

D R A F T

5 May 1958

TO: Howard W. Hoyt, Chief  
Police Administration Division

FROM: Lyman M. Rundlett,  
Communications Advisor *LMR*

SUBJECT: Study of Communications Program.

REF: Your Memo Dated 2 May 1958.

1. The Communications Program is proceeding at an extremely slow rate, but this is a normal circumstance under the conditions which exist in Viet-Nam. This slow rate of progress and the conditions which bring it about are by no means peculiar to Viet-Nam, but I have found them to exist in most countries outside the U.S. and in all tropical countries which I have visited. This is not a matter of individual personalities but is a way of life of the people which we cannot hope to change.

2. Of course, there are some areas where we can take constructive action to improve our progress.

(a) I have had a request for a Vietnamese assistant on file with our Personnel Office since shortly after my arrival on the Project. This man should have some technical ability and be capable of acting as interpreter.

(b) I have need of two (2) American assistants; one on a permanent basis and one for about six (6) months to assist with Municipal Police and Surete in-service training. This need has already been made known and is entirely independent of any decisions concerning the Civil Guard.

3. Suggestions in areas over which we have no control are:

(a) Municipal Police and Surete should each assign a counterpart who has as his only duty the expediting of the Communications Program.

(b) It is believed USOM purchasing procedures could be further streamlined.

4. I have encountered no deliberate attempt to impede my program on the part of GVN officials. In fact, quite the contrary is true. However, the fact is that Municipal Police have assigned no counterpart and my Surete counterpart, Lt. Tran Van Muoi, has a fulltime job as Communications Officer. This situation does impede my progress without any intent to do so and this situation should be corrected.

5. I feel that frequent social get-togethers are always beneficial in cementing a close personal relationship and I am highly in favor of having them more often.

6. The following is an outline of major communications projects with target completion dates based upon my best estimate of delivery of equipment. A large organization will be required to accomplish this task within the established time limits and it is imperative that recruitment of the personnel listed in paragraph 2 be effected as soon as possible.

A. SAIGON MUNICIPAL POLICE

1. Construction of  
Communications Building.....1 December 1958
2. Installation of Additional  
Radio Equipment (1957 Budget).....1 May 1959
3. Recondition Present Radio System.....15 December 1958
4. In-Service Training of Technicians.....1 May 1959
5. Installation of Telephone Call Boxes.....1 November 1959
6. Installation of New Telephone  
Equipment.....1 November 1959
7. Installation of Teletype Network.....1 May 1959

B. MUNICIPAL POLICE - OTHER CITIES

1. Installation of Reconditioned  
Radio Equipment From Saigon.....1 March 1959
2. Installation of Telephone Call Boxes.....1 January 1962

C. SURETE

1. Radio Direction-Finder Trucks.....1 December 1958
2. Radio-Teletype Network,  
Saigon to Dalat - Hue.....1 February 1959
3. Completion of Radio Teletype Net.....1 September 1959
4. National Headquarters Communications  
Center and Repair Facility.....1 February 1959
5. Saigon Transmitting Station.....1 February 1959
6. Saigon Receiving Station.....1 April 1959

C. SURETE (continued)

- 7. Interim Radio Telephone Network  
to all Provinces.....1 April 1959
- 8. Radio Network Regions to Provinces.....1 January 1960
- 9. Provincial Radio Networks.....1 July 1960
- 10. Mobile Radio System (First Phase).....1 April 1959
- 11. Mobile Radio System (Final Phase).....1 March 1960
- 12. Regional Repair Centers.....1 June 1959
- 13. In-Service Training Program.....1 July 1960

D. CIVIL GUARD

Still held in abeyance pending policy decision.

## MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

VIETNAM ADVISORY GROUP

## OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Howard W. Hoyt, Chief                      DATE: May 6, 1958  
Police Administration Division

FROM: E. C. Updike, Head, Civil Guard Section

SUBJECT: Study of the Civil Guard

The Michigan State University Civil Police Administration Program dated May 1, 1957, revised on July 25, 1957, set the goals to be achieved during the years 1957, 1958 and 1959. These are the same goals that the Civil Guard Section has continued to aim for.

I believe that the entire Police Administration Division has a fair knowledge of the many concepts which have been presented both by MAAG and the Vietnamese government and as they are also known to the Chief Advisor, there is little use in again reviewing them. I might point out in brief that all the papers pertaining to the various concepts have been classified by the Country Team and, therefore, cannot be made a part of this study. However, it is known that an acceptable plan to the Country Team has been submitted to Washington and a request made for advice and guidance. Until this information is received the entire program of procurement of materials is at a standstill.

