and provincial government. There seemed to be relatively little opportunity for the citizens to express their collective needs, aspirations, and desires. Admittedly our research effort has not yet included a study of the village level of government, at which one would first expect to observe such expressions. Nevertheless, at the regional and provincial level we could discern relatively little systematic attention being paid to them.

One instrument for democratic expression that exists at present is the provincial council. This council is indirectly rather than directly elected so that the people do not have the opportunity to look to representatives of their own choosing. Also, the council is frequently inadequate or inoperative altogether.

A number of officials were interested in seeing that a further separation of legislative from executive powers would be made, in order to

continue the gradual progress of Vietnam toward democracy. Thus the climate for a stronger council appears to be present.

e. The adequacy of the field administration service. Our research failed to uncover an adequate review system which would make control over administration possible. Although there are exceptions to this generalization, they were few and a need for an institutionalized, regular review system was evident. Within the provinces this function is supposed to be performed by the province chief, but it did not seem that he had the facilities for carrying out this important role in view of the pressure of his many activities. At the regional level and in the central department, the situation appears to be even more serious. The fact that there is a division of responsibility makes the need for a carefully planned review system even more conspicuous. Without such a system, the central government has no way of knowing whether government policies are being properly executed outside Saigon, and the Secretary of State for Interior as well as the other departments are seriously handicapped in the execution of his functions.

3. Other subsidiary factors. In any program of effectively extending government services to the people all over the country, factors of government administration like problems of divided responsibility, budget control, and utilization of personnel, are but a part of the total situation. Administrative factors must be tailored to fit in with other factors. The various government officials whom we interviewed frequently emphasized the significance of such non-administrative factors as (1) the geographical dispersion of Vietnam with a concentration of land and people in flatlands of the South but with a long trail of people living in communities along a coastline, separated from each other by mountains and short, swift-running rivers, the whole backed up by more

mountains; (2) the underdeveloped communications network of roads, railroads, telephone and telegraph facilities, etc.; (3) the relative insecurity of some areas, particularly in mountain and swamp country; (4) the communist threat; (5) historical and cultural factors like common dialects and customs in a given mountain valley and traditional boundary lines; (6) economic factors such as the various means of making a livelihood in various parts of the country; (7) political factors; (8) religious and sect factors.

A related non-administrative factor might be called planning-for-the-future. It is well known that as nations develop and means of communications improve, territorial sizes of administrative units should ideally be changed from time to time. But once territorial lines are set, there tend to develop vested interests that may be powerful enough to prevent needed reforms. Vietnam should be thinking not only in terms of today's needs but also in terms of those of the future. Vietnam may want to put up with some present inconvenience for the sake of a better future.

In the proposals that follow, we tried to take into account these non-administrative factors as best we could. How much we considered these factors is not always specifically stated.

By way of summary, it should again be stated that both administrative and non-administrative factors play a role in determining how to strengthen the Government outside Saigon. All these factors deserve the attention of the Government. They represent the kinds of considerations with which administrators and government officials the world over are concerned. No government has ever made a perfect and final resolution of all the factors that must be considered. However, a willingness to face the problems, to innovate, and to adapt is a long way toward solution. We submit the proposals that follow in the

hope that they will be of assistance in making the improvements the Government wants to make.

C. Proposals

1. Abolition of regional administration. The present system of regional administration should be eliminated. The office of the délégué, the delegation of the government, and the administrative structure existing in Dalat, Hue, and Saigon appear to have served their purpose under the colonial system, and, in our opinion, could best be abolished.

