

R. Turner



A Threat to the Peace

North Viet-Nam's Effort To Conquer South Viet-Nam

PART II—The Appendices

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North Viet-Nam's Effort To Conquer South Viet-Nam

In Two Parts

PART II—The Appendices

PART I—A separate publication—
is the report which refers
to these appendices

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

A Threat to the Peace
North Viet-Nam's Effort
To Conquer South Viet-Nam

In Two Parts

PART II - The Appendix

PART I - A separate publication

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APPENDIX A

Direction of the Viet Cong by North Viet-Nam

(See Part I, section IV, pp. 14-18)

The Government and the Communist Party in North Viet-Nam provide support and encouragement to the illegal movement to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam. The Communist Party, called the Lao Dong (Workers) Party in North Viet-Nam, provides the ideological orientation of the so-called "liberation movement" in South Viet-Nam.

The following excerpts from Lao Dong Party declarations and from the articles and speeches of party and government officials in Hanoi demonstrate clearly the leading role played by North Viet-Nam in the Viet Cong campaign in the South:

1. From the resolution of the 3d National Congress of the Lao Dong (Workers) Party of Viet-Nam adopted at Hanoi on September 10, 1960:

"1. The Third National Congress of the Party unanimously finds that over the past nine years and more, from the Second Congress to the third, under the leadership of the party, the Vietnamese revolution has won big victories. . . .

"The people's democratic power, more and more consolidated, is a strong instrument for fulfilling the tasks of proletarian dictatorship and speeding up socialist transformation and socialist construction in the North; at the same time, it is a firm base for our whole people in their struggle for the strengthening of peace and the achievement of national reunification. Under the leadership of the party, the People's Army has vigorously developed its revolutionary character, scored new achievements in study and in work, and made steady progress in turning itself into a regular and modern army.

"The national united front has been consolidated, the worker-peasant alliance strengthened. The Viet-Nam fatherland front and the political parties and mass organizations, members of the front, have made active contributions to the cause of socialist revolution in the North and the struggle for national reunification.

"In the South, our compatriots' struggle against the American imperialists and their agents, the Ngo Dinh Diem clique, though facing many difficulties, is being firmly maintained and further expanded day by day. Our people throughout the country have united closely in their struggle and enjoy worldwide sympathy and support. The American imperialists and their henchmen are more and more isolated. . . .

"Since the reestablishment of peace and the complete liberation of the North, the Vietnamese revolution has shifted over to a new stage. Under the leadership of the party, the North is advancing by firm steps toward socialism; it has strengthened its forces in all fields and become the bulwark of the nationwide revolution. Meanwhile, the U.S. imperialists and the Ngo Dinh Diem clique have set up a despotic and warlike administration in the South and turned it into a colony of a new type and a military base of the American imperialists. They are hampering and sabotaging the cause of national reunification of our people.

"In the present stage, the Vietnamese revolution has two strategic tasks: first, to carry out the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam; second, to liberate South Viet-Nam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order to achieve national unity and complete independence and freedom throughout the country. These two strategic tasks are closely related to each other and spur each other forward.

"To take the North toward socialism is a necessary and unavoidable task following the completion of the national people's democratic revolution. To take the North toward socialism and make it more and more powerful in every field will benefit the revolutionary movement for the liberation of the South, the development of the revolution throughout the country, and the preservation and consolidation of peace in Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the world. Therefore, to carry out the socialist revolution in the North, in the South we

must endeavor to rally all national and democratic forces, expand and consolidate the national unity bloc, isolate the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, and speed up the struggle to strengthen peace and reunify our fatherland. That is why the guiding principle of the socialist revolution in the North is: To build the North and take the South into due consideration.

"In the completion of the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country and the achievement of national reunification, our compatriots in the South have the task of directly overthrowing the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their agents. The revolutionary struggle of our compatriots in the South also aims at frustrating the attempt of the U.S.-Diem clique to rekindle war, and making an active contribution to the defense of peace in Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the world. That is why the struggle of our southern compatriots against the U.S.-Diem clique for the liberation of the South has a decisive and direct effect on the liberation of the South, the achievement of national reunification, and the completion of the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country.

"The two revolutionary tasks of the North and the South belong to two different strategies, each task being aimed at satisfying the definite requirement of each zone under the specific conditions of our divided country. But these two tasks have one common aim—to achieve peaceful national reunification and resolve one common contradiction of our whole country—the contradiction between our people and the imperialists and their henchmen.

"The common task of the Vietnamese revolution at present is: to strengthen the unity of all the people; to struggle resolutely to maintain peace, to accelerate the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam while at the same time stepping up the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam; to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy; to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, rich, and strong Viet-Nam; and to contribute practically to reinforcing the socialist camp and to maintaining peace in Southeast Asia and in the world. . . .

"The immediate task of the revolution in the South is to achieve the unity of the whole people, to fight resolutely against the aggressive and war-mongering U.S. imperialists, to overthrow the

dictatorial Ngo Dinh Diem ruling clique, lackeys of the democratic coalition government in South Viet-Nam, to win national independence and establish democratic freedoms, to improve the people's livelihood, to safeguard peace, to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy, and to make an active contribution to the defense of peace in Southeast Asia and the world.

"The revolution in the South is a protracted, hard, and complex process of struggle, combining many forms of struggle of great activity and flexibility, ranging from lower to higher, and taking as its basis the building, consolidation, and development of the revolutionary power of the masses. During this process we must pay special attention to the work of organizing and educating the people, first and foremost the workers, peasants and intellectuals, promoting to the highest degree the revolutionary fighting spirit of the various strata of our patriotic countrymen. We must unceasingly expose the criminal schemes and acts of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen, doing our utmost to divide and isolate them.

"To insure the complete success of the revolutionary struggle in South Viet-Nam our people there must strive to establish a united bloc of workers, peasants, and soldiers and to bring into being a broad national united front directed against the U.S.-Diem clique and based on the worker-peasant alliance. This front must rally all the patriotic classes and sections of the people, the majority and minority nationalities, all patriotic parties and religious groupings, together with all individuals inclined to oppose the U.S.-Diem clique. The aims of its struggle are peace, national independence, democratic freedoms, improvement of the people's living conditions, and peaceful national reunification.

"The front must carry out its work in a very flexible manner in order to rally all forces that can be rallied, win over all forces that can be won over, neutralize all forces that should be neutralized, and draw the broad masses into the general struggle against the U.S.-Diem clique for the liberation of the South and the peaceful reunification of the fatherland.

"The revolutionary movement in the South plays a very important role in relation to the reunification of the country. Simultaneously with the effort to build the North and advance toward socialism our people must strive to maintain and

develop the revolutionary forces in the South and create favorable conditions for peaceful national reunification. . . .”

2. From the speech of Ho Chi Minh at the opening session of the Lao Dong Party's 3d Congress in Hanoi, September 5, 1960:

“In the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and private capitalist industry and commerce, we have won a victory of a decisive character. We have recorded many achievements on the agricultural and industrial production fronts, and in cultural and educational work, and have made improvements in the people's living standards. The North is becoming more and more consolidated and transformed into a firm base for the struggle for national reunification. The big victories won over the past 9 years have testified to the correctness of our party's line and the firmness of our party's leadership. They are victories of Marxism-Leninism in a country which has suffered imperialist oppression and exploitation. Our party is worthy of the confidence of our people from north to south.

“Our party can be proud to be the heir to our people's glorious traditions, and the guide of our people on the road to a bright future. . . .

“The victories of the Vietnamese revolution are due also to the wholehearted assistance of the fraternal socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union and China. We avail ourselves of this opportunity to express our warm feelings of gratitude toward the fraternal socialist countries headed by the great Soviet Union. We are also sincerely grateful to other fraternal parties, first of all, to the French Communist Party, for their active support to our people's just struggle. We sincerely thank all colonial peoples and peace-loving people throughout the world, who have always given us their sympathy and support.

“The history of the 30-year-long struggle of our party has taught us this: the best guarantee of victory for the revolution is to steep ourselves in Marxism-Leninism; to remain loyal to the interests of the working class and the people; to preserve solidarity and unity of mind within the party and between all Communist parties and all countries of the big socialist family. . . .

“A prosperous and strong North is the firm base of the struggle for national reunification. This congress will shed new light on our people's

revolutionary path to peaceful national reunification. Our nation is one, our country is one. Our people will undoubtedly overcome all difficulties, 'achieve national reunification and bring the North and the South together again.'

“Dear comrades, the Vietnamese revolution is a part of the world forces of peace, democracy, and socialism. The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam is a member of the big socialist family headed by the great Soviet Union. It is our duty to defend the advance post of socialism in Southeast Asia, to endeavor to contribute to the strengthening of the forces of the socialist camp, and to safeguard peace in Southeast Asia and the world. . . .”

3. From an article by Ho Chi Minh in the Belgian Communist publication *Red Flag*, July 10, 1959:

“We are building socialism in Viet-Nam, but we are building it in only one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to direct and bring to a close the middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution.”

4. From the speech of Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap to the Lao Dong Party's 3d Congress in Hanoi, September 12, 1960:

“The August general uprisings [against the French] are a model of successful uprisings in a colonial and semifeudal country and a model of a clever association between political and armed struggles and between the political forces of the masses and the revolutionary armed forces.

“The success of the August general uprisings proves that under the present world situation, the liberation struggle by the people of a colonial country—under fixed historic conditions—can be brought to a successful conclusion through the channel of uprisings. This is an experience having a creative character which has been daily proved by the rich realities of the people's liberation movements over the past few years. . . .

“These successes and experiences give us this lesson: to be successful, the armed struggle and the building of armed forces must be guided by correct political lines and the armed struggle must serve the objectives of the political struggle. Indeed, during the whole process of its leadership over the armed struggle, our party kept a firm hold on the national democratic revolutionary line and cor-

rectly associated the anti-imperialist responsibility with the antifeudal responsibility, thus achieving brilliant successes. At the same time, we have fully understood that 'to build and consolidate our armed forces is one of the important conditions enabling our revolution to defeat any aggressive enemy, protect, and develop its achievements,' as stated in the political report.

"Under the lively conditions of our people's liberation struggle, our party has set forth a correct policy concerning the revolutionary armed struggle and on the building of the revolutionary armed forces: it is the policy of people's war and people's army. The major significance of this policy lies in the fact that our party has cleverly and creatively applied the general principles of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete realities of the revolutionary struggle in a former colonial and semifeudal country like ours. This is the cause of all successes achieved by our party. . . .

"After thoroughly surveying the international and domestic situation, the political report of the party Central Committee sets forth the revolutionary task to be carried out by our people in the present phase as follows: 'to strengthen the unity of all the people; to struggle resolutely to maintain peace; to accelerate the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam while at the same time stepping up the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam; to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy, to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, rich, and strong Viet-Nam, and to contribute practically to reinforcing the socialist camp and to maintaining peace in south-east Asia and in the world. . . .'"

5. From an article by Vo Nguyen Giap in the Lao Dong Party journal *Hoc Tap*, January 1960 issue:

"The North has become a large rear echelon of our army. . . . The North is the revolutionary base for the whole country."

6. From the political report of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party delivered at the Party's 3d Congress in Hanoi by Le Duan, First Secretary of the Committee, on September 5, 1960:

"At present our party is facing momentous tasks: to promote socialist construction in the

North and to consolidate the North into an ever more solid base for the struggle for national reunification; to strive to complete the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country, to liberate the South from the atrocious rule of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen; to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy; to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, prosperous, and strong Viet-Nam. To guarantee the full execution of these tasks, we must make our party even stronger and must strengthen the leadership of the party. The present national congress of the party will define for the whole party and the whole people the line for carrying out the socialist revolution in the North, for the completion of the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country, for the struggle to achieve national reunification; at the same time it will decide upon the basic orientation for the building of the party and for the strengthening of party leadership to meet the new requirements of the revolution.

"The Second National Congress of our party was the congress of resistance for national salvation. The present national congress is the congress of construction of socialism in the North and of struggle for the achievement of national reunification. It will open up the road to new victories for the people throughout our country. . . .

"The socialist revolution is carried out in the North while in the South we have to make every effort to achieve a broad national unity embracing all national and democratic forces, all forces opposed to the U.S. imperialists and Ngo Dinh Diem. In building and consolidating the North, we must on the one hand keep firmly to the line of socialist construction and, on the other, pay the greatest attention to the situation in the South, help create further conditions for the rallying of all patriotic forces opposed to the U.S.-Diem regime in the South into a broad national united front with the worker-peasant alliance as its basis, and insure the victory of the revolutionary struggle in the South. Our guiding principle in carrying out the socialist revolution in the North is: consolidate the North, and in so doing, take the South into due consideration. . . .

"The North is the common revolutionary base of the whole country. Its constant strengthening not only heightens the confidence and stimulates the revolutionary enthusiasm of our patriotic

countrymen in the South but also helps the balance of forces between revolution and counter-revolution on a national scale to tip over to the side of revolution, creating favorable conditions for the powerful development and final victory of the revolution in the South. Besides, since the North is the common revolutionary base of the whole country, the socialist revolution in the North aims not only at building a new life for the northern people but also at laying the foundations of a new life full of freedom and happiness for our entire nation and at preparing effectively the future development of the revolution throughout the country. . . .

“. . . the southern people's revolutionary struggle will be long, drawn out, and arduous. It is not a simple process but a complicated one, combining many varied forms of struggle—from elementary to advanced, legal and illegal—and based on the building, consolidation and development of the revolutionary force of the masses. In this process, we must constantly intensify our solidarity and the organization and education of the people of the South—especially the workers, peasants, and the intellectuals—and must uphold the revolutionary fighting spirit of all strata of patriotic compatriots. We must ceaselessly unmask the perfidious and cruel schemes of U.S. imperialism and its lackeys with a view to isolating them further, and winning over the forces that can be won over. On the basis of developing the great revolutionary force of the masses and uniting closely with the peace-loving peoples of the world, we must struggle tenaciously for the implementation of the Geneva agreements.

“In order to assure the complete victory of the revolutionary struggle in South Viet-Nam, the South Viet-Nam people, under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist Party and the working class, should endeavor to build a worker-peasant-army coalition bloc, and set up a broad national united front against the U.S.-Diem clique on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance. This front must be able to unite all patriotic classes and strata, the delta and minority peoples, all patriotic parties and religions, and all those who have anti-U.S.-Diem tendencies. The aims of the struggle of the national united front against the U.S.-Diem clique in South Viet-Nam are peace, national independence, democratic freedoms, improvement of the people's livelihood, and peaceful reunification of the fatherland. The activities of the front

must be extremely varied in order to unite all forces that can be united and win over all the forces that can be won over, neutralize the forces that must be neutralized, and draw the masses of the people into the common struggle against the U.S.-Diem clique.

“The revolutionary movement in South Viet-Nam has a very important position in the cause of national reunification. Parallel with the building and consolidation of North Viet-Nam, bringing it to socialism, our people should endeavor to maintain and develop the revolutionary forces in South Viet-Nam, thus creating favorable conditions for the peaceful reunification of the country. . . .”

7. From an article by Truong Chinh, a member of the Politburo of the Lao Dong Party, in the journal *Hoc Tap* for April 1961:

“Thus the resolutions of the Third National Party Congress have clearly set forth two strategic responsibilities of the Vietnamese revolution:

“1. ‘To carry out the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam’;

“2. ‘To liberate South Viet-Nam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order to achieve national unity and complete independence and freedom throughout the country.’

“These two strategic responsibilities aim at satisfying the objective and concrete requirements of each zone while our country is temporarily partitioned. But they also aim at solving a problem: to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, rich, and strong Viet-Nam. Thus the Third National Party Congress set forth the general responsibilities of the present Vietnamese revolution:

“‘To strengthen the unity of all the people; to struggle resolutely to maintain peace; to accelerate the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam while at the same time stepping up the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam; to achieve national reunification on the basis of independence and democracy; to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, rich, and strong Viet-Nam; and to contribute practically to reinforcing the socialist camp and to maintaining peace in southeast Asia and in the world. . . .’

"Inside the country, the responsibilities of the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam and those of the national people's democratic revolution in South Viet-Nam are also closely related and interdependent. Indeed, the success of the socialist revolution and construction in North Viet-Nam will not only consolidate North Viet-Nam and bring a peaceful, free, and happy life to the northern people, but it will also strongly encourage southern compatriots to struggle against the U.S.-Diemists, to liberate South Viet-Nam, and to achieve national reunification. On the other hand, each success of the National People's Democratic Revolution in South Viet-Nam has two effects: (1) to struggle against the U.S.-Diemists, restore to the southern people the right to earn their daily living, advance toward liberating South Viet-Nam from the imperialist and feudal yoke, and create favorable conditions for peacefully reunifying the country; and (2) to help protect revolutionary bases common to the entire country and to encourage the northern compatriots to do their best to build socialism.

"It is precisely because of this interdependence between the revolutionary responsibilities in the two zones that the congress has set forth this slogan for North Viet-Nam: 'Build North Viet-Nam and pay attention to the South.' One of the important points in the present propaganda, mobilization, and ideological education work in North Viet-Nam is to turn the hatred for the U.S.-Diemists into practical actions in order to step up the patriotic emulation movement and the building of socialism in North Viet-Nam.

"The Political report of the Central Committee to the congress said:

"The responsibilities of the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam are obviously the most decisive responsibilities in the development of the entire revolution in our country and in the national reunification work of our people."

"Why? First of all, because North Viet-Nam is the revolutionary base common to the entire country, and the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam not only seeks to build a peaceful, free, and happy life for the northern people but also lays the foundation for the building of a peaceful, free, and happy life for all the people throughout the country; and prepares practically for the future development of the entire country.

"After determining the role and responsibilities of the socialist revolution in North Viet-Nam, the congress set forth the role and responsibilities of the National People's Democratic Revolution in South Viet-Nam, which are: to overthrow the rule of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys in order to liberate South Viet-Nam and fulfill the responsibilities of the National People's Democratic Revolution throughout the country. . . .

"From a passive state, our people in South Viet-Nam are advancing to take the initiative. They have exhaustively exploited the difficulties encountered by the Ngo Dinh Diem authorities, especially since the November 1960 coup d'etat. Forms of struggle are multiplying daily; political struggles are being closely associated with military struggles. . . .

"The deadly enemies of our people do not resign themselves to dying. As long as they live, they will resort to all plots and measures to oppress and terrorize the revolutionary forces in South Viet-Nam, hoping to destroy them and provoke North Viet-Nam. Their plots will be thwarted and they will be destroyed only by the vigorous struggle of our people in South Viet-Nam as well as in North Viet-Nam, and by the positive support of the peace- and justice-loving people the world over. We are very enthusiastic over the development of the revolutionary movement in South Viet-Nam. However, we must understand that the struggle against the U.S.-Diemists to liberate South Viet-Nam is still arduous and complicated.

"However, we are firmly convinced that the revolution in South Viet-Nam and the struggle to achieve peaceful national reunification will surely succeed because they are evolving under these favorable conditions: socialist North Viet-Nam is being rapidly consolidated and strengthened, is providing good support to the South Vietnamese revolution, and is serving as a strong basis for the struggle for national reunification; the peaceful and socialist forces the world over are stronger than the warlike imperialist forces; and the colonial system of imperialism is disintegrating rapidly and is advancing toward destruction

"Unable to endure the oppressive, exploiting, and murderous policies of the enemy, southern compatriots have to rise and group themselves under the fighting banner of the Liberation Front to destroy the U.S.-Diemist regime and set up a National Democratic Coalition Government. Once established, this government will agree with

the DRV Government about achieving peaceful national reunification under one form or another, including the holding of free elections throughout the country. Thus, though South Viet-Nam will be liberated by nonpeaceful means, the Party policy of achieving peaceful national reunification is still correct. It is precisely because of the revolutionary struggle of southern compatriots to overthrow the U.S.-Diemists and to liberate Viet-Nam that there are favorable conditions to carry out the policy of achieving peaceful national reunification.

