

NATION BUILDING IN VIET-NAM

A Critique of USAID's Involvement in the Provinces of Viet-Nam

Part II

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Table of Contents

I.	American Bureaucratic Relationships	1
	A. General Remarks	1
	B. The Military-Civilian Conflict	5
	C. USAID Civilian Conflicts	13
	1. The Role of Technical Advisors	13
	2. The Regional Office	15
	3. Increased Paper Work	18
	4. The Saigon Office	19
	D. Conclusion and Recommendations	22
II.	American-Vietnamese Relationships	25
	A. Interpersonal Relations: Vietnamese Values	26
	B. Interpersonal Relations: Harmony, Hierarchy and American-Vietnamese Relations	31
	C. Interpersonal Relations: American Personal Conduct	37
	D. Corruption	38
	E. Conclusions and Recommendations: The Limits Examined	40
III.	A Final Note	44
IV.	References	45

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In this part we discuss the results and the reactions the various reorganizations have had.¹ The first section deals with American bureaucratic relationships and is divided into two areas: military relations and civilian/internal relations. The lack of coordination and cooperation between the military and civilian branches has resulted in problems for American operations in Viet-Nam. Part of the rationale for CORDS was to eliminate this conflict. Within USAID itself there has been centralization, decentralization and re-centralization, and accompanying each change there has been an expansion in the number of personnel. We touch upon civilian problems of management, staffing and supplying.

The second section concerns American/Vietnamese relations. No matter how efficiently the American side is organized, ultimate success or failure in Viet-Nam lies with the Vietnamese. In this section we give, first, a brief summary of the major characteristics of the Vietnamese bureaucracy concentrating on operating modes different from that of the Americans. Secondly, we examine the efforts made by USAID personnel to grapple with the Vietnamese procedures. USAID personnel were faced with a choice of (1) suggesting changes or modifications to improve Vietnamese bureaucratic operations, or (2) accepting those procedures as given which could not be changed

Within each division we evaluate the reorganizations and their problems, and make recommendations which could serve as guidelines for modifying USAID's operations in Viet-Nam. We conclude each section by summarizing our observations and recommendations. We feel that if changes were made based on the composite recommendations, USAID, and indeed the entire American effort in Viet-Nam, could be improved.

American Bureaucratic Relationships

General Remarks

Once AID/Viet-Nam decentralized from Saigon, programs slowly began moving in the provinces. The American (provincial representative) in the field was successful. One prov rep remarked that alone he was able to handle all the operations that needed to be taken care of in his province. Saigon sent him a secretary which he subsequently used as an assistant, he felt that even then he was overstaffed. The prov reps had a great deal of autonomy, they could use the funds, plan programs and so on without direction from Saigon. Comments during this period ran:

"The best part of the job in the province is that you can exercise initiative and establish your own working relationships and methods without being dictated to."²

Within a few years the province mentioned above had close to one hundred American civilians working in the U. S. government project of nation building for the Vietnamese. When the prov rep, who was being debriefed, was notified of the change in the number of Americans in his old province he was shocked.

The confusion that followed the increased American civilian involvement had to be solved. The various agencies had to be brought under one roof with an all encompassing organization at all levels from the province to the central government. In late 1966 the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) was set up to remedy the problem. As

part of this reorganization each of the individual agencies had to yield some of their autonomy to the head of OCO at their respective levels. In the provinces the prov rep was designated to lead the American mission; he was in charge of all American civilian personnel.

The people in the field felt that OCO would destroy their independence (from Saigon) to make decisions.³ However, after an initial period of muddling, complaining and adjusting, the new organization seemed to be working well. The first reports that Washington received were unfavorable though. OCO had not been working well, they thought, and the military was still not coordinated with the civilians-- another reorganization would be necessary. In the spring of 1967 the orders came down: reorganize from OCO to CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support).⁴

The general reaction to the new system was mixed, but there were a few salient themes running throughout most of the debriefings. There was a feeling that CORDS was a "crash" program, that there had been no careful planning.⁵ CORDS went from concept to implementation without any programming, which is usually required for a major reorganizational effort. The basic concept of CORDS was sound--a unified command and a single head, however problems arose when military and civilian personnel, programs and procedures were forced together. As one man put it: "it is like mixing oil and water."⁶ The military and the civilian establishments could not be fused easily or efficiently.

Another difficulty encountered was that the parent agencies were not willing to give full support to their own elements in CORDS. They were either clinging to their independence or just simply did not have the funds for support. As a result most of the funding and material for CORDS came from USAID. As it turned out, in addition to the civilian agencies, USAID was supplying the Military Assistance Command/Viet-Nam (MACV) in the provinces. Previously MACV was dependent on the Army of Viet-Nam (ARVN) for support and material, but this was rarely enough. MACV began to requisition civilian material and personnel

Among the civilians themselves there had always been problems. One of these areas of conflict had been with the technical advisors. In the past the technical personnel were either misused or ignored. OCO and CORDS were designed to solve this problem. What resulted was overstaffing.

The regional offices were notoriously impotent up until the OCO reorganization, and even up until the CORDS reorganization. It was hoped that by strengthening the regional offices the men in the field would not come to Saigon, but rather to their own offices at the regional level.

Paper work had also caused headaches, and the CORDS setup compounded the situation. It would not have been so bad if the paper work had increased communication, but the result was further inefficiency and delay. This was not remedied by the Saigon office

either. They began to gather the decision-making and policy-forming powers back to the capital. The man in the field was left powerless.

The Military-Civilian Conflict

One of the major drawbacks with CORDS has been the conflict between the American military and the American civilians. Before 1963 the military had only a small Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG) in Viet-Nam.⁷ Usually there were two American advisors in each province. ARVN was able to support and supply MAAG with little difficulty. When more military advisors arrived, the load was too large for ARVN to handle, and as a result the military advisors were undersupplied. During this time there was only a small USAID mission in Saigon, and cooperation between the military and the civilian branches was not a problem, because their official contacts were almost non-existent. When the prov reps first went into the provinces they relied on the army for advice regarding security and military matters. In fact some of the early prov reps were military men on loan. The military, with a long record of civic action and jealous of its programs, was reluctant to see the civilians come in and take over its projects. In some cases the military and civilians would carry out similar civic action programs in the same hamlet. This competition resulted in not only distrust, waste and duplication, but also the Vietnamese peasants and officials left with nothing to do.

