

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Glen & Ralph,

Dacca, E. Pakistan

Nov. 29, 1957

I've taken advantage of an invitation to visit the Harvard Project here in Dacca, not only to see what they are doing, but also to get an opportunity to contemplate what is going on in Saigon with some perspective. I know that my failure to write has probably caused you some concern. It has not been without careful consideration that I haven't written. There have been a variety of reasons for this. Firstly, the situation in Saigon, being serious and complex, is not easily articulated. This problem is compounded by the fact that I have been subject to listening to many points of view regarding the Project & the relevant personalities, by the relevant personalities. Secondly, I consider the situation re the Project in Saigon to be serious — in fact, it can be said that the Project is in crisis. Before saying so strongly a thing I had to be certain that this conclusion did not reflect an impulsive reaction by a newcomer into circumstances wherein operations were normally difficult. Thirdly, and more superficially, for obvious reasons I did not want to dictate what I have to say. To find time to type this myself has been annoyingly difficult. (I must apologize here for my longhand, but at the moment a typewriter is not accessible. You may want to have this typed — if so, I'd appreciate your holding a copy for me.) I have started several letters to you in the past two or three weeks, none of which I've completed. I am going to enclose

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one of these letters simply because I don't want to bother rewriting what is therein. I should point out that the moral problem (which ^{seems} to be emphasized in that letter, but only because it was never completed) has shown substantial improvement. This is partially because they've by now had been able to find more for the police to busy themselves with, and partially because two of the disturbing elements in the Dey Tam apartments were moved out. However, moral does remain a problem, though a less serious one. Let me just add one further comment in this regard; the announcement as soon as possible of a new Chief Advisor in whom they can find leadership and ~~for~~ whom they can place their trust and respect will just about remove the moral issue from the list of serious problems here. (I use the word 'here' in referring to Saigon.) I know you are aware of this, but it still needs emphasis.

In that letter I am enclosing I spoke of the project being stalled close to dead center. I was unable to expand on that remark then. In this letter I actually talk of crisis. About the stronger term I will write later in this letter, but it would, of course, be without relation to what I have to say here about 'dead center.' Several areas of the program are not proceeding because of the single objective fact that they are awaiting Vietnam Government approval before they can go ahead. In almost all these cases the approval would have to come from the President. As yet none have come.

Briefly these areas include

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1. The Research Section - several (5) proposals have been submitted via Thong to the President, there has been no reactions. Several proposals have come from the VNB side, but with one exception (involving low cost urban housing) these proposals would do not involve the kind of research we would consider basic & academic (even without being systemic). ^{our} The concept of research, as you know, has not yet achieved acceptability. One attempt by Hendry, Woodruff & Hickey to meet with some Vietnamese actually resulted in a reprimand.
2. The Consulting Section - Through the Presidency letters were sent asking for imitations from various ministries. Net result: nil. Murphy is continuing his fine work on the budget. This year the government is using his budget concurrently with their old. Next year it is expected the old will be dropped. Even USOM, who brought a budget man out. He withdrew (but after a little strain) recognizing that the budget problem was being successfully handled. [Paradoxically & unfortunately Mario Murphy is a bitter man regarding both the project & the VNB. I have gotten to some of the causes for this, but I hate to see him returning to Lansing in that frame of mind. He feels he has been mistreated here. There is an element of truth to that. I admit we cannot coddle our staff, but better understanding of their problems is required. I'd rather not write more on this, but I will want to discuss it with you.]

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The rest of Consulting is finishing up some other work, primarily that on the ~~History~~ of the Treasury. Dorsey is considering bring Consulting + Research together. Consulting is suffering from the heritage of Mode. There has been a general stiffening on the part of the GVN about which I hope to write later. However, Mode is generally accepted as being the cause of this stiffening. I do not intend to defend Mode [I have carefully read some of his reports + I have looked at his interview records, ~~and~~ (in hopes they'd be useful for research - which they are not) - quite obviously he was guilty of superficiality and 'mowing in'], but to the serious extent that VNB is reacting not all ^{blame} can fall on Mode's shoulders. But everyone, Wes, Dorsey, Barnows, Hoyt, even Vietnamese, speaks of the damage Mode caused. Consulting now suffers from that stigma. Conceivably, its role may thus be lost to us.

3. Civil Guard - here, the President finally took a stand, ^(unhappy) but it has proved ambiguous. He won't call it military and he won't call it civilian. Logistically he's placed it under Defense, but describes it as having a peacetime as well as an emergency role. USOM has obligated already some of the funds destined for the Civil Guard through P/S V & C. The situation is confused further by lack of clarity in the US position on the issue the details of which - because of the uncertainties + changes + counter

~~Large~~ changes as to motivations, etc within the US community -
 I'd prefer again not to discuss here. I think you already know how this stand by the President can affect the role of some of our police.

4. The V.B.I - here too a long awaited response by the President to HSCG proposals to regional reorganization just was received. And again left much to be desired from the point of view of HSCG proposals. For instance, local VBI agents report to Province Chiefs, not to central VBI Dept.
5. On the reverse side of the ledger - for the moment - have already just established a central identification office & a central criminal laboratory as per HSCG recommendations.
6. Academic Instruction - Thong remains uncooperative. It's hard for Montgomery to make contact with him. Apparently he wants to squeeze us out of all but the teaching function. NIA problems re curriculum, etc are never discussed with HSCG. Without consulting us HSCG instructors were dropped from all but one undergraduate course. Thong's insistence on protocol allows for communication between HSCG & NIA only at the top level. (Doug has proved a god send in this respect). Dorsay now feels that the close tie in of the Institute to the Presidency is detrimental. Thong wants Presidential approval for anything involving HSCG, & since more & more now flows to the President from all areas of VN6, there are long delays. Montgomery, by the way, is proving disappointing. He has ideas. Two excellent ones, in fact - one a case study proposal & the other regarding the graduate curriculum.