“The development of the revolutionary movement in South Viet-Nam is fully consistent with the following view of the Moscow Declaration of November 1960:


“The presence of the world socialist system and the weakening of imperialist position have opened for all the oppressed new possibilities to recover independence. The recovery of independence by colonial people through peaceful or nonpeaceful means depends on the concrete conditions of each country.’ . . .”

APPENDIX B

The Viet Cong Organization in North and South Viet-Nam


(See Part I, section V, pp. 18-22)

1. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE VIET CONG:




APPENDIX B (Cont.)

2. TYPICAL INTER-PROVINCE ORGANIZATION OF THE VIET CONG




APPENDIX B (Cont.)

3. ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL RESEARCH AGENCY OF THE VIET CONG




APPENDIX B (Cont.)

4. ORGANIZATION OF A TYPICAL
VC INTELLIGENCE CENTER



5. SPECIAL TARGETS FOR PENETRATION BY VIET CONG INTELLIGENCE AGENTS



The An Don Case


(See Part I, section VI, B, 1, pp. 25-26)



Map showing the route from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam taken by the Viet Cong agents in the An Don Case.



Viet Cong agents captured at An Don on June 5, 1961. (Left to right: Lam Dua, Nguyen Chuc, Huynh Tinh, Nguyen Dong, and Truong Van Hao.)



The junk that Nguyen Chuc and his comrades used to carry agents and messages between the Viet Cong base at Dong Hoi and landing sites in South Viet-Nam.

B IN KHAI CUNG DO KHAI
của

Tên NGUYỄN CHỨC bí danh NGHIỆP hay tên giả là
NGUYỄN THỊ Trung-Úy quân đội V.C., bị bắt
tại An Đôn (BT.040.790) ngày 5/6/1961
lúc 18 giờ 30



I)- TRÌNH LÍ LỊCH:

Họ và tên : NGUYỄN CHỨC tên giả NGUYỄN THỊ.
Bí danh : NGHIỆP.
Sinh năm : 1927 (34 tuổi).
Sinh quán : Thôn 1 xã Duy Nghĩa, huyện Duy Xuyên,
Tỉnh Quảng Nam.
Tên cha : NGUYỄN VĂN.
Tên mẹ : VÕ THỊ LƯƠNG.
Chức vụ : Trung-Úy, trong quân đội V.C.
Quốc tịch : Việt-Nam.
Tình trạng gia đình : Có vợ, 2 con
Lý do bị bắt : Thành phần tập kết và được V.C. bố trí
vào Namhạt sống.
Ngày bị bắt : 5/6/1961 lúc 18 giờ 30.

II)- CÁI TRÌNH HOẠT ĐỘNG :

a)- Trước ngày định chiến :

Năm 1945 - 1947 : tham gia đội bán quân sự Vệ quốc
Duy Nghĩa, huyện Duy Xuyên, Quảng
NAM

..../....2

Preliminary Statement
of

NGUYEN CHUC, alias Nghiep or Nguyen Thi, a lieutenant in the Viet Cong Army, who was arrested at An Don at 1830 hours on June 5, 1961

I. Personal History

Name : Nguyen Chuc alias Nguyen Thi
Secret name : Nghiep
Year of birth : 1927 (34 years old)
Place of birth : Hamlet 1, Duy Nghia township, Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam Province
Father's name : Nguyen Tung
Mother's name : Vo Thi Lang
Occupation : Lieutenant in the Viet Cong Army
Nationality : Viet-Nam
Family status : Married, 2 children
Reason for arrest : A regrouped person who was assigned to carry out activities in the South by the Viet Cong
Date of arrest : June 5, 1961, at 1830 hours

II. Chronology of activities

A. *Before the ceasefire (1954)*

1945-47 : Was in the self-defense militia of Duy Nghia township, Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam Province

Excerpts from remainder of Nguyen Chuc's confession

- 1947-49 : In charge of a transportation office in the South
- 1949-53 : In charge of transportation work in the Nam Dong area
- 1953-55 : At home ill

B. *After the ceasefire*

Regrouped to the North in January 1955. Taken to Thanh Hoa Province. Inducted into the 2d Battalion stationed at Thieu Hoa. Battalion was part of the 55th Regiment. Assumed duties of commander of Third Platoon of the 1st Company commanded by Nguyen Khuong.

From December 1955 to 1958, studied at the construction branch at Gia Lam and after graduating was assigned to work on camp construction.

In 1959 was assigned by the North Vietnamese High Command to carry documents into South Viet-Nam and was given training to prepare for the assignment.

III. His Story of Crossing the (17th) Parallel

I worked for the first time in South Viet-Nam in June 1959, and from then until May 1961 made 17 trips to the South.

There were five of us who worked in South Viet-Nam:

1. Nguyen Chuc alias Nguyen Thi (the subject)
2. Huynh Tinh alias Le Nghe
3. Truong Van Hao alias Ding Dai
4. Nguyen Dong alias Nguyen Tham
5. Lam Dua alias Le Lam

Traveled by boat No. T 02. The boat was built mainly by Nguyen Dong. . . .

The false inspection cards we brought in in order to carry out activities in the South were distributed at Dong Hoi by [men named] Nguyen Vinh and Binh.

The trip by boat from Dong Hoi to Tourane took only 3 days.

On our trips across the parallel to work in South Viet-Nam, we usually docked at [one of] three places:

1. Lang Co
2. Trem (Tourane)
3. An Don (the An Chanh section of Tourane)

Whenever the boat docked at a port, I [Chuc] went ashore alone to establish contact, usually for half an hour. The other four men waited in the boat. . . . On each trip across the parallel into South Viet-Nam I brought documents in from the North and received documents from the South to take out.

The documents brought from North to South Viet-Nam were usually rolled up in an aluminum tube about 10 centimeters long and 2 centimeters in diameter.

IV. Contacts on Shore

(Chuc listed the names and addresses at which he made contacts in South Viet-Nam with Viet Cong agents from June 1959 to June 1961. He also admitted transporting at least two Viet Cong agents between North and South Viet-Nam.)

BẢN KHAI CUNG SỞ KHỐI
của

Tên HUYỄN TÍNH (tên gia là HUYỄN TÍNH)
cán bộ V.C vượt tuyến vào Nam hoạt-dộng và bị
bắt ngày 5/6/61 tại ĐÀ NẴNG.



I.- PHẦN LÝ LỊCH :

<u>Họ và tên</u>	: HUYỄN TÍNH bí danh LE NGHE
<u>Ngày sinh</u>	: 36 tuổi
<u>Nơi sinh</u>	: Duy Nghĩa, Duy Xuyên, Quảng Nam
<u>Con ông</u>	: HUYỄN LÂM (o)
<u>Và bà</u>	: PHẠM THỊ LÂM
<u>Vợ</u>	: NGUYỄN THỊ NHÌ, 34 tuổi, ở làng
<u>Con trai</u>	: HUYỄN THU, 5 tuổi, ở làng
<u>Học lực</u>	: biết đọc biết viết
<u>Xu hướng chính trị</u>	: Gia nhập mặt Trận Liên Việt 1952 ở Duy Nghĩa do tên HÌNH cán bộ xa (tập kết) giới thiệu.
<u>Tôn giáo</u>	: Phật giáo
<u>Tiền án chính trị</u>	: Không
<u>Bà</u> :	: HUYỄN THỊ TÍNH 37 tuổi, buôn bán, vợ lẽ tên (Trần) Tứ, huyện Thăng- Bình - Quảng-Nam. - HUYỄN THỊ BÌNH, 36 tuổi, buôn bán, vợ tên NGUYỄN SĨ ở Duy-Xuyên. - HUYỄN THỊ KỶ, 32 tuổi, cô chồng đi lính cho chính phủ VNCH ở bản HỘI-AM - HUYỄN THỊ LIÊU, 30 tuổi, làm ruộng, chồng tên là TRẦN ĐỘ, thanh-niên Cộng-hóa xã Duy-Nghĩa. - HUYỄN SỰ, 20 tuổi, nghe nói cả lính cho chính phủ VNCH.

...../.....

P ÁN K HA I C UNG
của

tên NGUYỄN-DÔNG, can hoạt-động cho V.C tại ĐÀ-NẰNG, bị bắt ngày 5/6/1961 trên ghe đậu tại bến AN-DŨN (ĐÀ-NẰNG).



I.- PHÂN LÝ-LỊCH :

Họ tên : NGUYỄN-DÔNG (tên thể kiểm-tra giả)
ĐANG-DÔNG (-nt-)
NGUYỄN-THẨM (tên thật)

Ngày và nơi sinh : Năm 1903 tại Làng HÒA-THANH-HẠ, Quận TAM-KỶ, Tỉnh QUẢNG-NAM.

Nghề-nghiệp : Làm chài lưới (đi biển).

Địa-chỉ hiện tại : Che một cái lều ở bờ sông gần lò rèn và nhà thờ Thiên-Chúa-giáo ở Thị-xã ĐÔNG-HỚI (QUẢNG-BÌNH).

Cha - Mẹ : NGUYỄN-ĐÁ (chết) và TRẦN-THỊ-LOÀNG (c).

Vợ con : HUỖNH-THỊ-PHÔNG, 57 tuổi, làm nghề đi biển, hiện ở Làng HÒA-THANH-HẠ, Quận TAM-KỶ, Tỉnh QUẢNG-NAM. Hai con là : NGUYỄN-THỊ-CHÂU 24 tuổi, làm nữ cứu-thương cho bộ-đội V.C từ năm 1952 hiện nay không rõ ở đâu. NGUYỄN-BA 19 tuổi làm lưới ở VỚI-MỆ tại Làng HÒA-THANH-HẠ (QUẢNG-NAM).

Anh em ruột : Không có ai.

Cha Mẹ vợ : HUỖNH-TỐT (chết) và Bà LÊ-THỊ ... (chết)

Anh em vợ : Không có ai.

Tôn giáo : Đạo Phật.

Trình-độ học lục : Biết chữ Quốc-ngữ nhưng không thông thạo

Xu-hướng chính-trị : Không theo Đảng phái nào nhưng nghe lời tuyên-truyền của V.C nên theo V.C vượt-tuyên ra Miền BẮC VĨ-TUYÊN 17.

Tiền - án : Không.

... / ...



(-) AN KHAI CUNG SO KHOI

CỦA TÊN LAM ĐUA, TÊN GIẢ LÊ LAM (trong kiểm-tra)
bị bắt tại AN ĐỒN (BT.040.790 - NAI MIEM -
QUẢNG NAM) ngày 5/6/61 lúc 18 G 30.

I.- PHÂN LÝ LỊCH

Tên, họ : LAM ĐUA bí danh không có

tên giả trong thẻ kiểm-tra: LÊ LAM.

Đảng-viên Cộng-sản: 10 tuổi đảng, vào đảng CS năm 1952 do
sự giới-thiệu của :

- tên LÊ VĂN ĐOM, Ủy-viên Thường vụ Khu ĐÔNG -
HỘI AN - QUẢNG NAM.

- tên TRƯƠNG UYÊN, Phường-trưởng ở Khu ĐÔNG -
HỘI AN - QUẢNG NAM.

Sinh năm: 1929 (32 tuổi) tại Khu ĐÔNG, HỘI AN - QUẢNG NAM.

Tên cha : LAM ĐƯỢC (chết năm 1953)

Nghề-nghiệp người cha: làm cá tại CỬA ĐỢI - HỘI AN (Q. NAM)

Tên mẹ : PHẠM THỊ ĐUA (sống)

Tuổi : 50

Nghề-nghiệp người mẹ: đi mò tôm, cua, ở Khu ĐÔNG - HỘI AN -
QUẢNG NAM.

Địa-chỉ cha, mẹ: Làng NHẬT Khu ĐÔNG - HỘI AN - QUẢNG NAM.

Nghề-nghiệp đương-sự: Đánh cá tại CỬA ĐÔNG HỘI - HỘI-viên
"Ngư-Trưởng NHẬT LÊ".

Học lực : Lớp Tư (biết đọc, biết viết)

Giai cấp: Bần-nông (tuy nhiên gia đình được VC cấp 3 sào 3
ruộng ở làng NHẬT, Khu ĐÔNG, HỘI AN năm 1947.

Tôn-giáo : thờ tổ-tiên.

Tình trạng gia-đình: Có vợ, 1 con (1 chết)

Tên vợ : PHẠM THỊ NUÔI, 32 tuổi (năm 1929)

Nghề-nghiệp người vợ: đi mò cua, ốc, tôm (tuy nhiên nhà có
1 sào 5 ruộng do VC cấp vào năm 1952).

Tên người con thứ 1: không có (vì vừa lọt lòngra đã chết)-

...../...

3 AN KHAI CUNG SƠ - LƯỢC

của

tên TRƯƠNG VAN HẢO tức NGUYỄN DÀI dùng ghe vượt tuyến vào Miền Nam hoạt-dộng cho V.C, bị bắt giữ tại Bến An-Đôn (Nai-Hiên) hồi 18 giờ ngày 5-6-1961.

-o-o-o-



I.- PHÂN LÝ LỊCH.

Họ tên : TRƯƠNG VAN HẢO (tên thật)
- NGUYỄN DÀI (tên thẻ kiểm tra giả)
- ĐẶNG ĐAI (tên thẻ kiểm tra giả)

Ngày sinh và nơi sinh : Năm 1932 tại làng Hà-Khê, quận Châu-Thành Đà-Nẵng.

Nghề nghiệp : đánh cá

Địa chỉ hiện tại : Ở rạp sông Nhật-Lộ, thị xã Quảng-Bình (Bắc vĩ-tuyến 17).

Cha mẹ : TRƯƠNG VAN ĐŨ (chết) và LÊ THỊ TÍN, 70 tuổi, buôn bán ở làng Hà-Khê (Đà-Nẵng).

Vợ con vợ lớn : NGUYỄN THỊ DUNG 27 tuổi, buôn bán, hồi năm 1955 y vẫn ở với mẹ chồng tại làng Hà-Khê (Đà-Nẵng) có một con nười, lúc tôi ra đi còn nhỏ không rõ đặt tên là gì và THỊ DUNG có lẽ đã đi lấy chồng khác rồi.

Vợ nhỏ : TRƯƠNG THỊ KINH 25 tuổi, làm cá, ở thôn Đông-Thành, thuộc khu phố Thành-Lý thị xã Quảng-Bình (Bắc vĩ tuyến 17) đã có hai con nhưng đã chết rồi, hiện nay đang có thai được 6 tháng.

Anh em ruột : Có người anh tên là TRƯƠNG VAN THÂM, 44 tuổi, làm cá, ở làng Hà-Khê (Đà-Nẵng).

... / ...

The Calu Case

(See Part I, section VI, C, 1, p. 28)



Map showing infiltration route from the North, including the Calu way station.

The cover of Calu mealbook No. 1



The two mealbooks, pages of which are reproduced in this appendix, were captured during a raid by Republic of Viet-Nam armed forces on a Viet Cong infiltration station at Calu in Quang Tri Province on March 29, 1961. Calu was station No. 8 along a secret trail that had at least 25 such way stations where Viet Cong infiltrators from North Viet-Nam were fed and rested as they moved into the South.

Notebook No. 1 is a monthly record (October 1960-March 1961) of food items received and consumed at the Calu station. Separate entries were made for rice and for other foods (meat, vegetables, et cetera). The date of each transaction is recorded together with the quantity of rice or other food, the price paid, the person from whom received, and other data.

Notebook No. 2 is a record of food served at the Calu station by individuals or units. The front part of the notebook lists men by name, apparently the members of a Viet Cong unit based at or near Calu. The size of the unit varied from 28 to 35 over the 6-month period.

The back pages of notebook No. 2 provide a record of "guests" served at the Calu station from October to March, sometimes with the number of men involved, sometimes with merely the name of the leader and the notation that a group accompanied him.

With the average daily per capita consumption of rice known, as well as the amount of rice delivered to each passing group, it is possible to estimate with fair accuracy the number of Viet Cong who moved through the Calu station during the October-to-March period. On this basis it is believed that approximately 1,840 VC personnel moved south along the Calu trail during those 6 months.

APPENDIX E

The Tra Bong Case

(See Part I, section VI, C, 2, pp. 28-29)

A number of Viet Cong soldiers were killed in a fight with forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam at Tra Bong, Quang Ngai Province, in October 1960. Some of them (see below) had pictures of themselves wearing the uniform of the North Viet-Nam Army.



APPENDIX F

The Dakrotah Case

(See Part I, section VI, C, 3, p. 29)



Route of Y Lon and fellow Viet Cong from North Viet-Nam to Dakrotah, where he was captured on October 23, 1960.



Picture of Y Lon (left) and three other highland tribesmen who were members of a Viet Cong unit and were captured at Dakrotah on October 23, 1960.

BẢN KHAI CUNG

Của tên Y LON, đội-viên thuộc Trung-đội 3
Đại-đội 3 /Tiểu-đoàn 20 V.C. bị Tiểu-đoàn
2/41 bắt ngày 23/10/60 tại DakRotah (YB-965796)

- 5 -

I.- PHÂN CÁN CƯỚC VÀ LÝ LỊCH :



- Tên : Y LON
- Tuổi : 20 (không nhớ năm sinh. Chỉ nhớ 14 tuổi
thì tập kết).
- Quê quán : Toumorong (QUẢNG NGÃI)
- Trình-độ văn-hóa : lớp 5 V.C. (tương đương đệ lục của ta).
- Cha mẹ : Chết từ hồi còn nhỏ
- Thân quyến : Không còn ai
- Gia cảnh : 1 vợ, không con
- Tên vợ : MỜI
- Tuổi : 18
- Quê quán : Dak Dru Dok
- Cha mẹ vợ : O. A-XUNG và bà Y-DAM (không biết tuổi)
- Nghề-nghiệp : Làm rẫy ở Dak-Dru
- Thân-nhân vợ : không có

II.- LỜI KHAI TRONG ĐÊM THẨM VẤN ĐẦU TIÊN TẠI SAIGON (25/10).

Tôi thuộc Tiểu-đội 2, Trung-đội 3, Đại-đội 3, Tiểu-
đoàn 20 V.C., Quân số 111 người. Tôi bị bắt khi có nhiệm-vụ
đi dò đường từ Dak-Dru xuống Dak Rotah cho đơn-vị tôi tiếp viện
cho 1 đơn-vị khác ở Dak-Rotah.

Năm 1954, tôi 14 tuổi, làm bồi cho 1 tên Đại-úy Pháp.
Sở dĩ tôi biết Đại-úy BELLO vì tôi có theo người Cò đem gà và
gạo cho Đại-úy này luôn, lúc y ở tại DakTo. Tên này qua LÀO,
tôi ở lại bị V.C. dọ chết đói nên theo V.C. tập kết.

STATEMENT

of

Y LON, member of the 3d Platoon, 3d Company, 20th VC Battalion, who was captured by Battalion 2/41 on October 23, 1960, at Dakrotah

I. Identification and personal history

Name	: Y Lon
Age	: About 20 (does not remember year of birth but was about 14 when regrouped to North in 1954)
Native village	: Toumorong (Quang Ngai)
Parents	: Died when he was young
Relatives	: None
Family status	: Wife, no children
Wife's name	: Moi
Wife's age	: 18
Native village	: Dak Dru Dok
Wife's parents	: A Xung and Y Dam (ages unknown)
Occupation	: Farmers at Dak Dru
Wife's relatives	: None

II. Chronology of activities

Served with the French Army at Toumorong. In 1954 . . . went to Binh Dinh on the train and arrived at Qui Nhon. After resting for 4 days and 4 nights at Qui Nhon I was regrouped to the North on a Polish ship. On the ship there were about 6,000 or 7,000 mountain tribesmen who were attached to the 120th Regiment. The regiment was commanded by Y Bloc, a Hre tribesman, and at the present time is stationed at Nghe An. At present it is called Su-doan 120 and is still commanded by Y Bloc. The ship docked at Sam Son and, after a stopover of 5 days there, went to Ha Long. I went to Gia Lam for cultural study at the "nationalities" school.