In the days when there were few Americans in the provinces, a province council, made of the prov rep, the MACV sector advisor, and the province chief, would resolve many of these conflicts. Yet there

was still trouble between the military and the civilians. The prov reps were younger, and in some cases of lower rank than the military sector advisors. The province chief and the military advisor could out-vote and ride roughshod over the USAID prov rep if they chose to.⁸ Even with the OCO organization behind the prov rep, the military would not yield. In a few instances prov reps, who were former military men, would be treated by the Vietnamese and the American military according to their former rank in the service.⁹

This is not to say that the military and the civilians did not get along. In some cases they were able to coordinate their activities and operate effectively. However, in most of these the civilian and military elements got along best when each did his own job, and did not meddle where he was not wanted or needed. Only if there was overlapping or a major operation on would they get together.¹⁰

The CORDS organization was supposed to put an end to such conflict. The man in the top position would call the shots, and he alone would deal with the province chief. In a few of the provinces the civilians left when they discovered that the military sector advisor had been named the province senior advisor (PSA). The civilians were convinced that their programs would be abandoned or they just simply did not get along with the military man.¹¹

At this point it might be useful to review a few of the points made in regard to who should be the PSA, and when. By and large, the military felt that the military should run the provinces, and the

civilians felt that the civilians should. The military simply stated that "there is a war going on and the military has to run the war."¹² Since CORDS has only one head, the PSA should be a military man, because he would know what was happening militarily. In addition, the province chief was usually a military man, and he would not respect a civilian the way he would a military man.¹³ Though never stated, the military knew that CORDS had access to support operation funds, which had previously been denied MACV. Since MACV was not being equipped well enough through ARVN channels, a military man as PSA would be more inclined to direct funds toward MACV.¹⁴ However, the military did concede that at a future time the military sector would have to be phased out. At the end of a paper about how to be a military advisor, it stated that "at some point in the development phase, it will be possible to turn the job over to the civil advisor. Until that day arrives, however, every US military advisor who goes to Vietnam must be prepared to enter into any or all of the (civic action) activities outlined above and must display and request expertise expected of a technical consultant." (Authors' underscore)¹⁵

For their part the civilians felt that their projects would be curtailed, if not totally discontinued. The military would limit the flexibility of the AID program.¹⁶ The civilian priorities were clearly not congruent with those of the military. The Vietnamese, on the whole, contrary to what the military contended above, wanted CORDS to be headed by the USAID representative. - Some felt it was

the nature of the Vietnamese, even those in the military, not to be trustful of the military.¹⁷ Most of the American military officers were not really sensitive to the problems of rural development. In spite of the fact that there were a few MACV advisors who had training at Fort Bragg and had some appreciation of the civic action and advisory effort, even those were largely concerned with the military functioning alone. The military man had a war to fight, and he should devote full time to the fighting.¹⁸ By the very nature of his status the civilian was in a better position to handle community development and pacification programs than the military man.

One of the major areas of conflict between the two groups was over the military's use of civilian materials. When MACV began to use USAID material, relations between the two were really strained. In one instance the military used a civilian Scout vehicle for military operations. The civilian USAID officials were outraged. This abuse of civilian material would put the civilian in a precarious position if he were to go out into the countryside, particularly if the Viet Cong thought that he was military.¹⁹

One of the biggest obstacles to complete integration of the civilians and the military was tremendous differences in regulations and procedures. Even if the personality and commodity conflicts could be resolved, the two branches had different ways of operating. A CORDS management consultant summed up his feelings this way: "I ran right into a brick wall--neither would give--the military felt

that they could not give on theirs [regulations] and the civilian side felt that they could not give on theirs."²⁰ These procedural difficulties involved differences that ranged from handling memos to using manpower. For instance, the military is much more effective, because they have an abundance of manpower. Civilian agencies just cannot operate that inefficiently. As a way to resolve this conflict we would agree "that the operation of CORDS will have to be basically a civilian operation; the procedures will have to be clearly delineated as being those applicable to a civilian operation. The military, on the other hand, will have to come in under a separate set of regulations."²¹

The civilians felt that in the long run the CORDS setup would serve military interests rather than civilian. Even though CORDS would give the military man a broader perspective of the job to be done it would still give more to the military effort than to the civilian. When MACV moved into USAID housing and offices, and required USAID hirees to do MACV's work most of the civilian fears were thought to be confirmed.²²

Despite these apparent set-backs due to CORDS, one civilian USAID official was glad to see the merger of OCO and CORDS. In his region the CORDS organization would throttle the MACV elements whom this USAID official accused of sending in falsified or glossed-over reports. He requested all the civilian personnel not to sign any report which was not to their satisfaction. Even in some of the

provinces where the military man was the PSA, the USAID representative would not sign off. Before the CORDS reorganization MACV had no one to control it. With the new setup and the double sign-off on the reports, the USAID man could make changes in the reports, or if he disagreed with what the military was doing, then he was able to make comments at the end of the report saying why he disagreed. This USAID official felt that MACV, who had been pushing for CORDS, found themselves over their heads. MACV had not foreseen the control that the civilians would exercise over their reporting. The fact that they had been glossing over the reports soon became evident with civilian control.²³

If the military and civilian sectors have gotten along, it has been due to a blending of personalities and a reaching of agreements, not a joining of organizations. Perhaps we have dealt too harshly with the military above, but we feel, as do most of the civilians, that the military is handicapped to operate in full community development projects. It cannot, however, be denied that, at this point, the military has a superior structure, in terms of clear lines of command. They know what the job is, and they go straight at it. In 1966 MACV began working on revolutionary development programs unilaterally, but they kept USAID informed. In the opening of their memo/report to Ambassador Porter, then Deputy Ambassador, a joint planning committee noted that civilian-military cooperation was lacking. Later in the report they acknowledged the place for the military forces and the place for cooperation:

"The primary role of military forces in RD (revolutionary development) is to attain and maintain the requisite level of security in and around selected hamlet and village areas so that RD civil activities and, subsequently, nation building can proceed... Because RD is both a military and civil undertaking, joint planning and supervision must be exercised at all echelons. This begins, of course, at the provincial level."²⁴

Nowhere in the report does it say that the military should take the lead, but only support and defend.²⁵

There is a need for more understanding on the part of both sides as to what should be expected. Since total merger at all levels is impossible, it seems that it would be best not to integrate the two organizations (OCO and MACV), but rather to separate them.²⁶ Essentially, CORDS does represent a non-fusible combination of "military and civilian aptitudes, attitudes, skills and procedures."²⁷ What we are recommending is not a reversal back to OCO, but rather a single chief to coordinate the two sides. In other words MACV and USAID would continue to operate in their set ways, using their own procedures; but on the policy planning level there would be one head, the province senior advisor.

Next is the problem of deciding whether the PSA should be a military man or a civilian. That security is a prerequisite for good community development programs is understood. It is necessary to give the RD cadre and other officials the safety needed. It is also important for the civilians to handle community development and pacification programs. We recommend that in those provinces where

there is a large American armed force or heavy Viet Cong activity that the PSA be a military man. The exigencies of the situation require a man to "fight the war." In other provinces where there is only a small MACV or special forces detachment, the PSA should be a civilian. If the deputy province senior advisor is the opposite of the PSA, then each side will be guaranteed representation.

What is needed is a real blending of personalities much in the spirit of one USAID official--"Now I'm right with it and I'm boiling in the same pot with the military effort under CORDS."²⁸

USAID Civilian Conflicts

This section reviews the changes that have taken place in the relations between the civilians during the series of reorganizations. We discuss the more salient problems from handling technical personnel to coping with the paper work which has marked the CORDS reorganization. Within each heading we offer suggestions which we feel might reduce some of the bureau-pathology in USAID's operation in Viet-Nam.