The suggestion does not originate with us. As is the case in all the proposals which follow, it is the result of discussing the subject with various echelons of regional and provincial administration and with officials in the Department of Interior. The "suppression" of the regional administration is an idea shared by many top echelon officials for various reasons. These reasons include the need to break down the barriers of regionalism as the country moves toward unification. In addition to this important political argument there appear to be convincing administrative reasons. First, when Vietnam was part of a larger administrative unit, Indochina, a division into five regions seemed necessary in order to manage the affairs of so large an area. The position of governor, which preceded the present government delegation system, made administrative sense given a different framework and period. Today, however, the framework and objectives are substantially different. The country of Vietnam is not so large a geographic area that it need be divided first into regions and then into provinces. Second, the existence of regional administration tends to place an unnecessary administrative echelon between the provinces and the central government. This tends to slow down operations and create unnecessary paper work and red tape. Third, regional administration and services tend to

confuse the patterns of responsibility. The additional budget which regional administration requires, the ambiguity of relationships between the technical services and the *délégué*, and the nebulous control exercised over the *délégués* by the Secretary of Interior all tend to dim the clear lines of responsibility which are needed as democratic administration is developed. Finally, the most populous of the remaining three regions has its capital in Saigon, already the capital of the country. There appears to be duplication in direction and activities because of this proximity which is not warranted.

2. Creation of areas (enlarged provinces). If the region is eliminated, the question immediately arises as to what will take its place. The elimination of the region would leave 37 administrative units reporting directly to the Department of Interior. This would create an unwieldy administrative problem, as the supervisory span of control would be too large. Therefore, we propose the creation of areas which would combine presently existing small provinces into larger units called areas. The combination of provinces should follow economic, political and social criteria. For example, similar means of livelihood, ease of transportation and communication, and degree of political or military security should be considered in combining provinces. As an example, we are offering one way of dividing Vietnam into areas instead of the present provinces. (See Chart D.)

It is recognized that some exceptions to the uniform area pattern are self-evident; for instance, it may not be necessary to have a forestry agent in an area that has only rice agriculture. The purpose of establishing areas for the general government is to have a more manageable number of administrative units to deal with in the absence of the intermediate region. Each area would be large enough to be economically administered. Furthermore, there appears to

be no reason why the present provincial boundary lines would prevent such a realignment. Some changes of a minor nature are occurring regularly, the most recent being the boundary change between My Tho and Ben Tre.

We propose that in each of these areas there be (1) a chief of area, (2) an area representative of each technical department, and (3) an area council.

3. Relation between position of the area chief and the departmental operating services in the areas. The chief of area would have the following functions: (1) By his reputation and abilities, he should be the area leader. He would be expected to give leadership to the area by his administrative skill rather than by cumbersome detailed pre-audit fiscal controls. (2) He would be general planner and coordinator. He would submit his planning ideas to the central government; and when these plans are approved by the central department, he would be responsible for assuring that the departmental plans are carried out. (3) He would review and report on a regularized basis through the Department of Interior to the central government departments on the progress or lack of progress of the area representatives. (4) He would provide administrative support services to the area representatives. (5) He would recommend removal of representatives of the central government departments if he thought they were not doing the job effectively. (6) He would provide ceremonial leadership at public events in his area. He would be the recognized governmental leader of the area and be accorded positions of honor during special occasions including visits of dignitaries. (7) He would assist in the development of the proposed plans and budgets of the technical services into an integrated budget document for the area as a whole with each central government department being included. One copy of the general integrated budget would be sent to the Secretary of State

for Interior. Copies of each of the technical services' requests would be sent to its respective central government department. The document would show the planning of the area representative and any adjustment suggested by the area chief and the area council with full explanation going to the central government. (See Charts E and F.)

In our opinion the area chief would be a very important person in his area. Although he will be appointed by the central government, his length of service in the area and his responsibility to the people through the area council, which is discussed below, should make him an important element in democratic administration within a relatively short period.

It should be clearly understood that he would be an adviser on general governmental planning through his review and reporting functions but that his real responsibility would consist in giving leadership to the coordination of the general plans as set forth by the central office departments. But he should not be allowed to impose his judgment on the area representatives in technical execution of the plans approved by the respective departments.

The area representative for technical services should be responsible for the execution of the plans which have been expressly approved for this area service, and the area chief should assure that the representative does the job effectively. A positive approach by both the area chief and the technical representative should be somewhat as follows.

