

HANDWRITEN 3/

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY  
VietNam Technical Assistance Project

Office of Chief Advisor

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To: Mr. Leland Barrows, Director, USOM  
(for transmittal to Ambassador Reinhardt)

From: Dr. Edward W. Weidner, Chief Advisor

Subject: Recommendations for American and Vietnamese Action Re  
Civil Security.

I. When MSU Police Team Arrived

- A. We were briefed by members of Police Study Committee appointed by Ambassador Collins and Chairmanned by Colonel Dwan and composed of representatives of Embassy, MAAG, USOM and Special Assistance Liaison Mission. Their thinking was:
1. To bring some kind of order out of the many unplanned and uncoordinated police organizations.
  2. To centralize and unify the Civil Internal Security forces.
  3. That next to Military, Civil Internal Security was considered top priority in this country.
- B. We were briefed by Minister of Interior Think on his wishes which were:
1. Work toward streamlining the civil police agencies from administration point of view.
  2. Review agencies with a view to consolidating them if possible.
  3. Direct energies toward training of all agencies which he recognized as a major need.
  4. Review agencies' physical needs.
- C. Kept in close contact with members of police advisory committee because:

1. We were working in the dark, having no accurate survey or background material from which to draw.
  2. Needed careful guidance as to American policies, goals, conflicts, Vietnamese official reaction, etc.
  3. Needed information as to services, skills, information and reports that are available to us.
- D. Made weekly verbal reports to Minister of Interior Think
1. To make sure we stayed on course.
  2. To secure additional help when needed.
  3. Were introduced to appropriate officials with necessary approvals from the Minister.
- II. Developed a working plan.
- A. It has approval of all members of this committee.
1. We worked out differences among committee members.
  2. We could now go to Vietnamese officials with a united front.
  3. We proceeded with the confidence that all U.S. agencies in the field approved.
- B. Plan called for three law enforcement agencies in Vietnam, all under the Minister of the Interior.
1. Municipal police to number 5,000 to 6,000 men.
    - a. To be uniformed and armed.
    - b. Four to six larger city departments. Eventually more as self-government progressed.
  2. Garde Civile--a rural or National Police--approximately 45,000 men (later modified to 25,000 for budgetary reasons).
    - a. To be uniformed and armed.
    - b. To be responsible for law and order in all Vietnam, outside the cities.
    - c. To police the villages and smaller cities not incorporated.

- d. To become a part of community in which they live.
  - e. To be responsible for Internal Security up to a point of military emergency at which time is to be called in at the discretion of the President.
  - f. To be responsible for Intelligence collections and reports.
  - g. To be equipped and trained with modern mobile communications and firearm equipment.
  - h. To have mobile, hard striking, special companies to reinforce in troubled spots.
3. Sureté--Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation (VBI)--approximately 4,000 men.
- a. To be essentially specialists in plain clothes.
  - b. Carry responsibility of
    - 1) Criminal investigations (FBI-USA).
    - 2) Immigration and Customs.
    - 3) Narcotics and Drugs.
    - 4) Postal Inspection and laws.
    - 5) Tax Evasion, etc. etc.
  - c. To operate central, scientific criminal detection laboratories for all agencies in VietNam.
  - d. Operate central criminal files.
  - e. To operate central records and develop statistics.
  - f. Analyze all intelligence and coordinate appropriate action.
- C. Plan was submitted and approved by Vietnamese officials up to the President.
- 1. They have implemented it and are working toward it as their ultimate goal. It has been the basic guide of the Vietnamese Government.



- D. Plan was submitted to USOM July 3, 1955:
  - 1. Was modified several times as to amount of equipment, size of force, etc., so as to fit into the budget that was thought would be approved.
- E. Report is in Washington for approval.

III. Our recommendations.

- A. Only the above mentioned three enforcement units be recognized and supported by our government as armed civil protection forces.
- B. In areas threatened by the enemy to the extent that they are not considered pacified, the Army should assume responsibility of civil and military security using whatever measures are necessary to bring peace and restore order.
- C. When order is restored and area turned back to civil authorities, internal security responsibilities are to revert to the Minister of Interior, using the three enforcement agencies under his control for internal security responsibilities. Any arms distributed to villages must be collected by army before turning area over to civil authorities.
- D. The Gendarmerie be disbanded.
  - 1. It is less than 1,000 men.
  - 2. They perform functions and carry responsibilities of civil police that are identical to the civil enforcement agencies.
  - 3. They are under the Minister of Defense.
  - 4. Its members are well trained and equipped.
  - 5. Its members would create a rich cadre for Garde Civile (National Police).
- E. Traditional village law enforcement should be continued if any village so desires.
  - 1. But it should be on an unarmed, non-uniformed, and voluntary basis (unless village itself wishes to make small payments to the volunteers).

2. Its efforts should be considered as merely supplementary to the Garde Civile (National Police), the latter with power of supervision and coordination as necessary and desirable.
  3. We should not equip or train village law enforcement personnel.
- F. We should not support or encourage any other type of law enforcement groups in any ministry.
1. Specifically, this includes the proposed rural militia.
    - a. Only three weeks ago a group of 300 completed an intensive 30 day training school in Saigon.
    2. So-called militia, unarmed and unpaid volunteers as perhaps is the case in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai provinces, can be considered a natural outgrowth of traditional village law enforcement and thus consistent with these recommendations. But we would neither train nor equip.
- G. That our Government's direct support of civil security forces be limited to equipping and training.
- H. That we present a solid front to the government of VietNam.
- I. That we coordinate closely among ourselves when dealing with any matters of security and before any conversations on new matters with the Vietnamese.