The Role of Technical Advisors

Some of the Americans in the field had difficulty getting along, that is, they were "minding each other's business too much."²⁹ This was particularly true in the technical areas. The technical personnel were mostly on loan from another agency or under contract by USAID, and were largely autonomous. In the past technical advisors would often create their own problems. For instance, if a technical advisor visited a province a short time, that is, made a quick inspection tour, and then reported, the visit would be considered a nuisance by those in the province. The advisor had to get into the province and talk with the prov rep or PSA about the problems and the solutions.³⁰ With the increased American involvement technical people began moving into the provinces. Problems of neglect diminished, but problems of overstaffing were created.

When the prov reps were "jack-of-all-trades" the reverse happened --the prov rep would ignore the technical advisor, and in some cases rightfully so (like the one mentioned above). However, the type of

man who now serves as PSA is not knowledgeable about all the technical areas. He has to rely heavily on the technical staff for direction and advice. The OCO and CORDS reorganizations led to a greater cooperation among the various civilian units, particularly with the technical personnel who, if not properly utilized, were wasted.³¹ An interesting example is in the agricultural program. Though the CORDS reorganization did not change it a great deal, in terms of administration and support, it created an overall agriculture coordinator who would work to assure a unified program at the community level.³² Dependence of the agencies on CORDS caused the bickering and the infighting to subside. The one real problem that remained was overstaffing.

One solution to overstaffing might be to have more International Voluntary Services (IVS) type generalists and specialists working in the province. The IVSers have been able to get close to those with whom they are working, whether it be in education or agriculture. Their salary is just enough to cover living expenses. A staff of advisors at the regional level for various technical units could be made available to them for consultation. This type of operation would reduce the cost and the burden of having technical advisors in every province. What would happen is that there would be fewer staff positions in the province, thus reducing the size of the American senior advisory mission in the province, and the IVSers would then take up the slack of working with the Vietnamese. The USAID representative would be used to get the needed commodities for the IVSers.³³

The Regional Office

The regional office was originally set up to serve as an intermediary between the province and the Saigon office. The function of the regional office soon changed from that which Bert Fraleigh had outlined (see page 5 of Part I of this paper). The Vietnamese government and military command was structured so that the Corps commanders would have tremendous power. Instead of opposing this type of arrangement the USAID mission adopted it. What resulted was a bureaucratic mess.

By and large, the regional office was impotent, even as late as 1966. To compound matters USAID/Saigon was accused of being unresponsive, and "required continual and unwarranted prodding." Nothing would move out from Saigon.³⁴ During the reorganizations, the lines of authority were confused. The people in regional offices were setting up their own domain within which to operate. They had the impression that the regional group was a separate team from Saigon and the field.³⁵ Impatient province representatives did not want to wait for the region to act, they went directly to Saigon and to the office (Vietnamese or American) concerned to get the commodities moving. This violated the principle of working through channels, which USAID was trying to teach the Vietnamese. Some Vietnamese felt that the role of the prov rep was to be a go-between for the province chief and the national government--the American would be heard in the Vietnamese ministries, but the Vietnamese province

chief did not stand a chance.³⁶ By skirting the established channels the prov reps first, showed the Vietnamese how much better it was not to use the existing bureaucracy, and second, he showed the Vietnamese how little power they held vis-à-vis the Americans.

Since 1966 the regional offices have been strengthened, in order to relieve the pressure on Saigon. If the regional office had the authority and material, the prov reps would not have to hassle with Saigon, rather they could operate within their region. However, the degree of cooperation and efficiency seemed to depend not on the organization on paper, which looked good, but rather on the personnel involved. The people could operate as a tight-knit, well-functioning group, or they could become the opposite. There are a few contrasting examples.

In one region, representatives from the regional office would go into the provinces to study the programs and needs of the provinces. There were region-wide conferences which permitted the personnel from the provinces to get together.³⁷ The working relationship between the region and the provinces was superb. Most of the debriefs from this region showed a similar confidence in the regional office. They all felt there was good "team spirit."

In another region the regional office was of little use. One prov rep commented on how he would have to go to Saigon if he wanted any commodities or anything done. The regional director could not make decisions--he was a needless middleman. He did not want to take

any initiative in anything, and as a result the deputy regional director had to make the decisions, but only after costly delays. One prov rep summarized his attitude about the higher offices by saying: "I don't know what they have at regional level and at Saigon, but that's got to be the biggest mess that ever happened."³⁸

By 1968, the regional office had become largely autonomous under CORDS. On occasion when a man would be sent out to a province from Saigon, he would be diverted at the regional level. Usually he would be kept in the regional office, and never reach his assigned position. Since Saigon was rarely notified, an accurate account of the personnel could not be kept. Those in the region argued that the regional office should make personnel considerations because the field could make the placement better than Saigon. The rub between Saigon and the region has been settled in this area. The arrangement which seems to satisfy both parties is to allow the region to divert personnel with approval from Saigon.

The crux of the problems in the USAID bureaucratic relations was in having an ineffectual regional office poorly staffed. Since CORDS, the regional office has been strengthened to the point of becoming almost overstaffed. The problem of skirting channels has been eliminated. The implication being that now the Vietnamese can be taught how to use government channels. With these solutions to these problems, another problem has been created--increased reporting and paper work.

Increased Paper Work

In some cases the paper work has tripled since CORDS was set up. One prov rep estimated that he spent 40% of his time writing reports which had to be sent in four different channels.³⁹ In a more recent debrief a provincial agriculturist said he spent 50% of his time writing reports.⁴⁰ The paper work in the form of vouchers, reports and quantitative evaluations prevented people from getting an overview of the programs that were supposed to be carried out. This led to a limit on the effectiveness of any given person or project.⁴¹ At times simple solutions have been found for the awkward paper work. For instance, originally with CORDS everything had to get signed by the higher ups, (e.g., the deputy PSA and the PSA). So if an agricultural specialist wanted to know about the best insecticide for cucumbers he would have to send the memo through channels in his province to get everyone's signature first. It would take three days to get the message out of the province. Once it got to the regional office, the regional director would look at it, and pass it to the deputy regional director, who, after pondering it, might send it to the agriculturist at the region. This would be another three or four days. The needless red tape was obvious, and if there had been a real emergency there would have been trouble. The situation was remedied by allowing the technical people to send messages straight across the board to their American counterpart at the regional level without going through the PSA. All those in the province who were interested would receive carbons of the memos.⁴²

One prov rep (pre-CORDS) had another solution to the paper work. He merely refused to answer a memo more than once. If Saigon sent a duplicate memo down he would merely put it away in the circular file. We are not recommending this, but it seemed that much of the paper work could be cut without sacrificing information or communication. Indeed, even with all of the paper work Saigon did not seem responsive.