The discretion of the technical representative should be tempered by his professional knowledge and working relationship with the central office of his department. The support services offered by the area chief should be utilized to the fullest extent so that the area work of the representative can professionally proceed unhampered by the minor administrative details. Working

with the chief of area in planning and submitting the budget estimates and in keeping him informed of all the operating aspects of the service within the area are essentials for any field organization.

Carrying out the prescribed standards of the central department with respect to the professional aspects of the work in the area is equally essential. The fine balance for the "shadow area" of what is administrative as against what is technical must be reconciled by a positive cooperative manner of personal understanding; and when this is not obtained, changes in personnel at the area representative level are essential. It is for this reason that recommendations for removal of area representatives are suggested within the area chief's authority with implementation by the affected department in a specified period.

The personnel of the technical services should be members of the national civil service system and should be included in the general budgetary estimates of the national departments. Incentives should be provided and a "climate of work" should be established so that these representatives by their achievement can attain higher administrative and technical levels within the area, in other areas, and in the central offices in Saigon.

The appraisal of the area chief in connection with the technical services in the area should be based upon his ability to give leadership to the respective technical services so that the several representatives working together can accomplish more than they could working independently. If this leadership is not provided, it should be determined by the administrative reviews from the central office of the Department of Interior and he should be relieved of his duties. Another check on the area chief is provided by the area council which approves and can recommend the removal of the area chief and his deputy. Coercion by area chiefs over the technical services through interference on job

performance should not be tolerated. The need of democratic free Vietnam at this time is a cooperative administrative spirit which should provide better, more adequate services in a much more economical way than is currently being done.

4. New budget system. We propose that both the provincial and regional budgets be eliminated and only the national budget and village or local budgets be maintained. The area budgets would be a part of the national budget. (The role of village budgets is beyond the scope of this inquiry. It is assumed that they would continue or perhaps become even more important than at present.) The national budget should contain expenditures for all activities within the various areas. In each case the head of a technical service would submit his estimates to the respective central department, through the area chief, and area council. The area estimates would then be combined into the total budget for the Departments, and these in turn would be combined through the budget agency in the Presidency into the national budget. The area expenditures other than those of the technical services would be part of the budget of the Department of Interior.

As coordinator within the area, the area chief would have a part in the preparation of technical service estimates. We propose a multi-columned budget document which would contain columns for each of the following: previous year expenditure, estimate of the area representative, estimate of the area chief, estimate of the area council, estimate of central technical department, and the figure determined by the central budget agency in the Presidency and the budget as finally approved by the President and the National Assembly. The column for the area chief should be rarely used, i.e., only in cases where disagreement cannot be worked out in advance with the area representative. Where serious

disagreement continues to exist, the central department would be aware of this and would have to decide on the basis of this disagreement. It should give much weight to the advice of the area council. The budget bureau in the Presidency would have the responsibility for reconciling any differences and for bringing estimates within the amounts available in the national plan. The final approval would be given by the President and the National Assembly with general and specific directions for its execution. Of course, the constant reports by the area chiefs would be of great assistance to the budget agency, and the Secretary of State for Interior should make these available when requested.

A single budget such as proposed would eliminate much of the confusion which now exists in province expenditures. The system of subsidies as presently used would be eliminated with the decision to have the area budget a part of a national budget.

This proposal does not prevent a system of special grants to local budgets from developing specific projects nor does it prevent the use of other grant-in-aid programs. It merely leaves these issues for future determination, which might be based on a more general study into tax structure, fiscal administration, and other related economic questions.

5. Full personnel utilization. Our study revealed that the personnel currently employed at the regional and provincial level were unevenly utilized; for instance, one person would have a large amount of work to do and several others would have an insufficient amount of work to keep them fully occupied. Also, we found some provinces with technicians serving only a small province, whereas the adjoining province would not have that technical service at all. We believe that the suggestion of areas, which would combine the personnel of the several currently existing provinces, would provide for staffing of the new areas more adequately and would improve the service to the population.