However, he suffers from some of the insensitivities regarding working with the Vietnamese that did Wally Hobbs. (I also ~~feel~~, believe, on reasonably good evidence, that he wastes too much M5V6 laundry over at USOM. He's very close with Egan, they're old friends. Dorsey is concerned, and Wes should be.

7. In-Service Training - Here again we are more to the plus side of the ledger. This program never did enjoy adequate attention. Wickert was too often drawn into Consulting, & Murphy, acting in the interim, was not too interested, partially because it wasn't his area of competence and partially because he was too involved with budget. Now, Hayward despite general VNB resistance is moving ahead with considerable imagination & tact. Dorsey has put him in full charge, and I think we can expect results here also.

8. Police Plan generally certain advances are in evidence. It's easier, of course, to pin point their progress as compared to Pub. Ad. ~~about~~ They are active in training & especially in advice regarding training. But they too, sense the now oft-mentioned resistances. I'll talk more of Hoyt & Ryan later.

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Thus far I've discussed the 'dead center' aspect as distinct from the 'crisis' aspect. Obviously, the 'dead centerness' stems from the increasingly stiffening attitude we are sensing in the Vietnamese. MSU's people here put a 6 to 8 month figure in trying to judge when this stiffening was first noticed. The reaction of most of our staff is to believe that only MSU is affected, or at least to ignore the possibility that other units of the American Community are affected. (A similar phenomenon is occurring in East Pakistan.) Anyway, the problem is viewed as an MSU problem possibly to a great extent. However, it is a problem, a major one.

It is less easy to explain the 'crisis' nature of the situation. I want to point out that I'm using so strong a term after careful consideration. I've had lengthy explicit and open discussions about this with Dorsey, and he concurs in the seriousness of things. To the greater extent I use the term 'crisis' in regard to relations with the Government. However, I am becoming increasingly aware of a deteriorating situation re Barrows and USAM.

Since my arrival here the GVN has called for a review of the proposed MSU-GVN contract. It had been my understanding that the signing was imminent, and I therefore had cleared what I thought was the final

draft with Hoy + with ICA/W. Then GVN announced certain points were not acceptable. I gather Chau announced that they would show us the specifics. Which he did shortly after my arrival. Some points were minor, other major. For instance, the role of MSU in the Institute would be confined to the teaching of courses - we would lose the contractual role (apparently we've already lost it in practice) of advising in curriculum, teaching methods, etc. There are several back key issues. Much discussion. We present counter proposals, compromising on most points. We then felt that a meeting with Thong + Chau at the same time would be advisable. This would avoid back passing - we could better tell whether it was Thong or both Thong and Chau who was throwing up road blocks. A meeting was scheduled. Then ~~at~~ they could not make it, and scheduled a meeting for us with Thong (Us being Fishel, Dorsey, Stutzbarg + me) But then it turned out that Chau + Thong actually did meet at the time originally scheduled to meet with us. They had a rationale for this slippery hill, but we felt that a deal one had been gotten away with. This next meeting with Thong was in response to our counter-proposals as prepared by Dorsey, Stutzbarg, Wood + myself. And this meeting resulted in a series of counters by Thong. Then

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They leaves for his trips to Jakarta, Bangkok, Delhi, Karachi, Rangoon with Pang & Truc from Fonction Publique. (This trip is another story. Wes met them in Jakarta, John in Bangkok. I was supposed to spend almost 2 weeks at their last 3 stops, but only after some hard fighting did I succeed in pulling out & leaving them on their own. This is a story where facts & motivations will never be clear to me.) Thong left for Thursday Nov. 21. On Friday Chau called for a follow-up discussion regarding our ~~new~~ new counters to Thong's latest counters. He wanted present at this meeting Wes, Dorsey, Hoyt, Ryan, Stoutenburg, Montgomery, Hendry, Wood, and myself. This meeting required completion on Monday, 25th although Wes by this time had left for Jakarta. How about these two sessions in a moment.

During the several weeks of these negotiations I kept raising to Wes the implications of these new obstacles. Dorsey was with me in several of these conversations with Wes. Is this Thong's work, or does this contract problem reflect the general government position regarding MSU? Wes kept assuring me the latter was what the case. Both the President and Chau know that Thong is incompetent, and there does exist, Wes said, a possibility of his removal, not necessarily immediately. (I pointed out that we only have 15 months left to our contract). Dorsey did concern that

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1. Let's list out against what I thought removal
should be a fair

at least Chau did feel so negatively about them. Anyway
 if they were the obstacle, would removal come soon enough
 to save the MSU role? The answer most likely, even Wes
 admits to this, is no. But what about the other part of
 the question: is the contract obstacle a reflection of general
 VNB policy to us? I would attempt to state Wes' position
 on this, it's too complicated. However, I feel secure in
 stating that Dorsey would agree with me in stating that
 that probability is quite high. Frankly, I'm more negative
 than he — Dorsey has more faith in Chau & them than
 I have thus far been given cause to have. But Dorsey is
 concerned.