On May 1, 1959, the Viet Cong began to train me to educate my compatriots and on May 29 I left Gia Lam and went by car to Vinh Linh. . . . I arrived at Vinh Linh on June 1, 1959. After 2 days of rest at Vinh Linh, my group (which included 30 men) went out during the day on foot in order to cross the Ben Hai River. . . .

Immediately after we crossed the parallel, our group arrived at a contact point where there were four or five men who . . . showed us the way. After that, I do not know what places we passed through nor do I remember the date because we moved through the jungle. When we were near the Quang Nam border I remember that we stood on a mountain peak and looked at the ocean. I remember that we crossed Route 9 but I am not sure at what spot.

After leaving Quang Nam . . . we arrived at Mang Hon around August 1959 and reached Chieng 8 days later.

At Chieng, I went out with a group of Viet Cong cadre to propagandize among the tribal compatriots. About November 1959 we urged other tribal youths in the Chieng area to volunteer for military drill. A platoon of youths from Chieng was organized under the command of Vietnamese cadre. . . . They had military drill and they cleared land. . . .

[Y Lon gave details of his unit's attack on Dak Dru and of his capture together with three other Viet Cong the following day while carrying out a reconnaissance mission near Dakrotah.]

At the present time, in the remote areas of the southern plateau region, especially in the area of the Laos-Viet-Nam border, the Viet Cong have organized militia and self-defense units to guard the villages. They have forced the people to dig spiked ditches and have armed them with knives, machetes, and sticks, and some have bows with poison arrows.

Each time the Republic of Viet-Nam Army approaches a village, the self-defense militia guarding the village runs and reports to the Viet Cong troops and they use secret signals to inform the village people.

Ordinarily all our units are stationed in remote mountain areas far from the villages. Only the command cadres can enter the villages to contact the administrative units.

Usually we are given two types of training, military and political. Our program is organized as follows: in the morning from 5 to 11 o'clock we study physical training, politics, and the policies proposed for the national struggle; in the afternoon, we have military studies, especially on close combat fighting, bayonet attack, and post attacks.

Every day after we finish training, we indulge in sessions of stocktaking and criticism. But before these sessions the command cadre have met and reported to each other.

There is usually a shortage of food. Each day we receive two tins of rice which is supplied by the local people. We became more and more indifferent because they would never give us permission to visit our families. Parents did not know where their children were and were never allowed to see their children. The Viet Cong always said that "individuals do not count and must sacrifice themselves for the people and the Fatherland." . . .

The Le Hoa Case

(See Part I, section VI, C, 4, pp. 29-30)



Map showing the route Le Hoa and his group followed from their departure at Vinh in July 1961 to Le Hoa's surrender in Binh Dinh Province in South Viet-Nam on October 12, 1961.

K I N

(-) AN KHAI CUNG
tên LE HOA, Hạ-sĩ V.C., bị bắt tại
(BÌNH ĐỊNH) ngày 12.10.1961.

I.- PHÂN LÝ LỊCH :

- Họ và tên : LE HOA (tự BA)
- Ngày và nơi sinh : 1931 tại xã Đức Tân, quận Mộ Đức tỉnh QUẢNG NGÃI.
- Tên cha mẹ : LE TỰ (c), LE THỊ CỬU (đã tái giá)
- tên em : LE THỊ TƯ lấy chồng ở xã Đức Tân, Mộ-Đức, QUẢNG NGÃI.
- tên vợ : LỮ THỊ TẠO, độ 25 tuổi, ở tại làng.
- Trình độ học vấn : biết đọc biết viết quốc-ngữ
- Tôn giáo : thờ cúng ông bà.
- Xu hướng chính trị : Không đảng phái.

II.- QUÁ TRÌNH HOẠT-ĐỘNG :

- Từ bé đến đầu năm 1949 : đương sự sống với gia đình làm nghề đánh cá và đi đò lúa trên vùng thượng Ba-Tơ
- Cuối 1949, vào dân quân xã, có nhiệm vụ canh gác miền biên (không thoát ly)

INTERROGATION REPORT

of

LE HOA, corporal of the Viet Cong, captured at Binh Dinh Province on October 12, 1961

I. Personal history

Name : Le Hoa alias Ba
Date and place of birth : 1931, village of Duc Lan, district of Mo Duc, province of Quang Ngai
Name of parents : Le Tu (deceased) and Le Thi Cuu (remarried)
Sister : Le Thi Tu, married to a man in Duc Tan, Mo Duc, Quang Ngai
Wife : Lu Thi Tao, about 25, same village
Education : Can read and write
Religion : Ancestor worship
Political affiliation : None

II. Past activities

- Until 1949, lived with family, fishing and trading fish for rice in the midlands area of Ba To.

- End of 1949, joined village defense corps with the mission of watching the seashore (did not have to leave his family).

- July 1954, was recruited as a soldier of the district guard of Mo Duc, then stationed at Duc Thanh (district of Mo Duc). Effective strength of the district guard was about 90 men, under the command of district guard chief Ha Yen and his deputy, Hanh.

- October 1954, moved with district guard to Qui Nhon, then boarded a Polish ship to be regrouped to the North.

- Landed in Sam Son (Thanh Hoa Province). Had 2 days of rest then moved with the district guard to the village of Nam Thanh, district of Nam Dan, province of Nghe An. The entire group was assigned to building dams, fighting droughts, fighting floods, and so forth.

- June 1956, the district guard of Mo Duc was disbanded. The group integrated into Regiment No. 803, Division 324, then stationed at Anh Son, Nghe An Province. Le Hoa was assigned to Company 3, Battalion 1, as a private.

(Period June 1956 to June 1961 was occupied by military training, drill, et cetera.)

- June 1961, Le Hoa was ordered to report to the headquarters of Regiment 803 at Anh Son, together with the following: Thuong, a sergeant; and Corporals Hoa, Thoai, Giap, Yem, Duoc, Cong, and Doan. At the headquarters, a Major Thu, commanding Regiment 803, gave the group a welcoming party. He then told them they had been selected for training. Two days later, they were transferred to Vinh, where they were billeted at the camp of Regiment 271.

The next day, the Viet Cong brought another group of about 50 men to the camp. (The men belonged to various units formerly from Interzone 5 in South Viet-Nam, including natives of the South or Northerners who formerly participated in the "advance toward the South," all of them regrouped.) They had a political training course for 15 days. The lecturers were a Lieutenant Son, a native of Binh Dinh Province, and Lieutenant Luan, from Phu Yen. Both belonged to the Political Section of the Command Staff of Military

Zone No. 4. The theme of the course was "The Situation in the South" and the duties of cadres who had been regrouped and would return to the South to reinforce the Front for Liberation of the South.

- At the beginning of July 1961, the training sessions ended. Each trainee was promoted one rank except Le Hoa. (No reason given.)

All the trainees were grouped into units. Unit No. 1, to which Le Hoa was assigned, was to be sent to Binh Dinh and was still composed of the persons listed above. Thuong was promoted to 2d Lieutenant, commanding the unit, and the 7 others were promoted to 1st Sergeants. Only Le Hoa remained a corporal.

One day before departure, a Lt. Col. Khue from the Command Staff of Zone No. 4 came and visited the trainees. They had a farewell party. Next day, the trainees each received one khaki uniform, one set of black cloth underwear, one hat, one woolen coat, one hammock, one haversack, a water bottle, cooking pan, 2 kilograms of salt, and some medicine. No money or weapons were distributed at this time.

III. The trip to the South

Vinh-Ben Hai River

- On July 16, 1961, at about 7 o'clock the entire unit boarded a truck belonging to Regiment No. 271 at Vinh and traveled along Highway No. 1 to Ha Tinh. The other unit (50 men) were to be sent away too, but Le Hoa did not know where or when.

From Ha Tinh the truck followed Highway No. 3 to the district of Huong Khe, then crossed the river by ferry, and reached a military post on the border between the provinces of Ha Tinh and Quang Binh at about 4 p.m. There the unit rested all night.

- On July 17, 1961, heavy rain forced the unit to remain at the military post.

- On July 18, 1961, the unit left the post. They followed the main road for 2 or 3 kilometers, then took a track called the "Unity Route," a partly dirt trail, partially covered by vegetation which the unit had to clear as it went along. At 4 p.m. the unit halted, cooked a meal, and hung hammocks for a night's rest.

- July 19, 1961, at 6 a.m. unit departed under the guidance of a tribesman. They halted at 2 p.m. at which time a new guide came with some rice for the group. The unit spent the night there and also the following day and night.

Ben Hai-Hara

- On the night of July 21, 1961, at 7 p.m. the unit departed. It crossed the Ben Hai River (into South Viet-Nam) at 2 a.m. At 4 a.m. it crossed a wide road, then came to a relay station at 5 a.m. The group rested there all of July 22.

- July 23, 24, and 25, the unit continued marching south. After 3 days of marching, the unit crossed a high mountain and saw the sea. Le Hoa believes this was in the province of Thua Thien.

- Five or 6 days later, on August 2, 1961, the unit reached Quang Nam Province.

- Sixteen days later, August 18, 1961, the unit had crossed the territory of Quang Nam and were near Tra Bong. The trip through Quang Nam had been very tiring because of the hills.

- August 20, 1961, the unit crossed a road.

- August 23, the unit had crossed the territory of Quang Ngai Province and came to the mountain passes of Binh De and Tam Quan.

- Seven days later, on August 30, 1961, the unit reached the area of Ha Ra (10 kilometers from An Khe). Two days before, the unit had crossed a large river on a suspended bamboo bridge.

Here, the tribesman who had served as a guide led the unit to Dong, a native of Quang Nam with the rank of platoon commander. Dong told the unit that from then on he would be in charge of the group. He instructed them to rest before receiving orders for action.

In the camp Le Hoa met 21 young men from Binh Dinh who had left their families and joined the Viet Cong. The young men were responsible for transporting rice to the base. Le Hoa remembered that once two of the young men had brought nine rifles and three sub-machineguns to the camp. . . .

IV. Circumstances of Le Hoa's capture

After arriving at Ha Ra, Le Hoa and his group were able to rest a few days. Then they began to take part in production. After 1 day of work Le Hoa became ill and rested for 2 days.

During this sick leave he heard the young men who had left their families discussing escape from the Viet Cong who had taken them from their homes. They discussed some young men who had already returned to their homes. From that moment Le Hoa said he decided to escape and surrender. . . . He had been told that if he followed the direction of the sunrise he would arrive at the lowlands.

About midnight (October 8), Le Hoa left the camp carrying with him a MAT 49 submachinegun. He walked all that night and the following day. He arrived at a highland village. He begged for food and then went on until 9 p.m. Then he stopped and rested in a cave. The next morning, he continued walking.

On October 12, at 9 a.m., he met a young boy with a buffalo. He asked where he was and was told he was not far from Cat Hiep village. The boy showed him the way to National Road No. 1 and Le Hoa continued his trip. Meanwhile, the young boy had reported to the Self-Defense Corps unit in the village.

After walking for a while, Le Hoa met a man carrying potatoes and asked him the way. Suddenly, two Self-Defense Corps soldiers with a rifle came up on a bicycle and captured him. Le Hoa offered no resistance and obeyed his captors' orders. One man tied him and they took him to their post about 3 kilometers away. At the post, Le Hoa was well treated by the village officials who gave him something to eat. Then he was sent to Phu Cat, about 5 or 6 kilometers from the Self-Defense Corps post. He arrived at about 2 p.m. on October 12, 1961, and then was transferred to Qui Nhon.


The Diary of Nguyen Dinh Kieu

(See Part I, section VI, C, 5, pp. 30-31)



Map showing the route followed by Viet Cong Captain Nguyen Dinh Kieu and his men from North Viet-Nam through Laos into South Viet-Nam.

Photo of the cover of the diary of Viet Cong Captain Nguyen Dinh Kieu found in his possession at Dakakoi on September 26, 1961.



May 30, 1961

Under the heading *Bch toc* (probably the abbreviation for "Command Staff Organization"), Captain Kieu assembled notes and ideas on the current situation and on what had to be done, apparently in preparation for the move to the South. ("We still have enough time to get ready. . . ."):

- 1—Alertness is necessary ("We should not relax in political matters . . .").
- 2—Better combat disposition is needed ("more mobility . . .").
- 3—Party activities must be stepped up during operations.
("Before departure, GH [probably a political cadre] must come and discuss the situation, the difficulties we are going to face, our objectives, etc. . . .")
- 4—Command staff must realize our problems ("There will be long marches, no transportation, little food . . .").

- 5—Indoctrination (propaganda for the population and international affairs).

("Our allies have great admiration for us. But precisely at this moment we must not show any vanity which could lead our allies to think that the Vietnamese do not have any modesty.")

"See to it that our troops use only our own dry food supply and do not touch the property of the population. Beware of relationships with women Political cadres must reaffirm this before departure"

- 6—Protect secrecy ("Never leave used packages of cigarettes at camp sites . . .").
- 7—"Think of the problem of unity between the army and the population, between the political

cadres and the army."

- 8—"We must organize a system for relations with families."
- 9—Administrative problems ("Avoid carrying too bulky items.").

May 31 (in pencil) "The sandals and shoes distributed are a little tight."

(Notes on a Party cell meeting dated June 30.)

(On this date, it is apparent the unit was in Laos.)

June 21. "We rest at Thapachon, Kham Muon (Laotian province of Khammouane) It has taken us two and a half days of walking to reach here. This friendly country is really beautiful and rich. Why are its people so poor? . . ."

June 22. We arrive at Muong Xuan. This place has been burned down once by the French. Now it is again burned down by Fu Mi [Phoumi, a Laotian leader]. How much devastation! How many losses! . . ."

June 27. "We are leaving for Nam Mi. So far, the troops' morale is good We must be careful with the rice; we may run short of it"

June 28. "We arrive at Nam Mi. We rest here for one day. This area has been liberated only recently. The people are kind but show no understanding of politics We shall go southeast through Ban Ca Den"

June 29. "We arrive at Sepon [Tchepone]."

June 30. }
 July 1. } "Rest. Heavy rain. Party activities."
 July 2. }

(The following few entries are in pencil, apparently written before the above which are in ink:)

June 15, 1961. "At 1515 we depart, direction southeast."

"At 1820 we stop for rest at a place 4 kilometers away from Y Ly."

"At 2400 we take the ferry at Huong Khe across the river."

"At 0300 on the 16th of June we arrive at T. Lang [probably Thanh Lang]."

"D goes and contacts the border defense corps to get help with food." (end of portion in pencil)

(page 89)

(notation on forces)

C1+4+command staff+4

C2

C3

"Sepon-Tusa (Tchepone to Tusa) took us 8 days of travel, 4 days marching, one of rest, etc.

..."

June 16-17. "rest at Thanh Lang"

June 18. "departure for Fong Khai . . ."

July 8. "There is no rice at the places where there should be. Then how can we continue, and it is already the 8th of July . . ."

July 9. "We sleep at Thanh Cau (or Can)."

July 10. "We sleep at Cape (or Cabe). At night we depart from Cape for Tusa . . ."

"At 4 a.m. we arrive at the foot of the mountain. Why is it that the South is located in the skies? We keep going but when shall we reach the blue clouds and when shall we reach our beloved South?"

July 11. "We have been on the road for almost a month now. The mountain slopes are cruel . . ."

July 12. "Rest at Tusa. The road from Cape to Tusa, where we arrived only at 1630 today, has been

(page 90)

the most difficult and the longest."

July 18. "We have departed [several illegible words] for the border. We have been on the road for 5 days."

(notes on trouble with food supply, illness, etc.)

(page 91)

July 18. "From this day on, I am in the Fatherland again . . . We take along only a 2-day supply of food . . . The capacity of the population here for understanding politics seems higher . . ."

"We pass an area with enemy posts. There are three of them where we cross National Highway 14. Let's watch out for enemy patrols from Highway 14 to Dakley. Enemy planes are flying all day long. But we are relatively safe . . ."

"Our relay stations are distant from one another. Some of them can be reached only after 7 p.m. and sometimes much later than that. These stations have more security. They are built near the mountains and have living quarters . . ."

(page 92)

". . . We must do all we can to take care of the health and morale of the troops. A group of political cadre is accompanying us. We must avoid the enemy. That is why we have to take a longer route. We rest for one day after passing two or three relay stations . . ."

(page 93)

". . . We passed Cadou-Sedang. We do not reveal the area where we are going to operate. We must ask about our route. The signals are provided by the relay stations and each day we check in with one station . . ."

(page 94)

". . . We return for three days to the relay station in the western zone of Quang Nam. I feel here as though I were in a 'free area.' Enemy planes follow us. What are they looking for? . . . Here is a place which used to be a safe zone during the war against the French. . . . The problems of rice and salt have become critical. The maximum ration is 2 lon a day . . ."

July 23.

"I was seriously ill Fortunately, the 24th is a day of rest."

July 25-26. "Although very tired, I must have the necessary courage to continue. What is more thrilling than to stand here on my beloved fatherland looking at the beautiful Truong Son mountain range?"

(page 95)

Aug. 5. "Rest at BTC [?]. We have one day to prepare to go to Quang Ngai. Here is Tra My, in the province of Quang Nam, rich and fertile."

Aug. 13.

“Arrive at Co Lo.

“Effectives were 37 at departure.

Now the following are missing:

Hrim, Dich, Mom, Du.

“Preparations, equipment, weapons, everything is in good shape.”

(page 96)

(Notes on the qualifications of members of the company.)

(Notes on meeting of Party committee covering pages 96–99.)

(pages 101–2)

(A note to his wife, Thu Huong.)

“After fighting here, on our glorious fatherland, I am writing to you and to our child. I have already written to you on the way. Thu Huong, I have not received any letters from you for 4 months. The working conditions are difficult”

(page 103)

“Duty situation—

“Prepare a safe base from which we can start operations to harass the enemy”

(page 104)

“ . . . Exploit then the situation in the plains (Binh Son, Son Tinh, Quang Ngai, Mo Duc).”

“Winter-Spring 1961–62 operations: Start with small operations.

Gather all military power in Safe Base No. 1 (CKI), then launch simultaneous attacks

(page 105)

all over the mountain area. After this, leave the mountain area to local forces and go as far as possible toward the midlands. . . . D₅ operate on Highway No. 5. Konbrai, Mangden, Konklung: attack enemy rescue groups, paralyze their transport, reduce their manpower. . . .”

(Pages 105–16 contain notes on military matters, evaluations of personnel, new recruits, etc.)

(page 117)

(brief evaluation at Party meeting of battle of Konbrai):

“Good secrecy was observed. No man left to visit his family. No sign of low morale. We have not yet proceeded to the counting of our casualties. The spirit of the army is high with this first victory. . . .”

(page 118)

(lists new weapons received)

Diary concludes with an entry on September 15 which discusses plans for operations at Kon Mong and includes a hand-drawn map of the area north of Konbrai.

Capt. Kieu was killed on Sept. 26, 1961, at Dakakoi and the diary was picked up on that date.