In addition, we believe the technical and administrative personnel in the present regional office should be dispersed to augment the new area staffs. By doing this the new area would gain much-needed technicians from both directions, (1) from the small existing provinces and (2) from the elimination of regions.

6. New area council. In a democratic society the government is held accountable to the people. Hence, to assure accountability to the people, popular election of the chief policy officer in a given unit of government is essential. This is certainly the most desirable and realistic arrangement under normal conditions of security. However, given present circumstances in Vietnam, it is deemed inadvisable to provide for the election of the chief of area.

Popular participation in the governmental process on the area level is nonetheless vital at this time if democratic institutions are to thrive in the nation. In order to provide for that participation, which is the most effective way of providing the government with a popular base, it is recommended that area councils be established.

The following attributes and powers are recommended for the area council:

- (1) The area council should be elected directly by the people on the same suffrage as the national assembly is elected.
- (2) The size of the area council should be determined by the population of the area, e.g., one representative for each 50,000 people.
- (3) Elections for the area council should be on the basis of single-member constituencies to provide for the most direct representation.
- (4) The term of office of council members should be four years in order to permit them to gain sufficient experience in office to do their job; election of one half of the Assembly every two years is recommended to give the people greatest possible participation in their governance.

- (5) No person should be a member of the council unless he is a citizen of Vietnam and at the time of his election, twenty-five years of age, a qualified elector, and a resident of the constituency in which he is chosen.
- (6) The area council should convene automatically on specified dates once each quarter, e.g., January 3, April 1, July 1, and October 1. The duration of council sessions should be determined by the council itself.
- (7) The area council should have the following powers:
 - (a) The council should be empowered to organize itself, electing its own officers.
 - (b) The council should be empowered to prepare its own agenda.
 - (c) Area plans and programs of economic and social import and changes of communal boundaries should require the approval of the council.
 - (d) The area assembly should be empowered to pass resolutions on all questions of administration in the area. All resolutions should become part of the administrative review to see if they were carried out and if not, why not.
 - (e) The appointment of an area chief, or of a deputy area chief, should require the consent of the area council.
 - (f) The area council should be further empowered to remove an area chief, or a deputy area chief, upon a vote of two thirds of the members of the council.
- (8) The area chief should have no power to prorogue the council, but should be empowered to call it to special session.
- (9) Council members should be granted a reasonable per diem to cover living expenses while in the area capital, compensation for time spent in session, and normal office expenses.
- (10) Office space should be provided council members in the area headquarters.

From a political and democratic standpoint an institution such as this would not only provide for popular participation in the governmental process without unduly handicapping the central government on security matters; it would also serve as an important training ground for political leaders on the national level and evoke a greater area of agreement on general principles of government.

7. Building an effective field administration service within the Department of Interior. The administration of area affairs will continue to be one of the most important activities of the Department of Interior. In order to administer this activity properly, we propose the creation of a deputy to the Secretary of State for Interior.

The deputy secretary for area affairs would handle the system of review from the standpoint of the central government. He would channel reports to the technical departments concerned. He would follow up on controversies which could not be settled at the area level. In the budget process he would argue the case of the area chief and present the area chief's viewpoint to the budget agency. At regular intervals he would conduct formal administrative reviews and informal inspection tours of his own, working with the area chief in each area. Of course, he would perform any other duties relevant to area affairs that the Secretary of State for the Department of Interior would direct.

This type of organization within the Department should provide the kind of administrative review system that the central government has on only an inadequate basis at present. The administrative review of the areas by the Department of Interior would be a part of a regularized review and reporting system. (See Chart G.)

By administrative review is meant the systematic review of all functions of the administration performed at the area level. For instance, a periodic look at the system of communications, the length of time for payment of bills, the relationship of various technical services, the comparative cost of services rendered, and the adherence to plans are examples of areas that could be reviewed with the area chief by the Department field officers to assure that the best methods and practices are being followed. This review should be

looked at as a joint undertaking whereby the central office representative (field officer) would take an administrative inventory with the area chief to assure the most effective and efficient administration. Of course a written report would keep the Secretary of State for Interior informed of the review as well as being a plan for improving area operations. Any suggestions which the review report would contain would be the basis for future visits by the central office personnel.