These two meetings with Chau & so many of MSUG
 were announced to us by Wes as the occasion wherein
 Chau would state his recognition of MSU's accomplishments
 and wherein he would display the Government's sincerity
 in wanting to work with us on a continuing basis.

Here it is apropos to bring in mention of the
 police program with special reference to the Civil Guard
 issue and the issue of Hoyt ~~Ryan~~ vs. Wes. As I've
 already mentioned the President attempted, about three weeks ago,
 to answer USOM, MSUG & Embassy demands for a final position
 on the Civil Guard. His stand was equivocal, & USOM, at least,
 is disobligating oneself of the funds on the assumption that ~~it~~

the Civil Guard will not be organized as per MSU proposals. There are facets to this issue that I would not want to put in writing. Suffice it to say that within the American Community there have been degrees of mistrust of others within the community seriously affecting relations therein. (I'm sorry if I'm being cryptic here.) At any rate this situation represents a serious ~~example~~ example of how a part of MSU cannot proceed because of the CVN.

Worse, the role of Wesley West also be brought into focus here. His relations with the President are, by his own choosing, kept enshrouded in mystery. The disillusionment over the ability of his influence to obtain VNB support for MSUB has set in. At a time when a little aid from above might have broken the log-jam re Consulting, Research, Civil Guard, etc. Wesley, in a sense, hasn't been able to produce. (It could be argued that the situation would be far worse without Wes' presence). My estimation of the situation, then, is that Wes' role vis a vis the President has lost its usefulness as far as the Project is concerned. To the extent that that relationship has not produced the breakthroughs from the VNB, the relationship becomes negative in that it weakens Wes' role as leader of the project. Where the MSUB staff has looked to him to obtain VNB approvals they have not received them. I by no means feel that Wes is at fault in any of this. His friendship with one man, regardless of the influence of that

(I am now in Laos visiting my brother who is with the embassy here in Vientiane. The ways of this trip to Macca and here I'll touch upon later. But more important I'll have something to say as a result of this trip that will be relevant to the main purpose of this letter.)

one man upon his own people - and that influence is subject to increasing doubts - is not sufficient to affect what appears to be the changing attitude in the aggregate of those people.

Whether Wes senses this effect on his leadership I cannot say. My belief is that he does. He has been quite confidential with me, and he says sufficient to me for me to infer that he senses it although, of course, he cannot say so. What no doubt keeps the problem foremost in his mind ~~is~~ the vocal outbursts of Hoyt. Ryan is as critical of Wes as is Hoyt, but I believe he is far more discreet in how he expresses it - at least to my knowledge. (I've had some open discussions with Howard regarding his outbursts. This was done with Wes' knowledge, in fact, at Wes' suggestion. I appealed to Hoyt on the grounds that by talking down Wes both in front of his own men and over at USOM he was weakening the MSU organization, Hoyt's own, and that he couldn't possibly gain support for his part of the organization from without and from his own staff if it was felt that from the top down respect was not warranted. In other words I didn't feel that I could change Hoyt's perception of Fishal - Wes, damn him, keeps throwing Hoyt fuel by his frenetic administration, but I did feel that Hoyt could be appealed to on the grounds that his own part of the operation was being affected. I feel a little successful at this venture. Hoyt promised to tone down Ryan. And at least on two occasions since, he has jumped to Wes' defence. One of these occasions was in my presence, one was not, and there may have been others. I don't delude myself into thinking that this removes the problem. The situation is too far gone, I believe, for Hoyt to change his basic attitude in the few remaining months of Wes' time here. And an attitude will always show through - but at least it may have been toned down. Worse, a lot of damage has already been done vis a vis USOM and Harrows, but also vis a vis our own staff, which is the point I want to make here.)

I am now about two pages removed from the subject of the two meetings with Chau for which the presence of Hoyt, Ryan, Stoutenburg, Montgomery, Hendry, Dorsey, Wood and myself was requested. As I mentioned Wes told us that these meetings were to give Chau an occasion to restate the good faith of the government. ~~There was another purpose.~~ There was another purpose. Wolf Lademjinsky at Wes' request gave me the full details of a talk he, Wolf, had with the President. One subject of that talk regarding the police and their activities I will touch upon later; the other was to tell me that the meetings were ~~partly~~ arranged partially to show as large a ~~good~~ good number of the MSUG staff that Wes ~~still~~ still did have these high reaching contacts within the VNG and that they were effective. Chau's frankness and statement of good faith would prove that the President and ~~his~~ his higher representatives still respected Wes and his organization. That the meetings were necessary to discuss the contract there is no doubt. I am sorry that it had also to be used to restore faith in Wes by his own staff. I am sorry that Wes felt it necessary.

As you can see I have been discussing the contract negotiation, and especially these two meetings both in terms of the state of the MSUG organization itself and in terms of relations with ~~the~~ VNG. I'll say no more here about Wes' role and MSUG attitudes toward him other than this: With Wes leaving shortly a factor that ~~might~~ (and I do not say here would) add to the critical nature of the Project at this time will no longer be a cause for concern. The critical nature of things as they are revolve around relations with VNG. This involves what I have referred to as an increasingly stiffening attitude sensed from many directions. If this attitude reflects official or implicit VNG policy then we are faced with serious impotence for the duration of our stay. What Wesley's thinking in this regard is I cannot pretend to say. Openly he claims there is no problem. However, Dorsey and I have both been carefully following these contract negotiations to gain some insight into what VNG, be it Dies, be it Chau, is thinking in terms of MSUG's role. ~~(I should mention here what Chau did, as Wes said he would, reiterate the faith VNG has in Wes and MSUG. He briefly reviewed what has been accomplished, and he did even touch upon the Civil Guard. Regarding the latter point he said that the President's arrêté reflected his own thinking, but that in actuality it didn't differ too much from the US point of view. There is much disagreement here (even as to what is the US point of view) but I don't want to get off on that tangent. We then launched into the various points ~~regarding~~ at issue within the contract. Let me repeat that some of the points~~