A brief review of the Civil Guard activities since September 1957 might point out the progress which has been made. Upon my arrival in Vietnam and assignment to the Civil Guard Section, we had many contacts with various individuals at Civil Guard headquarters. It appeared that we were not enjoying the cooperation from the Civil Guard officials as was expected. After repeated visits and discussions Colonel Le-Khuong, who was then Deputy Director of Civil Guard, stated he would act as counterpart to the head of the Civil Guard Section. Various requests were made for field trip clearances, information on reports, etc., and the answers, if given at all, usually took 2-4 weeks. Stock answer by Col. Le-Khuong when this was brought to his attention was that he was only the Deputy Director.

In January 1958 Col. Le-Khuong was advanced to Director General of the Civil Guard. Since that time requests for information have cleared within a reasonable length of time. Cooperation between the Civil Guard officers in general and staff members of MSUG has greatly improved during the past four months.

To answer the questions outlined in your memorandum:

1. Are you satisfied with the progress which has been made



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in the Civil Guard? The answer must be, "No, I am not satisfied." My reason in giving this answer follows the goals set down by MSU in 1957 to supply some of the Civil Guard with American made weapons and transportation. We all know that this has not been fulfilled. Therefore, the problem is due to the lack of procurement of material. It is not the lack of enthusiasm on the part of GVN Civil Guard personnel and it is not due to lack of support by MSU as a group.

In paragraph 3 of your memorandum, request is made for recommendations for the proper approach or the best manner to overcome the obstacles. I believe these are plain as far as Civil Guard is concerned. Being of the opinion that eventually material will be procured in the form of transportation and communications equipment and weapons, this section has continued to impress upon the Civil Guard Director General the necessity of training instructors. He has repeatedly agreed that this is the proper procedure. He then asked the question: when will the training material be available? This is the obstacle that we now face. I can see no solution until such time as our government and GVN reach a decision.

I feel that the social get-togethers we have had with the Director General are sufficient, as I have been advised that he does not like too many functions but does enjoy those of MSU officials. I feel that the contacts between the Civil Guard and MSU are in very good condition at this time. I do not believe rejecting certain aid requests would in any way help our relations and that if requests for aid from Civil Guard are rejected for the sole purpose of forcing the Director General to meet unreal conditions, it would be a grave error on our part. It is my personal opinion that the Civil Guard not only looks to MSU for guidance and assistance, but they are pleased with the arrangements and do not wish to be connected with any other American advisory group.

The first action to be taken by the Civil Guard Section in the event the Civil Guard remains under the advice of the MSUG Police Administration Division, will be to discuss the new table of organization with the Director General of the Civil Guard. Up to this time this has not been possible due to the classification of all papers involved in the new concept. This has been discussed with Dave Wood of USOM who agreed that until a copy of the plan was filed with the Vietnamese government, this discussion would be improper. However, he did agree in the discussion with the Director General if there were differences of opinion, they could

*de classify  
certify  
materials  
which  
similar  
and finally  
could not  
be making progress in reorganization, etc.?*

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be resolved by amended subproject agreement. If this is realized the following goals should be given consideration and then placed in operation if agreed to by the Chief, Police Administration Division:

1. A Motor Maintenance School.

Civil Guard started a motor maintenance school at its Motor Pool in Saigon. In view of the possibility of enlarging this school MSU agreed with the Director General of Civil Guard to reconstruct a portion of the building located at the Motor Pool. This building is about completed and can be used for storage and automotive repair. A review of the training curriculum and instructors in the school will be necessary.

2. Radio School.

Director General of the Civil Guard has submitted for approval an additional plan for reconstruction of buildings at the Motor Pool. At the present time this is being reviewed by the Civil Guard Section and a report will be submitted to the Chief, Police Administration Division, with recommendations. It is the thinking of this Section that this new addition could be arranged into a radio school where installations of radio equipment and repair of radio equipment could be conducted. This has not been discussed with the Civil Guard.

3. Recruit School at Cat-Lo.

Due to the change from French to American weapons and equipment, recommendations will be made to the Director General of the Civil Guard for the construction of proper range facilities to provide better training for recruits.

4. River Company Training School.

The organization of a river company training school to teach operation and maintenance of water transportation equipment has been discussed very generally with the Director General and he seemed agreeable.

5. Highway Patrol Training.

Highway patrol training will be instituted in the fixed company training operation depending on the proposed locations of the companies and the amount of available equipment. This has also been discussed generally with the Director General and he appeared very interested.


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The goals set for this type of training, it is believed, could be planned and decided so that upon the arrival of material aid from the United States, Civil Guard instructors would be prepared to assist MSU in training. This phase of Civil Guard operation would then be discussed between Research & Training Section and Civil Guard Section to arrive at the most effective means of carrying out this program.