The Saigon Office

Many of the debriefs complained that Saigon would not respond to requests from the field. It was reported that they did not know and did not really care what was going on outside Saigon. They appeared to be more concerned with the operation of their internal bureaucracy and personal affairs than with getting something done in the field. One official remarked facetiously that Saigon could operate on and on without the field existing. He described his going into Saigon, saying that he felt like he was a "country boy" who had come to the big city, and those in the big city were anxious to get rid of him. He left Saigon thinking, "Well, if anything's going to be done, I'm going to have to do it because I'm not going to get too much support from up above."⁴³

On the one hand those in the field complained bitterly about those in Saigon or the regional offices who did nothing to support them. On the other hand, these same people were renouncing Saigon's central planning and involvement. This seeming paradox is not contra-

dictory at all. Those in the field wanted autonomy to operate and make decisions, but once they made their decision they wanted support. In 1966 a public administration advisor blamed overstaffing⁴⁴ for USAID operating inefficiently. Men in the field were making promises which were not fulfilled, and generally undermining USAID operations. There were criticisms that there was not enough planning, but the real fault was in not acting. Some felt that it would be better to act with poor planning than not to act at all--and Saigon just was not acting.

Since the CORDS reorganization Saigon has again taken a dominant role. They are acting and they are growing. Yet there is a mounting dissatisfaction from those in the field. As the numbers of Americans continue to grow, the USAID/CORDS bureaucracy becomes more complex. The camaraderie of the "young tigers" has long since passed, and some felt that any camaraderie that remained was being flattened under the giant CORDS. Everyone seemed "to be off in their own little slots--I don't sense that men feel the same sense of pitching together," one man remarked.⁴⁵ Still another reflected:

"The character of the job has changed. Our program is stifled now, it's mechanical--planned and programmed out completely--it's like a machine that cranks out projects without thought, human ideas or involvement. There is no creativity in our program now--there's no room for it."⁴⁶

This same prov rep went on to describe the result of denying local decision making--waste. There were electric poles in his province, but they were not according to the standard which called for cement poles at a distance of 50 feet. These poles were metal and spaced

30 to 40 feet, but quite functional. The order came down for them to be replaced. The cost of flying in the cement and paying for the labor was phenomenal. Before CORDS, he said, he could have made noise about the program, and saved the money, or at least been heard.⁴⁷

Based on these comments we concur that--"The success of CORDS is not going to be measured by what happens in Saigon, or even what happens in Regions--it's what happens in the provinces, villages, and hamlets that counts. So we've got to give flexibility to the Senior Prov Rep; we've got to let him work up procedures and programs which will fit his particular and unique situation."⁴⁸

Conclusion and Recommendations

The war has thwarted USAID from carrying out a truly successful program. In regard to the war, the first problem that needs straightening out is USAID's relations with the American military. The CORDS organization is basically sound, and should not be cast aside. However, all efforts to integrate the military and civilian establishments below the command level should stop. The procedures of the two establishments are so diverse that it makes no sense to overhaul either one of them. The PSA should remain as the chief American representative in the province; however, he should not deal with programs outside his area of expertise. If he is a military man, all civil matters to be discussed with the Vietnamese should go through the deputy PSA (a civilian). The same holds true in a reverse situation. What will take place is that MACV and the civilians will operate as independent agents, will rely on their parent organization for support with just a residual fund for general use. MACV should not be permitted to use civilian funds or materials for military purposes. The PSA should keep this firmly in mind, even if he is a military man.

It should be remembered that no aid project can be implemented without military security. There are provinces in Viet-Nam with large U. S. military units or with heavy combat. The Americans in these areas should be headed by a military man, and the military should be given priority. Before AID can go out to the field, their personal safety should be assured within reasonable limits. As one

man put it: "the pacification people have to go in behind the military people. In the absence of a military victory, there can be no pacification program."⁴⁹ In those provinces where USAID cannot operate efficiently or effectively the mission should be withdrawn or reduced to permit resources to go to a "secure" province.

In the provinces that are considered largely "secure" the CORDS PSA should be a civilian with vast experience in overseas operations. The PSAs should be action-oriented individuals, and if they are not they should be transferred out. The civilian PSA should use his staff as efficiently as possible and be watchful of wasted manpower in the province office. Because the province with a civilian PSA is considered "secure", greater funds should be used to get GVN projects moving. There are a number of cases where just a little more funding would have guaranteed a successful project.

Regardless of his status, the PSA should be aware of all civil or military programs in his province. If he is military it would be beneficial to give him a month of training at the Asia Training Center to become familiar with USAID. This would entail the ATC designing a program geared for the senior military man. In the same light, the civilian should be cognizant of the military requisites, and he should learn to operate within those confines.

The regional office should retain its present strength, but the regional director should be a man who can get along well with

others, and not one who would want to create his own empire or be jealous of his power. It is important for region to support and back up the man in the field. Saigon should be concerned with seeing that the regional offices are well stocked. Saigon's main responsibility should lie in general planning. Their concern should be with comprehensive guidelines rather than project by project detailing. When USAID/Saigon begins to "meddle" with details, the man in the field is deprived of his prerogative to decide what to do and how to act. The basic initiative should remain with the man in the field--he knows the interests and the needs of his province. Saigon should give the guidelines, not directives.

The time consuming paper work has to be reduced. Certainly much of the reporting and paper shuffling is unnecessary. If a PSA spends up to 40% of his time reporting and an agriculture man 50%, there has to be some duplication. Solutions will not be found in a massive change. Rather solutions will have to come from common-sense notions of what is needed and what is not needed. Perhaps a neutral management manpower study would be beneficial. As of yet there are no reports of one being carried out for USAID/VN.

American-Vietnamese Relations

We have already discussed the formal, organizational aspect of the GVN at the provincial level in Section I of this paper.⁵⁰ Given this formal structure, we now explore its informal aspects and the prov rep's role within it. We are now concerned with the informal constraints which the prov rep has to cope with. Which aspects of the Vietnamese bureaucracy at the provincial level are subject to change and which are not? What are the informal, cultural rules of action and attitude which the prov rep must observe to be effective? What are the limits of his potential effect? What methods are open to the prov rep within the Vietnamese context for achieving his goals? Indeed, what goals, articulated formally and officially in US/GVN agreements and documents, are realistic? It is this type of question we attempt to answer here.

Interpersonal Relations: Vietnamese Values

Regardless of how effective the internal organization of OCO or CORDS, ultimate success or failure depends upon American-Vietnamese relations because the task is Vietnamese nation building and the method is the use of existing Vietnamese government structures. Interpersonal relations become, then, extremely important and a prov rep (or PSA), no matter how technically or administratively competent, will be of little use if he cannot successfully bridge the gap between American and Vietnamese cultures. This is, of course, not to suggest a one-way street whereby the Americans must make all the effort and compromises. On the contrary, one often receives the impression that the opposite is more often the case which may be the result of the long history and attendant sophistication of Vietnamese culture as compared to our own. Some writers argue, too, that flexibility is a Vietnamese trait. The methodology urged upon its compatriots by the National Liberation Front attempts to capitalize on this trait. "The world should never know where one stands...No position is ever irretrievable, no commitment ever final...Be flexible, be changeable, adapt..."⁵¹

In spite of their flexibility, there does appear in the debriefs evidence of certain Vietnamese values which the Vietnamese are unwilling to compromise. If these values are not respected by the prov rep, his effectiveness will be greatly impaired.