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were minor ones, some major. Even on the minor ones compromise has been difficult, but all were resolved. As for the major ones the kind of resistance displayed does not leave me encouraged. Here are several of the issues:

1. The delegation of someone, either Sec of State of Pres or some other Sec of State ~~with~~ through whom the Group could contact other Ministries. In other words, a sort of focus is needed within VNG for our role. Of course, the other purpose of this position would be to avoid the necessity of having to get Presidential approval for even so minor an issue as visas for participants. Chau is afraid that such a coordinating position for any Secretary of State would place him above the other Secs of State and make something of a superminister of him. He cannot see (or does not want to see) the MSUG need for someone within the govt to carry the MSUG ball. The question here is Does he really want the MSUG ball carried?
2. ICA and USOM want a clause stating that *within the limits of its possibilities the VNG may give plaster support to the contract. (over and above counter part, of course). Note that this may is only permissive, but still this remains an issue.
3. re the use of research materials for publication by MSUG staff even after their tour of duty is completed. Here Chau wants MSU to assume responsibility for preventing publication of anything detrimental to the sovereignty, security, and prestige of VNG. Especially on the latter count Dorsey is resisting. Chau understands, or at least stated at one early point, why professionals could not be so limited. Then after fishing around - and I emphasize that he had to ~~find~~ a rationale for his position - he said that under any consulting arrangement professional secrecy was assumed. The point can be considered to be well taken. ~~But~~ he had his position, before he had his rationale for it. Frankly, I infer from this a sign of failure in his stated intent to cooperate.

There are other such points, but I won't go into them here. When Wes and John return from ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~mail~~ ^{mail} where they are this week for the ICA Far East Regional Public Administration conference these contract discussions will be resumed.

I have used the contract negotiations to pin point the critical nature of things. If there is no break through in approvals we are now awaiting from the President, and if the contract negotiations do not reveal a more sincere form of cooperation some serious questions have to be asked. The present 'stall ~~is~~ close to dead center' can be tolerated ~~is~~ by our professional staff so long as there is some hope that the break through will come. If the stated intent to continue the relationship is sincere why the legalistic bickering over the contract? If the present fears regarding intent prove accurate then we are in trouble. I've used the term crisis hoping to imply that the situation could move one way or another. I am not completely negative in my own reactions. ~~Nevertheless~~ The breakthrough could come upon us suddenly. The right to research might suddenly be granted; requests may suddenly start flowing into Consulting; etc. ~~Nevertheless~~ A lot of the thinking on my part and on Dorsey's part will depend on how Chau moves on the contract. With the contract at issue, then, I think this is the crisis period. If the contract is resolved in letter, but not in spirit then the results are negative.

And if the results are negative it would be possible for the University to remain in Saigon for the duration of its contract. I'm not even certain that the failure to achieve during the remaining time significant progress would reflect on the University. However, there is a professional staff here. These are people concerned with their own careers and their motivations to professional accomplishment. These, the key people, would not stay; the cost to them would be too high. A few, one significant person, has already stated intent to leave if things don't 'break'. And therein lies the real danger to the project.

My trip to ~~Da~~ ^{Da} ~~cc~~ ^{cc} and Vientiane have afforded me just the perspective that I was seeking. In Saigon my conversations were, of course, to the greater extent with MSUG staff, and these were suffering from the frustrations of the situation. On the part of our staff

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it is too strongly felt that somehow NSU has failed; that the ~~poor~~ presently felt resistances are the result of Mode's bulldozing; that therefore the Group has earned the mistrust of the entire VNU administration. There is no doubt that Mode did us a lot of harm, and in the best of situations we would be suffering. However, the resistance is too ubiquitous; the poor fellow should not be given all the blame.

In DaNang I found similar resistances ~~from~~ to the Harvard people from the Pakistanis, although to a far lesser extent. They are a smaller organization, however, and they follow the Ford pattern of 'waiting it out'. At this they've been successful. ~~Individual~~ Harvard men, acting individually make themselves known, and await requests. Such requests do not have to come from the top. And they finally do come. But my point is that anywhere there will be resistance to the outsider who comes bearing advice. During the honeymoon period of the first year or two in Saigon the reception was stronger, but as confidence grows within the Vietnamese bureaucratic rigidities also grow. Perhaps the kind of success we seek is too early self-defeating.

~~Here in Vientiane I am fortunate in gaining reactions to the general situation in Saigon from people who watch it fairly closely but are not involved themselves. At all levels of the US community here it is felt that 'frustration' is the key word in Vietnam, as far as the US role as a whole is concerned. As Diem has succeeded in concentrating more and more power within himself (and this continues at a galloping rate) less and less heed is paid to USOM and other advisors supplied not only by the US but also by the UN. Here it is felt that Diem is disregarding any assistance offered to offset what is in essence a seriously deteriorating economic situation. Their understanding of the situation in Saigon is simply that the American is now being rebuffed at every turn.~~

I had already checked with other contractors, Day and Zimmerman, Capital Engineering, etc., ~~and~~ in Saigon and I found them suffering the same malaise. USOM staff are ~~less~~ more reluctant to reveal their woes to outsiders, especially NSUG (with whom there is too much a sense of competition).