8. Political control system of appointments. The present method of appointing officials to various posts in the governmental hierarchy should be altered. This system, whereby alternate ranks in the hierarchy are appointed by and responsible to other alternate ranks, is cumbersome. For example, the Délégué is appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of State for Interior and is responsible to the latter; the province chief is appointed by the Secretary of State for Interior upon the recommendation of the Délégué and is responsible to the latter; and the district chief is appointed by the Délégué upon the recommendation of the province chief and is responsible to the latter.

Therefore, we propose that the area chief shall be appointed by the Secretary of State for Interior with the consent of the area council. And he shall be directly responsible to the Secretary of Interior as the chief administrator of the area. District chiefs should be considered as strictly administrative personnel. They should be appointed by the area chief and be responsible directly to him in accordance with existing civil service rules and regulations.

9. Police functions. Several police functions are performed by different administrative units; namely, the Army, the Gendarmerie, the Civil

Guard, the Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation (Sûreté), the municipal police and the communal police. With this large number of different administrative units responsible for security and order, it appears from our study and from consultation with the Michigan State University police team that there is overlapping of operations. Before suggesting changes in organization, we believe there is one basic need; namely, that the existing Vietnamese laws be reviewed in order to clearly determine the responsibility and authority of each law enforcement agency so that they could be defined and delimited. By doing this, each existing law would be clearly and solely the responsibility of one of the existing law enforcement agencies; and furthermore, each one would clearly understand its responsibility. Once a delimitations agreement has been developed, then each operating agency should understand its responsibility and functions. To carry this out, we are suggesting the general principle that functions which are country-wide should be allocated to a national unit. Therefore, we recommend that the Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation (Sûreté) be established with responsibility for those functions which are nation-wide. There are also some functions which are area-wide which should be performed by the area law enforcement unit with general coordination at the national level; these should be performed by the Civil Guard.

We believe that there are police functions which should be handled strictly on a municipal, village, or communal level. We believe these police should be responsible to their respective level and should be part of the local budget. This, however, does not preclude the financial assistance from the national level based upon specific standards to assure effective municipal operation.

The review of the functions of the gendarmerie indicate quite clearly that they have a military cast, and we recommend that they be attached to the military services as military police; or because of past law enforcement training and experience, they should be integrated into the Civil Guard; but in any event, we believe that they should no longer stay as a separate entity.

We well recognize that our recommendations have placed the functions and responsibilities at the various levels. We want to make equally clear that it is essential in police operations to have full cooperation not only at each level but among all law enforcement and other governmental agencies.

The municipal police organization of Saigon-Cholon requires special consideration which is not covered in this report.

D. Implementation

No plan for organization change, such as is contained in this report, is complete without some consideration of how the plan is to be put into effect. Actually, of course, the way of trying to put the plan into effect can make the plan succeed or fail.

The first step in implementation is to recognize in advance that the proposed reorganization will not solve all the Government's problems and may well create new ones. The hope is that there will be fewer problems after the change than there were before it. The remaining stages in implementation could be: (1) planning the necessary changes; (2) publicizing the changes, getting popular acceptance of them, and timing the changes; (3) putting the reorganization into effect; (4) following up on the unanticipated effects of the changes and solving the problems that have come up.

1. Planning. A planning commission would have to be set up, presumably within the Department of the Interior. The work of this planning commission

would involve taking into account the various factors mentioned in Part I, Section B, of this report. More specifically it would be concerned with working out of new boundaries, deciding which cities should become area headquarters, and similar details. General policies regarding personnel changes would also have to be prepared.

Personnel on the planning commission would have to be experienced men of the highest capacity. They may well have to do planning work in addition to their other duties.