The first of these values is harmony. Noted by most writers of

Viet-Nam, harmony as an important social value has its roots deeply embedded in the long tradition of Vietnamese history. More exactly, harmony has its roots in Confucianism and Taoism, "the two pillars of the cultural heritage of Vietnam, which shape the world view of the Vietnamese."⁵² It is not our purpose to delve deeply into the more abstract concepts of either of these two philosophies but rather to examine their manifestations in contemporary Viet-Nam as they bear on American-Vietnamese relations. Quoting again from Chi:

"Even though the two philosophies are totally different in content, they have several important points in common. Both rigidify their positions to the extreme by stressing strict harmony and intolerance of deviation. Both reject the belief that the individual left to himself can find his own way without heeding an outside standard for his life conduct. The importance of these points of similarity is that the world-view of a Vietnamese is colored chiefly by this traditional fear of conflict and by intolerance rather than by the concrete teachings of Confucius and Lao-Tse."

"The fear of disharmony is...very strong in Vietnam today. War, flood, famine, blight, etc., have always been interpreted as 'âm dương đảo lộn,' i.e., the yin and the yang are out of harmony."⁵³

This fear of disharmony need not be considered abstract in any way. It also colors day-to-day life and interpersonal relations. Hickey refers to the concept as it manifests itself in the village today:

"Adherence to it harmony is manifest almost daily in behavior...Belief in universal order, and the related concepts of harmony with this order and human destiny within it, are reflected in the conformity of all villagers to guidance by the lunar calendar and reliance on individual horoscopy. The notion of harmony is involved in many practices and rituals--observance of

taboos, use of amulets or talismans, preparation of medicines...invocations to deities, and veneration of ancestors. The aim of these is to preserve or restore harmony and, with it, well-being."⁵⁴

Another writer attributes the concept of harmony to what he calls Vietnamese government of the "Middle Way."

"The outstanding characteristic of Vietnamese government, even today, is this harmony orientation--the avoidance of extreme good, the avoidance of extreme evil, and moderation in all things, leading to harmony. This harmony, in which a decision not to decide is a perfect rationalization, was reflected in the Taoist theory of 'wu wei'--literally, let time decide, together with the Confucian idea of 'li'--right thinking and conduct...Soldier slang has named as 'numbah one' all good things, and 'numbah ten' all bad: this is the American view. The Vietnamese prefer to say that everything is 'numbah five.'"⁵⁵

We could go on to quote more examples, but hopefully these examples make clear the importance of harmony in Vietnamese society. We will return to the concept as it affects American-Vietnamese relations after discussing another important value of Vietnamese culture.

An adherence to a rigid hierarchical patterning of social relations and its consequent high status-consciousness is another value deeply inculcated into the Vietnamese through both their heritage and reinforced by more contemporary experience. Chi notes that Confucianism is not only based on the fundamental assumption that the life-ideal is to be in harmony with the tao, but also it is based on the second fundamental assumption that, "the tao is a highly hierarchical system...and from that assumption, a social system is built with strong emphasis on hierarchy."⁵⁶

From Confucianism, then, and more specifically, from Confucianism as practiced in China and imposed upon Viet-Nam, came the Mandarin system. For our purposes it is sufficient to note that the Mandarin system was a rigidly controlled hierarchy of offices with access dependent upon the peculiarly Chinese concept of "scholarship." Though "what was left of the old 'mandarinate' had been dispersed by the Viet Minh,"⁵⁷ the Mandarin style of administration remains very much in evidence in Viet-Nam:

"It is sometimes incomprehensible to Americans when the GVN official sits at his desk in mandarinal dignity and lets the problems come to him...rather than getting out of the office to where the 'action is,' in the Western manner. It bothers Americans for the Vietnamese to use the technique of 'administrative procrastination'; letting time solve problems according to harmony rules, rather than making an immediate decision."⁵⁸

The traditional hierarchical orientation, first inspired by the Mandarin hierarchy has since been reinforced by more contemporary experiences. First, by the impact of French colonialism with its emphasis upon extreme centralization.⁵⁹ And, more recently, by the even more highly centralized, greatly personalized government of President Ngo Dinh Diem.⁶⁰ The combined impact of these experiences has been summarized by Fox and Joiner:

"most Vietnamese civil servants remain passive and uninvolved, avoiding decisions by referring them to higher levels. Following mandarin and French colonial tradition, where the administrative system is autocratic and highly disciplined, unquestioned obedience at every level is expected."⁶¹

And, a slightly different explanation by Dang:

"when, with the intervention of the French, the actions

of mandarins ceased to be identified with the exercise of royal power, the only basic motivation remaining for the civil servant was a desire to advance in status."⁶²

Harmony and hierarchy, then, are the two values we have selected as most important in American-Vietnamese relations. It is the manifestations of these values in Vietnamese bureaucratic action and attitude most often noted in the debriefs and these are values that the prov reps must understand and respect if they are to be successful in their relations with the Vietnamese.

Interpersonal Relations:

Harmony, Hierarchy and American-Vietnamese Relations

As we have noted, harmony and hierarchy are not abstract concepts; rather, they are the substance of day-to-day interpersonal relations. To maintain harmony a premium is placed on behavior which is gentle, patient and avoids direct conflict. Gentleness and patience are mentioned often in the debriefs as necessary attributes of a prov rep. According to one prov rep:

"if /the prov rep/ goes into Vietnam and works quietly; if he does not adopt airs of superiority; if he does not get impatient with his counterparts; if he meets an obstacle, gently goes around it, over it, doesn't try to push it out of the way, or get upset about it, then I think...the American will do very well."⁶³

When tact and patience are not used by the American, the Vietnamese will rarely show his anger, but their relationship would be seriously damaged. A typical Vietnamese reaction to rudeness is demonstrated in this account by another prov rep:

"This was one of the real trying times in my career because this military advisor was gruff and rude. We used to go in to see the Province Chief together. He used to pound on the Province Chief's desk and swear at him--just had no tact at all. While he was ranting and raving in front of the Province Chief's desk, the Province Chief would just be quietly signing papers. When the advisor was done shouting...the Province Chief would take off his glasses, lay them on his desk, and say in the few English words he knew, 'finished,' or something of that nature. The Sector Advisor didn't know he was 'getting the treatment.'"⁶⁴

Or the response of the offended Vietnamese might take another subtle form:

"You can always tell when you've done something wrong because you start getting missed. The Province Chief might have a cocktail party and you don't get invited, although you're the senior man in the province. If something has gone wrong, you'd better find out as fast as you can and correct it. They'll never tell you when you've done something wrong, they'll just not invite you anyway. It's very simple."⁶⁵

These examples demonstrate that a certain type of deportment is necessary to preserve harmony. The rough, aggressive, action-oriented individual, to a certain extent idealized within the American tradition of competition and capitalism, will have a difficult time in Viet-Nam. He will, assuredly, encounter no direct hostility or conflict, but in quite subtle ways he will be thwarted. "If you don't have their respect, you're going to spend a year over there thinking you're getting something done, but in actuality, not really achieving anything."⁶⁶