My whole point in all this is to emphasize that there is no failure on the part of NSUG. We are suffering from a general thing. Even in Pakistan in the general discussion following a paper I gave on the Role of the Village in the Economics of Vietnam (a possible thesis topic) I was told that the nationalistic fervor in Vietnam was precluding outside aid. This came from a Pakistani who had just spent a month in Saigon. Again the ugly head of nationalism, then, is operating negatively. However, whether affecting NSUG or the entire community as well our concern is with the effect on NSUG.

That, then, is about all I want to directly say about the 'crisis' nature of things although some of my remaining remarks will have implications. I do not want to be alarmist. I do not think the prestige of the University will suffer if the 'breakthrough' isn't forthcoming. Most of the staff will continue to keep itself busy. After all, most of them are resourceful, competent people. They can always find things with which to occupy themselves, things that will satisfy our contractual role. But the quality and quantity of the NSU contribution to Vietnam will not be what had originally been envisioned. The tragedy, if so strong a word can be used, is not that the crisis will have led to disaster, but that so vast a potential, the NSU effort, will not have been realized.

Let me now discuss the police program for a bit. As I've mentioned the President had a discussion with Ledajinsky which was wanted Wolf to repeat to me directly. I've already mentioned one point of that discussion. However, the main purpose of the President's remarks were relative to the police program. Supposedly, this was the first time that the President has ever discussed the NSUG role with Wolf. Why he chose to make his remarks to Wolf and not to Wes I could not find out from Wolf. What he hoped to achieve by it I cannot judge. Nor can I judge why Wes so explicitly insisted the remarks be passed on to me. The remarks were actually brief. The President, it seems, feels that our police people are guilty

C. Brown. The background statement has been made time & again, but those involved in the activity, especially a Vietnam, for the first time, the need for personal in face of its ordinary

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of not only indiscreet remarks about the government, but also they have actually engaged in politicking. Wolf knew nothing more. I tried to find out if the larger part of the police group were at fault or if only one or two were involved. Wolf knew nothing. I tried to find out if this was a sort of informal statement of certain people being persona non grata. No, Wolf didn't think so. Then why did the President choose to tell Wolf all this especially if he wouldn't give details on which we could take action. Wolf ~~is~~ was certain as to motivation on the part of the President. I then tried to work out with Wolf the implications of his remarks. Wolf obviously didn't want to get too involved, but he did agree that more needed be known. Wolf and Wes and I then agreed that perhaps I should meet privately with the President so that he might reveal more to me. ~~Therefore~~ ~~Therefore~~ This meeting will occur early ~~next~~ next week. I'll be happier to receive such information directly and not through Wolf.

It's not hard to believe that the President was referring to Hoyt or Ryan or both. No doubt both are vocal, and although I'd accuse Hoyt of the greater guilt on that score I feel that Ryan would most likely be the one to involve himself in any activity. But with this kind of information coming indirectly through Ladejinsky I do not believe we have, thus far, sufficient basis for action. That is one reason why I hope the President will talk to me directly.

Again here I should mention the strong disappointment sensed by the police over the President's failure to follow MSU's recommendations re the Civil Guard and the VBI. A lot of their resentment is taken out against Wesley since he was not able to use this mysterious influence of his to get the President to decide otherwise. Wesley is also resented by the police (and ~~is~~ to others in the Group as well) simply because he is so closely tied in to the President. And here I have to emphasize that the American community does not perceive Diem in the favorable light it did a year ago. This may partially stem from their frustrations deriving from the resistances they face from the Vietnamese in general. But less and less is Diem regarded as the man who will bring democracy to Vietnam. And more and more the regime is considered corrupt ridden. (On the latter count some still say it is not Diem, but only those around him.) The point is that the American community as far as I can tell has lost its respect for Diem and his goals. The police having been subject to the vocalness of Howard and his leadership have not been an easy responsibility for Wes. This, of course, is further complicated by Barrows' view that Hoyt is his police advisor, thus putting Wes in the position of responsibility for an activity over which he has neither final say ~~nor~~ sometimes he fears complete knowledge. (Although Hoyt and Barrows have sworn up and down that Wes is kept fully informed.) In all I think here too Wes feels the police situation possibly out of control. I think there may be some connection between all this and the Ladejinsky-Diem exchange. Now, I want to emphasize that I suspect this as a possibility. I have no objective facts to support such a thesis, but over a few week period its possible to infer certain things from a myriad of remarks, none of which in themselves is significant. I'm saying all this not so much to impute anything to anyone's behavior, but to give some idea of the tenor of operations here these days. Via a via Ryan and Hoyt I don't believe there yet is any action to be taken on the counts as Diem is supposed to have stated them.