In conclusion, a major obstacle in the Civil Guard program is the agreement between GVN and ICA/W. It is my opinion that this should be resolved in the very near future.

ECU/her

  
E. C. UPDIKE, Head  
Civil Guard Section



# MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

VIETNAM ADVISORY GROUP

## OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO : Howard W. Hoyt, Chief  
Police Administration Division

DATE : May 6, 1958

FROM : J. D. Franklin, Traffic Advisor

SUBJECT : Evaluation of Traffic Program in Vietnam

I am satisfied in knowing that I am doing all that I as an individual can do. I am not satisfied with my progress when I know that there is so much that can be done. I believe at present our contacts with the Bureau of Public Works involving bus transportation and the "rules of the road" are good.

The primary problem causing unsatisfactory progress with the police is the lack of a definitely assigned counterpart. At present it is always necessary to call for an appointment, and if fortunately it can be made, the individual seems always to be in a hurry or preoccupied. Last year some time was spent developing Mr. Dung, an assistant to Mr. Quoi. However, the above men didn't get along professionally (which is not difficult to understand) and, therefore, Mr. Dung was promoted upstairs. What is needed is someone who can devote two or three hours a week on an uninterrupted schedule to me so that we can adequately discuss, analyze and suggest ideas. This individual must of necessity have enough rank so that he at least can be listened to, and also of enough intelligence to want to learn and apply theory and practice.

With regard to the above, we suggested to Mr. Tu that a committee on traffic be formed with members (at his suggestion) from the office of the Mayor, the police, the city engineer, and the Department of Public Works. He felt that possibly the importance of this committee could help sell the Mayor and others (ministers) on recommended changes. Frankly, he did not seem too optimistic.

I believe social contacts are most important, if we can keep them that way, and introduce a little American informality to break down the barriers. Maybe we could invite supposed Vietnamese antagonists who do not cooperate in their daily work habits and, therefore, attempt to break the ice. Maybe a trip somewhere such as on the attache's boat or informal dinners with some personal movies or slides, as was described in our staff meeting, might be in order.

Although I am removed from the high level operational standards and policies of our government, I feel that in Vietnam, in particular, although we need them--they need us as equally, and that we can be "demanding," if that is the correct word, in at least requesting some

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mutual cooperation in those fields where the Vietnamese have no knowledge. Further, they might respect us a little more if we actually checked on where equipment goes. After all, if we can be audited, so can they, and it might be a good introduction and further appreciation of our "democracy" in action.

JDF/her

# MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

VIETNAM ADVISORY GROUP

## OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO : Howard W. Hoyt, Chief  
Police Administration

DATE : 8 May 1958

FROM : John F. Manopoli

SUBJECT : Study of VBI Goals and Progress

Refer to your memorandum of 2 May 1958, on this subject. The following information will supplement the report of Mr. Chamberlin who will deal with the concrete goals and progress of the VBI Program. A study of the goals and progress of the American Aid Control Section will be the subject of a separate memorandum. Your memorandum of 2 May 1958, will be answered in the form of replies to the questions posed by you.

Question 1: Are you satisfied with the progress that has been made in the field of the VBI?

Answer: Yes, but with many specific reservations, particularly in the field of police administration and personnel management and, generally, in all fields since the appointment of the new Director General.

Question 2: Has this progress reached the goals in every case that you had in mind?

Answer: No, with the possible exception of the Central Identification Bureau, where great strides have been made in achieving our eventual goal.

Question 3: If progress is not satisfactory, what are the problems standing in the way of this program?

- Answer:
- (1) Whether the present turnabout on the part of the new Director General is from a dictated policy by higher authority, or from a personal reaction.
  - (2) The lack of police experience by our governing counterparts.
  - (3) Failure to tie in our advice and our ideas with the material and counterpart aid being offered.
  - (4) The recent loss of social and official contact with the present Director General.

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Question 4: Are they the lack of cooperation of any individual?

Answer: The former Director General was more amenable to ideas and advice and was slowly but definitely adopting our constructive suggestions. The present Director General has pursued an entirely different attitude on ideas, advice, the adoption of such ideas and advice, and the implementation of plans previously agreed upon with the former Director General. This attitude is also reflected in the more defensive attitudes adopted by subordinates who previously maintained closer working relations with the staff.

Question 5: Are they the results of any recent appointment of high level officials?

Answer: Refer to answer to Question 4.

Question 6: Are they due to lack of procurement of material?