It has been noted, too, that many Vietnamese will answer "yes" to any question a prov rep asks them because "he will tell you whatever he thinks you want to hear...he will answer whatever he thinks will make you happy, but he'll do what he wants to do to keep his boss happy."⁶⁷

The Vietnamese attempt to maintain harmony manifests itself in another way. As Eye has observed, there is an "absence of suggestions in the GVN from inferior to superior; in terms of GVN ethics, this is an implicit criticism of the boss and breaks the rules of the harmony game."⁶⁸

Of course, the absence of suggestion from inferior to superior is also a function of the rigid hierarchical patterning of Vietnamese relations. Dang views the strict Vietnamese adherence to hierarchy and harmony as developing "under a protective covering of symbols, gestures, and a vocabulary of respect, with any expression of the least original idea considered hazardous."⁶⁹

There are other aspects of this strict adherence to a hierarchical patterning with which a prov rep must deal as well. Perhaps the most often mentioned is the Vietnamese civil servant's avoidance of making decisions, upon which we have already briefly touched. This avoidance of taking the responsibility for decisions is not surprising in the context of Vietnamese tradition. Decisions have traditionally come from the central government, information flows down through the bureaucracy, not upwards. Taking responsibility for decisions means taking the responsibility for mistakes as well. Mistakes hinder promotion and status advancement. Under the circumstances it is much better to be as uninvolved as possible, doing the minimal amount of work, therefore keeping harmony and creating no disturbance.

To avoid the responsibility for making decisions, the Vietnamese bureaucrat often wraps himself, for self-defense, in a cloak of formalistic action as the following example well illustrates:

"It was important that the soy beans be planted by the first of April...then about the tenth of April, we found out that he /Vietnamese Agricultural Chief/ had taken no action to buy the seed. Well, in his

own view he had taken action; that is, he had written a letter to his ministry, and once he wrote the letter, his responsibility was finished. He wrote to his ministry and asked his ministry to get the seed, and having done that, he made no follow-up whatsoever. When the seed didn't come, he just sat there and folded his hands. His responsibility was over because he could produce a copy of a letter; he was no longer responsible when the seed didn't come."⁷⁰

Dang notes this "inhibitive formalism" when he states, "fear of responsibility is manifested in extensive correspondence asking for further explanation or supplementary details...Administrators often use procedure as a pretext for refusing to accept a file that is lacking some unimportant document or a certain signature."⁷¹

In a rigidly hierarchical society, status is most important. This extreme status-consciousness creates pitfalls for the unwary prov rep. It is imperative that the prov rep do nothing to undermine or threaten the status of his counterpart, the Province Chief. To this end, the importance of coordination cannot be over-emphasized. The Vietnamese Province Chief, it must be remembered, is the central government's representative at the provincial level. He holds the highest status in the province and it is under his responsibility that every governmental activity is conducted. In some respects his province is a private fiefdom which he heads.

The prov rep or PSA, on the other hand, has overall responsibility for channeling USAID resources and expertise into the very government structures the Province Chief commands. In theory this procedure sounds fine--it is developmental aid dispensed through Vietnamese

channels--but in practice there are many difficulties. The difficulties stem partly from the fact that in recent years, in many provinces, there has been such a proliferation of AID-supported, government projects that the Vietnamese Province Chief has difficulty just staying abreast of them all. To add to that difficulty is the frustration encountered by the Americans when they do attempt to utilize the existing Vietnamese structures. The temptation is obvious--"it would be much easier and much more efficient if we do it ourselves. Why tell the Province Chief we've got this seed for Village A, he's so busy, let's save the time and do it ourselves." Such a reaction from action-oriented Americans is understandable, but in the context of Viet-Nam it could severely damage relations with the Province Chief in the future. Eventually he will find out about the delivery and consider it an affront to his authority and a threat (real or perceived is irrelevant) to his status. Though a hypothetical case, it is just this lack of coordination which has caused problems in American-Vietnamese relations. Real examples are easily found in the debriefs.⁷²

The complexities of status can be quite indirect. One prov rep noted the importance of having a senior level interpreter who could meet the provincial officials on an equal status footing:

"Mr. Tao was 33 years old. He has a brother who is a major in the Air Force and another brother who was just elected to the upper house--now he has all kinds of family connections (Ed.-i.e., status). He plays tennis with the officials. That's the kind of man you want for your interpreter or translator at the senior level. We

have another man there who speaks really excellent English but I wouldn't hire him for ten seconds because he had no rapport with the province chief, the judge, or the deputy province chief for administration, etc."73

"I had a police advisor that I got rid of. He did several things in error. First, he hired a young kid--who I think was queer--as his interpreter. This young kid didn't have the respect of the chief of police, which made him no good as an interpreter and he should have been fired immediately...If you get a good interpreter, you have half the battle won."74

Interpersonal Relations: American Personal Conduct

The importance of Americans' conduct of their private lives is mentioned with enough frequency in the debriefs to warrant consideration here. It appears to be the judgment of many debriefed personnel that irresponsible conduct can seriously hamper an American's effectiveness in Viet-Nam. Rather than dwell at length on this issue, we quote with some completeness the opinion of one prov rep which we consider representative of other debriefs as well:

"An American has to be a little bit careful in his behavior. I'm not saying that you can't have your social and private life, but I urge a great deal of discretion. There are two types of Vietnamese: the military types, who are less well educated and who will introduce you to girlfriends and that sort of thing; and there is also a much more highly educated Vietnamese, such as our deputy province chief, who didn't respect that kind of behavior at all....I know a prov rep who almost completely undermined his status in his community and his province by just living with the secretary from his office. He was involved quite openly and blatantly with her. Apparently, because of his personality and his way of handling this thing...it injured him. I know another case where the prov rep is doing almost the same thing but under somewhat different circumstances and I don't think his position is being hurt...big city, big city standards; small city, small city standards...Some of our older people...are really held in fairly low esteem, I think. A lot of them are just a little too blatant--they think the society is this way, but it's not."⁷⁵

Corruption

Though there is no agreement concerning the prevalence of corruption⁷⁶ that exists in Viet-Nam, the debriefs report several examples. There are several forms it may take. One common form is the kickback. Examples of kickbacks are many. They exist as payment for helping someone get a job, whether it is as a rural schoolteacher or for a promotion from lieutenant to full colonel. Kickbacks exist for all kinds of goods and services. Inspectors from Saigon are most often suspect.

Another form of corruption is to pad the payroll with "ghost" soldiers or rural development cadre, or with "ghost" farmers slated to receive a new type of seed. This type of corruption is often mentioned in the debriefs.

