

27 November 1957

Dr Wesley R Fishel
MEUG USOM Box 54
Navy 150 E/o FPO
San Francisco California

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Wes

I am writing a separate note to the enclosed letter as a word of explanation. I am doing this in order to ~~make~~ it possible for you to use the other letter in any way you see fit with our own staff or with USOM personnel. It may be of no value to you, but if it is, use it.

I should also inform you that I have written Howard a personal confidential letter indicating that I have picked up rumors at several meetings concerning statements attributed to him that are critical of you. I wrote him because I heard these rumors outside of the MSU "family" and I told him that I consider it highly inappropriate. I have indicated to him that such matters should be handled within the "family" and that it is building an image of himself that may hurt his role as leader of the Police Administration group.

He probably will be coming to you to discuss it. I expressed confidence in his ability and in the work he has done, but did ask him to keep our differences on a professional level. He may not show you the letter because it is a personal one, but I thought you should know I had sent it.

Sincerely

Glen L Teggart Dean
International Programs

glt/mj
enc

27 November 1957

Dr Wesley R Fichel
MSUG USCM Box 54
Navy 150 c/o FPO
San Francisco California

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Wes

I have just returned from a two-week trip to San Francisco and Denver, where I attended the meetings of the American Commission on UNESCO, and the Land Grant College meetings. I met a number of interesting people concerned with international phases of education, and had many stimulating discussions.

I am becoming increasingly concerned about some of the basic problems faced by the MSU group, particularly in its internal morale. I have been aware for some time of certain difficulties you have faced with regard to criticism of the program and your own administrative role, on the part of certain members of our group. One has to expect a certain amount of this if he plays an administrative role. When it becomes excessive, however, it can hurt the program considerably. I am afraid this is happening as I am picking up bits of information in a variety of places. Thus, it seems to me that you may have to take forthright action in relation to some of the staff to curtail the problem. I am sure that Stan may be able to help with this, but you may find it necessary to sit down in closed session with whomever might be involved and have a good heart-to-heart discussion. Not from the point of view of vindictiveness, but of the effective operation of the MSU project, and consequently of the United States' contribution to Viet-Nam.

If such discussions do not prove fruitful, it may be necessary to reallocate responsibilities or to develop reassignments. In any case, I hope you will take the necessary action to clear the problem, under full realization that as far as MSU is concerned, we look upon you with complete confidence as the responsible head of the MSU group in Viet-Nam.

I plan on being in Saigon sometime during the latter part of January or the first part of February and will be happy at that time to take whatever action necessary to help correct the difficulty. I would appreciate it if, as a preparation to my coming to Viet-Nam, you would keep me as currently and fully informed as possible with regard to the matters mentioned above.

I would appreciate your giving me your thinking concerning the future development of the program, particularly those aspects that can be transferred more fully to the Vietnamese government and structure, and the phasing out pattern and schedule. I am sure some aspects of the program can be looked upon as being shorter term duration than others. It would seem to me, for example, that the overall development of the National Institute of Administration requires longer term planning and participation than other aspects of the program. This, of course, may be true also of the development of the Police Academy as a training institution.

Sincerely

Glen L Taggart, Dean
International Programs

glt/mj

27 November 1967

Howard Hoyt
MSUG USOM Box 54
Navy 150 c/o FPO
San Francisco California

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Howard

I have just returned from attending UNESCO Commission meetings in San Francisco, the Land Grant College Association meetings in Denver, and have quite recently been in Washington on contract negotiations with regard to some of our projects abroad. Several discussions have occurred at these meetings that prompt me to write you a personal letter.

Comments were made in these discussions concerning the apparent dissension that exists within the Michigan State group in Viet-Nam. You and I had talks both in Viet-Nam and here concerning some of your attitudes toward the administration of the MSU project there. I apprised these with you as sympathetically and understandingly as I could, and have taken them into account in some of the decisions made and action taken.

You will recall that in our talks here I encouraged you to work out your concerns and problems with Wes as far as possible and to assume as much initiative as you could in developing the Police Administration program. I was particularly concerned that any differences you may have with Wes would be kept within the "family." In the discussions at the meetings mentioned above, the people who talked with me repeated rumors concerning the apparent dissension within our group. In each case, reference was made to your point of view and to things which they had heard you had stated.

The people who passed this information on to me have the impression that although there may be some basis of fact, still they tended to associate it with a certain amount of personality conflict. I might indicate that one of the things that bothered me was that the people I talked with were not associated with our own staff. They were individuals who have contacts with Viet-Nam either by personal experience or through professional colleagues in that country.