Answer: Possibly because of the slow procurement process of ICA, and that we are one year behind in the implementation of our PIO/Cs. Also, our counterparts are demanding more material aid and do not seem to realize the general slowness in procurement procedure. The material aid program does not actually reflect progress because this aid is of a temporary nature and the only lasting good will be the advice and ideas adopted with or without supplementary material aid. The use of material aid as a bludgeon to have our ideas accepted would boomerang in the long run. As delicately as possible, material aid should be used as bait for the acceptance of technical, administrative and personnel reforms.

Question 7: Are they due to the lack of interest on the part of GVN?

Answer: No. Their interest whether different or similar to ours, exists. But the problem concerns the engendering of interest with counterparts at all levels and then, through what seems to be a high level policy of not leaving an official too long in a sensitive position; such generated interest is lost by transfer. This requires the promoting of new interests and new contacts within the police services. Further, any lack of interest is not evident when the matter under discussion is material or counterpart aid.



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Question 8: Are they due to the lack of support or proper coordination in this office?

Answer:

- (1) In the past, the concern of all the staff was primarily with progress made and not with problems that confronted us. This request to enumerate the problems in our overall goals is refreshing and indicative of a desire to increase the substantial support and coordination previously received.
- (2) Administrative support on the part of incapable interpreters-translators has hampered this program, particularly in creating situations of misunderstanding with our counterparts.
- (3) Section Head Meetings should be held more often to discuss the problems of the program. The problems could then be presented at regular staff meetings.

Question 9: Should we secure more regular conferences?

Answer: Yes. During the tenure of the previous Director General, there were two formalized conferences each week as deemed necessary at the call of either of the parties concerned. With the present Director General, all conferences are of a formalized nature, held once a week, with many of these once-a-week sessions cancelled and not re-scheduled. The more conferences we have with General La, the more opportunity we will have to present and re-present our ideas. The reserve that is apparent can most assuredly be broken as a result of additional conferences.

Question 10: Should we develop more frequent social get-togethers.

Answer: Yes, for reasons enumerated in Question 9. There has been a marked decrease in social contact with both General La and his subordinates since his term of office began.



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Question 11: Should we attempt to work closer with some of the subordinates of the officials that are blocking the program's progress?

Answer: No, if our eventual thought is to develop a closer working relationship with the present Director General. Working closer with subordinates should be done under either of the following two conditions:

- (1) after a rapport has been reached with the subordinate's superior; or
- (2) if it is eventually determined that this rapport is impossible and that higher level authority should be properly approached to remedy the impasse.

Question 12: Should we be more positive with them in rejecting certain aid requests until certain conditions are met?

Answer: Yes. Refer to answer to Question 6. Particularly, where the material or counterpart aid will be to perpetuate any antiquated administrative or technical function that diametrically is opposed to the overall police program.

JFM/mmd

JOHN F. MANOPOLI,  
Police Advisor

# MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

VIETNAM ADVISORY GROUP

## OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. Howard W. Hoyt, Chief                      DATE : May 9, 1958  
Police Administration Division

FROM : Research and Training Section *SM*

SUBJECT : Study in the Fields of Research and Training

In the training field it appears factual that MSU has, from the start, been more successful than expected. The interest generated through counseling for the firstmembers of the police team has resulted in rapidly expanding the training function in all police services. The early plans laid in cooperation with local officials have largely come to fruition.

Within the past few months the intensive effort in training has resulted in most services developing their own instructors in all necessary civil police subjects.

The National Police Academy marks a milestone in progress; planned from the first, it is now an accomplished fact and due to open May 20.

The Civil Guard has their own high level school and are currently working with us to develop their own instructors. This school terminates about September 1.

In addition, the VBI and the Municipal Police have instructors training their men in revolver shooting and special police weapons. The VBI has trained instructors in Crime Laboratory and Henry fingerprint work.

The Civil Guard is somewhat behind the other services but this lag appears to result <sup>from</sup> in lack of decisive action on the part of U.S. and GVN officials and is not the fault of MSU.

So, in answer to paragraph one of your memo, I think satisfactory progress has been made in the training field. Since there are no serious obstacles except as noted with the Civil Guard, this also answers paragraph 2.

In answer to paragraph three, question one, the only way around the Civil Guard obstacle, as I see it, is the unsatisfactory one of continuing to assist them in training their men for duties which they may or may not be eventually required to discharge and without equipment they must have to function. We can also stand by for an all-out training program if a favorable decision is forthcoming.

Relative to paragraph three, question two, I think we might well review and study some of the advice offered in our pre-assignment briefing to see whether or not

we are still on course. It might help in deciding the proper approach.

1. The President has stated that when an American goes abroad on a passport he represents the American people and his conduct abroad should for that reason be exemplary.