As for the prov reps' contact with corruption, a fatalistic attitude seems to prevail. "...you have to understand that the Vietnamese standards of morality are different from ours and you cannot shape them according to American morality...We have to expect some loss, some slippage in Vietnam."⁷⁷ Or, "It's just like our system--if you help me get elected president, I'll appoint you ambassador to Sweden. In Vietnam they do the same thing but they do it a little differently."⁷⁸

In most cases the prov reps would stop corruption if they could but it is, of course, very difficult to prove. "If some little girl

gets a job, she's not ever going to say that she paid for that job because nobody is ever going to protect her."⁷⁹

If corruption is too blatant, however, often something can be done.

"You can let him know in subtle ways he is not pulling the wool over your eyes and that you know he's stealing cement--but don't say it. Just let him know that you know what's going on and this usually controls it. I think that's all we can do is control it."⁸⁰

Conclusions and Recommendations: The Limits Examined

Up to this point our efforts have been mostly of a descriptive nature. We have attempted to define the limits within which a prov rep must operate. In the first part of this paper we dealt with a much higher level of constraints. The war itself is, of course, a major constraint. The structure of both the American and Vietnamese bureaucracies is another constraint which the prov rep must accept as a given. To a very great extent, the operating procedures of both bureaucracies also cannot be tampered with. It is unlikely to expect a Vietnamese civil servant at the province level to operate under a different set of rules than his superiors in the central government. In this section of the paper we have moved much further down the analytical scale. We have emphasized the values of harmony and hierarchy which we view as unchangeable, i.e., not subject to manipulation by the prov reps. They are the givens--the rules which the prov reps must not violate. We have tried to emphasize, too, the importance of the prov reps' personal relations with the Province Chiefs. The Province Chief must, indeed, be treated as a "personality, not an institution." We judge this to be the single most important factor involved in a prov rep's job for without rapport with the Province Chief, a prov rep can expect to accomplish little.

There is, however, within these constraints of personality and values, room for a prov rep to operate. Given even a bad Province

Chief, one who is not goal-oriented, one who is schooled in the traditional bureaucratic operating procedures, a prov rep may still be able to accomplish much. Many prov reps have found ways to circumvent the Province Chief or a poor Service Chief and have established contact with lesser, but more competent, officials. Circumvention is possible, but it must be done carefully and within the constraints we have described. For example, if a Province Chief is kept continually informed, if things are done in such a way that credit (but not failure!) will reflect upon him, if on the surface there is harmony and he perceives no threat to his status, a Province Chief or Service Chief may not act to undermine what a prov rep is trying to accomplish.

The prov rep's job is delicate in many ways. He must attempt to influence and motivate his counterpart while keeping that counterpart at the center of the stage at all times. He must make judgments upon the level and type of corruption that can be tolerated and that which cannot. He must instill ideas in his counterpart in such a way that they become the counterpart's own ideas. The techniques for achieving these goals, unfortunately, vary from personality to personality and no blanket statement can be made. We can only define the broad constraints, and to do more seems impossible.

One prov rep expressed his appreciation and knowledge of the limits within which he worked in the following manner:

"My area specialist, Mr. Tao--I used to introduce him

as my advisor. He was my advisor; he's the expert on Vietnam, not me. When I wanted advice I would ask him. I never wrote a piece of paper to a Vietnamese that I didn't give to him first and ask what his opinion was. He might look at it and say, 'Oh, you'd better not say it this way.' Then I'd tell him, 'Okay, you change it around so it's nice and polite. But I wanted to make the point that I want the fish market moved from Point A to Point B.' The Vietnamese was my advisor and if I didn't listen to his advice I would be in trouble."⁸¹

In a final summary, we feel compelled to add a rather discouraging observation. Our review of the debriefs combined with what we have learned about Viet-Nam while researching this paper, leads us to the conclusion that in most cases where the prov reps are successful, it seems often to be in spite of the Vietnamese rather than because of them. The prov reps, using their ingenuity, have found ways to get around the roadblocks in the Vietnamese system, but have had little success removing those roadblocks. The prov reps' solutions, then, are not really solutions at all. If the clever prov reps were removed, many of the same roadblocks would remain.

The only real hope of progress in public administration for Viet-Nam lies with the graduates of the Vietnamese National Institute of Administration (set up by Michigan State University in the 1950s). In every debrief the graduates of the institute are praised for their effectiveness. Most of these graduates are now in lower level positions, and are doing an excellent job. They have broken some of the traditional bureau-pathology of Vietnamese administration. Each year the number of graduates increases, it is hoped that these

graduates will be able to remove their roadblocks, because it is apparent that the Americans were able to do little.

A FINAL NOTE

This study has accented the negative--what is wrong with USAID/Viet-Nam. We have not acknowledged all that USAID/VN has accomplished. Indeed, they have made progress in almost every field, but as one man put it, "the cost has been tremendous."⁸² It was not the nature of this paper to be laudatory, rather we have sought to point out some of the weakness inherent in USAID/VN. The criticisms that we have made were possible only because those who were debriefed did not feel compelled to cover up. They were not pre-selected men, but rather open, honest citizens concerned about America's involvement in Viet-Nam. One man remarked that one reason USAID was under fire so heavily was that they encouraged internal criticism and honest reporting. He contrasted this with the alleged glossing over of reports by MACV. Perhaps this is the strongest argument which can be made in defense of USAID and for revolutionary and community development being civilian-run. USAID's men in the field have "told it like it is." It is this--regardless of the reorganization--which must not be sacrificed.

REFERENCES

1. Unfortunately we were unable to obtain the necessary information to do an analysis of the Revolutionary Development budget, consequently this was not discussed in this part of the paper. Another area we were unable to get adequate information about was on the type of prov rep that got along best with the military, however, within the section on the military-civilian conflict we touch upon this briefly.
2. "Interviewee Comments Regarding CORDS," Asia Training Center Debrief Section (Summer 1968), page 7. This paper uses a rough form of content analysis, regarding opinions about CORDS and covers debriefs from December 1966 to August 1968. Though this is not done rigorously, it gives a good summary of opinions of those debriefed.
3. In a few of the debriefs, the officials felt that OCO was a temporary organization, that it was part of a military plan to take over the American operation in Viet-Nam. OCO was one step on the way to CORDS.
4. The actual name of the new organization was MACCORDS--Military Assistance Command, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support. Those in the military insisted on calling it MACCORDS; CORDS, they said, was only the civilian half. Be that as it may, from this point on in the paper we refer to MACCORDS as CORDS. For the reasoning on why MACCORDS is preferable to some see Debrief 9682, page 26. This is a debrief of a military man.
5. Debrief 23682 (CORDS Management Consultant) pages 5 and 6 and Debrief 12674 (Public Administration Advisor).
6. Debrief 23682.
7. When the United States increased its troop commitment, the advisory group (MAAG) became a command (MACV).
8. Debrief 8664 (Prov Rep in IV Corps).
9. For an interesting case of this, read Debrief 31665. This prov rep was a former military man of high rank. Other USAID officials had high regard for his abilities to do a good job.
10. Debrief 10668 (Prov Rep in III Corps).
11. Debrief 14676 (Assistant Regional Director) and Debrief 9682.
12. Debrief 9682 (former military man, Province Senior Advisor, IV Corps).