However, the role of the police program as we've already discussed should be re-considered. There are many facets to the problem:

1. MSU has undertaken a large operation, but has seen fit to send only one of its own staff into the field. The rest have no loyalty to the University. The University is seriously gambling its reputation under circumstances that are decidedly unwise.
2. That the role of the police group here goes far beyond the normal activities and functions of a university needs no mention. It is on these grounds that I think the University could graciously and without loss of face relinquish its role to USOM. (This would remove a running sore with Barrows and improve our relations there. It would also serve to make MSU a much smaller organization - at this moment we're too damned obvious here. We're suffering from all the perjorative effects

- of operating as a Big Deal. And the loss of the police role would do most to remove the charge that we are involved in policy.)
3. Should we make the decision to give up the police function I think we will be doing so from strength. It is easier in the police area to articulate our successes. Despite all the criticism of Hoyt, to my knowledge, at least, his competence has not been questioned. We need not fear the charge that we are giving it up because we have failed. In fact, it would be expected that MSU would take the police unit over en masse, implying faith in their operations thus far. Barrows has faith in Hoyt's abilities, and the shift to his jurisdiction would not imply a loss of faith vis a vis MSUG.
 4. The role of Brandstatter. As stated in the start of an earlier letter I attempted, a copy of which is enclosed, he has done a respectable job of recruiting. However, he has damaged the name of MSU here because of the junkets he has made, and because of the irresponsible way he gave information to personnel before they came. (At least this latter part of it won't happen again.) It should be remembered that MSU has the police program because it is competent in the area. However, aside from the recruiting and the junkets Brandstatter has shown no interest in the substance of the program here. This hasn't endeared any of the police staff to MSU nor has Art gained the respect of any of them. Five days here, two of which were out hunting, did not give him much of a chance to go over their roles with the individuals on the staff. (I should also point out that Dave Wood is already questioning the expenditures on Art as a Consultant. I don't believe we can afford another such trip.) At this point I think it essential that even if we keep the police program only until the end of the present program contract that we get at least one more of the regular MSU permanent staff out here on a fixed long term basis. (Although this may be difficult now inasmuch as the Civil Guard decision may have served to have left us overstaffed.) I also think it would be wise to consider sending Art out here for a two or three month period to really involve himself in the program, and possibly to serve as the basis for further involvement by the Police School in the international programs. With the start we've had I should think that a program for training participants could be developed, but only with a more responsible attitude at the top level.
- One other thing about Art. When he was here he discussed with Howard a raise for Ryan. The raise was to be about \$1,400. I think you are aware of the story. It still hasn't been resolved at this end. I stand in objection to the raise. Howard of course supports it, but agreed after learning that Jack received \$900 as a merit increase in July that a figure like \$500 might be more acceptable. What strikes me as ludicrous is that so large an increase was proposed for a man about whom the Project has raised serious questions as to his continuation. Re Brandstatter I object to his coming out here and, without gaining any knowledge of the Project and Ryan's role in it, propose so drastic an increase. As for the problem of Jack's renewal I don't think that Wes as yet has answered your questions on that point. Jack leaves here December 7th and Wes arrives back from Manila December 6th; it's unlikely that the decision can be made in time to hand to Jack before he does leave, which should be the way it should be done. He cannot delay his departure inasmuch as he wants to be in France with his wife when she gives birth. In my last conversation with Wes on the point he was inclined to let Ryan stay return. Originally I felt the same way; in many respects regarding the substance of the work Ryan is a pillar of strength. Now after hearing from Wolf about the remarks of the President my mind has been reopened until I've given more concrete evidence (or statements). I just hope we're not backing into the return of someone the same way we did with Sanderson. Ryan doesn't reach Lansing until well after the 1st of the year. There will still be time, but obviously the decision should have been made before he left Saigon. One other factor that has to be seriously considered regarding the decision on Ryan is the reaction of Hoyt. Assuming Hoyt is with us another two years irreparable harm may be done vis a vis our relations with Hoyt and possibly also with Barrows if it is decided Ryan shouldn't return. Hoyt's reaction

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can be anticipated. He'll accuse Wes and MSU of coddling a corrupt government by sacrificing Ryan. The point overlooked of course is that that government is our host. Until it is decided by MSU that the government is corrupt the Group and its staff, Hoyt included, are committed to giving assistance to it as its guests. This bit of logic, unfortunately, won't do anything to change Hoyt's attitude. And with that attitude his usefulness to the project will be severely lessened. An alternative is that both Hoyt and Ryan should go. Such a move would ~~incur~~ further incur the wrath of USOM and Barrows unless MSU had a solid case; in which case the move should be made with Barrows in consultation (and with a strong MSU man ready to step into Hoyt's place. If there were sufficient reason to ~~move~~ decide against Ryan's returning, again I would say to lay the facts clear to Barrows; this would help keep Howard's reactions in check. But thus far I don't believe we have sufficient with which to go to Barrows; and with what we have to decide negatively on Ryan would create an impossible situation vis a vis Hoyt. Unless the President is willing to take a less devious method than a vague statement through Wolf I don't think we are in a position to act. What is called for is a strong Chief Advisor who can sit on Ryan and Hoyt. He should lay out cold what they can and cannot do, and what in a foreign country like this they can and cannot say. And then accept no breach.

Another point about the police program vis a vis MSU: It is so involved with USOM and the dollar aid program in a dollar sense that MSU's jurisdiction becomes vague. As a rule Wes had been taking us to any and sundry meetings concerning the project. But at one point there was a police meeting with Barrows, Hoyt, and Wes which I ~~participated~~ was not invited to on the grounds, as Wes put it, that it really didn't involve MSU. I make mention of this to show that if the police program is so far away from us then we should certainly get away from it.