2. The State Department reminded us that we were not going out on a benevolent mission of aid to the needy; that we are aiding this country only to protect our own way of life and, therefore, our motives are primarily selfish.

3. ICA/W reminded us that we were about to have a new experience; instead of being in the position of looking down rather disdainfully at the foreigner in America, we were about to become the foreigner. Further, we would be occidentals in an oriental world which would be even more reason for local people to resist to some extent.

The following points were made by Dean Taggart on the last day of our briefing:

5. Study the people and their problems in terms of their history, culture, etc.

6. Concentrate on accomplishable projects under their conditions.

7. Work yourself out of a job.

8. Lean on your counterparts.

9. Do not adopt the prevalent oriental acceptance of "serfdom."

10. Make more contacts among the poor and underprivileged instead of the natural contacts you will make among the ruling classes.

11. (Most important) Try to instill the idea of police as protectors instead of oppressors. "If you succeed in this one phase of your work, I will consider your job well done."

12. Accept the idea of "bureaucracy" as inevitable; but not the old type which is sensitive to leadership only, but the new, which is sensitive to public pressure and dedicated to public service.

In addition to the above, shortly after arrival, I made note of some of the things I thought we should keep in mind. Your memo caused me to dig these out for review and I believe, since we are evaluating, that they may be of interest and I am passing them along for any value they may have:

1. We are foreign guests of the Vietnamese government.
2. Our presence here is occasioned more by selfish interests than by good will motives.
3. We are here only as technical advisors and any insistence upon adoption of our ideas is therefore out of order.
4. While we might withhold certain gifts of equipment until the local government can put it to good use, this is merely a saving of US dollars and should not be a means of enforcing our demands.
5. Our training should be based upon their needs as determined through study, collaboration and agreement with local authorities.
6. Some of our advice and information, based upon Western experience, we must assume, will be of value to the government here. However, it would be error to assume that all of our methods and solutions based upon Western experience would be useful here, due to marked differences in laws, customs and culture; and for the further reason that we have not solved all our western problems in the best possible manner; in some cases we are still looking for any good answer.
7. We should not try to introduce change merely for the sake of changing things to accepted Western or American standards. This natural tendency should be avoided. It should be recalled that even though this country is trying to establish a working democracy patterned after the West, they may not want to and probably could not duplicate the pattern exactly.
8. Before proposing a change we should consider:
  - a) Is there an important problem?
  - b) Have we had experience with the same problem?
  - c) Have we previously solved it in the best possible manner?
  - d) Can we, or the local authorities, think of a better way?

Much of the above does, of course, lie outside the field of Training and Research; however, I believe they might be useful for discussion to determine the right approach. My opinion is that the correct approach is one of friendly cooperation in effecting those changes which will add to their security and material well being and consequently to our own. We should not forget that the prime objective of the civil police function is internal security and should bend our greatest efforts toward that objective without getting lost in matters that are not important to them nor to us. Since I am not aware of the number of conferences now being held I cannot say whether there should be

more frequent conferences, but I do believe they should be frequent so that each side will be better informed about the thinking of the other. I do not believe that much is accomplished in social get-togethers where large numbers of guests are entertained, but they may be useful occasionally on a good fellowship basis. They certainly do more good than social get-togethers confined to American personnel.

I don't think we should work closer with subordinates with the idea of getting things done in spite of his superior's reluctance. I do think we should cultivate the acquaintance of subordinates for cooperative reasons and also because they eventually become the bosses in many cases.

As for research, we have done very little. We have done and are still doing some study preparatory to planning, but this could hardly be called research in the true sense of the word. Actually the stepped-up training program left little time for research. The one project which was contemplated in cooperation with members of the Academic Section was abandoned because they were told that any mention of police or interest in the police might spoil their chances of securing the information they needed for the village study. Another project which was in the planning stage and involved measuring the impact of our aid did not get past the planning stage. With the present restrictions in relation to field trips such a study could not be made.

For the future I believe we should:

1. Continue phasing out of actual classroom instruction.
2. Offer whatever assistance we can to the several schools and visit them regularly.
3. Consider more third country training and observation trips.
4. Stand ready for a stepped-up training program for the Civil Guard.
5. Take a greater interest in and assist participants in the U.S.
6. Consider making more frequent field trips for observing training progress and making contacts and, if feasible, doing some mobile unit training.
7. Consider trying to get clearance for a village study on our own.

Unfinished items due for completion are:

1. A series of translated lectures which will constitute a "Training Manual." This is underway and should be finished by July 1st.



2. Study of and improvement of Saigon Police Department records system. Completion date cannot be estimated.

3. Make suggestions for In-Service Training for Saigon Police Department to the Minister of Interior. This should be completed within one week.