I am passing this on to you not only because I am desirous of having our own people work out their differences in a professional and dignified manner, which is extremely important, but also because by permitting this kind of image to develop of yourself, it may be destroying the effectiveness of your role as a leader of the Police Administration group. I hate to see this happen because of the very significant and effective contribution made thus far.

I fully realize that the differences breaking into the open may not have basis in fact - that it may only be rumor. But I am sure that the image of it breaking into the open is believed and that it is developing in the minds of some, characteristics of personality which I am sure you do not have.

Howard Hoyt
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I doubt if anything can be done in terms of public denial or a statement that will correct the image that appears to exist. However, I hope that any action in the future in terms of relationships with USOM and other Americans will certainly take this problem into account.

I feel free to write this letter to you as I am sure you understand the high esteem in which I hold you, and that you have assurance of our belief that you are making a very significant contribution to the MSU and US operations in Viet-Nam. I am passing this on to you in a sense of helpfulness and with sincere concern about the basic overall contributions being made by our group in Viet-Nam.

Sincerely

Glen L Taggart Dean
International Programs

glt/mj

Prof. Taggart

MSUG - Box 34
Navy 150 c/o FPO
San Francisco, Calif.
12 December 1957

Glenn L. Taggart, Dean
International Programs
Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan

Dear Dean:

I have received your friendly letter of 27 November 1957. I have re-read it many times, have drafted and re-drafted this reply, have let it lay over the week-end, and then re-edited it. I have gone over past correspondence and my notes made following our talks this summer. I am trying to summarize the situation as I see it, in as rational a way as is possible. Again, I am forced to write this at home, as I do not want to involve anyone else in this confidential communication.

First of all, I want you to know that I sincerely appreciate your personal concern on this matter which you discuss; your thoughtfulness in bringing it to my attention in the friendly fashion you do, and your suggested future action. As you read this letter, please bear in mind that I have no hard feelings toward anyone for the course this Project has been forced to follow.

After Wes returned from Manila, I heard that he had talked with you on the telephone and that you had told him what you had been hearing at home. Then, in our weekly conference yesterday afternoon, he not only told me about the telephone conversation, but also read me part of your letter and asked me if I had received the letter from you. He told me that over eight months ago he started hearing these same general rumors; that he has discussed the matter with you on several occasions, and that you had asked him before I came home on leave if he wanted me back again. Wes said he not only said "yes", but recommended strongly for the raise I got - in spite of the fact these rumors were being reported to him by you and others, as far back as then. I told him that I regretted very much that we had not sat down long ago and frankly discussed this, discussed our differences and ironed them out. (As you know, I was uncertain as to the wisdom of my second term even while I was home. Had I had any idea that either of you entertained a question in your minds as to whether I should return, I certainly would have aided you in clearing the question.)

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[Dec 12, 1967]

Wes and I talked for an hour and a half without interruptions. (It was, in my opinion, by far the most fruitful of all our weekly conferences.) We both agreed that, in the future, neither of us will allow time to elapse as it has in the past. We will be frank with one another in our criticisms, but we will keep them within our own walls; then, when we do not agree on issues where other agencies are involved, it will be open and above-board, and the others will know that it is just one of those cases where we, as humans, have honest differences of opinion. We discussed several specific issues now on the fire and agreed how we will handle them. I am sure that the road will be smoother as far as Wes and I are concerned. I can assure you that if you hear anything from now on, it will either be backwashes or just plain not the truth.

I can further assure you that I have nothing against Wes as an individual. I greatly admire him intellectually. He has done wonders in his political science field. He has been able to get in where no one else could. But, leadership, administration and coordinating a program and people are not abilities in which he excells, just as many of us would fail trying to do what he is best at.

Also, I would like to assure you that at no time during our conversation did I even infer I had ever talked over these matters, nor did I try to point out to Wes what might be his weaknesses or how he could improve this operation. If that should be done, it should have been done by the University authorities before now.

It now appears from what you say in your letter and from other sources at home, that "the problem" in the field is now referred to, even by the President, as "the conflict between Hoyt and Fishel". This, it seems to me, is taking the position that the one who sounds the alarm is apparently the one responsible for the fire, or, at least, is adding fuel to it. May I just take a little time to retrace some of the events that have transpired?