APPENDIX I

The Calu Case (2)

(See Part I, section VI, D, 1, pp. 32-33)

In the attack of March 29, 1961, against the Calu station of a Viet Cong infiltration trail (see Part I, section VI, C, 1, p. 28 and Part II, appendix D), armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam captured the notebook of a VC officer, probably the commander of the Calu post. In his notebook, the officer had listed weapons brought in to the station for distribution to VC forces in Quang Tri, in Zone 5, and in other areas.

Below is a photograph of the cover of the notebook.



The Ly Son Case

(See Part I, section VI, D, 2, pp. 33-36)

On January 31, 1960, a junk from North Viet-Nam with six men aboard landed at the island of Ly Son off the Quang Ngai coast. They claimed to be fleeing from Communist rule in the North. In April, a high-ranking agent of the Viet Cong was captured in South Viet-Nam and exposed the real purpose of the voyage of the six men: to bring supplies from the North to a Viet Cong unit in the South. Confronted by the testimony of the agent, all six of the captured men confessed that they had been on a VC supply mission. They provided extensive details of their voyage and of the special infiltration unit in North Viet-Nam to which they were attached.

Below is a picture of Nguyen Bat (third from the left), leader of the group, and his five VC companions.



Below is a map showing the planned and actual voyages of Nguyen Bat and five other Viet Cong agents captured in the Ly Son Case.



H 0 - 30 LÝ - LỊCH

của

NGUYỄN-BAT tức ĐƯỜNG - Tử của sông GIANGH (Bắc-Việt)
dùng thuyền vượt biển vào Nam, tiếp-tế lương-thực,
quân-dụng, quân trang và vũ-khí cho cán-bộ Việt-Đông
nam vùng.

- o -

Xuất phát : 27-01-1960
Tới Ly-Sơn : 31-01-1960
Hỏi 1/Thiền : 12-03-1960
Hỏi Hải-Quân : 14-04-1960



X

X

-----X

- 1.- Tên người vượt tuyến : NGUYỄN-BAT (tên khai sinh)
tức ĐƯỜNG (tên thật kiểu-bra
giả do V.C đặt vào đầu tháng
12/1959).
1/x Biệt danh : NGHĨA (tên đảng-viên Q.C)
- 2.- Nơi-dân : Xã Thanh-Châu tức Tây-Nghĩa
quận Duy-Xuyên tỉnh Quảng-Nam
2/x Quốc tịch : Việt-Nam
- 3.- Ngày sinh : 1927
3/x Nghề nghiệp : Trung-Úy, Đại-đội phó, phụ
trách giao liên thủy vận trong
đoàn 603 quân-đội V.C.
3b/ Tôn giáo : Thờ tổ tiên
- 4.- Địa chỉ trước ngày V/t: Đơn-vị 603 thuộc đơn vị 959, tổng-
cục hậu cần, trú quân tại phía
Nam sông GIANGH, huyện Quảng-
Trạch tỉnh Quảng-Bình Bắc-Việt.
4/a Hướng địa chỉ trước địa chỉ trên :
- 7-10-59 : xuống tàu Ha-Uy tập kết ra Bắc.
- 23-10-59 : tàu Ha-Uy cập bến Sầm-Sơn Thanh-Hóa, tạm
trú tại bãi bờ Sầm-Sơn 3 ngày đêm.

... / ...

PERSONAL HISTORY

of

NGUYEN-BAT alias Duong—From the mouth of the Gianh River (North Viet-Nam), he used a boat to cross the border into the South to supply foodstuffs, military supplies, equipment and arms to the Viet Cong cadre in the South.

Departure : Jan. 27, 1960
Arrive at Ly Son : Jan. 31, 1960
Arrive Thua Thien : Mar. 12, 1960
Arrive Saigon : Apr. 14, 1960

1. Name of person crossing border : Nguyen-Bat (name on birth certificate) alias DUONG (name on forged identification card given him by the Viet Cong at the beginning of December, 1959)
 - 1/a Pseudonym : Nghia (assigned on joining Communist Party)
2. Place of birth : Thanh Chau village, also known as Duy Nghia, Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam Province
 - 2/a Citizenship : Viet-Nam
3. Date of birth : 1927
 - 3/a Occupation : First Lieutenant, assistant company commander in charge of Ocean Transportation unit in Doan 603 of the Viet Cong armed forces
 - 3/ Religion : Ancestor worship
4. Address before crossing : Don-vi 603, subordinate to Doan 559 of the Rear Services Directorate, stationed south of the Gianh River, Quang Trach District, Quang Binh Province, North Viet-Nam
 - 4/a Addresses prior to above :
 - October 7, 1954 : Aboard a Norwegian ship for regrouping to the North
 - October 23, 1954 : When the Norwegian ship docked at Sam Son in Thanh Hoa, he stayed there on the Sam Son coast for 3 days and nights.

A summary of Nguyen Bat's confession follows:

From October 1954 to May 1955, Bat was stationed in Thanh Hoa Province. From May to July 1955, he served in the Coast Guard Bureau of the North Viet-Nam General Staff in Hanoi. From July to October, he received special training in coastal defense work. From October 1955 to March 1957 he was a member of Bach Dang naval unit patrolling the North Viet-Nam coast from Haiphong to Thai Binh. He then had 18 months of political training. He said he worked at the Haiphong fish cannery from September 1958 to

July 1959. From the latter date until his capture he was a member of Doan 603, the special maritime infiltration unit of the Viet Cong.

Bat said his father, Nguyen Giap, was dead. His mother, Do Thi Chinh, was living in the village of Duy Nghia. He said he had 5 brothers and two sisters, all in the same village in Quang Nam. Bat is unmarried.

Bat joined the Viet Minh in 1948 in the war against the French. He was progressively: a soldier in a transportation company; deputy chief of a small boat unit; commander of a small boat

unit; deputy commander of a larger boat unit; a deputy company commander. In 1954 he was regrouped to the North with his unit, the 812th regiment. Meantime, in 1951, he had become a member of the Communist Party.

In July 1959, when the North Viet-Nam authorities decided to establish Doan 603, the special unit for transporting agents and supplies to the Viet Cong in the South, Bat was picked as one of the original complement of 107 men. They went through a period of political training and the unit was activated in August.

Doan 603 was organized into two companies. One was responsible for administration, personnel, boat building, and other command and supply functions. The second company, of which Bat was commander, was responsible for carrying out assignments to the South by sea.

On October 20, 1959, five men were picked to carry out a supply mission to South Viet-Nam. They were: Nguyen Bat, Nguyen Xanh, Nguyen Nu, Huynh Lach, and Tran Muc. The following day they went to Vinh to get two fishing boats, each about 5 tons and built to look like fishing boats in the South. From late October to late November the men sailed one of the boats to become familiar with it and to practice chart reading, navigation, and boat handling. In late November and early December they were given leave to visit Hanoi before departing on their assignment.

On December 8 they met Nguyen Nua, who was to accompany them as a guide on their return trip. Nua was a "stay-behind" cadre of the Viet Cong who had remained in the South, in Quang Nam Province, until 1958.

Plans for the voyage:

They were to leave from the mouth of the Gianh River and to sail southeast, then south until they arrived at the planned landing site on the Quang Nam coast. They were to wait until after sunset before landing. They were to exchange flashlight signals with the shore party before landing. A waving red light would indicate that it was unsafe to land.

If captured with all their supplies and weapons, they were to admit they came from the North. But they were instructed to be vague about their landing site and where they came from. They were told to say only that the supplies came from the "Hanoi Office of Rear Services."

If they had managed to dispose of all their supplies and weapons before capture, they were to tell the authorities they had come from Vinh in the North to seek freedom. If they disposed of their weapons but not the supplies, they were to tell the authorities that they were from the South and were to use their forged boat papers and identity cards.

The men were told they could scuttle their cargo if:

- they encountered severe weather that prevented them from reaching their destination.
- a patrol boat of the Republic of Viet-Nam approached within 3 miles.
- if they encountered a group of small boats that seemed to be police craft.

Should they meet a single small boat that tried to check on them, they were instructed to use their weapons to destroy it and its occupants.

They were advised to use forged papers only in contacts with village or district officials, not with provincial or national authorities who would be likely to recognize them as forgeries.

Nguyen Bat listed the following items in the cargo he and his companions brought to the South: 12 bolts of nylon cloth, 5 large rolls of white paper, 3 bolts of black cloth, 20 cases of medicine, 2 cases of rice seed, 2 rolls of electric wire, a case of electric light bulbs, a case of batteries, one electric motor, a mimeograph machine, a case of printer's ink, 15 packages of documents, and 4 bundles of warm clothing (100 items).

Bat said each man aboard carried: 2 suits of black cotton, a long-sleeved jacket, 1,000 piasters (about \$13.60) in Southern currency, one kilogram of dried fish, a pot for cooking rice, a package of assorted medicines, a bag of tobacco with lighter and alcohol, and 20 kilograms of rice.

Each man also was given: an identity card, a card proving service in the armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam, a voting card.

The boat also carried: 6 submachineguns (MAT 49), 24 clips of ammunition, 18 grenades, 6 knives. They were to be delivered in the South and used for self-defense if necessary on the voyage.

After delivering their cargo to the Viet Cong in Quang Nam, Bat and his crew were to destroy their boat and return to the North overland. Nua was to guide them on this journey over secret trails to the North.

Bat and his crew made three unsuccessful attempts to carry out their assignment. They left

the Gianh River on December 9, on December 14, and again on December 29. Each time, bad weather forced them to turn back. Finally, on January 27, 1960, they set off again determined to complete their task.

Once again they ran into heavy weather. The rudder was broken. In a short time the spare rudder also broke. They drifted southward unable to control their direction. On the morning of January 31, they sighted a light. At first they feared it might be a patrol boat. Then they decided it was Ly Son Island, off the Quang Ngai coast.

They had the choice of continuing to drift at sea or trying to move in toward the island. They chose the latter course for their supply of fresh water was almost gone. They decided, too, to abandon their cargo and weapons.

Bat's statement concluded:

"I talked with the others about letting the boat move toward Ly Son Island because if we just let it drift we would die out in the middle of the ocean because the fresh water in the boat was almost gone. The boat did not have a rudder and we knew we had to go somewhere and hide.

"After everyone expressed his ideas, I had all the supplies and weapons thrown overboard. But the nylon cloth, even though it had a stone tied

to it, continued to drift along the surface. The crew, after throwing the cases of medicine, rice seed, and the four packages of clothing over the side, had to fish them out again in order to open them up and let the water in. Otherwise they would have kept floating. The clothing had to be tossed over piece by piece.

"When we opened up the packages with the warm clothing, it was such a shame [to abandon them] that each of us took one [coat] and a piece of nylon cloth to wrap them in and protect them.

"Having thrown out the cargo and the weapons, we destroyed all the papers we had brought along with us. The 1,000 piasters for each person were given back to Nua and he wrapped them in a fat roll. At first Nua did not want to throw the money away but we decided it would give us away.

"Then we let the broken rudder go so the boat would drift in to Ly Son Island. We landed around 3 p.m. on January 31, 1960. All of us declared that we had crossed the 17th parallel to seek freedom."

Sample pages from the interrogation records of the other members of Nguyen Bat's crew are reproduced below. Their accounts, though given individually to Republic of Viet-Nam authorities, follow Bat's confession even in minor details.

H O - S O L Y - L I C H
của



NGUYỄN-NỮA - Xuất phát 27-10-60, tới đảo Ly-Sơn, QUẢNG NGÃI
31-1-1960.

Tới ty CA QUẢNG-NGÃI : 09.02.60
Tới HUẾ : 12.03.60
Tới BÀ-NẴNG : 12.4.60
Tới SAIGON : 14.04.60

- 1/- Tên người viết tuyên : NGUYỄN-NỮA
1/a Bí danh : THANH (tuyên thệ chính thức đảng viên
:1949 và đang trong bộ đội VC)
1/b :NGO CHAU (trong thẻ kiểm tra gia đê VC.
:cấp dụng trong chuyến tiếp tế vũ khí
:vào miền Nam 1960)
- 2/- Nơi sinh :Thôn Bấy, xã Duy-Nghĩa, huyện Duy-Xuyên
:Tỉnh QUẢNG NAM (trước 1945 gọi là xã
:Tây-Sơn)
2/a Cuộc tịch :VIET NAM
- 3/- Ngày sinh :1923
3/a Nghề nghiệp :- Nghề biển 1923 - 1950
:- Bộ đội 1950 - 1954
:- Cán bộ nằm vùng 1954 - 1958
:- Ra Bắc Việt (HANOI) 1958 - 1960
3/b Tôn giáo :Vô tôn-giáo
- 4/- Địa chỉ trước ngày v/t :Thanh-Khê (sông Giaph) huyện Thanh-
:Trạch, tỉnh QUẢNG-BÌNH
4/a Những địa chỉ trước địa chỉ vừa kể trên :
- Duy-Nghĩa, Duy-Xuyên, QUẢNG-NAM 1923 - 1950
- Bộ đội VC liên khu V, 1950 - 1954
- Bộ đội nằm vùng quận Hòa-Vang 1954 - 1958
- HÀ-NỘI (xin tiếp) 1958 - 1960
- 5/- Tên người cha :NGUYỄN-HỢI
5/a Bí danh :Không
5/b Nơi sinh :Duy-Nghĩa, Duy-Xuyên, QUẢNG NAM
5/c Ngày sinh :Chết 1947, thọ ngoài 50 T.
- 6/- Tên người mẹ :TRẦN THỊ ĐÔNG
6/a Nơi Sinh :Duy-Nghĩa, Duy-Xuyên, QUẢNG NAM
6/b Ngày sinh :1947 (thọ ngoài 40 T.)
- 7/1 Anh em :NGUYỄN-ĐÔI
7/1a Nơi sinh :Duy-Nghĩa, Duy-Xuyên, QUẢNG NAM
7/1b Ngày sinh :Trạc 40 T.
7/1c Địa chỉ :Duy-Nghĩa
7/1d Nghề nghiệp :Làm biển
- 7/2 Anh em :NGUYỄN-YỆ (tàng tệt)
7/2a Nơi sinh :Duy-Nghĩa, Duy-Xuyên, QUẢNG NAM
7/2b Ngày sinh :Trạc 35 T.
7/2c Địa chỉ :Duy-Nghĩa
7/2d Nghề nghiệp :làm biển và làm ruộng
- 8/1 Chị em :NGUYỄN-THỊ-BƯA
8/1a Nơi sinh :Duy-Nghĩa, Duy-Xuyên, QUẢNG NAM.



HỒ SƠ LÝ - LỊCH
của

TRẦN-MỨC tức HUỖNH - Cán-bộ miền Nam tập kết.

Xuất phát ngày : 27.01.60
Đến Ly-Sơn " : 31.01.60
Đến Thừa-Thiên : 12.03.60
Tới Saigon : 14.04.60

- 1/- Tên người v/t : TRẦN - MỨC
1/a Bí danh : Huỳnh (tên lúc nhập đảng CS)
- 2/- Nơi sanh : Xã Đức-Thắng, huyện Mộ-Đức, tỉnh Quảng-Ngãi.
2/a Quốc-tịch : Việt-Nam.
- 3/- Ngày sanh : 1927
3/a Nghề nghiệp : - Xem Bội-trưởng du-kịch
- Tập đoàn đánh cá xã Hải-Bình, Huyện Tĩnh-Gia (Thanh-Hóa)
3/b Tôn-giáo : Phật-giáo
- 4/- Địa-chỉ trước ngày v/t : Xã Thanh-trạch, huyện Bồ-Trạch, Tỉnh Quảng-Bình (Đánh trại 603).
4/a Những địa-chỉ trước địa-chỉ vừa kể trên :
- Tập kết ra Bắc năm 1954
- 1955 - 1958, đi công-trường đắp đường quốc lộ số 1 từ Minh-Bình vào Nghệ-An.
- Tháng 2/1958, tập đoàn đánh cá xã Hải-Bình, huyện Tĩnh-Gia (Thanh-Hóa).
- 5/- Tên người cha : Trần Chuẩn
5/a Bí danh : không
5/b Nơi sanh : Xã Đức-Thắng, huyện Mộ-Đức, tỉnh Quảng-Ngãi.
5/c Ngày sanh : 72 tuổi
5/d Địa-chỉ : Xã Đức-Thắng
5/e Nghề-nghiệp : Lừa cá 2 mắt (không làm gì)
- 6/- Tên người mẹ : Nguyễn-thị-Chuẩn
5/a Nơi sanh : Xã Đức-Thắng
5/b Ngày sanh : 70 tuổi
5/c Địa-chỉ : Xã Đức-Thắng
5/d Nghề-nghiệp : Nội-trợ.
- 7/1 Anh em : Trần-Kỳ-Sắt
7/1a Nơi sanh : Xã Đức-Thắng
7/1b Ngày sanh : Ngoài 40 tuổi
7/1c Địa-chỉ : Xã Đức-Thắng
7/1d Nghề-nghiệp : Đánh cá



HỒ SƠ LÝ LỊCH

của

HUYỀN-LÁCH tự HUYỀN-SƠN - cán-bộ tiếp-tê V.C.

Xoát phát ngày : 27.01.60

Tới Ly-Sơn : 31.01.60

Tới QUẢNG NGÃI : 09.02.60

Tới SAIGON : 14.04.60

1/- Tên người V/t

: HUYỀN LÁCH (theo giấy khai sinh)

1/a Bí danh

- : - HUYỀN-SƠN (lấy 1955 gia-nhập bộ-đội)
- HOÀNG KIM (lấy thẻ cử-tri giả 1959)
- CHAU (lấy 1956 khi gia-nhập Đảng)

2/- Nơi sinh

: Thôn Tám, xã Thăng-Phước, huyện Thăng-Bình, tỉnh QUẢNG-NAM.

2/a Quốc-tịch

: VIỆT-NAM

3/- Ngày sinh

: Sinh năm 1929 (31 tuổi)

3/a Nghề-nghiệp

: Bộ-đội vận-tải 603 (tiếp-tê miền Nam)

3/b Tôn giáo

: Phật giáo

4/- Địa-chỉ trước ngày V/t

: Thôn Thạch-Khê, xã Thanh-Trạch, huyện Bù-Trạch, tỉnh QUẢNG-BÌNH.

4/a Những địa-chỉ trước địa-chỉ vừa kể trên :

- 1929 - 1952, ở tại xã Thăng-Phước
- 11/1952 , gia-nhập bộ-đội vận-tải tiểu-đoàn V.C. 242
- 1954 , Đại-đội 240 đóng tại Đại-Lực QUẢNG NAM.
- 8/1954 , C.425 tại QUY NHƠN.

HỒ - SƠ LÝ - LỊCH

của

NGUYỄN - XANH (Cán-bộ tiếp-tê V.C.)



Buất-phát ngày : 27.01.1960

Tới Ly-Sơn : 31.01.1960

Tới Quảng-Ngai : 09.02.1960

Tới Huế : 12.03.1960

Tới Bà-Năng : 12.04.1960

Tới Saigon : 14.04.1960.