Salter was in Saigon last week which fact presented a situation where the four corners of the rectangle were in one place. MSUG, MSU, USOM and IDAW were. We took advantage of the opportunity to ~~pass~~ pass past June 1959. I took the position that the University was not ready to commit itself yet although it would be absolutely essential to extend the contract for final phasing out should the University make the extreme decision not to continue. (The mechanics of phasing out would require us to go past June 1959.) Implicit in the discussion was the ~~present~~ background of the present resistances felt from the Vietnamese. However, neither side really ever admitted to the fact. (Esman sat in for Barrows who was in Hong Kong, and I sat in for Wes who was in Jakarta, but with Stoutenburg present.) What surprised me was that even Esman, who is probably the most vocal and most anti-MSUG person at USOM, felt that with any kind of a breakthrough the Project should be continued. September 1958 was set at the target date for commencing new contract discussions; in the meantime all hands would, of course, continue to mull and discuss informally the pros and cons.

Vis a vis USOM and Barrows I sense that relations are somewhat poorer than usual. A lot of this can be attributed to the decision on the Civil Guard. Barrows feels that somehow the rug was pulled out from beneath him, and in an irrational moment he made an outburst to me regarding the MSU role in the matter. He admitted when he calmed down that his remark was unjustified. But it does indicate the tenor of things. Another factor has been an abnormal focus of MSU 3rd country travel within a short time span. However, even Dave Wood admitted that the frictions over that were manifestations of a more deeply rooted irritation with MSU. Esman is something of the culprit over there. At the slightest provocation (and often without such) he'll launch into a diatribe of ~~those~~ clichés against MSU and its big wheeling and dealing operations. His remarks are superficial; I used the term 'clichés' because everything he says has been heard from other lips many times. It is fairly obvious that he's emotionally oriented against us; his remarks have no substantial foundations. Salter had to at one point make it clear to Esman that MSU had served a very positive role and the contract had been designed to fill a definite need. Problem is that Esman, right or wrong, is very, very vocal. ~~Incidentally~~

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Barrows, on the other hand, seems to have a more balanced view. He has his complaints against us, and he wants me to come in so that he can articulate them. But he himself stated that he has no doubts as to the quality of the work accomplished by the group.

Barrows also stated a concern over the departure of Fishel. I don't agree with his position. And his position is a strong one considering his frictions with Wes. He feels that MSU contacts with VNG will be even more hampered when Wes leaves. Most of our contacts, he said, resulted either from Wes' relationship with Diem and the support Diem gave us (which support today I have to look hard for), or else it came from fear on the part of some VNG administrators of Wes' power with the President. Once Wes leaves, Barrows said, MSU may have rough sledding gaining the cooperation of various VNG levels. This is the kind of argument for which or against which it is difficult to offer evidence. I don't agree, however. In fact, I think that Wes' very contact with the President tends to preclude contact by MSUG staff at lower levels. In a way Wes feels that his unique relationship with the President is the way through which to channel most MSUG activities, especially on the Pub Ad side. In a very subtle way this tends to inhibit our staff from more energetic ~~attempts~~ attempts to create contacts.

At any rate Barrows seems pleased with MSU's longer range goals vis a vis the Project. He feared a certain empire-building tendency; I think that to the greater extent his mind is open on the subject. Last year's contract negotiations didn't help, but he's stated that he'll be happy to see recently stated University intentions given a chance. By this I suspect he was referring to Glen's remarks during his trip last year (which remarks I can assume although I don't know) and to my own which I believe to have been in support of Glen's.

In my remarks I've had to say certain things about Wes. This has been rather difficult, and I think it was a subjective factor ~~in getting this letter off the ground~~ causing the delay in getting this letter off the ground. I've tried to state things as I've seen them. In some cases my remarks represent mere suspicions and as such they are not factors to be used for evaluation of either the project or of Wes. I'll not here go into the positive elements in Wes' role. I don't believe they're as pertinent to what I've been trying to emphasize. However, I am concerned that certain things I've said herein about Wes may be misconstrued. I therefore want to ~~add~~ say that those remarks are for yours, ~~and~~ Glen's and Ralph's, ears, only. Even at that I haven't been completely frank. When I get back we'll have plenty of occasion to get the rest of my story.

I am particularly sensitive to the harm that can be done to an individual by these sort of observations because of the harm that I feel has been done in a way to Dorsey via Dr. Reeves and Bill Ross's remarks concerning the emotional, father-son relationship existing between him, Dorsey, and the President. I know that because of those remarks you have felt negatively about Dorsey becoming Chief Advisor. (I don't feel Dorsey should be Chief Advisor, but for other reasons. To pull him out of the Pub Ad Division would seriously hamper that division and would waste Dorsey's talents.) What disturbs me is that this factor affected so important a decision, ~~more~~ especially when I am without doubt that those remarks are without foundation. I'm quite certain that Dr. Reeves picked up the notion from Ross. When I saw Ross he went into a complex description of Dorsey's behavior in the President's presence, from which he imputed not only the President's feeling towards John but also vice versa. The description of Dorsey's behavior fits Dorsey's behavior in almost any serious conversation: somewhat slow and nervous. If there is an relationship between Dorsey and the President there is no existing evidence of it. Since Dorsey has been here, he's seen the President at only two meetings, one of which included Ross and Reeves, and at about two or three receptions, and that is all. Further, at one of those receptions Dorsey was standing near the President who was alone. He made an attempt at conversation which failed; a few niceties were exchanged and that was the extent of it. I am disturbed here that responsible people on a three day visit could make so profound an observation. I hope you will accept my assurance that absolutely no such relationship exists, but I repeat I am not here pumping for Dorsey for Chief Advisor.