The planning commission should also be prepared to work fast, against deadlines. It should be recognized from the outset that it will not do a perfect job. To speed up its actions, it may want to subdivide itself into small working committees, one on boundaries, one on personnel policy, one on policy of what to do about government building space, etc. These various sub-problems could then be coordinated toward the end by the planning commission as a whole.

2. Publicity and timing problems. Vietnam is now said to be ready for, and expecting, bold, dramatic change. At the same time, however, there is a real need for clear and adequate explanation of changes, involving the various levels of government officials in making the changes so that they will become personally involved and will be motivated to support them. Much emphasis should be placed on what is in it for them as well as how Vietnam as a country will benefit. Group training of officials may be called for; perhaps this could be coordinated with the program of in-service training of government supervisors now being planned by the National Institute of Administration.

3. Putting the reorganization into effect. This phase of the reorganization would probably have to be done by the newly appointed chiefs of

organizations. Selection and redistribution, training and retraining of personnel would have to be done. The distributing of technicians would take on special importance.

Making the physical shifts of files and equipment will be another part of this task. New buildings may have to be constructed; decisions of what to do with government-owned buildings in abandoned capitals will have to be faced; finding housing for personnel in new centers may be a problem.

Budget changeover may not be easy.

Abolition of the regional system and the consolidation of provinces into areas will entail a major revision in the administrative law of Vietnam. Specific suggestions for preparing the needed legislation are offered in Part II in the first section under "Administrative Procedures," page 6.

4. Finally, follow-up is needed to pick up loose ends. Problems that were not expected will develop and will need solution before the enthusiasm for change wears off.


During all the above stages, the Field Administration team of Michigan State University is prepared to assist with respect to such significant details as planning methods, personnel procedures, and the like, as well as to see the whole reorganization carried through.

A

PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM





ELECT



**PRESENT LIMITED
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT**


B

**PROPOSED 100%
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT**





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
APPOINTMENT SYSTEM



D

PROPOSED AREA REGROUPMENT



 **POULO CONDORE**

1 de Phu Quoc

Provincial Partition for South Vietnam*
(Comparative Scheme)

<u>Up to 1955 (with the French) and present partition</u>	<u>Suggested grouping of provinces</u>
1. Long Xuyen	1. Long Xuyen
2. Chau Doc	Chau Doc
3. Sa Dec	Sa Dec
4. Ha Tien	Can Tho
5. Thu Dau Mot	2. Thu Dau Mot
6. Bien Hoa	Bien Hoa
7. Gia Dinh	Vung Tau
8. Tay Ninh	(Cap St. Jacques)
9. Vinh Long	Ba Ria
10. Tra Vinh	3. Gia Dinh
11. Tan An	Tay Ninh
12. My Tho	Cho Lon
13. Go Cong	4. Vinh Long
14. Vung Tau (Cap St. Jacques)	Tra Vinh
15. Ba Ria	Ben Tre
16. Ben Tre	5. Tan An
17. Can Tho	My Tho
18. Soc Trang	Go Cong
19. Rach Gia	6. Soc Trang
20. Bac Lieu	Rach Gia
21. Cho Lon	Ha Tien
	7. Bac Lieu

*The regrouping of provinces in South Viet Nam as indicated on this sheet was chosen for economic and historical considerations. The reasons for the specific groupings of these provinces has not been noted as it has been for the suggested changes in CVN and PMS.

Suggestions for Province Grouping in Central Vietnam

The following are the main ideas which have directed these suggestions:

1. The so-called PMS actually has little reason to exist because:
 - a. Prior to 1945, the four provinces of Dong Nai Thuong (Djiring), Darlac (Bannethuot), Pleiku, and Kontum, which at present constitute the PMS delegation, were provinces of Central Vietnam. With only minor differences, due to the majority being mountaineers, their administrative organization was similar to that of every other province in Central Vietnam.
 - b. The present PMS, in fact, was created by the French who contemplated designating these four rich but almost virgin provinces a "reserve land" with no entrance for the Vietnamese. The idea has lately been adopted by Bao-Dai's followers under another name, "The Crown Estate." The so-called "Crown Estate" was finally returned to the Vietnamese in June, 1954, and became the PMS delegation. All these considerations are designed to stress the artificial aspect of the situation.
 - c. The problem of economic development of the PMS is mainly that of outlets to the coast of Central Vietnam. At present, the Trans-Indochinese railway and the National Road No. 1 run along the coast and drain off local coastal products to Saigon. A wise policy of eastward economic attraction, by promoting the combination of hinterland PMS provinces with Central Vietnam coastal provinces, would permit an interacting development of the two areas which have much to complement each other's products.

2. It is highly desirable that each "area" be self-sufficient.

Usually, provinces in Central Vietnam must balance their budgets with subsidies from the National or Regional Budget. Moreover, the population must live on food supplies coming from richer provinces. The present extensive territorial division permanently endangers the food situation. The areas suggested hereunder would be able to produce sufficient rice, salt, meal, and forest products to feed their own populations.

Combinations Suggested (going from South to North):

Area No. 1 would include:

- the two present provinces of Bien Hoa and Baria (SVN), plus
- the southern part of the province of Binh-Thuan up to the Phan Ri River (Song Lay).

Reasons: complete analogy with South Vietnam (mode of life, language accent, etc.); economic activity entirely turned toward South Vietnam (Phan Thiet largely supplies the Saigon market with fresh fish, nuoc man, timber, etc.; Phan Thiet forest is a very popular hunting place for Saigon people on weekends).

-half the province of Dong Nai Thuong (Djiring).

Reasons: Djiring, the province capital, is connected directly to Saigon on the one hand, and to Saigon through Phan Thiet on the other hand, by excellent roads. Phan Thiet and Saigon are the main outlets and consumptive markets for tea, timber, coffee and other products from plantations in this part of the highland.

-a small part of the province of Darlac.

Reasons: At present a number of rubber plantations and timber developments are located in the area called "The Three Frontiers" and overlap three provinces: Bien Hoa, Dong Nai Thuong and Darlac. Although the numerous villages of plantation laborers have the same employer, they are administratively responsible to three different provincial authorities.

Area No. 2 would include:

- the entire province of Phan Rang with its small harbor on the mouth of a river which penetrates deep into the hinterland,
- almost the northern third of the province of Binh Thuan,
- half the province of Dong Nai Thuong, including Dalat and environs.

Reasons: An excellent road and a branch railway connect Dalat to Phan Rang (via TourCham). This link makes Phan Rang the natural outlet from Dalat to the sea and a relay point to Saigon.

-a substantial center part of the province of Darlac.

Area No. 3 would include:

- the whole province of Khanh Hoa and its natural harbor,
- half the province of Darlac with Ban Me Thuot, the province capital.

Reasons: outlet to the sea for that fabulously fertile but almost unexploited part of the PMS, usually called the "red soil land." The presence of the Bay of Cam Ranh in this area permits great hopes of development.

Area No. 4 would include:

- the two provinces of Binh Dinh and Phu Yen (CVN) and the whole province of Pleiku (PMS).

Reasons: The rich highland of Pleiku is connected to the coast by two roads--to Quy Nhon and Tuy Hoa. The center of An Khe, half the way from

Pleiku to Quynhon, is a well-known market for the exchange of goods between the mountaineers and the coastal population. Tuy Hoa has always been regarded as an excellent bridgehead for penetration into the interior. In 1953 Tuy Hoa actually was the main landing point for military forces of operation "Atlante."

Area No. 5 would include:

-the two provinces of Quang Ngai (CVN) and Kontum (PMS).

Reasons: These two provinces always have been sister provinces. Kontum is connected by road to Quang Ngai, its natural outlet to the coast and to the outer world. On this road is Ba To, the traditional center for goods exchange between the mountaineers and the coastal people. Six months before the Geneva Agreements, the Viet Minh seized Kontum and occupied the town--and the region--for three months. Those Viet Minh troops actually came from Quang Ngai via Ba To. At present Kontum is the see of a vast catholic vicarage which includes Quang Ngai territory.