- 1/- Tên người vượt tuyến : NGUYỄN-XANH (tên lấy 1951 khi gia nhập bộ-đội)
- 1/a Hí danh : - Nguyễn-Mia (tên bí còn nhỏ ở nhà)
 - Nguyễn-Tốt (bí danh khi vào Đảng ngày 28.7.1955)
 - Nguyễn-Lưu (bí danh đảng khai ở Quảng-Ngai)
 - Phạm-Bư (tên trong cấn-cước giả ở Bà-Ngôi cấp khi đi công-tác tiếp tê vào Nam)
- 2/- Hơi sinh : Bà Tỉnh Thủy, huyện Tam-Kỳ, tỉnh Quảng-Nam.
- 2/a Quốc-tịch : Việt-Nam
- 3/- Ngày sinh : 03.3.1919
- 3/a Nghề-nghiệp : Tiểu-đội trưởng VC
- 3/b Tôn-giao : Phật-giao
- 4/- Địa-chỉ trước ngày v/t : Đoàn 603 (tiếp-tê cho miền Nam) đồn trú tại xã Thanh-Trạch, huyện Bồ-Trạch, tỉnh Quảng-Bình.
- 4/a Những địa-chỉ trước địa-chỉ vừa kể trên :
- 1934 xã Tam-Thành (cũ xã Hòa-thành-Thương)
 - 1946-51, VN cướp chính-quyền, đ/s đi dân quân và tự-vệ xã
 - 09/1951, đi bộ-đội thuộc tiểu-đoàn 248 vận-tai tiếp-tê Liên-khu V (Bình, Bình, Thuận) đóng tại Tuy-Hòa thuộc tỉnh Phú-Yên.
 - 12/1953, Pháp đổ bộ Tuy-Hòa, tiểu-đoàn 248 chuyển đến Bình-Bình
 - 06/1954, công-tác tại cửa Lò-Bì thuộc tỉnh Phú-Yên, di Bình-Thuận.
 - 09/1954, chuyển đến Camp St Jacques đợi tập kết nhập vào trung-đoàn 812 thuộc tỉnh-đội Bình-Thuận. Vì mất liên-lạc với tiểu-đoàn 248 trong thời gian sinh chiến đ/s vẫn đi công-tác.
 - 10/1954, tập kết ra Bắc đóng tại huyện Tĩnh-Gia thuộc Thanh-Hóa.

APPENDIX K

Medical Equipment From North Viet-Nam and the Communist Bloc

(See Part I, section VI, D, 4, pp. 37-38)


Below are reproduced pictures of three Chinese medical charts printed in Peiping. The Vietnamese translations of anatomical terms are written in. The charts were captured by Republic of Viet-Nam forces in an attack on a Viet Cong medical post and military unit near Darlac in August 1961.



Below are reproduced pictures of Soviet, Chinese, and other Communist-bloc medicines, medical instruments, and other equipment captured by forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam in actions against the Viet Cong. Articles manufactured in the Communist bloc are not available in South Viet-Nam and must have been introduced from outside.



In an attack on a Viet Cong unit near Ban Me Thuot on October 3, 1961, Viet-Nam Government forces overran a VC medical aid station. The diary of the medical officer was captured (see the Mai Xuan Phong Case in Part I, pp. 41-42). Among the captured equipment were medical supplies, including vials of novocain, atropine, and other drugs manufactured in a state-owned pharmaceutical plant in North Viet-Nam. A picture of some of these vials is reproduced below.



1. North Vietnamese Forces in Laos

(See Part I, section VI, E, 1, p. 39)

During the fighting in Laos a number of officers and men of the Army of North Viet-Nam have surrendered or been captured. They have admitted they were ordered to go to Laos to fight alongside the Pathet Lao against the forces of the Royal Lao Government. One such prisoner was Private Second Class Ne Tong, pictured below. He identified himself as a member of Company 2, First Battalion, Regiment 120, of the Army of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

A summary of Ne Tong's statement to his captors follows:

On December 11, 1960, Regiment 120 of the Army of North Viet-Nam was ordered to move from its base at Phu Quy to the area of Nong Het in Laos. The unit moved by truck along Route #6



to Cua Rao. It then marched, via Route #7, to the Nong Het area.

On December 15 the unit took part in the attack on the Royal Lao Army outpost at Nong Het. Ne Tong was wounded in the right arm and was captured.

Another soldier of the Army of North Viet-Nam captured in Laos was Private Vi Van Sang, pictured below.



Sang was a member of Independent Battalion 925 of the Army of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. He said he was ordered on February 19, 1961, to go to Laos. He traveled with two sections of 42 men each from his battalion. They marched for 4 days to the Nong Het area in Laos. Then they were moved by truck convoy to the Plaine des Jarres. They were attached to Pathet Lao Battalion #6. Sang took the Lao name of



Lieutenant Nguyen Van Nham.

Boun Kong, a common practice among Vietnamese fighting in Laos.

From the Plaine des Jarres, Sang's unit marched to the Muong Kassy area. They took part in the attack on Muong Kassy on March 11. Eight days later the unit fought in the battle of Pha Tang. Sang was wounded by shrapnel in this engagement and was taken prisoner. He was hospitalized in Vientiane.

Sang said his detachment of 42 specialists in mortars and machineguns who were assigned to fight in Laos was commanded by Sublieutenant Pham Van Duong of the 925th Battalion.

Still another North Vietnamese who took part in the fighting in Laos was Sublieutenant Nguyen Van Nham from the Huong Khe District of Ha Tinh Province. He was a platoon commander in Company 1, 6th Battalion, of the 335th Division, Army of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

On December 25, 1960, Nham was ordered to go to Laos. He traveled from Moc Chau in the northwest to Hanoi. On December 26 he flew from Gia Lam airport to Vang Vieng in Laos. Nham was accompanied by nine specialists in the use of mortars.

He took part in actions at Phou Pha and Ban Hin Heup. On January 30, 1961, Nham was wounded and captured in a fight near Ban Hin Heup.

The Do Luc Diary

(See Part I, section VI, E, 2, p. 40)


After a fight at Daktrum on September 3, 1961, forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam found a diary in the uniform of a Viet Cong soldier who had been killed in the engagement. Together with the diary were several pictures. One (reproduced on right) shows two men and a young boy. The men are wearing the uniform of the Army of North Viet-Nam.

The Do Luc diary opens on a melancholy, pitiful note. On July 28, 1961, Do Luc wrote a brief note on the first page. Apparently the lonesome soldier pretended it was a message to him from his loved one, Nguyen Thi Minh Chau, in the North. It reads:

“We are in love and we have talked about that many times. Even though mountains and rivers will separate us, I shall wait until the revolution succeeds! My heart aches when I look toward the South, my darling! Is it not true that in the South there is still boiling oil, burning fire and many painful and mournful situations, my darling?”



A photo of the first page of the Do Luc diary is reproduced below



Do Luc made his first entry in his homemade diary on May 4, 1961. On that date he wrote:

“Leaving temporarily the beloved North to return to my native South to liberate my compatriots from the yoke of misery imposed by My-Diem (U.S.-Diem). This has been my ideal for a long time.”

An entry of the same date with the time 1:30 a.m. noted:

“Here is the Viet-Nam-Laos border. I will always remember the international love which is engraved deep in my heart.”

This was apparently a reference to his earlier service in Laos, which he described later.


By the middle of June, Do Luc and his companions had passed through Laos and had entered South Viet-Nam. On June 17 he wrote:

“Having been away for several years from the territory of Interzone 5 ‘Quang Nam,’ my heart is both happy and sad. What shall I do now to be a worthy son of Interzone 5?”

On August 6, Do Luc wrote as follows:

“A few lines to remind me of this remote place! Not enough rice; meals tasteless because there is not enough salt; clothing is not warm enough for this very high peak.

“Nevertheless, in his determined heart, the fighter for liberation of the South remains faithful to the Party, to the people of the South, and he remains faithful to his only love.”



Beginning on August 14, 1961, Do Luc began a review of some of his experiences. He wrote:

“Memory!

“One afternoon which is turning into evening. I am sitting on the peak of a high mountain. This is a famous scenic place. This is the highest peak of the whole chain of mountains, and it is all covered with mist. All this scenery arouses nostalgia in my heart! I try to recall my life since I was a young boy.

“I answered the call of the Party when I was very young, and what did I do for the people of my village? I devoted myself to the people. I took part in propaganda and aroused the people to carry out the policy of the Party and the Government and helped organize village defense and fighting forces. On March 25, 1954, I began my fighting career and I contributed my part in fighting the French Expeditionary Force. With the army of Interzone 5, I saw the end of the war on July 20, 1954, and then on April 26, 1955, I left my native place and all the ties with my family and friends to go North as a victorious fighter.

Since that day, my spirit has matured together with that of the regular army. We have built up a beautiful and prosperous and strong North; the construction sites and factories spring up quickly everywhere under a bright sky and under the superior socialist regime. Close to me there was a unique source of consolation in my life. My life was beautiful, my happiness immeasurable. Enough to eat; warm clothing in my daily life; earning a living was fairly easy; often I enjoyed songs and dances which deal with the healthy life of all the people in the North and with the maturity of the Army.”

In the following entry Do Luc wrote:

“Then, one morning, while my life was touched with a fresh, joyous and peaceful atmosphere, in harmony with the reconstruction program in the North, while my life was a normal one and I was happy with my only love . . .

“Suddenly, on December 15, 1960, . . .

“I answered the needs of the international solidarity of the Vietnamese-Laotian proletariat. I

had to leave my beloved fatherland and my sweet life and go to help our friends with a spirit of unselfishness, of class solidarity, of love for my fatherland, and the spirit of the international proletarian revolution, in order to annihilate the reactionary clique of Pumi Buon Um (Phoumi-Boun Oum) so that mankind and the two countries, Viet-Nam and Laos, could achieve prosperity and happiness.

"Thus, I succeeded in meeting the needs of a friendly country.

"Our friends' war has stopped and the guns are silent. On the call of the Party, I returned to my beloved fatherland! My life returned to normal. I enjoyed again the peaceful atmosphere and my happiness. I continued training daily for the defense of the territory of the North and for the continuation of the liberation of the South. But I was back with my only love. Hurrah! How happy and how sweet. But my life could not continue that way!

"For the third time my life turned to war again. For the liberation of our compatriots in the South, a situation of boiling oil and burning fire is necessary! A situation in which husband is separated


from wife, father from son, brother from brother is necessary. I joined the ranks of the liberation army in answer to the call of the front for liberation of the South.

"Now my life is full of hardship—not enough rice to eat nor enough salt to give a taste to my tongue, not enough clothing to keep myself warm! But in my heart I keep loyal to the Party and to the people. I am proud and happy.

"I am writing down this story for my sons and my grandsons of the future to know of my life and activities during the revolution when the best medicine available was the root of the wild banana tree and the best bandage was the leaf of rau lui, when there was no salt to give a taste to our meals, when there was no such food as meat or fish like we enjoy in a time of peace and happiness such as I have known and left behind. But that day will not take long to return to my life."

On the back pages of his diary, Do Luc had listed a number of Vietnamese words with their equivalents in the language of one of the mountain tribes in the area where he was stationed.

(See page reproduced below.)



In the back pages of his diary, Do Luc also listed "10 disciplinary rules for military security" as follows:

"1. Do not disclose army secrets. Do not be curious about your own responsibilities and duties.

"2. Do not discuss the duties you must carry out.

"3. You must respect absolutely the regulations which protect documents during your activities. Do not carry with you those things that regulations prohibit you from carrying. If you are captured by the enemy, be determined not to give in."

(Ironically, this regulation on documents was violated by the diary in which he wrote down the rule!)

"Slogans:—absolute loyalty to the revolution
—death is preferable to slavery

"4. Keep secret our method of hiding weapons.

"5. Do not take the liberty of listening to enemy broadcasts or of reading their newspapers or documents. Do not spread false rumors.

"6. Do not have any relations with any organization with evil segments of the population which are harmful to the revolution.

"7. Do not take your family or relatives or friends to military camp sites.

"8. Keep order and security among the population as well as among yourselves.

"9. Do not cease to carry out self-criticism or being vigilant, and continue your training.

"10. Implement seriously these ten rules, mentally as well as in deeds."

The map below shows Do Luc's itinerary from 1954 to 1961.




APPENDIX N

The Vo Van Tan Case

(See Part I, section VI, E, 2, p. 41)

Vo Van Tan, whose picture appears below, was a private, first class, in the First Battalion of Regiment 664, Army of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (North Viet-Nam). In June 1961 he was assigned to a special unit, Independent Battalion #2, to go to South Viet-Nam. In August, after a battle, Tan decided to defect. He stole some rice and money and made his way to Saigon. On September 18 he was arrested by the police at the An Dong bus station during a routine check of identification papers.



B ẢN K H Ậ U C Ứ N G

của

VỎ VẠN TẤN tự VỎ HOA MI tự
VỎ-MAI-HÀ bí danh VỎ QUANG VINH,
Thượng-sĩ thuộc Tiểu-đoàn II Cán-Bộ
Việt-Cộng, đặc phái trở vào Nam hoạt
động, bị bắt ngày 18/9/61 tại SÀI G Ò N.



I.- L Y L I C H

- VỎ VĂN TẤN tự VỎ HOA MI tự VỎ MAI HÀ, bí danh VỎ QUANG MINH.
- Sinh năm 1927 tại xã Hưng Lợi, Huyện Giồng Riềng, tỉnh Rạch Giá (KIÊN GIANG).
- Con ông VỎ VĂN QUANG (c) và Bà Nguyễn thị HẰNG (c).
- Thọ mộc
- độc thân
- Khai chưa tiền án.
- Anh chị em ruột : không có.

Nhân dạng :

Cao 1m.52 - Trung người. Da bánh ít. Mặt trái soan. Gò má cao. Mắt sâu. Lông mày đen và dài. Miệng rộng. Một nốt ruồi cách 2 phân trên đầu lông mày trái, gần giữa trán. Rái tai trái lẹp một miếng nhỏ.

II.- T R Ư Ờ N G H Ợ P B I B Ắ T

Thượng sĩ quân đội Việt-Cộng thuộc Tiểu đoàn 2 Độc Lập (tiểu đoàn cán-bộ) đặc phái vào Nam tăng cường cho các đơn-vị V.C., đào ngũ và đánh cướp tiền của đơn-vị trốn vào Sài Gòn, bị bắt tại bến xe An Đông (Saigon) ngày 18/9/61.

III.- T I N T ỨC C H Ạ N H T H ỨC

~~Huân chương công lực VVC, cấp kết quả và hoạt động
từ tháng 1/1955
ngày 7/10/55~~

- Trước năm 1945 : ở chôn trâu cho người có ruộng, sau theo ông già vừa làm ruộng vừa học nghề thợ mộc.
- 1946 : gia nhập Thanh-niên Tiên-Phong xã Hưng Lợi, huyện Châu Thành tỉnh Rạch Giá.
- 1948 : sau khi Thanh-niên tiên-phong giải tán, gia nhập đoàn Thanh Niên Cứu Quốc xã Hưng Lợi.
- 11-1952 : do sự giới thiệu của tên MIÊN, tiểu đội trưởng Du-kích xã Ấp Hưng Đông xã Hưng Lợi, y được kết nạp vào Tiểu đội trên và tham gia (cùng đơn-vị chủ lực địa-phương) công tác chặn viện các đồn bót lẻ tẻ trong xã.

.... / 2

INTERROGATION REPORT

for

VO VAN TAN, alias Vo Hoa Mi, alias Vo Mai Ha, secret name of Vo Quang Vinh, Private, First Class, Battalion 2, Viet Cong cadre, charged with returning to South Viet-Nam for active duty. Arrested in Saigon, September 18, 1961.

I. Biographical data

- Vo Van Tan, alias Vo Hoa Mi, alias Vo Mai Ha, secret name Vo Quang Vinh
- Born in 1927 in Hung Loi hamlet, Giong Rieng district, Rach Gia province (now Kien Giang)
- Father is Vo Van Quang; mother is Nguyen Thi Hang
- Carpenter
- Single
- Declared he has no police record
- No sisters or brothers

Measurements:

1.52 meters; medium build; complexion—clear brown; high cheekbones; deep-set eyes; long black eyebrows; large mouth; mole 2 mm. over right eyebrow near middle; left ear close to head.

II. Circumstances of arrest

Private, first class, in Viet Cong Independent Battalion 2 (cadre battalion). Was assigned to South Viet-Nam to increase the potential of Viet Cong units. He deserted, stole the money of the battalion, and escaped to Saigon. He was arrested at An Dong bus station in Saigon on September 18, 1961.

III. Specific information

- Before 1945: he kept buffaloes for his aunt. Later he worked in the rice fields with his father and at the same time was trained to be a carpenter.
- 1946: he joined the Youth Commandos of Hung Loi village, Chau Thanh district, Rach Gia province.
- 1948: after the Youth Commandos were disbanded, he joined the Youth for Liberation of the Country.

- November 1952: He was sponsored by a man named Mien, who was head of a guerrilla platoon in Hung Dong hamlet, Hung Loi village, and was accepted as a member of this platoon which took part (together with other local platoons) in attacks on scattered outposts near the village.

(end of page 1)

A summary of the remainder of Vo Van Tan's confession follows:

In October 1954 he boarded a French ship to go to the North. At O Cap he transferred to a Russian ship together with about 3,000 other Vietnamese. On October 5, 1954, they arrived at Sam Son in Thanh Hoa province in North Viet-Nam. He was assigned to the 338th Division.

In 1961, in preparation for their assignment to South Viet-Nam, Tan and some of his comrades were given a special course to familiarize them with the use of French and U.S. weapons. On June 20, 1961, they began their journey to the South, starting at Hoa Binh, then passing through Hanoi and Thanh to Vinh, where they rested. From Vinh they traveled southwest into Laos. Tan noted the passage of his unit, Independent Battalion No. 2, through "Cam Muon," the Laotian province of Khammouane.

They entered South Viet-Nam through Quang Nam Province. Tan said they passed through Kontum and Darlac Provinces and operated in the area around the city of Ban Me Thuot.

On August 26, 1961, Tan said, his unit encountered troops of the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam and suffered heavy casualties. He said they were saved only by a Viet Cong unit that was nearby and came to their aid. Tan and the rest of the survivors managed to escape into the jungle. Tan told his interrogators that he deserted within 24 hours following this engagement.

He stole a bag of rice and 95,000 piasters (about \$1,292) from his unit and left for Saigon. Traveling entirely at night, he reached his goal but he was picked up almost immediately by South Vietnamese police.

The map below shows Vo Van Tan's travels.




The Mai Xuan Phong Diary

(See Part I, section VI, E, 2, pp. 41-42)

On October 3, 1961, in Darlac Province a unit of the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam overran a Viet Cong camp. The VC group had included a small medical detachment. The ARVN

forces captured some medical supplies and a diary kept by the Viet Cong medical officer, a man named Mai Xuan Phong. The first dated entry in the diary is for April 20, 1961; the final one, for September 21, 1961. In the back pages of his notebook Phong wrote the words of a popular Vietnamese song.

The cover of the Mai Xuan Phong diary is pictured below.



Excerpts from the Mai Xuan Phong diary follow:

(page 4)

The most precious thing for a man is his life, because one has only one life. One must, then, live in such a way that one does not have to regret the wasted years and months, that one does not have to be ashamed of a pitiful past, that one is able to say before passing away: my whole life, my whole

strength have been devoted to the most elevated and the most beautiful cause—the struggle for the liberation of mankind. . . .

(page 5)

. . . And one has to live in a hurry. A stupid accident, disease, or any tragic hazard may suddenly put an end to one's life. . . .

(page 6)

April 20, 1961

Departure for a new mission to which I have been assigned. There are so many happy memories which will encourage me to fulfill my duty

April 22, 1961

We left the beloved fatherland at exactly five minutes to 12. Here is a friendly country. We have to cross a very mountainous border region.

(page 7)

May 14, 1961

At 15 minutes before 9:00 we arrived at Highway No. 9 which has just been liberated. On the highway lie the remnants of four enemy GMC trucks and two armored cars which our forces have destroyed. We arrived at the post of Muong Phin (Muong Phine) which has just been liberated. We slept at Muong Phine and, next day, we cross Highway No. 9.

(unintelligible code sign "6-5 * +")

We stop here and help build a road to allow trucks to bring in rice supplies. For two days, we have been short of food and had only glutinous rice. This portion of our route is really hard. The sun is burning hot. We do not have enough drinking water

(page 8)

but our patriotism and our determination to liberate the native land will help us overcome all the difficulties and accomplish our duty.