4. Procure information on a continuing basis and prepare a logical method of reporting monthly the number of students graduating from training schools in the three police services. This should be completed by the end of May.

5. Aiding the Civil Guard in preparing a pistol range at Cap St. Jacques. All facilities for doing this at practically no cost are available. It appears all that is necessary is get high enough in their chain of command to get the order issued.

6. Completion of historical, cultural and statistical information on the provinces and larger cities of Vietnam for reference for those making field trips and others who may need it from time to time. The separation of Mr. Tan who was working on this project has temporarily halted this project.

7. Putting Vietnamese sound tracks on films which the NPA instructors wish to use. This will progress as the school gets underway.

It appears that there will be plenty for the staff, which is shortly to be depleted by three men, to do for the next few months. These activities could logically include:

1. Continuous contact with the various schools to offer technical advice on questions which arise and which have not previously been covered. To assist them with visual aids. We also should attempt to determine the quality of instruction being given. Whether or not the instructors we have trained actually have the ability to deliver and whether they have had sufficient training to deliver. We might also study the police operation through daily observation with the thought that we may be able to offer more specific advice than contained in lecture materials based largely on American experience.

2. Continued training of VBI instructors, or re-training of them as found necessary.

3. Continued training of Civil Guard instructors.

These, together with those mentioned previously, field trips, mobile training units, third country observation trips, village research, contacting U.S. participants, etc., should leave little time to spare.

## MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

VIETNAM ADVISORY GROUP

## OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO : H. W. Hoyt, Chief  
Police Administration Division

DATE : 2 June 1958

FROM : VBI Criminal Section

SUBJECT : Study of the VBI (reply to memo of 2 May 1958).

Answer to Question #1.

I am satisfied with the progress of some projects, but not with others. The goals were not set by me but by my predecessors, Mr. Ryan, Mr. Turner and Mr. Dymond. During my indoctrination in Saigon by Mr. Ryan and Mr. Turner, I was briefed on the several projects which had been started and was assigned more or less as a coordinator-expediter. No target date was set for the completion of the projects other than the phase-out in 1959; however, an order or priority was made. If the present rate of accomplishment is maintained, many of the goals should be reached by the phase-out date.

Answer to Question #2.

This question demands a lengthy explanation because of the complicated nature of the advisor's role and the many facets of the VBI project.

The Directors General of the VBI and their subordinates must be given the credit for any progress which has been made outside the scope of material aid. An advisor is limited to stimulating interest in improvement, making surveys and giving advice. He must obtain the respect of his counterparts in order that these may be accomplished and must rely upon the counterpart's zeal to put the advice into operation. He may on occasion act as a passive overseer to detect divergences from this advice and bring these divergences to the counterpart's attention. If the advice is not sound because of the advisor's inability to consider all ramifications of the problem, he cannot expect to have his advice accepted. Also, if his personality is not the type which commands respect, the same rejection may be the result. This is a reason for lack of progress which was not included in question #2.

Another obstacle to progress is what may be called tunnel vision. That is concentration on one facet of the project to

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the exclusion of others. This causes an irregular line of progress. The realization that these are serious obstacles has been the product of my own experience, which I think is not unique.

The suggested reasons given in question #2 apply to the VBI only to a limited extent. The cooperation of the counterparts has been unexpectedly satisfactory. For only a short space of 1½ months when General La replaced General Chieu was there a period of limited cooperation. Since that time, due to the active interest taken by Mr. Hoyt and Mr. Ryan, there has been a better understanding and wholehearted cooperation.

On a few occasions the delay in receiving material aid and the limitations placed upon the type of articles which can be purchased has slowed down the rate of progress. This is particularly true in the communications field. There seems to be no lack of interest on the part of the GVN but only a tendency to make haste slowly. There seems to be no lack of support by the Police Division except when there are differences of opinion; however, coordination is not as good as it might be. I realize that in an ideal organization, support and coordination are automatic, but such a Utopian setup exists nowhere to my knowledge.

Support outside the Police Division has been lacking at times. Adequate transportation has not been available. On four occasions a lack of intersectional coordination has caused embarrassment to, and strained relations with counterparts.

*Review letters*  
To correct any misunderstanding with the counterpart, it is suggested that a detailed brochure of MSU's relationship to the GVN be drawn up. This should include an explanation of why MSU was selected to furnish advisors on Public Administration (copies of any letters, etc. from President Ngo Dinh Diem requesting this assistance and outlining the conditions of the request); an explanation of MSU's relationship to the Embassy, USOM, and other US Government organizations; the laws controlling the manner in which aid and assistance can be given; a resume of all advice given, progress made as well as material aid delivered and on order; agreements reached with former counterparts, etc. This, it is believed, will eliminate much misunderstanding with new counterparts. It can also be used as orientation material for new staff members.