Area No. 6 would include:

-the whole present province of Quang Nam.

Reasons: Comparatively speaking, Quang Nam is the richest province of Central Vietnam, and it has always been self-sufficient. Faifoo, the provincial capital, was the first locality (during the 17th century) to be settled by foreign merchants (Japanese, Chinese, Portuguese, Dutch, Spaniards. . .).

Tourane, its harbor, was third in importance (after Saigon and Haiphong). Nevertheless, its importance as the outlet of Hue has diminished since the beginning of the Trans-Indochinese railway; that is why it is not suggested to combine it with the province of Thua Thien (Hue) from which it is partitioned by the famous "Pass of Clouds" (Deo Hai-Van).

Area No. 7 would include:

-the three whole provinces of Thua Thien, Quang Tri and Quang Binh (provisionally in the Viet Cong zone).


Reasons: the existence of natural boundaries: on the South, the "Pass of Clouds," and on the North, the Pass of Annam Gate. This area would resurrect the traditional province of Binh-Tri-Thien which existed before the French came.

Taken separately, these three provinces are the poorest of Central Vietnam, and if Hue has so far been able to exist decently, it is merely because it is the capital city of the region.

Attached herewith: a map with suggested area boundaries.

(E)

BUDGET PLANNING



— CHANNEL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURES
— CHANNEL FOR PROGRAM EXPENDITURES

(F)

AREA PARTICIPATION IN BUDGET PLANNING OF TECHNICAL DEPARTMENTS


AREA LEVEL				NATIONAL LEVEL		
I PREVIOUS YEARS EXPENDITURES	II AREA REPRESENTATIVE	III AREA CHIEF	IV AREA COUNCIL	V GOVT DEPTS DEPARTMENTS	VI BUDGET BUREAU OF PRESIDENCY	VII BUDGET AS FINALLY APPROVED BY PRESIDENT AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
I PART MONEY ESTIMATES CHAPTERS TITLES LINES	ORIGINAL ESTIMATES	SHOWS ONLY DIFFERENCES NOT RECONCILED WITH AREA REPRESENTATIVES	SHOWS ONLY DIFFERENCES FROM COLUMNS II & III	FOR INCLUSION IN DEPT. OF INTERIOR & NATIONAL TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT BUDGETS	FINAL AUTHORITY TO RECONCILE ANY DIFFERENCES AND TO BRING WITHIN AMOUNTS AVAILABLE IN NATIONAL PLAN	FINAL APPROVAL
II PART PROPOSED PLANS	BUDGET PLANS AND JUSTIFICATIONS	DIFFERENCES AND JUSTIFICATION FOR SAME	COMMENTS ON COLUMNS II & III AND ADD OTHER JUSTIFICATIONS	NATIONAL 1. PLANS 2. JUSTIFICATIONS	REASONS FOR ANY MODIFICATIONS	GENERAL & SPECIFIC DIRECTIONS

// AREA LEVEL

/// NATIONAL LEVEL

G

REVIEW & REPORT SYSTEM



— REVIEW

- 1 GENERAL ADMINISTRATION.
- 2 PROGRESS OF PLANS.
- 3 RELATIONSHIP WITH TECHNICAL SERVICE.
- 4 PROBLEMS.
- 5 SUBSTANTIVE PROGRAM RESULTS.
- 6 ACTION ON AREA COUNCIL ADVICES OR RESOLUTIONS.
- 7 COSTS & EXPENDITURES REVIEW.

— REPORT

- 1 AREAS UNDER REVIEW.
- 2 FINDINGS.
- 3 ACTION AGREED UPON.
- 4 SCHEDULE OF PROPOSED ACTION.
- 5 PLANS FOR IMPROVEMENT.
- 6 PROBLEMS FOR DEPARTMENT CONSIDERATION.
- 7 FISCAL STATUS WITH JUSTIFICATION.