(signature)

June 1, 1961

At 15 minutes to 2:00 we arrived at the regrouping station located on the border between Laos and Viet-Nam, at the border of Quang Nam [Province]. I have been away from the beloved fatherland for one month and 20 days (Note: bad arithmetic, should be one month and 10 days!), and I have been away from my native South for 6 years.

(signature)

(page 9)

At exactly 3:00 p.m. on the 10th of June '61 we arrived at the boundary of Contum (Kontum) province

(signature)


We entered Cambodia on July 10, 1961—across the border of Cambodia and Viet-Nam in the province of Gia Rai

(page 10)

We arrived at the operational base in Dac Lac (Darlac) province, in the southwest highlands, on August 7, 1961

On August 9, I received orders to go on a mission and join an armed unit. This unit has just been organized. It does not have living quarters yet and is not yet fully equipped. The unit is composed of only two squads, all mountain tribesmen except for two Vietnamese who came from the North. As for me, in my capacity as medical assistant, I find that there are no conditions or means for me to operate. There is not sufficient medicine. Life in this base is really difficult

A sample page of the Mai Xuan Phong diary is reproduced below.



(page 11)

But I shall overcome all these difficulties in order to fulfill my duty in the revolution in the South.

After three months and nine days, after having crossed many a border—Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam—after having gone through all this hardship and danger, I think that I have accomplished at this point a part of my duty.

August 9, 1961

(signature)

(page 12)

September 20, 1961

Today we begin our tour of armed propaganda. We shall attack the enemy and establish popular bases among the population of the land development centers in Dac Lac (Darlac) province, in the southwest highlands

September 21, 1961

I received instructions to report to K (note: probably the Viet Cong operational headquarters

in the Ban Me Thuot area) in order to be assigned a new mission

(page 14)

September 21, 1961


At 5:30, our forces launched a massive attack on the land development center of Quang Nhieu, Ba Moi Thuoc (Ban Me Thuot), and we proceeded to armed propaganda. We gathered together about 400 people and propagandized on the policy of the Front for Liberation of the South

We have secured good results. We have awakened these people after the dark years they lived under My-Diem. We seized many documents and much military equipment

(signature)

The inside cover of the Mai Xuan Phong diary bears the seal of the Tong Cong Ty Bach Hoa (literally, General Company for a Hundred Things), a state-owned enterprise in North Vietnam.

The inside cover of the Mai Xuan Phong diary is reproduced below.



The map below shows Mai Xuan Phong's itinerary.



APPENDIX P


ITEM 1

Communist Party Cadres in the South

(See Part 1, section VI, F, 1, pp. 43-44)

On October 26, 1961, troops of the Republic of Viet-Nam attacked and seized a Viet Cong camp. Many documents were seized. Included were the medical and Party records of a Party cadre named Huynh Van Cuong.

The medical record, reproduced below, showed that Cuong was suffering from a lung ailment. The record sheet is headed "Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam." It is from the "Military Medical Office, Medical Section 108."



The "Announcement Certificate" below is a receipt for the certificate of introduction for Cuong from the Lao Dong Party (Communist Party). It is dated April 1961 and shows that he was a member of the Party since 1947. He apparently brought it from the North to present to his new Party unit, F 351, in the South.

(FRONT)

ĐẢNG LAO ĐỘNG VIỆT-NAM

PHIẾU BÁO

Ban Tổ chức _____
Số _____

Đã tiếp nhận giấy giới thiệu S.H.Đ. _____

Kính gửi: **BAN TỔ CHỨC** F351

Xin báo đã tiếp nhận giấy giới thiệu sinh hoạt Đảng số 479 / 40
ngày 4/4/61 của Bao
Đồng chí Huyên Cường vào Đảng 4/47
Chính thức 7/47

Ngày _____ tháng _____ năm _____
T/M Ban Tổ chức _____

Chú ý — Hướng dẫn cách ghi xem ở mặt sau

(BACK)

Chú ý:

— Khi cơ quan giới thiệu sinh hoạt Đảng cho đồng viên phải viết kèm phiếu báo.

— Mục Kính gửi Ban Tổ chức.... thì nơi gửi viết luôn, tức là viết trả lại cho cơ quan mình.

— Ngày vào Đảng, ngày chính thức cũng cơ quan gửi ghi vào luôn.

— Cơ quan tiếp nhận giấy giới thiệu sinh hoạt Đảng chỉ xem lại ngày vào Đảng, ngày chính thức trong giấy giới thiệu sinh hoạt Đảng rồi ghi số, ngày tháng và ký tên đóng dấu...

Below is a photograph of a "Certificate of Introduction" from the Lao Dong Party in the name of Huynh Van Cuong. It lists his Party alias, Quoc Cang, and notes his entry into the Party on April 3, 1947. It is from his regular organization, chapter 11, section E 400, and lists his next assignment as "administrative headquarters for cadre." It requests that Cuong be permitted by his new organization in the South, "F 351," to carry out "special missions."

(FRONT)

35 /GTSHD Kinh chuyển: _____

Để nghị giới thiệu cho đồng chí _____ được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng tại _____

Ngày tháng năm 196 _____

ĐẢNG LAO ĐỘNG VIỆT-NAM

Chi bộ A

E 400

SS: A1 /GTSHD Kinh gửi: Phòng chính trị, E 400

GIẤY GIỚI THIỆU SINH HOẠT ĐẢNG

Đồng chí Huỳnh Văn Cường, tuổi 35

Họ danh Quốc Cang

Được kết nạp vào Đảng ngày: ngày 03 tháng 4 năm 1947

Được chuyển bổ chính thức ngày: tháng 04 năm 1947

Nhân công tác ở: Chi bộ A, Phòng 400

Nơi đi công tác ở: Phòng chính trị

Được nâng cấp tuổi Đảng loại: _____ của và đã lãnh hết tháng _____ năm 196 _____

Đã đóng Đảng phí hết tháng 3 năm 196 _____

Mong các đồng chí giới thiệu cho đồng chí Huỳnh Văn Cường được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng.

Kèm theo: _____

Độc điền:

Cao: 1m 68 Ngày 3 tháng 4 năm 1964

Đã và cấp tại: _____

Số chuẩn hình ảnh: 034 177 Thay mặt chính ủy: Nguyễn Văn Lương

Đỗ Trung


SS 71 /GTSHD Kinh chuyển: Ban Kế Hoạch F 351

Để nghị giới thiệu cho đồng chí Cuông được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng tại đơn vị tại biệt

Ngày 3 tháng 6 năm 1964

Đỗ Trung

Photograph of a "Certificate of Introduction"—Continued
(BACK)

Số _____ /GTSHD Kính chuyển: <u>Cục Cảnh Sát</u> <u>Tổng Cục Cảnh Sát</u> Đề nghị giới thiệu cho đồng chí _____ được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng tại _____ <u>Quảng</u>	Số _____ /GTSHD Kính chuyển: _____ Đề nghị giới thiệu cho đồng chí _____ được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng tại _____ Ngày _____ tháng _____ năm 195_____
Ngày _____ tháng _____ năm 195_____ Tướng Bảo Tô  <u>Hoàng Văn Cửu</u>	Ngày _____ tháng _____ năm 195_____
Số _____ /GTSHD Kính chuyển: _____ Đề nghị giới thiệu cho đồng chí _____ được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng tại _____ Ngày _____ tháng _____ năm 195_____	Số _____ /GTSHD Kính chuyển: _____ Đề nghị giới thiệu cho đồng chí _____ được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng tại _____ Ngày _____ tháng _____ năm 195_____
Số _____ /GTSHD Kính chuyển: _____ Đề nghị giới thiệu cho đồng chí _____ được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng tại _____ Ngày _____ tháng _____ năm 195_____	Số _____ /GTSHD Kính chuyển: _____ Đề nghị giới thiệu cho đồng chí _____ được tiếp tục tham gia sinh hoạt Đảng tại _____ Ngày _____ tháng _____ năm 195_____

Party Leadership of Front Organizations

(See Part I, section VI, F, 2, pp. 44-46)

Below is a page from the "Draft Program of Action and Rules of Procedure of the Association of Peasants for Liberation" picked up by Republic of Viet-Nam authorities in Dinh Tuong Province in 1960.

DỰ - TRÌNH

CHƯƠNG-TRÌNH VÀ ĐIỀU-LỆ
TÓM TẮC CỦA
HỘI NÔNG-DÂN GIẢI-PHÓNG

A.- CHƯƠNG-TRÌNH :

Nông-dân Lao-Động chúng ta rất đông, gồm trên 90 phần trăm dân số của dân-tộc. Chúng ta là những người sản-xuất ra lúa gạo, thực-phẩm và nhiều vật-liệu khác cho công-nghệ. Chúng ta nuôi sống mọi người và làm giàu cho đất nước. Hàng ngày chúng ta đổ ra biết bao nhiêu mồ-hôi, công sức, tay chân bần đê biên đời hoang, rừng rậm, bưng sinh thành đồng ruộng và vườn tược mệnh-mạng tươi tốt. Đồng ruộng vườn tược ấy do tay chúng ta làm nên đang lệ chúng ta phải được quyền làm chủ, nhưng lại lọt vào tay Thực-Dân Đế-Quốc và Phong-Kiến địa-chủ.

Chúng ta lao động vất-và, song vì tô thuế nặng nề tay làm không đủ hàm nhai, manh quan tâm ao không lạnh, đau yếu không thuốc men. Ngoài ra hàng ngày bọn Chanh-Quyền thống-trị áp bức bóc-lột chúng ta rất nặng nề, nào là sưu cao thuế nặng, nào là bắt sâu, bắt lính, nào là tù đày giết chóc, tra-tấn da-mạn, nào đồn dân dưới làng, nào bắt chúng ta vào ("Khu-Tru-Mật" "Dinh-Điện").

Nông-dân chúng ta đã có truyền thống đấu-tranh Cách-Mạng anh-dũng đã từng đứng lên chống Đế-Quốc Pháp, Nhật, và bọn Phong-Kiến Cường-hạo. Dưới sự lãnh đạo của giai-cấp Công-Nhân và Đảng Tiên-Phong Cách-Mạng là Đảng Cộng-Sản Đông-Dương tức là Đảng Lao-Động Việt-Nam hiện nay từ năm 1930 chúng ta đã tham gia các cuộc biểu-tình chống thuế, chống sưu, chống tô-tuất và mọi áp bức bóc lột khác, đã quật khởi trong cuộc Nam-Kỳ khởi nghĩa năm 1940, đánh đổ Pháp, Nhật giành thắng lợi cho cuộc Cách-Mạng tháng 8 vĩ-đại và kháng-chiến 9 năm thắng giặc Pháp một cách anh-hùng.

Cách-Mạng tháng 8 đã thật sự giải-quyết quyền lợi ruộng đất cho chúng ta, đem lại cho chúng ta đại-vị xứng đáng của con người, đem lại cho chúng ta cơm ăn áo mặc, từ chỗ giam-tò, xoa nợ cu, giam tù đi đến tạm cất đất cho chúng ta. Ở miền Bắc hiện nay toàn bộ giai-cấp địa-chủ đã bị đánh đổ, Nông-dân lao-động chúng ta trở thành chủ như ông ở thóm xóm, đời sống hàng ngày càng được cải-thiện không ngừng.

Nhưng ở miền Nam bọn Đế-Quốc Mỹ và bọn Phong-Kiến Ngô-Đình-Diệm mạnh tay chia cắt đất nước chúng ta và trắng trợn xoa bỏ mọi quyền lợi mà chúng ta đã đấu tranh máu mới giành được. Luật 57 cai-cách ruộng đất gia hiệu của chúng ta, tước bỏ quyền sở hữu ruộng đất của chúng ta, dùng tung bọn địa chủ cường hào ác bá cướp đất, tăng tô, xao cạp, Mỹ bỏ tiền ra bắt con em chúng ta đi lính dựng lên một Quân-Đội Phát-Kiệt, lính sung đạn của Mỹ, do Mỹ chỉ huy ngày đêm đi đàn áp, bóc-lột, kềm kẹp chúng ta, gây ra không biết bao nhiêu tội ác. Trước mắt chúng chỉ có hai con đường : hoặc cam tâm chịu chết lần chết mòn thê-tham dưới gong cùm của Mỹ - Diệm, hoặc phải vùng lên đấu-tranh để cứu mình, cứu nhà, cứu nước, để giành quyền sống. không thể khác nữa, chúng ta chọn con đường thứ hai, con đường Cách-Mạng.

...2...

Excerpts from the "Draft Program of Action and Rules of Procedure of the Association of Peasants for Liberation":

(Page 1)—“Our peasants have an old and glorious tradition of resistance against the imperialists, French and Japanese, and against the feudalists and exploiters. Under the leadership of the working class and the leadership of the Party, which is in the vanguard of the revolution, which was the Communist Party of Indochina, and which is now the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam, since 1930 we have taken part in all the demonstrations against taxes, forced labor, taxes on the rice crop, and all other kinds of exploitation”

(Page 2)—“The Association of Peasants for Liberation, together with all the other classes and revolutionary forces belonging to the Popular Front for Liberation of South Viet-Nam, will contribute to strengthening the links of solidarity among the working classes under the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam”

Below is a page from a "Research Document on the Organization of Peasants Association" captured by Republic of Viet-Nam authorities in Bien Hoa on February 8, 1961.

TÀI LIỆU THAM-KHAO VỀ
TỔ CHỨC NÔNG HỘI

**BÁO CÁO TÌNH HÌNH TỔ CHỨC NÔNG HỘI
VÀ HƯỚNG DẪN HỌC TẬP CHƯƠNG TRÌNH
ĐIỀU LỆ 0 XA**

I.- VỀ TỔ CHỨC NÔNG HỘI .-

1/- Ban van-dong Nong-hoi Xa :

Vì CU nam tinh-hinh không sát với van-dong không ky, cho nên đến ngay tập-trung học-tập (30/12/60) chỉ có 5 uy-vien và đc CUV fu-trach Nong-hoi là 6 người, còn 1 ở Lập-Vinh tu chơi không đảm nhận nhiệm-vụ. May đã tìm được người thay thế, đã đủ 7 uy-vien, gồm có : 1 Co-nong, và 5 Trung-nong lớp dưới.

Vì tinh-hình giai-cap ở đây đã sơ là Trung-nong và đã sơ đông-chi và nong-cot là Trung-nong, cho nên chưa thực-hiện được đã sơ Ban van-dong Xa là Ban-Co-nong.

Một điều nữa là trong Ban van-dong Xa chưa có Phu-nu. Do cùng là do y-thức van-dong Phu-nu của các đông-chi còn kém, còn ngại van đê kém van-hoa của chi em. Mặt khác chi em ngại đi công-tác ra ngoài ấp, ban công việc gia-dinh, còn cái, ngại làm việc với các ông "Nông-dân" đang van-dong 2 CH làm uy-vien du-khuyet, nham các ấp chưa có đại-bieu (L. Binh, L. Châu).

Sau khi học-tập, Ban van-dong Xa fan-cong fu-trach các ấp, fan công đi hướng-dan học-tập và tổ-chức các Ban chấp-hành ấp. Chưa fan - TV vì chưa nắm chắc trình-độ của mỗi uy-vien. Chỉ fan-cong 1 uy-vien thường-truc là đc CUV fu-trach Nong-hoi.

2/- Ban Cán-sù Nong-hoi ấp :

Đã thành-lập xong 9 Ban Cán-sù ấp còn 1 ấp Long-Châu chưa thành-lập vì đc fu-trach Binh. Hai, ấp châu-vi Cầu-van thì không thành lập Ban Cán-sù mà có cán-bộ van-dong đơn-tuyên với đông-chi fu-trach Nong-hoi trong các Ban Cán-sù ấp có đại-bieu Phu-nu nhưng chưa khắp (lý do như trên) thì nh-fan giai-cap ở đây có nhiều BN hơn ở các Xa.

Vì fan lớn uy-vien Xa fu-trach 2 ấp và còn ban mùa màng cho nên đến tới mai (30/1/61) mới học xong Ban Cán-sù ấp.

Uy-vien Ban van-dong không kiêm trọng Ban Cán-sù, mà chỉ hướng - dan giúp-đo Ban Cán-sù.

3/- Tổ Nong-hoi : (ke-hoath).

Vì thời gian đến cuối bước chỉ còn 2 ngày mà mất hết 1 buổi họp kiểm-điểm tình-hình và tổ-chức Ban cán-sù, cho nên yêu-cau tổ-đức Tổ Nong-hoi chỉ thực-hiện được ở 1 số ấp hồi trước, còn các ấp khác mỗi uy-vien Ban van-dong và Ban Cán-sù chỉ có thể van-dong được 1 vai hội-vien.

Uy-vien Ban van-dong và Ban Cán-sù không trực-tiếp làm Tổ-trưởng Tổ Nong-hoi. Uy-vien Ban van-dong vừa trực-tiếp hướng-dan Ban Cán-sù vừa trực-tiếp hướng-dan 1 Tổ Nong-hoi nơi mình ở để rút kinh-nghiệm chung.

4/- Thắc-mắc về tổ-chức Nong-hoi :

- Có tổ-chức nong-cot và TVBM và Nong-hoi không ?

Excerpts from "Research Document on the Organization of Peasants Association":

(Page 4)—“Our final victory will depend on our policy in rural areas. The Front’s policy should be in deep harmony with the laboring class and should be placed under the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam”

(Page 6)—“Under what leadership should the Peasants Association be placed?

“The Peasants Association accepts the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam because: imperialism and feudalism, concretely represented by the U.S.-Diem clique, are the peasants’ enemies and have always exploited and oppressed the peasants; on the other hand, the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam has always led the fight against imperialists and feudalists, and for the liberation of the people”

Below is a page from a letter from the commanding officer of Company 265 of the "Army of Liberation of the South" addressed to officers and men of the Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam at Truc Giang in Kien Hoa Province, dated June 5, 1960.

Giải-Phóng Quân Miền Nam
Việt-Nam

Sau Chỉ-Huy Đại-Đội
265

07-20
Gửi : Anh em binh sĩ, sĩ quan
trong hàng ngũ, quân-đội
chánh quyền Mỹ-Điền ở
Trúc-Giang.

Các Bạn thân mến,

Sáu năm qua, đế quốc Mỹ và bè lũ phong kiến Việt-gian do tên Ngô đình Diệm cầm đầu, cố tận tâm sát phong trào cách mạng của nhân-dân ta, giết hại những người yêu nước, yêu hòa-bình để chúng đế chế thực hiện âm mưu biến miền Nam thành thuộc địa và căn cứ quân sự của đế quốc Mỹ, chuẩn bị gây chiến tranh đánh miền Bắc, Lào, Miên hầu mong bắt nhân-dân ta và nhân-dân Miên-Lào làm nô lệ cho chúng.

Để đi sâu vào âm mưu giết người, chúng xua đẩy anh em binh sĩ, sĩ quan trong quân-đội miền Nam đi sâu vào con đường tội lỗi, tàn sát ches giết giữa người Việt và người Việt với nhau. Ngoài thủ đoạn mua chuộc, dụ dỗ bằng chức tước tiền bạc, Mỹ Điền lại dùng thủ đoạn nham hiểm hơn tên hơn là đưa ra chiêu bài chống Cộng, tố Cộng, cho rằng Cộng-Sản phá rối trật tự, an ninh v.v... để tạo lý lẽ tàn sát dân-tộc giết hại những người yêu nước, yêu hòa bình, hầu tị do bắt nhân dân ta và xua binh lính miền Nam ra mặt trận gây một cuộc chiến tranh Nam-Bắc tương tàn để giữ vững địa vị thống trị tội thời, mục nát của chúng.