[Dec 11, 1957]

While here I've kept as careful a check as possible on all administrative matters involving East Lansing. I know this does not seem apparent in light of the absence of my name anywhere. But I have been hovering. At times it has been difficult for me to see the mail before it goes out and at least on one occasion I would have stopped (or attempted to) one enclosure. This one concerned Calder. I don't believe we should be involved with two architects at once for the same job, especially when one has already begun plans. However, for the moment there is nothing ~~pressing~~ pressing re Calder so I'll save the discussion till I get back. But for informational purposes it does look as if USOM will purchase Brown's plans.

At any rate Cliffe seems to be doing a really creditable job of avoiding major complications. I didn't envy his having to step into the position so soon after arrival on campus. Looking back at my absence it begins to appear more and more that this particular time was best. Recruitment is going to become a focal point again just about as soon as I return. Even if the project were to grind to a complete halt in June 59 certain spots, eg Stoutenburg, McKee will need replacement. Cliffe has probably already passed on two memos from Gardner. Gardner has done an excellent job here, and would stay on but for his health. A replacement for him is essential now that the library program is going full steam. As his memo states he'll stay into the fall. I would also urge careful consideration of his statement regarding an international librarian. He's an excellent man and I'd hate to see USU forego the opportunity of getting him on its permanent staff.

As for the proposals I've seen on the Chief Adviser vacancy. I had lunch with Harver Bernstein at the New York meetings, and the mention of his name as a potential candidate ~~did not cause any thinking on the part~~ was very favorably received by me. I was sorry to learn later that he was no longer available.

I react negatively to Keith Caldwell; from the contacts I've had with him I don't think he has the imagination nor the strength with which to handle the problems here. I should caution you in this regard that even at Indiana he has a rather limited role. Laves does the recruiting, and the contract negotiation. This was true, at least, when I was there last Spring. As you know the reaction here generally to McHargue was also negative. I hadn't been too impressed in just two personal contacts, but I had also picked up in the past few months several negative remarks about him. All of these cannot be considered good grounds, I recognize, for taking a stand. However, Wes' and Dorsey's own thinking reflected the things I had heard.

As for Dorsey, as I've mentioned earlier, I don't think he should be assigned given the present structure of the project. Were it simply a Public Administration operation on a smaller scale there would be no better man. He's got the strength and the ability to work with the Vietnamese, as you know. But we'd be losing our pillar of substantive strength in the pub ad area if he were assigned to ~~handle~~ that role. I know you are already aware of the sensitivities here regarding the method in which the choice is made. Make absolutely certain that Wes and John are brought into the picture and kept up to date. There have been several exchanges of letters between you and Wes which I don't get to see (I find this kind of secrecy irritating) and most probably you are trying to get as much information here as possible. I merely repeat that it is important to do so.

~~I know that John has written to you via Wes suggesting that name for~~
~~xxxxxxx that this xxxxxxxx kept to xxxxxx~~

[Date: 1/19/72]

I know also that Dean Seelye and Guy Fox are active in the recruiting problem. Which raises a point. Several weeks ago someone here received a letter stating that there had been something of a coup on campus. Namely, that Seelye was now directly in charge of the Project and that the role of the Office of International Programs was now predominantly of a house-keeping nature. I find it hard to believe that such a change could have taken place without my having been told or without Wes having been told. Nevertheless, such a rumor can have a disturbing effect. I think you would do well to articulate what, if anything, has happened.

I am at the moment going to rush this to a close in order to catch the mail. A fourth and final apology for the slovenliness of this letter, and for the fact that I haven't redited it.

Before I do close I'd like to summarize:

A vast potential of manpower, some of it permanent MSU staff, is faced with eighteen months of idle time. The present attitudes of the Vietnamese government, apparently at all levels, sets the limits within which we can operate. These limits are narrow. ~~xxxxxxx~~ I am not convinced that neither MSUG leadership nor NSOB leadership is displaying any imagination in trying to push back these limits. Further, and equally as bad, organizational problems within MSUG are preventing utilization of MSUG potential even up to the extent of those limits that do exist now. (The morale problem, touched upon in the accompanying letter, is serious.) The whole picture is further complicated by a government here that apparently is moving from some sort of autocracy to a dictatorship. The stability here is explosive. (That may sound paradoxical, but the extent to which ^{the} has lost touch with and the confidence of the people was probably the greatest shock I received here. Since the assassination attempt public appearances are limited, ~~and~~ and when he does appear, say, at an exposition the crowds are moved out. There is no formal political threat now. A military coup in this kind of a situation is a strong possibility. The economy is deteriorating. Another assassination attempt is always a possibility.) But to repeat, evidences are such that the government is moving in a direction not may be embarrassing to US foreign policy. MSU should seriously consider its role in such a development (and need I again mention especially the police force in what may be a police state). Thus I am recommending not that MSU pull out, but that it seriously consider such a possibility. (Glen; I hope you'll be here long enough to get past the manner to which quiet guests are subject. I also hope that I'll get sufficient time with you to expand on these remarks. I really wish we could be out here concurrently.) What I say here is with regard for the name of the University, nothing more. And again to repeat, I have a profound belief that there is a vast potential here given the right kind of leadership. I hope you make the correct choice.

So that's it for now. It will be easier for me to get out subsequent remarks to you, but the bulk of what I want to say has been said here. If I have sounded alarmist it will have served a purpose. Sitting in East Lansing I had no concept of the true state of things here. A better means of communication is going to be necessary.

At any rate I miss all of you and will, in a sense, be anxious to get back. This has been an exhausting routine for me. I'll have been here about 60 days. There are 50 on the MSUG and another 30 or so Vietnamese who all feel some responsibility about my social well being. I have finally had to call a halt.

My best wishes
John