13. Debriefs 9682 and 166612 (Prov Rep, IV Corps).
14. Debrief 9682.
15. "Versatility in Vietnam: Hallmark of the Advisor." This short paper on military advising is on file at the Asia Training Center Library. It has no date nor author. From its appearance we would estimate it to have been written during 1966 or so by the military.
16. Debrief 86711 (Prov Rep), page 8.
17. Debriefs 23682 and 56712 (Vietnamese official), pages 18 and 19. From debriefs of the Vietnamese we got the same impression. The Vietnamese set up a double standard for the military and the civilian personnel. Where the military man was expected to go to bars, the civilian was to be morally straight and above reproach. For Vietnamese attitudes see "Vietnamese Collectanea" sources, page 2. It is interesting to note that in Confucian class ranking the military was last.
18. Debrief 2682 (Assistant District Advisor), page 20. Also see Debrief 16687, where the man contends that the military is too concerned with killing to be good at civic action.
19. Debrief 24681 (Agriculture Department Chief, IV Corps). This debrief touches upon the relative security that a civilian has over a military man. Generally, the civilians were not shot at, ambushed, or harassed as much as were the military. Though during Tet all Americans or Westerners were attacked indiscriminately, it was felt that the civilians were still in a much safer position than were the military. Though this debrief was recorded before the Tet offensive, his concern is still valid.
20. Debrief 23682, page 10.
21. Debrief 23682, page 12.
22. Debrief 24681 (Regional Agriculture Advisor), page 13, and Debrief 86711 (Prov Rep), page 8.
23. Debrief 14676 (Assistant Regional Director).
24. Powell, Marcus (Colonel, GS, Chairman of Joint Planning Group), "Memo for Ambassador Porter; Subject: Action Report, Joint Planning Group Debriefing Tour," dated October 28, 1966, page 5.
25. Also see Debrief 9682, page 24, for a discussion about the necessity of having the military for security.
26. The suggestions that follow here are derived in part from Debrief 23682.

27. Debrief 126712.
28. Debrief 2682 (Assistant District Advisor), page 26.
29. Debrief 24681 (Regional Agricultural Director, IV Corps).
30. 136612 (Education Advisor, II Corps).
31. 12681A (Senior AID Official).
32. Debriefs 3681 (Regional CORDS New Life Development Coordinator) and 24681 (Agriculture Advisor).
33. While working in Viet-Nam I found that the two IVS agriculturists were doing as much as the agriculturists on loan from the Department of Agriculture. The IVSers were limited only by the reluctance of the PSA to use them more. The IVSers had higher mobility than the man on loan, they spoke Vietnamese and could communicate with the people better. - 1b.

This recommendation probably reflects a bias we both have in terms of having Americans working close to the people and the projects they are concerned with overseas.

34. Debrief 12681A (Senior AID Official), pages 7 and 8.
35. Debrief 136612 (AID Education Advisor, Region II), page 6.
36. Vietnamese Collectanea.
37. Debrief 136710 (Agricultural Advisor), page 3. For a description of how a small staff at the region was able to operate effectively, see Debrief 2667 under "U. S. Bureaucratic Relations."
38. Debrief 9682, page 25. For comments regarding poor relationships with the regional offices, see Debriefs 10668, 14676 and 86711.
39. Debrief 86711, page 7. Also see Debrief 15681.
40. Debrief 46812 (Provincial Agriculturist on loan from the Department of Agriculture).
41. Debrief 306711 (British physician).
42. Debrief 24681 (Regional Agricultural Advisor), pages 15 and 16.
43. Debrief 2682 (District Representative), page 22. In another debrief, an AID official describes how he was treated when he first arrived--cold. Whether or not AID/Saigon was doing all it could cannot really be judged from our perspective here, but it does appear that there was a great deal of dissatisfaction with USAID/Saigon from those coming back. For further information see Debrief 9682.

44. Debrief 146612 (Public Administration Advisor). From the USAID "Highlights Fiscal Year 1966 Programs in Support of the Government of Vietnam" we were able to get figures on USAID's growth from 1965 to 1966. USAID established positions were doubled, there were 200 people under contract, and that was expected to double within the year. Those in the field went from 187 to 327, and many of those on contract were sent to the field. The emphasis was on field work. Note that this increase was before OCO had been created.
45. Debrief 2682, pages 27 and 28.
46. Debrief 86711, page 6. For a glimpse of the freedom of the old days see Debrief 166612.
47. Ibid.
48. Debrief 23682, page 17.
49. Debrief 23682, page 5.
50. See first section of this paper, "Relations with GVN and ARVN," pages 13 through 15.
51. Douglas Pike, VIET CONG: THE ORGANIZATION AND TECHNIQUES OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF SOUTH VIETNAM, (Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1966), page 9.
52. Nguyen Huu Chi, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE, (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1965), page 49.
53. Ibid., page 50.
54. Gerald C. Hickey, VILLAGE IN VIETNAM, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964), page 277. See also his discussion on pages 56 and 57.
55. Ralph Eye, "The Games We Play: An Approach to an Attitudinal-Administrative Bridge," a paper on file at the Asia Training Center Library.
56. Chi., op. cit., page 69.
57. Walter Sharp, "Some Observations on Public Administration in Indochina," in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Vol. 14, No. 7, (Winter, 1954), page 48.
58. Eye, op.cit., page 5.
59. For an at length discussion of the impact of the French colonial period see Nghiem Dang, VIETNAM: POLITICS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,

(Honolulu, East-West Center Press, 1966), especially Part One, "Social Setting and Administrative Dualism."

60. For discussion of Diem's personalization of GVN see Robert Scigliano, SOUTH VIETNAM: NATION UNDER STRESS, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963), especially Chapter Three, "The New Regime: People."
61. G. Fox and C. Joiner, "Perceptions of the Vietnamese Public Administration System," in ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Vol. 8, No. 4, (March, 1964), page 451.
62. Dang, op. cit., page 264.
63. Debrief 18672, (Prov Rep, IV Corps), page 2.
64. Debrief 86711, (PSA, III Corps), page 10.
65. Debrief 9682, (Prov Rep, IV Corps), page 20.
66. Ibid.,
67. Ibid., page 16.
68. Eye, op. cit., page 6.
69. Dang, op. cit., page 265.
70. Debrief 3672, (Bert Fraleigh), page 29.
71. Dang, op. cit., page 265.
72. See for instance Debrief 86711, (PSA, III Corps), pages 27 and 28; pages 32 and 33; and Debrief 9682 (Prov Rep, IV Corps), pages 18 and 19; pages 27 and 28.
73. Debrief 9682, pages 21 and 22.
74. Ibid., page 20.
75. Debrief 18672, page 3.
76. We use the word "corruption" with the understanding that we are referring to the American meaning.
77. Debrief 3672, (Bert Fraleigh), page 37.
78. Debrief 9682, page 32.
79. Debrief 86711, page 39.
80. Debrief 9682, page 33.

- 81. Ibid., page 15.
- 82. Debrief 46812, (Provincial Agriculture Advisor, IV Corps).