Trong qua 10 năm kháng chiến và 6 năm đấu tranh chánh trị, đồng bào ta đã hiểu rõ Cộng-Sản không phải là người phá rối trật tự an ninh như Mỹ Điền nói, mà Cộng-Sản chính là những người yêu nước, yêu hòa bình và có công với Tổ quốc với dân-tộc nhất.

Những người Cộng-Sản luôn luôn đi đầu trong công cuộc chiến đấu chống Pháp thắng lợi, thiết thực đem lại ruộng cấy, nhà ở cho nông-dân. Người Cộng-Sản Việt-Nam đã lãnh đạo nhân-dân Việt-Nam chiến thắng Điện Biên Phủ, ký hiệp định Genève, lập lại hòa bình ở Đông-Dương, giải phóng được miền Bắc và lãnh đạo toàn dân đấu tranh 6 năm qua, kềm hãm không cho Mỹ-Điền gây một cuộc chiến tranh tàn khốc, thực tế như người Cộng-Sản và anh em binh-sĩ, sĩ quan trong hàng ngũ Mỹ-Điền ở đó mau vô ích vì âm mưu đen tối của Mỹ Điền.

Đã qua, người Cộng-Sản Việt-Nam lãnh đạo nhân-dân Việt-Nam đánh bại thực dân Pháp, bè lũ phong kiến Bảo-Đại. Hiện tại và tương lai người Cộng-Sản Việt-Nam đã và sẽ lãnh đạo nhân-dân Việt-Nam đánh bại đế quốc Mỹ và bọn phong kiến Việt-gian Miên, dùng chiêu bài chống Cộng để thực hiện chánh sách cướp nước, bán nước của chúng.

Người . . .

Below is a page from a letter, dated April 22, 1960 from the same source as that on the previous page.

GIẢI PHÓNG QUÂN MIỀN NAM
VIỆT NAM

Ban Chỉ-Huy Đại-Đội

Văn-phòng, ngày 22 tháng 4 năm 1960

Thân ái gửi anh em binh sĩ,

Chúng tôi đứng trên quan niệm dân-tộc này : sắc da vàng, giống nòi thuần và có trách nhiệm đối với gia đình anh. Đồng thời chúng tôi được hiểu gia đình anh xuất thân từ giai cấp bị bóc lột vì hoàn cảnh hay do ý. Vẫn còn trong hàng ngũ giặc, giết hại đồng bào ta gây nên cảnh tan tóc cột nhục tương tàn, chính gia đình anh cũng vẫn nằm trong gia đình đó trước nhất ai hết.

Nên chúng tôi viết thư này gửi đến anh mục đích là để cùng nhau bàn bạc tình hình thời cuộc nhiệm-vụ của công-dân đối với giai đoạn này để có phương hướng xuất định con đường đi và đường tránh, đồng thời gửi đến anh lời thăm hỏi sức khỏe an lành.

Anh ơi : lập trường cách mạng và nhiệm vụ phải đề phả phong của toàn dân do Đảng Lao-Động Việt Nam lãnh-đạo là phải tiêu diệt đế quốc và phong kiến để thực hiện người cày có ruộng, tạo điều kiện tiến lên Xã-Hội chủ-nghĩa và Cộng-Sản chủ nghĩa. Nhưng trước mắt hiện nay phải tiêu diệt đế quốc xâm lược Mỹ, tập đoàn phong kiến quan liêu là Ngô-Trần hòa bình thống nhất Tổ quốc trên cơ sở độc lập dân-chủ để xây dựng một nước Việt-Nam.

Hòa bình thống nhất độc-lập dân-chủ và giàu mạnh.

Xuất phát từ lập trường cách mạng nhiệm vụ và quyền lợi nhiệm vụ tối cao nguyện vọng tối cao của dân tộc. Kẻ nài đi ngược lại nguyện vọng cao đẹp đó và cộng tác với Mỹ-Địch ngay nay là kẻ thù Việt-gian nhất định phải tiêu diệt.

Bởi gì ai ai cũng nhận rằng : Dân-tộc Việt-Nam đã từng anh dũng bất khuất đứng lên làm cách mạng chống thực dân Pháp can thiệp Mỹ gần 100 năm dưới sự lãnh đạo của Đảng Cộng-Sản nay là Đảng Lao-Động Việt-Nam anh minh nhất tinh hoa nhất, sáng suốt nhất là Hồ-Chủ-Tịch đã đưa cách mạng thành công cướp chính quyền tháng 9 năm 1945 dưới tay Phát-xít. 15 năm trước kỳ kháng chiến nhất định thắng lợi. Hòa bình được lập lại ở Việt-Nam. Miền Bắc nước ta được giải phóng, hiệp định Genève ra đời ngay nay đã toàn thực hiện được trong nước một ánh tỏ rõ, bằng tay nghe mắt thấy với sự thật.

Chúng . . .

Excerpts from the letters of the commanding officer of Company 265:

1. (June 5, 1960)—“In the past, the Vietnamese Communists have led the Vietnamese people in the victorious fight against the French colonialists and the feudalistic Bao Dai clique. Now and in the future, the Vietnamese Communists are leading and will lead the Vietnamese people in the struggle against the American imperialists and the feudal Diem clique”

2. (April 22, 1960)—“The policy of the revolution and the responsibility of the entire population in the fight against colonialism and feudalism, under the leadership of the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam, is to annihilate imperialism and feudalism, to give land to the tillers, and to lay the foundation for the building of socialism and communism”

Calls for More Aggressive Action

(See Part I, section VI, F, 3, p. 46)

Below is a page from "Instructions on the Creation of People's Self-Defense Units" seized by Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam authorities in Bien Hoa Province on February 8, 1961.

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V/v XÂY DỰNG ĐỘI VTTV CỦA NHÂN DÂN

I/- Kiểm điểm tình hình ~~hình~~ xây dựng ĐỘI VÕ-TRANG đã qua 12 nhận thấy có mấy khuyết điểm sau đây cần được các cấp Đảng hết sức quan tâm và khắc phục sửa chữa kịp thời ~~chất lượng~~.

A) Về tổ chức chưa tinh giản, kết nạp thành phần thiếu cơ bản trong sách, giai cấp, tự giác cách mạng. Do đó chất lượng chưa đảm bảo. ~~nhiệm vụ~~.

B) Xây dựng chưa lấy chính trị làm chính để có cơ sở chủ yếu phát huy khả năng quân sự.

Do khuyết điểm trên nên tình hình tổ chức và chất lượng thành phần của một số chiến sĩ trong các ĐỘI VÕ-TRANG hiện nay chưa đúng tiêu chuẩn và do đó chưa đảm bảo nhiệm vụ Cách-Mạng mà Đảng đã đề ra.

II/- Đề khắc phục khuyết điểm trên chúng ta cần nhận rõ :

A) Công cuộc đấu tranh cách mạng ở miền nam hiện nay có đầy đủ tính chất đấu tranh giai cấp gay gắt và sự đối kháng giai cấp của kẻ thù rất ác liệt.

Cho nên việc xây dựng và tổ chức lực lượng võ trang của Đảng hiện nay phải là tổ chức võ trang của Công-Nông (Công-Nhân, Công-Nông Bản-Nông và Trung-Nông) mới có sức mạnh đánh ngã địch. Xây dựng cho chiến sĩ có một tinh thần chiến đấu vì giai cấp Công-Nông vì Nhân-Dân theo đường lối của Đảng dưới sự lãnh đạo của Đảng, nhận rõ lực lượng võ trang là của Đảng tổ chức xây dựng nên dù là quân chủng trong ĐỘI cũng phải theo chế độ chính trị của Đảng tức là chiến đấu, công tác, học tập sinh hoạt, tinh thần tự tưởng, kỷ luật. v.v... đều phải theo đường lối của Đảng, theo đúng chủ trương chính sách của Đảng.

B) Nhận rõ tính chất lâu dài từ hoạt động hỗ trợ đấu tranh chính trị của quần chúng đi đến Tổng-Khởi-Nghĩa, phải trải qua chiến đấu, võ trang tuyên truyền, công tác quần chúng chịu đựng mọi gian khổ sức tập trong hoạn nạn Cách-Mạng. Thấy rõ vai trò nòng cốt cho sự phát triển lực lượng võ trang sắp tới và nòng cốt cho các lực lượng võ trang khởi nghĩa của nhân dân mà xây dựng.

C) Trong xây dựng lực lượng võ trang phải lấy xây dựng chính trị làm chính vì tính chất giai cấp của quân đội Cách-Mạng, phát huy khả năng quân sự phải xuất phát từ tư tưởng lập trường chính trị của giai cấp mà ra. Không có lập trường chính trị thì không thể phát huy khả năng quân sự đúng yêu cầu của chính trị được. Quân sự không xuất phát từ tư tưởng chính trị thì quân sự ấy sẽ sai lệch với tính chất giai cấp sẽ rơi vào quân sự thuần túy v.v...

Hiện nay xây dựng chính trị cho ĐỘI VÕ-TRANG là chính và đồng thời học tập quân sự là cần thiết.

III/- Chúng ta cần cấp xây dựng củng cố các đội võ trang dựa vào yêu cầu của nhiệm vụ vai trò hiện tại và tương lai. Việc xây dựng đội võ trang xuất phát từ 4 điểm sau đây :

- 1) Hoạt động tác chiến, diệt ác hỗ trợ phong trào.
- 2) Công tác quần chúng cụ thể là công tác mặt trận, công tác tuyên truyền vận động tập hợp quần chúng tổ chức cơ sở cách mạng xây dựng lực lượng chính trị trong nhân dân.
- 3) Công tác tự cấp tự túc.
- 4) Xây dựng lực lượng.

Excerpts from "Instructions on the Creation of People's Self-Defense Units":

(On page 1)—Examining the past situation of the armed self-defense units, 12 (unit commander's code designation) was able to find some weak points which must be attended to and speedily corrected by *Party members* of all ranks

(Same page)—Our present and future responsibility is to create armed self-defense units. The creation of armed self-defense units is based on the following four points:

- 1) take the offensive in order to eliminate the enemy and protect the movement.
- 2) our activity among the people is [through] the Front; propagandize in order to rally the people; organize basic revolutionary cells in order to build political forces among the people.
- 3) try to achieve self-sufficiency.
- 4) create a reserve force

Below is a page from a Viet Cong document, "Instructions Regarding Activities in Cities,"
picked up by the police in Saigon in January 1961.

KHẮC PHỤC KHUYẾT ĐIỂM

PHÁT HUY ƯU ĐIỂM

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RA SỨC ĐẪY MẠNH HƠN NỬA CÔNG-TÁC ĐÔ-THỊ

Nhiệm-vụ và phương châm trước mắt chủ yếu của Đảng-bộ ta là mở rộng công-tác thôn quê, đẩy mạnh công-tác Đô-thị, giành lại những vùng căn-cứ kháng chiến cũ, mở rộng những khu an-toàn, thu hẹp phạm-vi hoạt-động và kiểm-soát của địch, làm thay đổi lực-lượng so sánh giữa ta và địch, làm cho địch chằng những bị động về toàn cuộc mà còn làm cho địch bị động cả về cục bộ nữa, tạo điều kiện đi đến khởi nghĩa cướp chính quyền.

Mở rộng thôn quê, đẩy mạnh Đô-thị, giành lại những vùng căn-cứ kháng chiến cũ chằng những nó là nhiệm-vụ trước mắt, là phương châm chỉ-đạo ở vùng song song tiến lên, mà nó còn là tư-tưởng chỉ-đạo của Đảng-bộ ta. Tư-tưởng đó phải quán triệt trong các mặt hoạt-động, trong mọi công-tác của Đảng-bộ ta hiện nay. Tách rời tư-tưởng chỉ-đạo đó thì công-tác sẽ phạm sai lầm, đi lệch một chân, hoặc đi khắp khênh, không toàn diện.

Theo phương hướng tiến lên khởi nghĩa cướp chính-quyền thì đấu-tranh trong Đô-thị cũng vẫn là đấu-tranh chính-trị chủ yếu có kết hợp với đấu-tranh võ-trang đúng mức và kịp thời.

Trong Đô-thị đấu-tranh đơn thuần về chính-trị là không đúng, vì đơn thuần về chính-trị thì không xây dựng, củng cố, phát-triển được cơ-sở và không đưa phong-trào đấu-tranh chính trị của quần chúng lên được.

Muốn đạt được yêu cầu mong muốn đó, cần thiết và trước hết phải có lực-lượng, phải có lực-lượng chính-

trị . . .

Excerpts from "Instructions Regarding Activities in Cities":

(Page 1)—The responsibility and main goals that our Party has in view are to develop activities in the countryside, to increase activity in the cities, to reoccupy our former resistance bases, to extend our security zones, to limit the field of action and control of the enemy. . . .

ITEM 4

The Policy of Forcible Seizure of Power

(See Part I, section VI, F, 4, pp. 46-47)

In December 1960 in a raid on a Viet Cong headquarters in Dinh Tuong Province, armed forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam seized many documents. Included was the notebook of a VC commissioner. Excerpts from the notebook follow:

Subject: Preparation for the creation of a liberation front.

1.—How the international balance of power and the internal balance of power affect the revolution in the South.

—the strategy of our revolution remains a popular and democratic one (unchanged). Its basic purpose: overthrow of imperialism and feudalism and land for the tillers.

—the present policy of the revolution in the South is not the same as in 1956.

—on the basis of the balance of power between ourselves and our enemies inside the country and outside, the Central Committee has outlined a new policy for the revolution in the South

Our purposes: to incite the people to rise against the U.S.-Diem clique in order to achieve the objective of the revolutionary liberation of the South. The enemy is now implementing a dreadful policy to oppress the people (for example, decree No. 10/59, agrovilles, etc.). The people should stand up and fight against them, using all means, legal and illegal, political and military.

The fascist policy of the enemy has prompted the people to join the fight for self-defense with arms.

Whether we should resort to the use of arms or not depends on the actual situation at the moment. This should not occur too early or too late, and it is only up to the Central Committee to determine when the time is appropriate and reach a decision.

The revolution in the South at the present time has two possibilities:

—general uprising to seize power.

—a long-term armed struggle.

But our final objective is a general uprising to seize power.

The Revolution in the South should go through two stages until the General Uprising:

—the preparatory stage, to upset the balance of power.

—the stage of direct revolution.

When the balance of power has completely changed in our favor and when the time is proper for a general uprising, military means will be the essential means and arming the population and our forces will be our primary task.

When should the general uprising take place?

During the preparatory stage, in order to change the balance of power in our favor, we must exert our influence on the people in rural areas and in cities and organize the masses under the strict leadership of the Party.


Party Policy Toward the Front

(See Part I, section VI, F, 5, p. 47)

Below is a copy of the Thu-Bien "instructions" issued by the Lao Dong (Communist) Party organization in the Thu Dau Mot and Bien Hoa region. It is dated March 28, 1961, and was seized in the hideout of a Viet Cong official in Phuoc Thanh Province.

ĐẢNG LAO ĐỘNG VIỆT NAM
BAN CHIẾM-ANH ĐỈNH-BỘ
TỈNH THU-BIỆN
-o-o-o-o-
Số: 8/CT

HỘI-ĐỒNG THÔNG-TRUYỀN ĐỘC LẬP DÂN-CHỦ



VỀ VIỆC TỔ-CHỨC UB .N.T.D.T.G.F.

Mặt-Trận Dân-Tộc Giải-Fóng Miền-Nam ra đời là 1 thắng lợi lịch-sử vô-vang cho nhân-dân cả nước ta. Phong-Trào Cách-Lạng K.N. được sự ủng-hộ nhiệt tình của đồng-bào Miền Bắc và nhân-dân tiến bộ trên thế-giới, ngày càng tiến mạnh nhanh chóng như vũ-bạo. Kỳ-Điệm ngày thêm bị cô-lập, suy-sụp mau lẹ.

Để tập hợp quần chúng ngày càng thêm đông-dào, trong Mặt-Trận ta phải luôn luôn tích-cực tuyên-truyền Tuyên-Ngôn của Mặt-Trận, lấy tuyên-ngôn của Mặt-Trận làm cơ-sở để tuyên-truyền phát động cho mọi vấn đề khác để đẩy mạnh phong-trào đấu-tranh mọi mặt. Đồng thời việc tổ-chức UB.T các cấp, bắt đầu là ở xã là rất cần thiết vì quần chúng muốn biết những người lãnh đạo các cấp Mặt-Trận để xuyên qua tìm hiểu chân-sách.

Để đó, nhân dân được chỉ thị này, yêu cầu các đồng-chí tiến hành ngay việc tổ-chức Ủy-Ban Mặt-Trận ở các Xã căn-cứ, các xã mới đấu mạnh, và ở những xã xôi dậu yếu nhưng đã có thế kềm kẹp ở vài ấp có thể hợp một tỉnh lồi 100 người được và đã tổ-chức BCH Nông-Hội rồi.

Ủy-Ban Mặt-Trận xã gồm: 1 Đại-biểu của Chi-bộ, 1 Đại-biểu của Chi-Đoàn TWLD, 1 Đại-biểu của BCH xã-đội-bộ, 1 Đại-biểu của Nông-lội, 1 Đại-biểu của TWGF, 1 Đại-biểu của FNGF, 1 Đại-biểu của Hội mẹ chiến-sĩ... Nơi nào cơ tin đó Cao-Đài, Công-Giao, Di-cứ, cả hạn Nô-nông, địa-chủ yếu nước chống Mỹ-Điệm, tinh-thần vững chắc và có uy-tín, có tinh-cách tiêu-biểu, đi ra cũng cố gắng vận động họ tham gia vào Mặt-Trận. Nơi nào có Chi-bộ Đảng Dân-Chủ thì cũng mời 1 Đại-biểu vào.

Hiện nay tùy tinh-thần tương quan lực lượng ta địch ở mỗi xã mà tổ-chức Ủy-Ban Mặt-Trận từ 3 đến 5 ủy-viên: 1 chủ-nhiệm, 1 phó chủ-nhiệm, 1 ủy-viên thứ 3 và những ủy-viên khác. Nếu Ủy-ban Mặt-Trận có từ 5 ủy-viên trở lên, thì chủ-nhiệm, phó chủ-nhiệm và ủy-viên thứ 3 hợp thành thường-vụ Ủy-ban Mặt-Trận.

Ở các xã căn-cứ và xôi dậu mạnh, Ủy-Ban Mặt-Trận xã trực tiếp đặc nhận nhiệm vụ quản trị hành chánh, lo về các mặt chánh-trị, quân-sự, kinh tế, văn-hóa, giáo-duc v.v... Đại-diện của Xã-Đội-Bộ đảm nhận công-tác chỉ-huy dân-quân tự-vệ, đối du-kịch xã và công-tác an-ninh trật tự, fòng gian bảo mật, trừng trị bọn tay sai phản động.

Tùy theo số ủy-viên và khả năng mỗi ủy-viên mà phân công phụ-trách những nhiệm vụ: Tuyên-hiến tổ-chức, kinh tế, tài chánh, binh-vận, giao liên, văn-hóa, giáo-duc. Đại-diện của xã-đội-bộ thì phụ trách quân-sự, bảo vệ như đã nói trên.

Mỗi ủy-viên ra công-khai với danh nghĩa ủy-viên UBMT trước quần-chúng nhiều hay ít tùy tương quan lực lượng mỗi xã, nhưng ít nhất phải có 2 người ra công-khai, những ủy-viên khác tùy chức ra công-khai trước đồng-bào quần chúng với danh nghĩa ủy-viên UBMT, nhưng vẫn tuyên-truyền Mặt-Trận 1 cách bí-mật và phát động quần chúng đấu-tranh chống hướng của Mặt-Trận, nhưng phải thấy rằng sắp tới đây vùng căn-cứ được thành hình vững mạnh, vùng xôi dậu mạnh được củng cố thêm, thì toàn thể ủy-viên Ủy-Ban Mặt-Trận hoặc đại đa số sẽ ra công-khai hoạt-động trước quần chúng.