In August 1956, only four months after Wesley assumed leadership of MSUG, I told Dr. Weidner, then MSU/EL Coordinator, while he was here on the field inspection trip, that "the lid will blow off I am afraid, if more positive leadership is not provided, and our course of operation is not changed - we are just drifting." I said that his kind of leadership cannot bring anything but chaos. I emphasized that this Project was too important to our Government, the Vietnamese Government and to the prestige of MSU, for the authorities in East Lansing not to take note of it. He did not commit himself at all at that time, other than to assure me that he had found considerable progress had been made since he left; that there seemed

to be good relationships, he thought, with USOM and the local government, and he predicted that Wes would soon get the feel of his responsibilities and start lending more direct leadership.

By the time you arrived in December, I had decided that I would, for the first time in my life, take the easy way out of a situation - I would forget it all and return to accept one of two or three positions then on the string, one of which was in Kalamazoo. I did not feel that I could afford to jeopardize my professional reputation and future in an operation that I felt could not succeed. In fact, I believe I mentioned to you that I was seriously considering leaving at the end of my 18 months, rather than stay out the two years. At our first discussion, I did not tell you why I had arrived at that decision, as I felt that since I was not a member of the University Family, I did not feel it was my place to criticize to you, but should only work as long as I could with a clear conscience, and when I could no longer do that - resign. This was the course I had decided to take - the same course all the rest of the MSUG staff has taken, with the exception of Sanderson, Sloane and, now I find, myself.

After several days here, you sought me out again and told me you had found out what you thought were the reasons for my decision. You asked my advice on the course you should recommend back home; you asked me about certain ones who might be considered for directing this Project toward the success we both agreed was possible. We both agreed also that this is too big a Project to allow any one individual's personality, or lack of leadership, to interfere with its progress. Then, later you assured me, "I can promise you there will be relief of this situation in the very near future, within two or three months, in fact." You said that you would be able to make the offers attractive enough to where even those who had said they would not return under present conditions, could not help but do so. (I would like to call your attention to paragraph 3 of my personal letter to you dated 1 February 1957.)

You strongly urged me to think in terms of returning for another tour. With your assurances ringing in my ears, I told Doctor Hannah the next day that I would return, and I cut all the strings that I had out at the time at home.

Again, referring to my letter of 1 February 1957, paragraph 7, you will recall I asked you to release me from this obligation, when it began to appear that not only were we not getting the assistance ~~from~~ Wes that we both thought would help alleviate the situation, but Wes had announced that he was going to stay

on for fourteen months more, instead of the six months. I stated in that letter, "I am sure I cannot physically or mentally go through 14 more months of present conditions." (I am the only one in the field today who has worked directly for Wes more than eight months, as a Division Chief). In your reply of February 20th, you stated that if Wes did remain on here, you would have a "top quality man as a second man to work with him." And you intimated that your calling him back to East Lansing in March might result in him re-considering his decision to stay on until the Spring. This summer you gave me the run-down on the "Squeeze Play" you found yourself in, but you assured me that with the new reorganization of the Division here in the field, that you folks recommended back home, both Dorsey and I would find more autonomy in carrying out the program at least, and probably in planning it, as well. This has not proved to be the case. In fact, we find more interference on small professional matters than we ever did before. Wes takes it upon himself to instruct members of my staff on what he wants done, without telling me; has some of them communicate directly with him on certain matters; even at times attempts to assign secretarial and local staff help. I do not know if Dorsey has this interference or not, but, as you know, Wes is at heart a junior "G" man, a "cloak and dagger" operator. He detects a secret agent in everyone - from the Air France hostess waiting on him to the man sitting in the corner of the coffee shop. He reads all books and magazine stories in that field, so naturally throws himself into any inquiry or discussion that comes up in our field. He cannot resist giving advice at random on everything from fingerprinting techniques, files, records, through modern police communications needs, to reorganization procedures in the various forces. Often, this advice is at variance with what my men are giving. This creates the impression, of course, that there is not agreement within our Group, when the issue is one which we feel cannot be compromised. In other words, we have had to retrace his steps and correct mis-statements of his, or correct advice he has given. We have tried to be as tactful as possible in going about this. This has had to be done in our dealings with USOM. We have had to re-advise them that certain facts are different than those he has claimed. (We still experience the same difficulty in not being able to get him to sit still long enough to hear our problems, or understand what our Program is).

There are times when his opinions and his conclusions have been different than ours, which, of course, is reasonable and is expected. When at all possible, we abide by his. But, sometimes, we have had to take a stand because either technically or ethically, or U.S. policy-wise, we could not agree.

In such cases, we first try to frankly talk to him about it. However, this is difficult - he does not listen, does not make himself available, or just goes charging off, committing us to whatever he wants. I have tried to keep loyal to my ideals, to the U.S., to MSU, and to this Group with whom I work. There are times when our policy disagreements hinge on this point. I defend Wes in public on many occasions. When it comes to where I cannot, I try to avoid the appearance of disunity by keeping quiet, but that cannot always be done either.