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*MODE →*  
*Problems  
to be solved*

The program to reorganize the VBI and all other police agencies has bogged down due partly to recommendations given by a MSU advisor in 1955. This advice was approved despite the protests of the Police Division at that time. It has been and will be difficult to rectify this mistake. It is suggested that all proposed advice whenever it concerns more than one section be submitted for approval of the heads of the sections concerned before it is discussed with the counterpart. This can be done by requiring that a memorandum of the advice to be given be submitted to the Chief. He may then approve, ask for a revision, or call in the head of another section if that section is concerned; (e.g. registration program originated in the Consulting Section but involved the Police Division).

There is an overlapping of functions between the Police Administration units. This may be because some units are established on a specialty basis (Research and Training, Traffic Engineering, and Communications); others according to representation (separate GVN police agencies to which advice is given (Civil Guard, Municipal Police, and VBI)), and one according to an administrative function (American Aid Control).

To better coordinate the Police Division it is suggested that the advisors to the Civil Guard, Municipal Police and VBI be placed under the direct supervision of Mr. Ryan who will act as coordinator as well as Assistant Chief. Research, American Aid Control and the clerical-typing staff should be grouped together as Administrative functions. Training, Communications and Traffic Engineering could be grouped under Specialty functions.

The counterparts of the police organization advisors are well known, but counterparts for the other advisors (with the exception of the Communications advisor) are not firmly established.

Need for specialist advice should be developed by the advisors to the VBI, Civil Guard and Municipal Police. These advisors should then have their counterparts appoint a subordinate counterpart in the specialty needing assistance and obtain from the Training section a specialist in this subject to work with the assigned subordinate counterpart. The advisor to the police organization should be kept abreast of all developments and should take all misunderstandings to his counterpart.



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There are often too many people giving independent advice to one person.

A detailed account for the record of all meetings with counterparts should be furnished to the Chief of the Police Division.

✓ Social get-togethers are good confidence builders if the language barriers do not reduce them to groups who can converse and those who cannot. This has been a rather undercurrent objection to some of the get-togethers.

Advisors on special assignment should work closely with subordinates but approval of the officials must be obtained first, otherwise the subordinate is placed in a very precarious position.

Arbitrary rejections of aid should not be used as a tool to accomplish a purpose. I believe there is a USOM rule which limits American Aid to projects which are progressive and supported by advisor recommendations. If that is true, it is impossible to approve of aid which ignores certain conditions.

There are other conditions which interfere with the progress of the project. The solutions of some are rather simple--others more difficult:

1. About one-half of the interpreters assigned to the Police Division are unable to serve in that capacity when important meetings with counterparts are held. The capable interpreters with the exception of two are on general assignment and seldom available for unplanned meetings. When the unqualified interpreters are used, there is a great danger of a misunderstanding with the counterpart, which may be impossible to rectify.

Solution: Replace poor interpreters with satisfactory ones.

2. Some advisors are inclined to become resentful and belligerent when their advice is not accepted. The rejection is not always because the counterpart believes the advice is unsound, but because it may be too typically American.

Solution: It was explained to me that the people of Vietnam are struggling to become self-sufficient, not only



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from foreign financing but also from foreign advice. This can not be accomplished unless they are forced or force themselves to do their own thinking. Also, they must build national pride. They wish to create ideas that are Vietnamese, not American or French or Chinese, but something they can proudly show to the world as a product of their own industry and ingenuity. If the advisor believes that the counterproposal of the GVN is nearly as good as his, or even if he thinks that the plan is only fair but workable, it might be well to support it. In the long run the ultimate goal of the US in Vietnam may be reached more quickly by this approach.

3. Lack of closer more frequent contact with a counterpart may cause him to believe you are indifferent. Very few advisors make frequent enough contact with their counterparts. This is due to too many diversions from the primary objectives and the language barrier which is not bridged by interpreters because so few are competent.

Solution: Advisors with responsible counterparts should not be expected to waste valuable time teaching classes of questionable value at Cap St. Jacques, etc., where often as much as one-half the time is lost. While the advisor is away on these diversions, it is necessary to furnish a substitute to meet with the advisor's counterpart. If the advisor is working with three or four counterparts, the interruptions become frustrating.

The solutions are to assign permanent interpreters to the advisors to the Civil Guard, Municipal Police and VBI. The other interpreters can work general assignment. As much as possible diversions should be eliminated. I realize that as staff members of MSU we are expected to teach, but this may be overcome by all members submitting a complete text of lectures in specialized subjects to the Training Section and having persons assigned to that section deliver the lecture.