Để đảm bảo tinh chất quần chúng rộng rãi của Mặt-Trận, số Đảng-viên trong ủy-ban Mặt-Trận không nên quá 2 lần 5 số ủy-viên.

Chi-Bộ lãnh đạo Ủy-Ban Mặt-Trận bằng fương-fáp Đảng-Đoàn, nghĩa là những đồng-chí nằm trong ủy-ban Mặt-Trận phải giáo-duc, thuyết phục các ủy-viên khác nhận rõ trách nhiệm, fải thi-hành những chủ-trương gì, do lợi ích nào, chống tác phong quan liêu, mệnh lệnh, gian-áp, bao biện làm mất sáng kiến, tự động và tinh-chất độc lập của tổ-chức Q/C.

Yêu cầu các đồng-chí khẩn trương tiến hành tổ chức UBMT xã-nhanh chóng nhưng fải kỹ càng chọn người vững chắc, có uy-tín, có thành tích đấu-tranh. Đồng thời với việc thành lập; các Ủy-ban Mặt-Trận Xã như đã nói trên, các đồng-chí cần tích-cực vận động người do đề nghị về 11 thông qua để tổ-chức Ủy-Ban Mặt-Trận Huyện kể từ đầu tháng 5/1961, theo chỉ thị gần đây của trên.

Hong các đồng-chí tích-cực thi-hành chỉ-thị này và báo cáo kết quả về chúng tôi rõ./.

Sao y số 19/ST

Kính gửi các đồng-chí phụ-trách các đơn vị và chi-bộ 24 để nghiên-cứ thi-hành. Chi-Bộ 25 để biết.

Ngày 29 tháng 3 năm 1961

TRANG.

Ngày 28 tháng 3 năm 1961

T.H. - TỈNH-ỦY

QUANG-ĐỨC

Excerpts from the Thu-Bien "Instructions":

. . . The organization of committees of the Popular Front at all levels, starting with the villages, is very important because the people want to know the leaders of the Popular Front at all levels and, through them, the policy of the Front.

We urge you, comrades, to start immediately the organization of committees of the Popular Front in village bases [controlled by the VC], "rice and beans" villages [mixed control], and in "rice and beans" villages [where the VC is] weak but where we have managed to exert a certain control over a few hamlets and where we can gather about 100 people for demonstrations and where we have already organized peasants associations


The number of members of those [Party] committees working overtly as members of committees of the Popular Front varies according to the degree of control over each village, but in any case the minimum number of committee members operating overtly as such should be two. The other members, although they do not operate openly as committee members, should engage secretly in propaganda activities for the Popular Front, while waiting for the time when we have extended our control over the villages and all or the majority of committee members can operate openly as such.

To secure a broad base of representation within the Front, the number of Party members on committees of the Popular Front should not exceed two-fifths of the total membership

Deceptive Appeal for Broad Support of the "Liberation" Movement Is a Temporary Policy of the Communist Party

(See Part I, section VI, F, 6, p. 48)

Below is a photograph of instructions issued by the Viet Cong Regional Committee of the South to inter-province committees, seized in Tay Ninh on February 15, 1961.



Chỉ thị của Ban Chỉ đạo Miền Nam, ngày 15/2/1961

"Về đấu tranh trước lúc tổng khởi nghĩa miền Nam"

Để thi hành chỉ thị của TW, Ban Chỉ đạo Miền Nam đã ban hành hướng dẫn cho các cấp ủy đảng và chính quyền địa phương, cũng như các đoàn thể quần chúng, về nội dung và hình thức đấu tranh trước lúc tổng khởi nghĩa.

1/ Về tư tưởng quần chúng, phải luôn luôn nêu cao tinh thần tự giác, tự nguyện, tự nguyện đấu tranh, không chờ đợi, không sợ hãi, không sợ khó khăn, gian khổ, không sợ hy sinh, không sợ tử nạn.

Trong khi sự tiến bộ của cuộc kháng chiến ngày càng phát triển, cần phải luôn luôn tiếp tục phát huy tinh thần đấu tranh, không ngừng nghỉ, không ngừng tiến lên.

2/ Thi hành nghị quyết của TW, Ban Chỉ đạo Miền Nam đã ban hành hướng dẫn cho các cấp ủy đảng và chính quyền địa phương, cũng như các đoàn thể quần chúng, về nội dung và hình thức đấu tranh trước lúc tổng khởi nghĩa.

Các tài liệu như Tuyên ngôn, Chương trình của NDTG, cũng như các tài liệu khác, phải được phổ biến rộng rãi, phải được học tập, nghiên cứu, nắm vững, vận dụng vào thực tiễn.

3/ Thi hành nghị quyết của TW, Ban Chỉ đạo Miền Nam đã ban hành hướng dẫn cho các cấp ủy đảng và chính quyền địa phương, cũng như các đoàn thể quần chúng, về nội dung và hình thức đấu tranh trước lúc tổng khởi nghĩa.

Để đáp ứng yêu cầu của cuộc kháng chiến, cần phải luôn luôn nâng cao tinh thần cảnh giác, luôn luôn sẵn sàng chiến đấu, không ngừng nghỉ, không ngừng tiến lên.

4/ Thi hành nghị quyết của TW, Ban Chỉ đạo Miền Nam đã ban hành hướng dẫn cho các cấp ủy đảng và chính quyền địa phương, cũng như các đoàn thể quần chúng, về nội dung và hình thức đấu tranh trước lúc tổng khởi nghĩa.

Vì vậy, TW đã ban hành hướng dẫn cho các cấp ủy đảng và chính quyền địa phương, cũng như các đoàn thể quần chúng, về nội dung và hình thức đấu tranh trước lúc tổng khởi nghĩa.

Trong quá trình đấu tranh, cần phải luôn luôn nắm vững nguyên tắc đấu tranh, không ngừng nghỉ, không ngừng tiến lên.

5/ Thi hành nghị quyết của TW, Ban Chỉ đạo Miền Nam đã ban hành hướng dẫn cho các cấp ủy đảng và chính quyền địa phương, cũng như các đoàn thể quần chúng, về nội dung và hình thức đấu tranh trước lúc tổng khởi nghĩa.

Để thi hành nghị quyết của TW, Ban Chỉ đạo Miền Nam đã ban hành hướng dẫn cho các cấp ủy đảng và chính quyền địa phương, cũng như các đoàn thể quần chúng, về nội dung và hình thức đấu tranh trước lúc tổng khởi nghĩa.

6/ Thi hành nghị quyết của TW, Ban Chỉ đạo Miền Nam đã ban hành hướng dẫn cho các cấp ủy đảng và chính quyền địa phương, cũng như các đoàn thể quần chúng, về nội dung và hình thức đấu tranh trước lúc tổng khởi nghĩa.

7/ Thi hành nghị quyết của TW, Ban Chỉ đạo Miền Nam đã ban hành hướng dẫn cho các cấp ủy đảng và chính quyền địa phương, cũng như các đoàn thể quần chúng, về nội dung và hình thức đấu tranh trước lúc tổng khởi nghĩa.

8/ Thi hành nghị quyết của TW, Ban Chỉ đạo Miền Nam đã ban hành hướng dẫn cho các cấp ủy đảng và chính quyền địa phương, cũng như các đoàn thể quần chúng, về nội dung và hình thức đấu tranh trước lúc tổng khởi nghĩa.

9/ Thi hành nghị quyết của TW, Ban Chỉ đạo Miền Nam đã ban hành hướng dẫn cho các cấp ủy đảng và chính quyền địa phương, cũng như các đoàn thể quần chúng, về nội dung và hình thức đấu tranh trước lúc tổng khởi nghĩa.

10/ Thi hành nghị quyết của TW, Ban Chỉ đạo Miền Nam đã ban hành hướng dẫn cho các cấp ủy đảng và chính quyền địa phương, cũng như các đoàn thể quần chúng, về nội dung và hình thức đấu tranh trước lúc tổng khởi nghĩa.

11/ Thi hành nghị quyết của TW, Ban Chỉ đạo Miền Nam đã ban hành hướng dẫn cho các cấp ủy đảng và chính quyền địa phương, cũng như các đoàn thể quần chúng, về nội dung và hình thức đấu tranh trước lúc tổng khởi nghĩa.

12/ Thi hành nghị quyết của TW, Ban Chỉ đạo Miền Nam đã ban hành hướng dẫn cho các cấp ủy đảng và chính quyền địa phương, cũng như các đoàn thể quần chúng, về nội dung và hình thức đấu tranh trước lúc tổng khởi nghĩa.

13/ Thi hành nghị quyết của TW, Ban Chỉ đạo Miền Nam đã ban hành hướng dẫn cho các cấp ủy đảng và chính quyền địa phương, cũng như các đoàn thể quần chúng, về nội dung và hình thức đấu tranh trước lúc tổng khởi nghĩa.

Ngày 15-2-61
T.N.

Excerpts from the "Instructions" issued by the Viet Cong Committee for the South to inter-province committees:

The policy of the Front is that of building up the massive solidarity of all the people without distinctions of race, social class, religion, political party, or sex, without distinctions among intellectuals, bourgeoisie, rich peasants or poor peasants or proletariats. Even those who were against the Resistance or the Party will be admitted to the Front on the sole condition that they be for peace and reunification of the country. All efforts should be directed to attack the enemy number one of the Vietnamese people, the U.S. and Ngo Dinh Diem clique.

For this reason, the Front's forces will comprise workers, peasants, bourgeoisie, students, intellectuals, prominent national figures who are for the progress of the country, and all organizations or individuals in South Viet-Nam who are for peace and reunification of the country.

Of these constituent elements, workers are the heralds of the revolutionary struggle. The coalition bloc of workers and peasants is the foundation stone of the Front for these two classes occupy the absolute majority in the Front. Furthermore, they have the spirit of sacrifice and endurance for the sake of the revolution.

But in the present situation, these two classes do not enjoy high prestige and are not capable of leading the revolution to decisive victory.

That reason prompts the Party to apply the policy of the Front and to set up the People's Front for Liberation of South Viet-Nam to attract bourgeois intellectual circles which comprise young men and girls and students in the cities, middle and rich peasants in the countryside.

In reports read to the 3d Congress of the Party, Comrades Le Duan and Le Duc Tho observed that young men and girls, students, intellectuals, and the bourgeoisie in the cities, as well as rich and middle peasants in the country, are quickly converted to socialism but they are also very prompt to waver and to oppose the revolution, socialism and Marx-Leninism. They are inclined to self-interest, security and pleasure. In the present situation of South Viet-Nam, the Central Committee supports integration of these elements into the Front, not because the Party is betraying the policy of class struggle and of the revolution, not because the Party is going to entrust these classes with heavy responsibilities in the revolutionary liberation of South Viet-Nam, but only to utilize their abilities and their prestige in order to push forward the revolution and to give more prestige to the People's Front for the Liberation of South Viet-Nam.

This line of conduct is only a temporary policy of the Party. When the revolution is crowned with success, this policy will be revised. Then the Party will act overtly to lead the revolution in South Viet-Nam.

The policy of the Front will help us to control the majority of the people and to isolate the enemy, which will be reduced to a handful of reactionaries in the Government and in the Army. Our final victory will be assured. . . .

Excerpts from the VC instructions from Long An follow:

(The first part of the document points out certain shortcomings in Viet Cong operations.)

Instructions:

I₁ urges all 14 W (provincial cadre) to correct the above shortcomings and from now until National Day, September 2, 1961, to step up the following activities:

1. Special caution against civil guard members who might surrender for infiltration purposes. Conduct thorough investigation of each particular case for no more than three months. After this period, if the case remains suspicious, immediately liquidate the suspect to avoid further trouble for the revolution.

2. Step up extermination activities against traitors. All those refusing to have rice collected, to pay taxes or make money contributions to the Front can be considered as reactionaries and punished like other traitors.

3. Step up activities [aimed at] encircling and paralyzing strategic roads, means of communication used for transporting rice, pigs and charcoal, such as canals and most particularly Inter-Provincial Road No. 4. These activities are aimed at ruining the economy of the enemy, at raising the cost of living in the city of Saigon, and thereby creating discontent.

The accomplishments of the 14 W of Long An and Dinh Tuong during the month of June—sinking 5 junks (loaded with) charcoal, 8 junks with rice, confiscating 4 trucks of pigs—deserve our praise.

4. Build up the revolutionary spirit of the cadre and Party members and most particularly of the liberation forces. Regularly study revolutionary documents so that cadre, Party members and combatants do not panic in the face of the enemy and have strong confidence in the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party and of the Front.

The Present Danger

(See Part I, section VII, pp. 49-51)

The first page of a copy of the "Military Plan of the Provincial Party Committee at Baria" is reproduced below.

1-3) AN SAO "ĐỀ-ÁN QUAN-SỰ TỈNH ĐẢNG BỘ BÀ-RIÀ"
(bắt được tại Hát-Dịch "Phước-Tuy" ngày 12 - 5 - 1961)

-:--:-

NHIỆM-VỤ CỦA LỰC-LƯỢNG VÕ-TRANG : - Để thực-hiện được đường lối hoạt-động của Đảng hiện nay với tình-hình mới : Nâng cao hoạt-động võ-trang lên ngang với đấu-tranh chính-trị và đường lối hoạt-động riêng cụ thể của mỗi vùng : vùng căn-cứ hoạt-động võ trang là chủ yếu, vùng nông thôn ngang với đ/tranh chính trị. Vùng đô-thị đấu tranh chính trị là chủ yếu.

Thi hành đường lối của Đảng thích hợp với tình hình ta nhiệm-vụ chung của các lực-lượng võ trang phải đẩy mạnh hoạt-động gỡ thế kềm kẹp, võ trang TT và tác chiến tấn công địch liên tục sâu rộng đều khắp để phục vụ kịp yêu cầu của cách mạng. Tích cực tiêu hao, tiêu diệt binh lực địch, bồi dưỡng. Xây dựng lực lượng ta.

VỀ HOẠT-ĐỘNG CỤ THỂ :

1/- Gỡ thế kềm kẹp, phối hợp chặt chẽ với lực-lượng chính trị quyết tâm thi hành kế hoạch gỡ thế kềm kẹp trong phân đ/tranh gỡ thế kềm kẹp.

Nhưng chúng ta phải tiến mạnh với hình thức quyết liệt quy mô có tập trung, có điểm, có diện. Các lực lượng của quân phối hợp với 1 xã có du kích và dân quân tự vệ, tự vệ bí mật, quét sạch trong 1 vùng nhứt địch với hình thức như khởi nghĩa quần chúng trong vùng đó. Lực lượng tập trung của mỗi Quận phải phối hợp tiến hành cho được 1 điểm trong 1 xã hoặc liên xã. Riêng 21/22 và 55 chuẩn bị 1 điểm có lực lượng của T hỗ trợ. Các đội xã tiến lên xoi đậu mạnh và chưa gỡ thế kềm kẹp có xã đội, có đội du-kích phải tiến hành cho được 1 liên ấp.

Các đội phụ trách thị xã, thị trấn, dinh-diên phải có diệt ác tác chiến tại Trung-Tâm để thời động địch nhắm bọn Công An và CDV và Quân, bọn ác ôn đầu sỏ. Ngoài ra, có 1 cuộc võ-trang TT và thường xuyên đi sâu xây dựng cơ sở.

A translation of page 1 of the Baria military plan follows:

The responsibilities and duties of armed groups:

In order to carry out the present policies of the Party to meet the new situation: increase armed activities to the level of political activities and the policies appropriate for each region—in base areas, armed intervention or activities are the mainstay; in rural areas armed activities should be at the same level as political activities; in towns and cities, political activities are the most important.

To carry out the policies of the Party appropriate to the new situation, the common task of armed units of the military forces is to press forward measures to overcome encircling pressures, propaganda under armed protection, and military attacks on the enemy in a continuous, spreading and well-coordinated manner to serve the needs of the revolution. Weaken and annihilate enemy military forces, then regroup for recovery. Build up our forces.

Concrete activities:

I. Overcome encircling pressure; coordinate closely with the political branch to carry out plans for this purpose.

However, we must move forward with determination, planning places for concentration, targets and areas of activities. Forces at the district level should coordinate with a number of villages having guerrilla and people's militia security forces. Wipe out the enemy in one area at a time under the guise of liberating the people in that particular area. Concentrated forces of a district should coordinate to establish a beachhead in a village or inter-village. 21/22 and 55 be prepared for a beachhead with support from the forces of T. Village forces under encircling pressure and having guerrilla groups must progress into inter-village formations.

Squads in charge of villages and agrovilles must carry out assassination missions right at the center to immobilize the enemy. Prime targets should be security forces and civil action district officials, hooligans and thugs. Besides, propaganda under armed protection must be carried out on a regular basis with a view to establishing bases.

Excerpts from the Baria military plan follow:

Organization qualities:

Quick, up-to-date, well planned. All personnel who meet standards and support the directives can

be formed into guerrilla-militia. To be left out: hooligans, spies, police, sons and daughters of landlords and businessmen.

Duties:

- Identical for village guerrilla squads and people's militia.

- Deliver villages from pressure. Assassinate hooligans and oppressors. Disperse reactionary organizations carrying out propaganda to soldiers.

- Protect the people, protect production, maintain security and order in villages. Information and labor duties. Fight the enemy in order to take over weapons and establish bases.

- Oppose military service, labor assignments, concentration of people in agrovilles, and fight against corruption.

Equipment:

For village guerrillas, each squad must have at least two guns, and simple weapons for each member.

Secret militia:

Fight against pressure, suppress corrupt officials, carry out military logistics, sabotage, provide and disseminate information.

Fifth column:

Constant underground activities. Be on the alert to sabotage the enemy's military forces whenever necessary. In this case, instructions from above will be given.

Target level of the districts:

6/14:	2,500
7/14:	6,800
55:	7,500
21/22:	9,800
23:	4,300
5/11:	5,100

Attention: This does not include existing organizations

Training requirements:

The cells supervise the execution of all missions, maintain discipline, administer punishments and rewards. In all Party committees, military training must be given to members as well as to the Party secretary.

Political studies:

Cadre in village and district units:

- Study the combined Party resolution of 1961.
- Study the central resolution No. 15 and the military resolution.
- Study the scope and objectives of the Front for Liberation of the South.

Village local guards:

- Study of the regulations is a duty for local guards.
- Study the bylaws of the Peasants Association and take part in organized political-military discussions in the villages.

New recruits:

- Study the documents related to youth.
- Study the objectives of our struggle.

All units:

- Study the above documents. In addition, study the characteristics of the People's Army.
- In daily activities, the units must instill in the minds of the soldiers, and urge them to carry out, the 36 commandments for the revolutionary fighter.
- Carry out battle analysis after every engagement.
- Propagate education in the units.

Military training:

Guerrillas:

- Study guerrilla tactics. (Each region must analyze its tactical experience. Documents will be sent later.)
- Practice individual combat, triangular formation, and close combat.

Secret local guards:

- Study the employment of rifles, grenades and all other available weapons, practice close combat.

Cadre at district level and in centralized units:

- Study the tactics of cell leaders, guerrilla principles and Mao's theses.
- All units and cadres must practice individual combat, triangular formation (A fights B; C evaluates A's and B's performance against theory).
- Military training must be carried on every day; new techniques will be initiated regularly once or twice a month.
- Discuss and draw conclusions from field exercises and from documents exchanged between regions.
- In addition, the village guerrilla units and those at district level must study the maintenance of available weapons. . . .