Another reason that the internal disunity of our Group comes to the surface over my head is that besides my position within our Group, I have the responsibility of being the technician for USOM in the matter of recommending and spending a sizeable amount of money in U.S. Aid funds - over 5.6 million dollars this last year. This has to be done by filling out certain forms, securing the signatures on certain agreements, ordering these commodities in a certain manner with the approval of certain USOM officials, and, then, watching over them after their arrival until they are disbursed in the proper manner. I cannot shut my eyes and order things blindly without technical justification. This makes me responsible to two organizations or groups, and that is cause for certain feelings. Wes wants the same autonomy in this operation as he insists on in our MSU Project. For example, he was critical because certain range-finding equipment had not been ordered. He had told us to order it because the President wanted it. USOM would not authorize it until certain checking was done, and it was determined that it fell in the province of the police field; that there was a need for it, more than the President requesting it, etc. Wes felt it should have been ordered on the strength of his instructions. He could not appreciate this other red tape, even though the order will exceed \$40,000.00. It was Mr. Barrows' understanding when the new contract was under discussion, that he would consider me as his staff man on police matters. Both Weidner and Ralph operated with that understanding, and with the understanding, of course, that I would always keep them advised of the meetings, and if they could not attend, keep them informed of what was discussed, etc. After several months, Wes agreed to let the same procedure continue, upon Barrows' suggestion. But, since my return, he has resisted Mr. Barrows using us as his advisors, and has told me outright at times not to make reports to Barrows on matters that are his business, or give him services he has a right to expect. Brandstatter told Jack and me that Barrows had told him that if he had known how Wes was going to go, he never would have agreed a year ago to MSU continuing with the police portion of this contract. He has told us this on several occasions. This, of course, disturbed Art.

We have a man at USOM, Milton Esman, who arrived here early last Spring with a vicious attitude toward MSU. (I understand that

this is traceable to the fact that he was rejected at one time as an MSU staff member by Weidner). Although he acts friendly enough to me, and although I thought his attitude toward us had mellowed somewhat after finding out we are pretty good people doing an acceptable job, I have learned through experience recently that he is guilty of crediting statements to us that are absolutely not so, and of still making inferences about MSU that have long since been discounted by thinking people.

The evidence you have probably leads you to conclude from your distance and, perhaps from even closer, that the ever-present smoke over this Project is due to a Hoyt-Fishel feud, when this is not the case. I happen to be the oldest one here in point of service on this Project. I happen to be heading up an operation that catches the average fellow's eye - either for accomplishments or lack of progress. I happen to be heading up a division of this Project that is responsible not only to MSU, but also to the USOM Project entitled Civil Police Commodity Assistance Project. I happen to be the head of the largest division of the MSU Project, and ours happens to be the largest police project our government sponsors. I happen to have several men on my team right now that are, or might become, concerns of ours and maybe the Americans of this community. All this tends to focus undue attention on me, I think.

It appears now as though I would have been wise not to have followed your advice, and done as all the others have - quietly left the scene after one term, when it became evident that there was no relief in sight.

I am most anxious to keep the boat on an even keel, and will do everything I can. I agree with you that little can be done in terms of public denial or statements that will correct the image that appears to exist. It is doubtful that even this letter can materially clear up the maze that has gathered. I can only present my reputation here, not only among my own Group, but throughout this community, my reputation at home, the fact that I have never encountered any difficulty in working for or with anyone before, as evidence that your confidence in me is well taken.

Because I had the courage, or poor judgment, whatever it turns out to be, to sound the alarm does not necessarily indicate I either started the fire or am adding fuel to it.


There is one question I would like to ask and would like an answer to, if you have it. During our discussion yesterday, Wes made the remark that if he returns for another two-year turn he would want me at his side, etc. Is this seriously

[Dec. 12, 1959]

being considered in East Lansing - could it conceivably become a reality?

I hope you understand that the spirit of this letter is not meant to be critical. I will make an added effort to keep from having any further complaints coming your way. And, I hope that MSU/EL will agree to what Wes and I agreed to - namely, that if you have such complaints, you will not hold them for eight to ten months, but air them. I still feel as I did a year ago when we talked about it - that this Project is bigger than any individual in it. Therefore, if you and others feel its progress will be enhanced by me also stepping out of its light, I will regretfully do so.

Sincerely yours,


HOWARD W. HOYT