4. There is a shortage of stenographic help. One or two stenographers for 23 advisors in a "paper organization" are definitely not enough. There should be at least one stenographer for each unit. Because there are no stenographers, advisors must spend many valuable hours writing letters, reports, memorandums, lectures, etc., in long hand.

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5. Lack of privacy. There is no noise free, traffic free, interruption free office where an advisor can get his paper work done. As a test check in my office, there were six interruptions in 30 minutes. Phone calls for someone else, people from other sections passing the time of day, visiting friends, bill collectors, snackbar employees, visiting firemen, etc. Don't underestimate this cause. Mr. Ryan obtained a desk for me at Camp des Mares but each time I went there I had to take a great deal of material with me. Also Mr. Houng, Mr. LeCan, Lt. Thanh and other employees of Camp des Mares felt they must be congenial by carrying on a conversation and this was most distracting. The only sanctuary is my own bedroom and of course, this cannot be approved.

Solution: In the present building this is relatively impossible to rectify.

6. Telephonic communication is relatively impossible. As nothing can be accomplished without contact with counterparts, it is often necessary to make trips across the city to get the answers to questions which could be obtained in a few minutes if the telephone system was more dependable. Counterparts have the same trouble contacting us.

Solution: Part of the trouble is with our own operator. Instruction in telephone courtesy might help.

7. There are too many holidays when interpreters, clerical help and counterparts are not available.

Solution: None.

8. Inadequate health protection and impersonal treatment has often caused long periods of lassitude which often brings progress to a standstill.

Solution: MSU should have its own doctor who could be partially paid by Blue Cross contributions.

To recapitulate there are many conditions peculiar to the Vietnamese and their government which are obstacles to progress, but there is little we can do to change them. If we straighten up our own house

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perhaps the shortcomings of the Vietnamese would not appear so grave. When we tell them to adapt, not adopt, we might take our own advice and adapt our advice to their conditions rather than expect them to adopt our methods.

If I were asked for my opinion as to whether the progress made could have been realized without MSU, I would have to say frankly that material aid could have been given by USOM without MSU. However, most of the accomplishments have been the results of advice, not material aid, and these could not have been realized without MSU. I realize that advice and material aid are in some instances inseparable, but a few advisors from USOM could determine the need for material aid after requests from GVN had been made.

Advisors to the VBI have given technical assistance in the following fields with these results:

a) Organization - A well thought out plan for the efficient organization has been submitted with only a few minor revisions. Within the Central Headquarters there have been constructive changes but in the overall organization there has been no improvement. This is due to an arrete in 1955 which gave control of the Provincial VBI headquarters to the Province Chiefs and in effect created 36 separate agencies. Any reorganization is subject to the whims of the Province Chiefs.

b) Personnel Management - A system of cataloging the special abilities of all VBI employees was started but bogged down, partly due to indifference in the provinces. It has been reactivated under the new Director General. A system for classifying employees was suggested but not favorably accepted because it is somewhat dependent on a civil service system which is non-existent. The civil service system should be started on a national level and not confined to the VBI; therefore, advisors of the Public Administration Division should handle this.

c) Recruitment - GVN officials have taken advice in this field and the President has tried to select 500 men of superior education to form the nucleus of a progressive national police service.

d) Promotion - This has met resistance because of the newly appointed officials desire to surround themselves with loyal men

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rather than those of ability. Where loyalty is very necessary it should be confined to loyalty to the country, the organization and the Director General--not to the party.

e) Supply Management - Much valuable advice has been given and applied in this field so far as the Central Headquarters is concerned. In the provinces the advice has had limited effect.

f) Records and Statistics - Progress has been made here and the future promises even greater advances.

g) Training - Very satisfactory progress. Many schools have developed rather naive recruits into potentially valuable policemen and technicians.

h) Supervision - As this field deals almost exclusively with human relations, it would be difficult to change ideas and customs which have been developed over the centuries. A few ideas for tables of organization, arrangement of desk space, maintenance of logs and charts to determine worker productivity have been accepted. However, there is a rather subtle form of passive resistance against using the ideas to insure a more efficient productive organization because this dovetails with discipline.

i) Discipline - It is very inadvisable to become involved in disciplinary methods. This definitely places us in the field of operations and threatens to involve us too personally in the operations of an organization. Civil service or a merit system universally applied should solve the problem of discipline.

j) Auxillary Services - Identification Bureau and Laboratory. Because these are Central Headquarters functions there has been little or no opposition to our advice. Progress has been satisfactory to the advisor of the VBI, but any slowdown has been due to lack of proper building facilities and the inactivity of the advisor. When the needed facilities are made available, the goals should be reached without difficulty.

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